

FRANCISCAN APPROACH TO THEOLOGY


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FRANCISCAN APPROACH TO THEOLOGY

*Report of the Thirty-Eighth
Annual Meeting
of the
Franciscan Educational Conference
Our Lady Queen of Angels, Saginaw, Mich.
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
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FOREWORD

Francis of Assisi was a saint but not a theologian. His study of God, therefore, was not that of a professional. He was an *amateur* in the fullest and most literal sense of that word, so that his view of God was that of a lover. Francis had a way of looking at God, a way of thinking about God and a way of talking about God, which stemmed from his deep love for Christ, the Son of God. As a result, his approach to the study of God was Christ-centred. Following in the footsteps and spirit of their founder, Franciscan theologians of the past saw God through the eyes of love and through the eyes of Christ.

There are many facets to a jewel, a tree, and to the Maker of the tree, God. Franciscan theologians did not create a new theology, but they did stress some aspects of religion and see spiritual truths from different vantage points. This is what is meant by the Franciscan Approach to Theology. Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, St. Lawrence of Brindisi and others have contributed much to the theological literature of the Church, accentuating the primacy of love, Christ-centredness, and the teachings of the Gospel. All of this has helped to make the Franciscan way of approaching theology practical, human and appealing.

In the succeeding pages, contemporary Franciscan scholars have attempted to recapture the spirit of St. Francis and of eminent Franciscan theologians in their quest for a better understanding of God.

SEBASTIAN F. MIKLAS, O.F.M.Cap.

Editor

THE CONCEPT OF FRANCISCAN THEOLOGY

MAURICE GRAJEWSKI, O.F.M.

I. THE FRANCISCAN THEOLOGICAL SYNTHESIS

A. The Need of a Theological Synthesis

Theology, especially in the United States, is in the doldrums.¹ Antiquated textbooks and second-rate periodical articles do little to foster initiative and originality. Theologians, acutely aware of this sorry state of affairs, have been prodded into action. But alas, their efforts are resulting in the pseudo-modernization of the centuries-old theological systems, the reproduction in the English language of medieval texts and the simple, undigested and unassimilated addition of new material into a system whose framework provides no room for its inclusion, and very often is even logically opposed to the newly developed doctrines.

Just as scholastic theology is not merely the theology of the Patristic Age, so also modern theology should not be merely a restatement of thirteenth-century theological thought. The crying need for revitalization can be satisfied only by a dynamic theology, integrated with the conditions and problems of modern life. It is not sufficient to put it in modern dress. It must also be modern in content.

Another reason which exists for a new theological synthesis, one that did not exist a decade ago, is the current interest in providing the content and method for the theology for laymen.² The en-

¹ Contemporary theologians are acutely aware of this situation and many have written of the need to revitalize theology. One of the most frequent suggestions is the need of a radically revised presentation of courses of theology. Karl Rahner, S.J., gives a rather trenchant critique of our theology and theological courses and suggests an approach and a solution to the problem. Cf. his *Schriften zur Theologie* (Einsiedeln-Zurich-Cologne, 1954-1955), 2 vols., pp. 414, 399.

² A vast literature on theology for the laity has made its appearance in the last twenty years. The following works may be consulted profitably: Stephan Hartdegen, O.F.M., "Theology for Laymen," *Franciscan Educa-*

lightened laity is clamoring for a knowledge of God beyond that provided by the penny catechism and the selected stories from the Bible. Their renewed and intensified role in the service of the Church, so frequently advocated in recent papal documents and pronouncements, indicates the need for their fuller and deeper study and understanding of theology.³ Such a need is being presently supplied by newly published or promised courses which essentially are only watered-down syntheses of the professional theologian's theological tomes. This indeed is a lamentable fact for such a procedure does not take into account the layman's lack of formal background training in philosophy, the distinct emphases, proportions and interests which are his by reason of his position in society and the Church and, above all, the approach and method which should be geared to the specific point of view of the layman.

Akin to the cry for a theology for the laity, is the equally urgent request from all sides for a theology for Sisters.⁴ An appropriate course in theology is in demand at the numerous Theological Institutes for Sisters, which have made their appearance in various sections of our country.⁵ Hitherto they have been offered courses originally destined for seminarians based on the seminarian's textbooks and suitable for the apostolic work of the priest. Doesn't the spiritual life of the Sisters as religious and their magnificent role in

tional Conference Report, XXXIV (1953), 19-32; Ezio Francheschini, "La Teologia e la Spiritualità dei Laici," *Teologia e Spiritualità* (Milan, 1952), 181-194; J. C. Murray, S.J., "Towards a Theology for Laymen," *Theological Studies*, V (1945), 43-75, 340-376; C. E. Sheedy, "Problem of Theology for the Laity," *Catholic Theological Society of America Proceedings*, VII (1952), 111-117; "Theology and the Laity," *Catholic Mind*, LIII (1955), 577-584; H. C. Grief, "Theology and the Laymen," *Catholic World*, CLXXXII (1956), 421-424; R. Rousseau, S.J., "Theology for the Layman in American Jesuit Colleges," *Lumen*, IX (1954), 291-302.

³ Cf. especially the apostolic constitution *Sedes Sapientiae* (May 31, 1956) and the *Si Diligis* of Pope Pius XII (*American Ecclesiastical Review*, CXXXI (1954), 127-137).

⁴ Cyril Shircel, O.F.M., "The Position of the Blessed Mother in the Franciscan Theological Synthesis," *Franciscan Educational Conference Report*, XXXV (1954), 89.

⁵ Such institutes are regularly conducted for the Franciscan Sisterhoods at the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure, N. Y., at the College of St. Francis in Joliet, Ill., and at Stevens Point, Wisconsin. Theological Institutes have also been organized among the non-Franciscan Sisterhoods, e.g., at Notre Dame, Ind.

the Church as Christian educators suggest a theology dictated by their needs and suited to their work?

Lastly, the seminarian delving into the mysteries of God for the first time must satisfy himself with a textbook written at the turn of the century and revised and up-dated for the twenty-seventh time!⁶ These re-editions, for the most part, have only an occasional footnote or a bibliographical addition as their prime claim to being abreast of current theology. The scholars' latest findings, the implications of the study of the development of dogma, the timely and profound teaching of the papal encyclicals are not incorporated into an integrated theological course but are dovetailed into the mosaic of doctrines in a system which was modern fifty years ago.

Not only do these general needs indicate the advisability of a new theological synthesis, but others also prompt us to make this a Franciscan doctrinal synthesis. Let us pass some of these specific points in review.

Our venerable clerics and sisters are demanding and are entitled to a theological course which is Franciscan in spirit and content. They are no longer satisfied with generalities, with the mouthing of the time-honored cliché of "the great Franciscan tradition," with the convenient name-dropping technique of referring to the great Franciscan masters, with the platitudes about the modernity of Franciscan doctrines which are never specifically indicated, and with the oft-repeated promise of having a Franciscan doctrinal synthesis when and if the critical edition of the *Opera Omnia* of this or that Franciscan theologian will be provided or the manuscripts of his works published or his contributions studied in the fullness of their implications. They feel, and justly so, that it can be done now.

The feasibility of realizing the completion of such a project at present lies in the status of Franciscan scholarship in our day. Within the last seventy-five years it has made tremendous progress by providing us with periodicals brimming with studies of Franciscan theology,⁷ by publishing for the first time, reprinting or

⁶ This is the case with the often reprinted standard manual of dogmatic theology written by A. Tanqueray in 1894 entitled *Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis hodiernis moribus accommodata* in 3 vols.

⁷ Imposing theological scholarship is contained in such periodicals as *Antoni-*

critically editing the masterworks of our doctors and theologians⁸ and by furnishing indispensable bibliographical aids and well-equipped libraries. Though much is yet desired for completeness and perfection, nevertheless, the work of integration and synthesis can safely be pursued.

Nor can we any longer disregard the insistence of our Constitutions and the *Statuta pro Studiis regendis* which, with the approval of the Holy See, command our Lectors not to neglect the Franciscan School.⁹ To do so is to abandon the traditions of the Order and to deprive the soul and mind of the spirit of St. Francis. The injunction "lectores scholae franciscanae ex animo inhaerere studeant" is not given in the spirit of school pride or to the exclusion of seeking the truth wherever it may be found (for we are to learn even from our enemies) but it does remind us not to pass over the treasure to be found in our own back yard.

And if all that were not enough, there is great pressure placed upon us by those outside of the Order, who avidly clamor for information about the distinctive Franciscan theses, the Franciscan approach and the Franciscan insights into theological doctrines. Many of our contributions to theology have been incorporated into the traditional Catholic teaching and their Franciscan provenance has been obscured by the hoary centuries (witness many of the decrees of the Council of Trent and the recent dogmatic definitions and liturgical innovations). Seekers after truth suspect a rich treasure-trove in our vast theological literature but bewail the lack of a reliable guide through the mazes of this intricate and volumi-

anum, Franziskanische Studien, Franciscan Studies, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, Franciscan Educational Conference Proceedings, Études Franciscaines, Wissenschaft und Weisheit, Miscellanea Franciscana, Collectanea Franciscana, Studi Francescani, Estudios Franciscanos, etc.

⁸ The famous critical Quaracchi edition of St. Bonaventure's works, the current Vatican edition of Duns Scotus, the critical edition of Occam and lesser Franciscan theologians being produced at the Franciscan Institute, the numerous publications of the Quaracchi Fathers, etc.

⁹ *Regula et Constitutiones Generales Ordinis Fratrum Minorum* (Romae, 1953), Art. 238, par. 6: "In doctrinis philosophicis et theologicis lectores scholae franciscanae ex animo inhaerere studeant"; *Statuta pro Studiis regendis in Ordine Fratrum Minorum* (Romae, 1949), Art. 60; *Constitutiones Fratrum Minorum Capuccinorum* (Romae, 1931), nn. 187 and 191; cf. also Michael Brlek, O.F.M., *De Evolutione Iuridica Studiorum in Ordine Minorum* (Dubrovnik, 1942), pp. 87-92.

nous literary production. A Franciscan theological synthesis placed in their hands would once again bring back the luster and glory of the Franciscan School which for several centuries knew no peer.

Last, but not least, our modest undertaking to produce a Franciscan theological synthesis is motivated by mankind's natural quest for truth and wisdom. The prolific Franciscan School which has produced thousands of works now gathering dust on the musty shelves of libraries and archives is a practically inexhaustible storehouse of ideas and doctrines awaiting the researcher's inquisitive probing. Great truths, once discovered by the genius of a friar, lie dormant in the pages of works long-since forgotten. The famous *rigor minorum* which produced brilliant critiques and acute evaluations of their predecessors and contemporaries also evolved arguments and sought out proofs that would throw light on many of our current difficulties and problems. It is our purpose to ferret out these gems, restore them to their original splendor and utilize them to their best advantage.

B. Franciscan Theological Syntheses of the Past

From what has been said it would appear that the projected Franciscan theological synthesis is an innovation unparalleled in the seven centuries old Franciscan Order. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Under one form or another such theological syntheses, more or less complete, existed from the very beginning of the thirteenth century.

From the pen of the first great Franciscan master and his collaborators, issued a theological *Summa* which subsequent ages identified as the *Summa Minorum*. Though this *Summa* was at first believed to have been directly composed for the greater part by Alexander of Hales himself, most recent scholarship has proven conclusively that it is a mosaic and collection of the teachings of the various Franciscan theologians, known and anonymous, who lived in the celebrated Franciscan convent at Paris between 1230 and 1245.¹⁰ It is precisely because of the nature of this work that it

¹⁰ Abundant literature has appeared concerning the complicated question of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales. The following may be consulted with profit. Victorin Doucet, O.F.M., "The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the *Summa*," *Franciscan Studies*, VII (1947), 26-41, 274-312; Humbertus Betti, O.F.M., "Pro editione critica quaestionum Alexandri Halensis,"

can be justly styled as the first attempt at a Franciscan theological or doctrinal synthesis.

In this same age appeared other summists and commentators who attempted synthetical compositions. To mention but a few, it suffices to recall the *Summa de anima* of John de la Rochelle,¹¹ the *Summa virtutum* of William of Melitona,¹² the celebrated *Breviloquium* of St. Bonaventure,¹³ the superbly practical *Summa de poenitentia* and the *Summa iustitiae* of John Wall.¹⁴ During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the numerous commentaries and compendia served a like purpose. Though the work of one theologian they embodied the thought of their predecessors in the school and favored various theses and doctrines which were even then being referred

Antonianum, XXVI (1951), 83-98; Lorenzo di Fonzo, O.F.M.Conv., "Il P.M. Alessandro d'Hales, O.Min. (-1245) e il ritrovato suo 'Commento' alle Sentenze del Lombardo," *Miscellanea Franciscana*, XLVII (1947), 412-435; Bonaventura a Mehr, O.F.M.Cap., "De operibus recenter critice editis Alexandri de Hales, Joannis Duns Scoti, S. Bernardini Senensis," *Collectanea Franciscana*, XXI (1951), 411-429; F. M. Henquinet, O.F.M., "Le Commentaire d'Aléxandre de Hales sur les Sentences enfin retrouvé," *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati* (Studi e Testi, Città del Vaticano, 1946), II, 359-382; Victorin Doucet, O.F.M., "Une nouvelle source de la 'Summa Fratris Alexandri,'" *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa*, XVII (Jan.-Mar., 1947), 51*-66*.

¹¹ No critical edition of this work exists. In the last century Marcellino da Civezza and Teofilo Domenicelli brought out a very defective edition entitled: *La "Summa de anima" di Frate Giovanni della Rochelle* (Prato, 1882). Cf. also Parthenius Minges, O.F.M., "De scriptis quibusdam Fr. Joannis de Rupella, O.F.M. (d. 1245)," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, VI (1913), 597-622.

¹² Bernhard Geyer, *Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie* (Basel-Stuttgart, 1956), 382.

¹³ *Breviloquium* appears in volume V of the Quaracchi edition of the *Opera Omnia* of St. Bonaventure (pp. 199-291); English translation by Erwin Nemmers (B. Herder Book Co., St. Louis, 1946). St. Bonaventure intended his work to be a *compendium* or *summa* for the prologue of his work describes his purpose as follows: "Upon the request of my associates that from my poor knowledge I say something briefly in a *summa* about the truths of theology, and conquered by their prayers, I have consented to set down a kind of *compendium* in which I do not deal with all matters summarily, but treat briefly certain matters that it is more important to know, including at the same time such explanation for their understanding as may come to mind at the moment" (Prologus, § 6).

¹⁴ B. Hauréau, "Jean de Gales," *Histoire littéraire de la France* (Paris, 1869), XXV, 177-200; A. G. Little, *The Grey Friars in Oxford* (Oxford, 1892), 143-151; P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des Maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1933), II, 114-118.

to as the *positio franciscana* or *doctrina communis franciscanorum*. Frequently these works purported to give the unalloyed doctrine of one Master, usually Duns Scotus, who was already identified as the *capo da scuola*. The commentaries of Peter d'Aquila, nicknamed Scotellus, are a compendium of Scotism;¹⁵ Peter Aureoli wrote a *Compendium theologiae*;¹⁶ Alvarus Pelagius authored a *Summa theologiae* which is undeservedly neglected;¹⁷ a series of commentaries *ad mentem S. Bonaventurae et Scoti* of which that of William Vorri-laun is typical;¹⁸ and the *Aureum sacrae theologiae rosarium* of Pelbartus de Themesvar.¹⁹

The Golden Age of the Franciscan School is identified with the seventeenth century. As would be expected, various attempts at synthesis were made and some remain unexcelled till this day. Fran-

¹⁵ Many editions of his commentary are found in various libraries. The latest edited by Cyprian Paolini, O.F.M., appeared in four volumes (Levanti, 1907). Cf. also Ludgerus Meier, O.F.M., "De schola franciscana Erfordiensis saeculi XV," *Antonianum*, V (1930), 173-174; Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, O.S.B., "Des Petrus von Aquila Compendium supra librum Sententiarum aufgefunden," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, XVII (1950), 267-282; M. Bernards, "Zu dem Schriftums des Petrus von Aquila, O.F.M. (-1361)," *Franziskanische Studien*, XXXV (1953), 113-115.

¹⁶ Alphonse Coan, O.F.M., "The History of Franciscan Dogmatists," *Franciscan Educational Conference Report*, V (1922), 124-125; Valois Noël, "Pierre Auriol, O.F.M.," *Histoire littéraire de la France* (Paris, 1906), XXXIII, 459-527; Amedeus Teetaert, O.F.M.Cap., "Pierre Auriol," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* (Paris, 1935), XII, 1826-1833; E. M. Buytaert, O.F.M. (ed.), *Petri Aureoli Scriptum super primum Sententiarum* (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1953).

¹⁷ Alphonse Coan, O.F.M., *op. cit.*, p. 125; N. Bayländer, *Alvaro Pelayo. Studien zu seinem Leben und seinen Schriften* (Aschaffenburg, 1910); Alejandro Amaro, O.F.M., *Alvaro Pelagio, su vida, sus obras y su posición respecto de la cuestión de la pobreza teórica en la Orden Franciscana bajo Juan XXII* (Madrid, 1916); N. Jung, *Un franciscain théologien du pouvoir pontifical au XIV siècle, Alvaro Pelayo, évêque et pénitencier de Jean XXII* (Paris, 1931).

¹⁸ Franz Pelster, S.J., "Wilhelm von Vorillon, ein Skotist des 15 Jahrhunderts," *Franziskanische Studien*, VIII (1921), 48-66; Erich Wegerich, O.F.M., "Bio-bibliographische Notizen über Franziskanerlehrer des 15 Jahrhunderts," *Franziskanische Studien*, XXIX (1942), 193-197; Ignatius Brady, O.F.M., "The *Liber de anima* of William of Vaurouillon, O.F.M.," *Medieval Studies*, X (1948), 225-297; XI (1949), 247-307.

¹⁹ *Aureum sacrae theologiae rosarium iuxta quatuor Sententiarum libros quadripartitum ex doctrina Doctoris Subtilis, Divi Thomae, Divi Bonaventurae, aliorumque sacrorum doctorum a. R. P. Pelbarto de Themesvar Ordinis Minorum de Observantia . . . Venetiis, 1536.*

ciscus a Coriolanus, O.F.M.Cap., worked out St. Bonaventure's works in the form of a *Summa* like that of St. Thomas;²⁰ Vulpes, a Conventual, composed a remarkable *Summa theologiae Scoti* in twelve folio volumes;²¹ and then there are the rich and weighty volumes of John Ponce,²² Mastrius²³ and Bartholomew a Barberiis,²⁴ all of which need no introduction.

During this period was inaugurated a type of theological literature which was to supplant the commentaries on the *Book of Sentences* as the textbook in the Schools. Inspired by the *Cursus philosophicus* and the *Cursus theologicus* of John Ponce, lectors began to publish their class-notes which were in reality syntheses of theology and gave birth to the very extensive "*cursus* literature" which rivaled in numbers and proportion the vast production of commentaries in the preceding three centuries.²⁵

The eighteenth century brought to light two classics in the Franciscan School. Claude Frassen, who taught at the Sorbonne, edited the multi-volumed *Scotus Academicus* which remains highly serviceable to this day.²⁶ Equally famous is the celebrated *Summa theo-*

²⁰ Alphonse Coan, O.F.M., *op. cit.*, p. 136.

²¹ *Sacrae theologiae Summa Joannis Duns Scoti Doctoris Subtilis et Commentaria quibus ejus doctrina elucidatur, comprobatur, defenditur. . .* Neapoli, 1622; Dominique de Caylus, O.F.M.Cap., "Merveilleux épanouissement de l'école scotiste au XVII^e siècle," *Études Franciscaines*, XXV (1911), 644-645.

²² R.P.F. Joannis Ponci Hiberni Corcariensis Ordinis Minorum . . . *Theologiae cursus integer ad mentem Scoti* (Lyons, 1671); *Commentarii theologici in quibus Subtilis Doctoris quaestiones in libros Sententiarum elucidantur et illustrantur* (Paris, 1661).

²³ *Disputationes theologiae in primum (secundum etc.) librum Sententiarum quibus ab adversantibus tum veterum, tum recentiorum iaculis Scoti theologia vindicatur*. Auctore F. Bartholomaeo Mastrio de Maldula Ordinis Min. Con. . . Venetiis, 1655-1664. Cf. also Bonaventure Crowley, O.F.M. Conv., "The Life and Works of Bartholomew Mastrius, O.F.M.Conv. (1602-1673)," *Franciscan Studies*, VIII (1948), 97-152.

²⁴ *Flores et Fructus seraphici, ex Seraphico Paradiso excerpti, theologica et philosophica ex multiplici Seraphici Doctoris S. Bonaventurae doctrina selecta et in moderniore usum in tres partes distributa* (Lyons, 1677); cf. also Dionysius Genuensis, O.F.M.Cap., *Bibliotheca scriptorum Ordinis Minorum S. Francisci Capucinatorum* (Genoa, 1691), p. 46.

²⁵ Maurice Grajewski, O.F.M., "John Ponce, Franciscan Scotist of the Seventeenth Century," *Franciscan Studies*, VI (1946), 61.

²⁶ *Scotus Academicus, seu Universa Doctoris Subtilis theologia dogmata quae ad . . . academiae Parisiensis docendi methodum concinnavit* (Paris, 1672-1677).

logica compiled by Jerome de Montefortino which contains the teaching of the Franciscan School, principally those of the Subtle Doctor, arranged according to the order of the *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas.²⁷ Modern editions of these two monumental works are the work of Father Fernandez Garcia²⁸ and Cyprian Paolini²⁹ who completed their work in the first few years of the twentieth century.

In our day, with the rebirth of interest in things scholastic and the revival of the Franciscan School, theological syntheses were formulated by several outstanding scholars. The following merit our special attention:

1. Parthenius Minges, O.F.M., is the author of the posthumously printed two-volume work entitled: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Doctrina Philosophica et Theologica quoad res praecipuas proposita et exposita*.³⁰ In the first volume he treats the basic philosophical doctrines and all of fundamental theology; the second volume is devoted to special theology. His numerous scholarly articles on the Franciscan School serve as valuable supplementary material.

2. Even more in the nature of a theological synthesis embracing the entire Franciscan School is the same author's textbook in theology entitled: *Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae Specialis* in two volumes.³¹ Written after the manner of textbooks which appeared in this century, it was and still is widely used as a textbook in many Franciscan seminaries particularly in Europe. Actually it is the only one of its kind in existence, unless one would likewise wish to include here the partial work of Cornelisse on *De Deo Uno et Trino*.

3. The indefatigable Father Déodat Marie de Basly, O.F.M., whose numerous contributions comprise a very critical study of the Franciscan School, is noted for two celebrated syntheses. The more famous and the more useful of the two is the *Scotus Docens ou Duns Scot enseignant la Philosophie, la Théologie, la Mystique* which bears the subtitle of "la construction doctrinale."³² He is the first to

²⁷ *I. Duns Scoti . . . Summa theologiae ex universis operibus eius concinnata iuxta ordinem et dispositionem Summae Angelici Doctoris S. Thomae Aquinatis* (Romae, 1728-1738).

²⁸ Romae, Ex typographia Sallustiana, 1900-1902.

²⁹ Romae, Ex typographia Sallustiana, 1900-1903.

³⁰ Ad Claras Aquas, Ex typographia collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1930. 2 vols.

³¹ Monachii, Sumptibus librariae lentnerianae, 1901. 2 vols.

³² Paris, *La France franciscaine*, 1934.

use *ex professo* the word "synthesis" in his reconstruction of Scotistic thought, entitling each of the three parts in which his book is divided *synthèse philosophique*, *synthèse théologique*, and *synthèse mystique*.

His other work is rather an edition of theological texts from Scotus than a theological synthesis. Entitled *Capitalia opera beati Joannis Duns Scoti*, it presents in two volumes illustrative Scotistic texts on philosophical and theological doctrines arranged according to a systematic plan of his own.³³

4. A work from the pen of Father Diomedè Scaramuzzi, O.F.M., received wide acclaim in Italy and throughout the world; it was his *Duns Scoti: Summula scelta di scritti coordinati in dottrina*.³⁴ Under the main headings of Man, God, Christ and the Moral and Social Life, he groups representative Scotistic texts and provides on parallel pages an Italian translation of the same.

To these works may be added several basic articles issued a little more than twenty years ago which indicate the basic principles underlying a Franciscan doctrinal synthesis and develop the framework within which it should be constructed. The most important of these are the following:

1. Richard Deffrennes, O.F.M., "Essai de synthèse de la théologie dans la charité" in *La France Franciscaine*, XVI (1933), 133-161.

2. Marianus Mueller, O.F.M., "Die theologische Gesamtsynthese des Duns Skotus" in *Wissenschaft und Weisheit*, I (1934), 110-140.

3. Éphrem Longpré, O.F.M., and Eucharius Schmitt, O.F.M., "Das seraphische Weltbild des Duns Skotus" in *Wissenschaft und Weisheit*, II (1935), 70-88.³⁵

The broad outlines of the Franciscan theological synthesis were envisioned in the past. To a certain extent, partial implementation of the details lies buried in scattered volumes and articles awaiting to be gathered. Our work seemingly starts *ab ovo* and yet we feel that much has been done which only awaits our attention. The golden thread which is woven throughout the Franciscan theological

³³ Le Havre, Ad portum Gratiae, La Bonne Parole, (no date) [1908].

³⁴ Firenze, Edizioni "Testi Cristiani," 1932.

³⁵ For an outline of these syntheses cf. Cyril Shircel, O.F.M., "The Position of the Blessed Mother in the Franciscan Theological Synthesis," *Franciscan Educational Conference Report*, XXXV (1954), 92-97.

framework has been duly recognized and is being followed throughout the sum total of theology. Apparent disagreements and fragmentary inconsistencies can be resolved readily. The gradual filling out of detail to achieve completion and to bring out the integrating factors of a singularly Franciscan theology for our day is our dedicated purpose. This we hope to accomplish in due time.

C. The Nature and Mechanics of the Projected Synthesis

The projected Franciscan theological synthesis upon completion should present a fully-rounded complete course in theology, written in such a fashion that it may be used as a textbook in our seminaries. With some minor modifications and adjustments it will thereafter be made available as a textbook for use in the various Sisters' Institutes and for lay-theology courses. Its contemplated length and manner of treatment should provide professors of theology with sufficient material for the usual four-year course of theology, provided that the more important portions of the text be supplemented by additional reading and research.

Since the title of the synthesis bears the name "Franciscan" it is definitely not to be regarded as simply "Bonaventurian" or "Scotistic." Even though Scotus is commonly accepted as the head of the Franciscan School and is identified with most of the great Franciscan doctrines, it was deemed advisable not to restrict the synthesis to his theological works for many valid and compelling reasons. The vastness and sublimity of theology cannot be encompassed by the mind, no matter how brilliant, of one friar; it cannot become the exclusive possession of one school; it is not concentrated in the productivity of one period or age. The growth and development of dogma exclude the possibility of such limited concentration.

Neither is the title "Franciscan" intended to exclude the inclusion of the deeper understanding of dogmatic truths, the profound insights and the incontestable proofs and arguments found in other theological systems and the classical works of scholars other than our own. We do not intend to be blinded by false school pride or resentment against our intellectual foes to whom God has given a just share in the possession of divine truth and wisdom. *Fas est ab hoste doceri* is certainly a prudent tactic in the intellectual arena

as it is in the field of battle. An additional light in the hands of a foe and the guiding trail-mark of those who passed our way before should not be spurned or overlooked, especially if it vouchsafes a surer and faster attainment of our common goal.

Much of the success of the synthesis will consist in avoiding the pitfalls and the obstacles which hampered similar attempts in the past. Of prime importance will be the avoidance of fruitless and inane discussions, the useless consideration of purely academic problems and questions, and the dissipation of efforts upon inconsequential and unimportant matters, which are of interest only to warring intellectual factions. Neither will space be given to the purely scholastic distinctions and divisions which have been unnecessarily multiplied and which are largely to blame for the decline of scholasticism and the resulting deterioration of the theological science.

In adopting one of the strong points of previous syntheses and particularly in conforming to the practice of our illustrious Franciscan doctors and masters, stress will be placed on the abundant use of Sacred Scriptures and the time-honored recourse to the writings of the Fathers of the Church. Tradition is by no means a weak and unreliable argument or the source of untenable conclusions.

Finally, one of the most glaring lacunae encountered in modern textbooks of theology is the repeated failure to integrate the teaching of the *magisterium ecclesiae* into the doctrinal consideration of a given theological thesis. Particularly is this omission noticeable with regard to papal pronouncements and encyclicals which, if they are mentioned at all, are relegated to a brief allusion in the footnotes in the manner of an afterthought. The wealth of material which has emanated from the tongue and pen of the last five pontiffs, will be incorporated in our synthesis in order to give it the weight of apostolic teaching and assuring it of keeping abreast of official contemporary theological positions.

From the purely mechanical viewpoint, our synthesis will follow these general procedures:

1. The uniform use of logical divisions throughout each section;
2. The incorporation of a full critical and bibliographical apparatus at the end of each main section;
3. Throughout the synthesis the Franciscan approach to affective

theology will be achieved by the addition of numerous *scholia* showing the application of the particular doctrine to personal spiritual life, catechetical instruction, sermon material, etc.;

4. The adoption of the policy of dropping the theological notes with the exception of the *de fide* notations (The *Prolegomena* will contain the *raison d'être* of this procedure.);

5. In the instances where a doctrine or position is controverted among the friars themselves, it will be presented as a controversial topic and no acceptance of one position over another will be made, leaving the final conclusion to the judgment of the professor or the reader;

6. Wherever possible, especially if intrinsic worth or traditional usage canonized the position of other schools of thought or the contributions of theologians other than our own, references to and quotations from their works will be included. By all means the canonical legislation of Canon 1366, § 2 will be observed in accordance with the accepted interpretation of said legislation.

II. ST. FRANCIS AND THEOLOGY

In accordance with the natural course of events, the Franciscan Order and its theology reflect the spirit of its founder, St. Francis. As Gilson points out, in the center of every doctrine truly Franciscan, there is hidden the ideal of St. Francis, the secret principle of its form and its life, just as the heart is the center of the body that it animates.³⁶ The very denomination "Franciscan" indicates that St. Francis stamped his own character and temperament upon its being, its activities and apostolate. So pronounced is the imprint of the personality of the Poverello not only upon his own times and people but also upon more than seven hundred years of world history that scholars have filled volumes about his influence on art and architecture, music and history, literature and drama. It is no wonder then that we may also seek to delve into his influence upon theology.

³⁶ As quoted by Carlo Balić, O.F.M., "Sant' Antonio 'Dottore Evangelico' e gli altri dottori della scolastica francescana," *S. Antonio Dottore della Chiesa* (Vaticano, 1947), p. 16, footnote 31: "Toujours, au sein d'une doctrine authentiquement franciscaine, se cache l'idéal de saint François, principe secret de la forme et de sa vie, comme le coeur au centre du corps au'il anime."

St. Francis was wont to call himself an *idiota*. Certainly he was not such in his knowledge of God and His operations. Thomas of Celano observed in his *Vita secunda* that "quamvis homo iste beatus nullis fuerit scientiae studiis innutritus, tamen quae de sursum est a Deo sapientiam discens, et aeternae lucis irradiatus, de scripturis non infime sentiebat. Penetrabat enim ab omni labe purum ingenium mysteriorum abscondita, et ubi magistralis scientia foris est, affectus introibat amantis."³⁷ In his life, speech and writings, St. Francis reveals a profound grasp of things divine. It is our purpose here to show that his concept of God, his love of Christ and his constant use of Sacred Scriptures not only colors the Franciscan theological synthesis but also provides the basic foundations for its framework.

It is generally accepted as an incontestable truth that a man's concept of God shapes his philosophy of life and orients his relations with the universe. St. Francis, in his life and works, depicts God in a typically Pauline-Augustinian manner. All truth proceeds from God as from its source. God is Wisdom,³⁸ the Light of Creation,³⁹ the Giver of knowledge and hence the Teacher of men.⁴⁰

God the Creator is not considered by Francis as a stern Master or Judge, inspiring awe and fear, but as the Great King, the "Rex omnipotens. . . Rex coeli et terrae,"⁴¹ in whose service man finds his highest happiness. So fully overcome was Francis with this tremendous privilege that he declared for all to know that "I am the Herald of the Great King!"⁴² As the ambassador of God, Francis spent his life in making God's goodness known to all men. "To those who serve Him, God is the liberal Benefactor" becomes the message the Poverello preaches daily. In his appealing words addressed to preachers and teachers, St. Francis urges them to recognize, praise and propagate this doctrine of divine goodness: "Omnia bona Domino Deo . . . reddamus, . . . omnia bona ipsius esse recog-

³⁷ Thomas de Celano, *Vita secunda S. Francisci Assisiensis*, Pars. II, c. LXVIII, n. 102 (*Analecta franciscana*, X, pp. 190-191).

³⁸ *Opuscula S. Patris Francisci Assisiensis* (Bibliotheca franciscana ascetica medii aevi, Quaracchi, 1904), I, 124.

³⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 128.

⁴¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁴² S. Bonaventura, *Legenda S. Francisci*, c. 2, n. 5 (*Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae*, Quaracchi, 1882-1902, VIII, 509).

noscamus, . . . *de omnibus ei gratias referamus*, a quo bona cuncta procedunt."⁴³ Why this concern? It is only because God is the highest goodness, the very essence of all good: "Tu es trinus et unus Dominus Deus, omne bonum. Tu es bonum, omne bonum, summum bonum."⁴⁴

God for St. Francis was the Supreme Being with all the attributes listed in theology books—simplicity and infinity, immutability and eternity, immensity and ubiquity—and many more which the earth-bound theologians overlook. Two years before his death, at the time he was blessed with the stigmata, the poetic soul of Francis erupted in a canticle on the Praises of God (*Laudes Dei*) which is a glorious *Te Deum*:

Thou art holy, Lord God, who alone workest wonders.
 Thou art strong. Thou art great. Thou art most high.
 Thou art the almighty King, Thou, holy Father, King of heaven and earth.
 Thou art the Lord God, Triune and One, all good.
 Thou art good, all good, highest good, Lord God, living and true.
 Thou art charity, love.
 Thou art wisdom.
 Thou art humility.
 Thou art patience.
 Thou art security.
 Thou art quietude.
 Thou art joy and gladness.
 Thou art justice and temperance.
 Thou art all riches to sufficiency.
 Thou art beauty.
 Thou art meekness.
 Thou art protector.
 Thou art guardian and defender.
 Thou art strength.
 Thou art refreshment.
 Thou art our hope.
 Thou art our faith.
 Thou art our great sweetness.
 Thou art our eternal life, great and admirable Lord God almighty, merciful Saviour.⁴⁵

⁴³ *Opuscula S. Patris Francisci Assisiensis* (Bibliotheca franciscana ascetica medii aevi, Quaracchi, 1904), I, 48.

⁴⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁴⁵ Hilarin Felder, O.F.M.Cap., *The Ideals of St. Francis of Assisi* (New York, 1925), 411–412.

How appealing to man's nature is such an understanding of God! And, as if this paean of praises were not enough, St. Francis captured all of theology's knowledge of God in his ecstatic "Deus meus et omnia!"—My God and my All.

God's most perfect demonstration of goodness is revealed in the giving to sinful man His own Son as a Redeemer. Christ is the King of love. To St. Francis' practical mind, the revelation of Christ's love in the pages of Holy Writ induces him to acts of imitation which with the passage of time make him an *alter Christus*. His only preoccupation in life was to love Christ with the burning love of the seraph, to serve Him as the one and only Master and to imitate Him as closely as possible. So closely a Christ-centered life has its repercussions upon the life and doctrine of his followers.

Incidentally, the great Franciscan devotions stem from the Poverello's devotion and appreciation of the King of Love. Christ who revealed His love by His humble birth in the stable, by His sufferings on the Cross and the piercing of His Sacred Heart, by His supreme gift of Self in the Holy Eucharist, inspired Francis to introduce the crib at Greccio, to speak tearfully of what his followers called the Stations of the Cross, to exhort the faithful to a greater appreciation of the hidden Christ in the Eucharist and to seek shelter in the protective custody of the Sacred Heart. We are, indeed, custodians of a heritage in Christology which is tremendous simply because it is in keeping with the spirit of Christ as understood by Francis.

We cannot conclude our remarks about St. Francis and theology without some mention of his intimate relation with the sacred pages of the Gospels. That Franciscan theologians are first and foremost exponents of the "Sancti Domini Nostri Jesu Christi Evangelium"⁴⁶ is due in the largest measure to the example and exhortations of their seraphic Founder. Thomas of Celano summing up the ideal of St. Francis succinctly stated it as "summa eius (i.e., Francisci) intentio, praeceptum desiderium supremumque propositum erat: sanctum Evangelium in omnibus et per omnia observare."⁴⁷ As the

⁴⁶ *Regula et Constitutiones Generales Ordinis Fratrum Minorum* (Romae, 1953), c. 1, p. V.

⁴⁷ Thomas de Celano, *Vita prima S. Francisci*, Pars I, c. XXX, n. 84 (*Analecta franciscana*, X, 63).

result the entire Franciscan movement is evangelical because "the Most High Himself revealed to me that I should live according to the form of the Holy Gospel."⁴⁸ One of the earliest recorded names for the Friars Minor was the "Men of the Gospel."

As one biographer puts it, St. Francis "was no listless hearer of the Gospel, but kept faithfully in mind all that he had heard, and was careful to fulfill all things literally."⁴⁹ His first grasp of the mission in life was the flash of understanding upon hearing the Gospel read at Holy Mass. A compilation of Gospel texts became the heart of the primitive rule. Brother Caesar of Speyer, who had gained fame as a Scripture scholar, was commissioned by Francis himself to insert various biblical texts in connection with the ordinances of the new Rule. The religious ideal of St. Francis was the life "according to the Gospel," "after the manner of the Gospel," "according to the perfection of the Gospel."

In keeping with their seraphic founder's predilection for the Gospels, the friars, be they preachers or teachers, adopted the Gospel truths for their daily work. The entire Franciscan movement assumed its character and individuality from the Gospel. Franciscan sermons (witness those of St. Anthony) delight in an abundance of biblical texts; Franciscan spiritual classics inculcate the life of perfection and the restoration of the fuller Christian life with frequent recourse to scriptural foundations; Franciscan theological treatises draw their inspiration and argumentation from the profound study of the Bible. What St. Francis simply felt and lived intuitively, Franciscan scholars thought out academically. This return to the Gospels is, according to all authorities, the crowning achievement of St. Francis.⁵⁰ If the Order and its theologians are to be the "salt of the earth" and to retain their exalted position in the Church, they must always remain true in principle and in practice to the motto of St. Francis: "The rule and the life of the

⁴⁸ *Testamentum S. Patris Francisci* (Bibliotheca franciscana ascetica medii aevi, Ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi, 1949), I, p. 79: "sed ipse altissimus revelavit mihi, quod deberem vivere secundum formam sancti Evangelii."

⁴⁹ Thomas de Celano, *Vita prima S. Francisci*, Pars I, c. IX, n. 22 (*Analecta franciscana*, X, p. 19): "Non enim fuerat Evangelii surdus auditor, sed laudabili memoriae quae audierat cuncta commendans, ad litteram diligenter implere curabat."

⁵⁰ Felder, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

Friars Minor is this: to observe the holy Gospel of Our Lord Jesus Christ."

III. FRANCISCAN THEOLOGY

A. Franciscan Theology or Franciscan Theologians?

There is no doubt that friar theologians existed in the past and are active at the present. The great names of the theologians in the Order, like Alexander, Bonaventure and Scotus, attest to this fact. On the other hand, we also speak of a Franciscan theology (just as we do of Franciscan philosophy and Franciscan science) and we claim that it resides essentially in the spirit of our scholars—the spirit to which St. Francis gave simplicity, humility, love of Christ and the life of the Gospels—the spirit to which the great Seraphic Doctor, St. Bonaventure, gave a mystic and affective turn—the spirit to which the subtle mind of Duns Scotus added scientific precision and a healthy, progressive zeal for truth. Add to this a series of doctrines and theses (e.g., the universal and absolute primacy of Christ, the supremacy of charity, the metaphysical essence of God, absolute predestination, the Immaculate Conception) and many will claim that there is no doubt that such a thing as Franciscan theology exists.

But someone may object: Is the mere adherence to a catalogue of theses traditional in the Franciscan Order sufficient to distinguish us with a special Franciscan theology? Obviously other theologians did and do hold a great many of these theses without necessarily subscribing to all the theses held by Franciscan theologians. Furthermore, the mere adherence to these theses and doctrines is not presented as *the* constituent element of Franciscan theology but must be accompanied by the spirit of Franciscanism which permeates these teachings and serves as the leavening influence.

To those who very glibly object to the very use of the phrase "Franciscan theology" as not being in keeping with the teaching of Mother Church since our theology must be "Catholic theology," we may simply retort that it has the same *raison d'être* as "Thomistic" or "Suarezian" theology—phrases which appear quite frequently on the theological horizon.

When and where precisely does Franciscan theology come into

being? If it does exist as we claim, its existence is realized when the reality of theology (with its specific content matter) is happily conjoined with the reality of the friar (with his spirit of Franciscanism). In an acceptable definition of Franciscan theology this must be brought out and strictly delineated. As a working descriptive definition of Franciscan theology, which would determine specifically the limits of our claim, we suggest the following paraphrase of the definition of Franciscan philosophy given by Father Philotheus Boehner: It has a historical and doctrinal meaning inasmuch as it is the collective name of theological ideas, doctrines, theses and arguments conceived or elaborated by the members of the three branches of the Franciscan Order, representing an uninterrupted continuation of the Franciscan tradition and taught with the Franciscan spirit as its animating and unifying element.⁵¹

B. Characteristics of Franciscan Theology

1. *Primacy of Charity*

Franciscan theology is *par excellence* the way of love and tends toward an intimate union with God. The favorite definition of God, commented on so frequently by Franciscan scholars in preference to other biblical definitions of God, is the Joannine description of "Deus caritas est."⁵² The seraphic ardor of St. Francis inflamed his brethren and inspired the masters of the Franciscan School. Love became the very soul of his entire life, so much so that the stigmatized Francis is called in our liturgy the "divi amoris victima."

The great Franciscan theologians, inspired by the Poverello's way of love, built their theological systems within its framework and under its guiding light. St. Bonaventure, the spokesman for the older Franciscan School, wholeheartedly embraced this principle, incorporated it into his splendid treatises, calling for a happy marriage of knowledge and charity.⁵³ As Gilson points out, the

⁵¹ Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., *The History of the Franciscan School* (St. Bonaventure, N. Y. [Re-mimeographed at Duns Scotus College, Detroit, Mich., 1947]), I, p. 1.

⁵² John IV, 16.

⁵³ *De septem donis Spiritus Sancti*, IV, n. 23 (*Opera Omnia*, V, 478): "Ideo oportet jungere cum scientia caritatem, ut homo habeat simul scientiam et caritatem."

Seraphic Doctor wished "to reconstruct human knowledge and the whole universe with a view to the unique peace of love."⁵⁴

Duns Scotus reverts to this fundamental thesis time and time again. His principle of finality, underlying God's and man's activities, is intimately connected with the primacy of love. Without hesitation he holds that "vult Deus ex caritate primo bene sibi tamquam fini omnium."⁵⁵ In his works the Subtle Doctor elaborates an hierarchical arrangement in God's act of love. First, he says "God loves Himself; secondly, He loves Himself in others, and this is chaste love; thirdly, He wills to be loved by that one among external beings which can love Him in the highest degree; and fourth, He foresees His union with this nature which must love Him best, even though no one had ever sinned."⁵⁶

It has been repeatedly pointed out that the primacy of charity is the secret of true Franciscanism, the "well-spring of its energy, the source of its power and the strength of its poverty and abnegation."⁵⁷ So many of the typical Franciscan devotions stem from this theological position. It constitutes the appeal of Franciscan preaching. Even in philosophy, voluntarism so completely identified with the Franciscan School is but the realization that the world of love is infinitely above the world of knowledge. Here mere intellectualism gives way to the wisdom flowing from the affective act.⁵⁸ As the result, charity is the fruit of man's search after truth.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Etienne Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure* (New York, 1938), p. 86.

⁵⁵ Duns Scotus, *Reportata Parisiensia*, III, d. 32, q. 1, nn. 10-11 (*Opera Omnia*, Vivès edition), XXIII, 508.

⁵⁶ *Reportata Parisiensia*, III, d. 7, q. 4, n. 5 (XXIII, 303): "Dico ergo sic: quod primo Deus diligit se, secundo diligit se aliis et iste est amor castus, tertio vult se diligi ab Eo qui potest eum summe diligere, loquendo de amore alicujus extrinseci, et quarto praevidit unionem illius naturae quae debet eum summe diligere, etsi nullus cecidisset."

⁵⁷ Cuthbert Gumbinger, O.F.M.Cap., "The Primacy of Charity in Franciscan Theology," *Franciscan Studies*, XXIV (1943), 232.

⁵⁸ S. Bonaventura, *III Sent.*, d. 35, q. 1 (III, 774b-c): "Actus sapientiae consistit in degustando divinam suavitatem. Et quoniam ad gustum interiorem, in quo est delectatio, necessario requiritur actus affectionis ad conjungendum et actus cognitionis ad apprehendendum . . . hinc est quod actus doni sapientiae partim est cognitivus et partim est affectivus; ita quod in cognitione inchoatur et in affectione consummatur, secundum quod ipse gustus vel saporatio est experimentalis boni et dulcis cognitio. Et ideo est ex parte affectivae."

2. Christocentricity

The Christocentricity of Franciscan theology stems from St. Francis' complete and unquestioning dedication to his mission as the "Herald of the Great King." His only preoccupation in life was to love Christ with the burning love of the seraph, serve Him as the one and only Master and imitate Him as faithfully as possible. As the result of this Christ-centered life of the seraphic founder, the followers of the Poverello have shown a special interest in Christ as the center of all their theology.

Ever since St. Bonaventure indicated that "incipiendum est a medio, quod est Christus,"⁵⁹ the friars elaborated their theological systems upon a Christ-centered world-view. For them Christ is the capstone of the Church.⁶¹ In their Christology they saw it fit and proper to extoll Christ as highly as possible. Scotus laid down the principle according to which the content matter of Christology is to be determined: "in commendando Christum, malo excedere quam deficere a laude sibi debita, si propter ignorantiam oporteat in alterutrum incidere."⁶² The source of their inspiration was the love of the Crucified in whom they saw the King of the entire universe.⁶³

Christocentricity, as a characteristic of Franciscan theology, involves a series of basic theses which are intimately connected with it or are logical corollaries and deductions from it. The doctrine of universal and absolute predestination with its fundamental and all-pervading principle of finality, the glorious thesis of the primacy of Christ and its importance for its relationship to other dogmas and the timely teaching concerning the Kingship of Christ, doubtlessly constitute the broad basis for the Franciscan teaching in Christology. Once firmly established, these theses provide the point of departure for the systematic treatment of the Incarnation and Redemption, the development of the doctrine of the Mystical

⁵⁹ S. Bonaventura, *In Hexaemeron*, c. XVIII, n. 32 (V, 419c): "Iste est fructus Scripturarum, scilicet caritas."

⁶⁰ *In Hexaemeron*, c. I, n. 10 (V, 330).

⁶¹ S. Bonaventura, *In Lucam*, c. XX, n. 23 (VII, 508): "Imaginandus est Christus tamquam lapis centralis in toto corpore Ecclesiae."

⁶² *Opus Ozoniense*, III, d. 13, q. 4, n. 9 (XIV, 463).

⁶³ Augustine Gemelli, O.F.M., *The Franciscan Message to the World* (London, 1934), p. 282.

Body, the Marian prerogatives, spiritual theology and the devotions to the Holy Eucharist and the Sacred Heart.⁶⁴

The universal and absolute predestination of Christ in the Franciscan School is based upon the classic arguments of Duns Scotus. His closely reasoned and penetrating treatment of the doctrine leaves no doubt as to its meaning and implications. The integrating principle of finality underlying this Franciscan position is succinctly stated in truly scholastic fashion: "omne rationabiliter volens primo vult finem et secundo immediate illud quod attingit finem et tertio alia quae sunt remotius ordinata ad attingendum finem."⁶⁵ Its application to the predestination of Christ from all eternity is equally clearly stated: "it would seem universally true that one who wills orderly, first intends that which is nearer his end. And just as He intends that one have glory before grace, so among those predestined to glory, He who wills orderly would seem to intend first the glory of Him who is nearest the end. And, therefore, He would first decree glory to Christ's soul before decreeing glory to any other soul. And He first intends grace and glory to one before He foresees the opposites of these habits. Therefore, from the beginning He first intended glory to Christ's soul before He foresaw the fall of Adam."⁶⁶

By the absolute primacy of Christ is understood the unconditional predestination of Christ by God from all eternity as the final and exemplary cause of all creation.⁶⁷ In this wise Christ, the model of all mankind, is the fulfillment of the purpose of creation and consequently the "primum volitum inter omnia creata volita."⁶⁸ Father Dominic Unger, O.F.M.Cap., summarizes the doctrine of the primacy of Christ as the predestination of Christ "primarily for His own glory, then as the universal Scope of all creation, and as uni-

⁶⁴ Dominic Unger, O.F.M.Cap., "Franciscan Christology," *Franciscan Studies*, XXIII (1942), 472-474.

⁶⁵ *Opus Oxoniense*, III, d. 32, q. unica, n. 6 (XV, 433).

⁶⁶ *Opus Oxoniense*, III, d. 7, q. 7; cf. also *Reportata Parisiensia*, III, d. 7, q. 4, n. 4.

⁶⁷ *Opus Oxoniense*, III, d. 20, q. unica, n. 9 (XIV, 737); *Reportata Parisiensia*, III, d. 7, q. 4, n. 4 (XXIII, 303).

⁶⁸ Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M., "La Primauté de Jésus-Christ d'après le B. Duns Scot; Texte inédit du Ms. Ripoll. 53," *Studi Francescani*, XXX (1933), 223.

versal Exemplar of all creatures, and as universal Mediator of Angels and of men, in the order of nature and of grace and of glory from the beginning, so that Christ is the universal Head of the entire Church; in fact, even all the inanimate creation is united in and through Him. Again, Christ Jesus was decreed as Redeemer after the fall of Adam, but primarily for His own glory, and only secondarily for the redemption of man. Thus Christ holds the first place in all things (Col. i, 18) and in Him are all things summarized and brought to a head (Eph. i, 10)."⁶⁹

In upholding the absolute primacy of Christ, the Franciscan theologians prepared the way for the development of the doctrine of the Kingship of Christ. This doctrinal background placed the friars in the front ranks of the promoters of the feast of Christ the King and of the devotion to Christ the King. Having recognized Christ's exalted position and having placed Him on the highest throne possible, it is but a small step for the friar to proclaim Him King because of His lordship over all creatures.⁷⁰ Franciscan theologians and preachers are wont to treat extensively the various titles to Christ's sovereignty. Our Saviour is the King of kings and the absolute ruler of all creation "by right of inheritance" because of the hypostatic union; because of the universal redemption he rules "by right of conquest"; "by right of creation" all things were made for Christ in accordance with the principle of finality propounded by Scotus; and lastly, His title is sustained "by right of election" resulting from personal selection by which men dedicate themselves to His service.⁷¹

3. Practicality

St. Bonaventure teaches that wisdom results in action⁷² and that

⁶⁹ Dominic Unger, O.F.M.Cap., *op. cit.*, p. 430.

⁷⁰ Pope Pius XI brought this point out beautifully in his immortal encyclical *Quas Primas* (1925) dealing with the Kingship of Christ.

⁷¹ These considerations are well worked out in the following treatises: Leonardo M. Bello, O.F.M., *De universalitate Christi primatu atque regalitate* (Romae, 1933); Père Chrysostome, O.F.M., "La Fête du Christ-Roi et le motif de l'incarnation," *Études Franciscaines*, XL (1928), 459-481, 595-611; Éphrem Longpré, O.F.M., *La Royauté de Jésus-Christ chez S. Bonaventure et le b. Duns Scot* (2 ed., Montréal, 1927).

⁷² S. Bonaventura, *III Sent.*, d. 35, q. 2 (III, 778a).

the end and aim of theology is practical rather than speculative.⁷³ So convinced was Scotus of the subordination of reasoning and speculation to the affective acts of the will that he did not hesitate to conclude that "parum valeret contemplari Deum, nisi contemplando diligeretur."⁷⁴ Practicality is one of the most important implications of the voluntaristic approach to Franciscan thought. The will in its act of love represents a higher and more practical value than the intellect in the act of contemplation and understanding.

Franciscan theological life, unhampered by the confining restrictions of subscribing to the authority of an approved master or school whose *ipse dixit* must remain unquestioned, is continually in action and progress. Complete freedom within the bounds of orthodox faith insures theological growth and development. Hence Franciscan theology results in a body of living and dynamic doctrine. For the major part, theology for the friar is not the speculative theorizing about abstracted essences and hypothetical solutions, but a constant striving to mould into practical teaching the revealed realities of the deposit of Catholic faith. Practicality and actuality, not theory and possibility, constitute its focal point. It simply strives to mirror the life of the faithful in the life of our Lord as recorded in the Gospels and tradition. It is for this reason that Franciscan theology fits in so admirably with the kerygmatic approach advocated by contemporary theologians.⁷⁵

Theology for the Franciscan is practical not only because it is affective but also because it is social. As all creatures, theology provides the ladder for man's ascent to God.⁷⁶ It is the task of the theologian to help the faithful to contemplate and understand Christ's "glad tidings" and to adjust their lives to an effective realization of His teaching. Christ revealed to us the mysteries of

⁷³ S. Bonaventura, *I Sent.*, proemium, q. 3 (I, 13a).

⁷⁴ *Reportata Parisiensia*, III, d. 18, q. 3, n. 15 (XXIII, 400).

⁷⁵ The kerygmatic approach has been treated in numerous articles which reflect much of the traditional Franciscan approach to theology. Cf. especially Johannes Hofinger, S.J., *The Art of Teaching Christian Doctrine* (Notre Dame, 1957); Émil Mersch, S.J., "L'Objet de la théologie et le Christus Totus," *Recherches de science religieuse*, X (1936), 129-157; Josef A. Jungmann, S.J., *Christus als Mittelpunkt religiöser Erziehung* (Freiburg, 1939).

⁷⁶ S. Bonaventura, *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, c. I, 2 (V, 297).

God. The theologian, inspired by the words and example of St. Francis whose sole aim was "non sibi soli vivere sed aliis proficere," spreads the knowledge of these mysteries among his fellow men.

In fulfilling his social mission, the Franciscan theologian strives to fathom the *sensus fidelium* or the *sensus ecclesiae* as he finds it in human society. His role is that of a catalyst achieving the harmonious blending of the revealed teaching of Christ with the soul and mind of man. In making the divine incomprehensible mysteries scientifically and humanly comprehensible, the theologian benefits mankind by raising human activity and knowledge to its rightful position in the divine economy.

Conclusion

Franciscan theology, in keeping with the spirit of Franciscanism itself, is founded on the word of God, the Sacred Scriptures. It is a theology of love because of the Joannine definition of God: "Deus caritas est."⁷⁷ Its end is Jesus Christ whom St. Paul designated as the central mystery of our religion and the final end of our apostolic teaching: "the mystery, which had been hidden from ages and generations, which is Christ."⁷⁸ This Christocentric approach to theology contains the sum total of revealed truth and all implications. It is the purpose of theology to endeavour to fathom these riches.

Theology at the hands of the great Franciscan Masters becomes a dynamic and vibrant study of truth. Its limits reach beyond the narrow confines of restraining abstract considerations and delve into the very order of eternal divine predestination. We as Franciscans, emulating the spirit and teaching of our holy founder, St. Francis, must become the "Heralds of the Great King."

⁷⁷ John IV, 16.

⁷⁸ Col. I, 26-27; II, 2; IV, 3; Eph. I, 9; III, 5, 9.

THE ONE AND TRIUNE GOD

CYRIL SHIRCEL, O.F.M.

It is our purpose to examine that theological tract which has come to be variously titled as *De Trinitate et Unitate*, *De Deo uno*, *De Deo trino*, *De Deo uno et trino*. We are interested in the content and treatment of this tract. Several questions shall be raised. Precisely what problems and subject-matter are pertinent? How are they to be discussed and developed? Is it a safe and desirable policy to have this tract assimilate appropriate parts of a philosophical system for the sake of the explanation and elaboration of various theological theses? What contributions have Franciscan thinkers made to this tract? What modifications are to be made in the *De Deo uno et trino* in the light of the Franciscan theological synthesis? In the course of this paper, we shall suggest tentative answers to these questions.

I

Introduction

The seminarian unquestionably has been marveling for years at that extraordinary phenomenon of overlapping which he is quick to discover as he embarks on his study of systematic theology. He has already painstakingly plowed his weary way through that part of philosophy which really is metaphysics, but which has been unnaturally separated from it, granted its own independence, and given the title of "Theodicy" or "Natural Theology." Now, as he checks on the material which shall occupy him in theology, he finds that a large portion of his metaphysics, call it "Theodicy" or "Natural Theology" if you like, has been lifted bodily from his philosophical course and then given some theological trimmings. He is quite chagrined at this double philosophical exposure. And after all had been said and studied, he would not be quite sure whether his philosophy has been theologized or his theology philosophized.

As a matter of fact, he might even begin to wonder whether all this classroom insistence on the role of philosophy as the *ancilla* of theology is in accord with the facts; perhaps it has become the *socia*, maybe even the *domina*.

This procedure, however, does not seem to be a one-way boulevard. If the seminarian had been somewhat more observant and critical in his approach to the seemingly miraculous conclusions of his philosophical textbooks—and, of course, the textbooks have obviated all problems by the simple expedient of supplying *all* the answers—then he would have noted that somehow theology had made its inroads in philosophy. And he would have become painfully aware that a careful separation and distinction of philosophical and theological notions was not the prerogative of all the great medievalists; nor is it the prerogative of many neo-scholastics.¹ This type of reasoning has come to be known as a “theologism.” This strange mental creature does not serve the best interests of either philosophy or theology.

You may rest assured that this is not an exaggerated picture of an existing situation. It brings to the surface our first two general problems. The first has to do with the content of *De Deo uno et trino*, the second with the role of reason and philosophical systems specifically in this tract.

Perhaps the best approach to the first problem, the contents of this tract, would be a backward glance to one of the most successful theological textbooks of all time, namely, the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Since our traditional theological tracts trace their ancestry to this text, it may prove enlightening to review some of its background and format. For one thing, it may seem somewhat amusing that the question which plagued Peter Lombard some eight centuries ago has much in common with the question that plagues us today. There were two distinct currents of thought as to method and procedure at his time. There was, firstly, the tendency of the dialecticians who indulged too much in speculation and who were bent on philosophizing theology. We are told that in their theologizing they relied too heavily on Aristotle with the result that they

¹ Cf. Boehner, “The Spirit of Franciscan Philosophy,” *Franciscan Studies*, 2 (1942), pp. 222–225.

became deeply involved with many curious and useless propositions. These were known as members of the "modern" school. At the opposite extreme were theologians of the "old" school, who in proving the dogmas of faith were content with the authority and arguments of Sacred Scriptures and the Fathers of the Church. They would have no truck with reason in their theology. Peter Lombard avoided both extremes and maintained what he believed to be a middle course, one which would allow for the moderate use of philosophy in theology.² It will be interesting to observe what happened to this "middle course" in subsequent commentaries as the *Sentences* became the textbook in the university courses, upon which each future doctor had to lecture during a two-year period.

First Subject-Matter—The Trinity

Another illuminating feature of the *Sentences* is the relative amount of space it gives to certain areas under consideration and the disposition of these areas in the course of the tract. It is in Book I, as we would expect, that we find the treatment on the one and triune God. After an introductory section—which later came to be known as "Distinction I"—Peter Lombard embarks immediately on a rather lengthy discussion of the Most Blessed Trinity. Observe that his first subject-matter is the triune, not the one God. He discusses the Trinity from Distinction II to Distinction XXXIV inclusively. It is only in the final fourteen Distinctions of Book I (XXXV–XLVIII) that he considers matter which today falls under the title of the one God, that is, such topics as divine knowledge, divine will, omnipotence, providence, etc. In space, the triune God occupies 219 pages while the one God occupies only 75 pages.³ We might note that in the first chapter of Distinction III the matter under discussion has been titled "*De cognitione Creatoris per creaturas, in quibus Trinitatis vestigium apparet.*" This title gave Peter Lombard the occasion to speak of our natural knowledge of God. However, he restricts this discussion to the space of two pages, and then continues with his treatise on the Trinity.⁴ We might note,

² *Petri Lombardi Libri IV Sententiarum* (Ad Claras Aquas: ex typographia collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1916), I, xxxvi–xxxix.

³ *Op. cit.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31.

too, that Distinction VIII likewise contains topics which currently are discussed in the section on the one God. Here Peter Lombard studies especially the truth and simplicity of God. This area covers some nine pages.⁵

Lombard's systematic arrangement of theological doctrines and theories proved very convenient for reference and classroom use. It should not be surprising, therefore, that it became a standard text. And in becoming a standard text, it should reveal through the many commentaries made upon it the vicissitudes to which the disposition of parts in the tract *De Deo uno et trino* was subjected. Let us consider the evolution of this tract in a few representative medievalists.

In his glosses on the First Book of Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales follows the general pattern and content of the *Sentences*. A new trend, however, already manifests itself. Alexander had at his disposal practically the whole doctrine of Aristotle. While he was not able to effect the integration of Aristotle and theology of later years, he did manage to use Aristotle profitably in his commentary. Thus considerably more philosophy finds its way into his Distinction III. While in Lombard the entire discussion of the first chapter of this Distinction covers slightly more than three pages, in Alexander the same discussion covers nearly forty pages. And since the section on the one God lends itself more readily to the assimilation of philosophical elements than the section on the triune God, we can expect the ratio of space devoted to them to change. In the glosses of Alexander we do, indeed, note such a change, even though not as marked as that observed in Distinction III.⁶

In St. Bonaventure the trend continues. In his commentary on Distinction III there is further philosophical addition and refinement. While first and foremost a theologian, he was convinced that rational elements must be added to faith in order to achieve a more fruitful understanding. Hence the ratio of space on the two areas of this tract in St. Bonaventure follows the direction of Alexander of Hales. The commentary on the *Sentences* now becomes a bulkier affair, thanks to an ever-increasing absorption of philosophical

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 57-65.

⁶ *Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (Ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi, 1951), I.

knowledge and the raising of new and more pointed theological questions.⁷

The *Ordinatio* of John Duns Scotus represents a still further departure from Peter Lombard. In common with the work of St. Bonaventure, it was much more than a mere cursory explanation of the text. Original and profound in thought, Scotus was able to see the weaknesses of his predecessors and promptly refuted them; he was able to see problems in a new light, raised questions about them, and then proceeded to expound his own doctrine. He deviates from Peter Lombard even before he reaches Distinction III. He divides Distinction II into two parts, in the first of which he discusses *ex professo* his philosophical reasons for the existence and unicity of God. It is a lengthy and detailed discussion, numbering some one hundred and twenty pages in the new Vatican edition. The second part of Distinction II deals with the Trinity. In Distinction III, which comprises one hundred and seventy-two pages, the Subtle Doctor deals with the nature of our knowledge of God. These two Distinctions constitute some of the best of medieval philosophical thought; certainly, they constitute the best of the *Ordinatio*.⁸

Philosophy "Overpowers" Theology

One can hardly fail to see what has been happening to the original disposition of the parts of the theological tract *De Deo uno et trino* as found in the *Sentences*. Perhaps we could summarize this change with two statements. Firstly, there is the slow but undeniable shift from the priority of the triune God in the *Sentences* to the priority of the one God in its commentaries. Distinctions II and III which in the *Sentences* deal so sketchily with the existence and unicity of God, in commentaries eventually contain almost a complete metaphysics of the one God. Secondly, there is what almost could be termed the "overpowering" of theology by the philosophy of Aristotle in the sense that theological treatises were elaborated and clarified with philosophical terminology and concept and that purely philosophical treatises made their appearance within the Distinctions.

⁷ *Liber I Sententiarum* (ed. minor) (Ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi, 1934).

⁸ *Joannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia* (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis), II (1950), III (1954).

This two-fold trend had already been sufficiently accentuated, even before the time of Duns Scotus, by the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Angelic Doctor, freed somewhat from the systematization of the *Sentences* and embarking on his own, gives priority to a discussion of the one God. He deals with the one God in twenty-five Questions of his *Summa*,⁹ and then with the triune God in eighteen Questions.¹⁰ The order of the *Sentences* now becomes completely inverted, both as to the topic and extensiveness of treatment. The theological texts of our own day are patterned accordingly.

At this point we might ask ourselves two questions. Firstly, why did Peter Lombard prefer the emphasis on the triune rather than the one God and why did the scholastics slowly invert this order? Is there any significance in this shift of emphasis? Can it perhaps be explained by a growing awareness among the medievalists of the Aristotelian concept of science? Frankly, this writer feels he is not qualified to answer this question. Yet, if it could be answered, it would have far-reaching consequences in the development of the tract on the one and triune God.

The second question might be worded as follows: Must the tract on the one and triune God remain "overpowered" with philosophy? Certainly, we cannot find fault with the scholastics who in their works were able so cleverly to separate the chaff from the wheat in Aristotelian philosophy and then assimilate it so naturally with supernaturally revealed truths for the sake of explanation and clarification. Nor can we find fault with them if alongside a supernaturally revealed truth, corroborated with citations from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, they should attempt to prove the same truth with purely philosophical demonstrations. After all, they could distinguish between the purely philosophical and the purely theological, which they did, and there was at the time no urgent reason always to restrict themselves to the exclusively philosophical in one opus and to the exclusively theological in another. However, for better or for worse, times have changed. Philosophy has been separated from theology, and the three-year philosophy curriculum has been separated from the five-year theological one. This does

⁹ Ia, qq. ii-xxvi.

¹⁰ Ia, qq. xxvii-xliv.

entail a separation among the writings of the medievalists of philosophical elements from theological ones. Philosophers have attempted to do just that, and they believe, at least, that the many conclusions of their various disciplines are just that—purely philosophical. But what of the theologians? Apparently, they fail in trust and confidence for their philosophical brethren. They retain the medieval format in spite of the modern setting, and they insist on repeating in the *De Deo uno*, though in a very emasculated and watered-down form, just about everything the seminarian has already studied in a previous philosophical course. This, certainly, can no longer be justified. If it is to be a theological treatise on *De Deo uno*, then let it so be. If our present curriculum demands that the two sciences, philosophy and theology, be taught separately, then let us so teach them. It should not be inferred from the above that we hereby rule out the role of reason. Most assuredly, we do not. But we do rule out whatever constitutes an “overpowering” philosophy. What constitutes an “overpowering” philosophy will be discussed below as we take up the specific problems of God’s existence and nature.

The Role of Reason

The second general problem concerns the role of reason and philosophical systems in the tract under discussion. First of all, let us do away with the illusion that there is any philosophical system which has exclusive rights to the term “Catholic.” There is no such being. Naturally acquired truth does not carry a label with it, Catholic or otherwise. We may speak of the philosophical systems of Catholic thinkers, but, strictly speaking, we cannot speak of Catholic philosophical systems. One needs but to review history to discover what pitfalls await the theologian who proceeds upon that assumption.

In a study of the view of St. Bonaventure on this subject, G. H. Tavard writes the following:

Philosophy is the work of reason; yet one cannot, with the utmost good will, apply to it what St. Bonaventure admits concerning the use of reason in theology. It is granted that theology is bound to encounter philosophy and may have to subsume it in some way or other, but the point is: which philosophy? For philosophy as such is little more than a concept and what goes under its label is in practice—however much this ought to be grieved for—a collection of widely divergent and more or less rational systems. In

spite of common items, points upon which most are agreed, the philosophical kaleidoscope is in the main so varied that theologians cannot be too cautious in their approach. Before assuming a philosophical system, they shall be well-advised carefully to enquire about the issues that may be at stake. Even once they are satisfied that reason must have its say and cannot be left aside without endangering the superstructure of theology, they shall feel impeded in their supernatural outlook, if they have not previously discerned which rational system, if any, squares with the revealed principles upon which theology is grounded.¹¹

St. Bonaventure thus carefully distinguishes between the role of reason and the role of philosophy. Reason and philosophy cannot always be identified. If philosophy is "an elaborate attempt at sorting out and classifying the data of reason, the principles of such an elaboration do not necessarily set philosophy apart. There will be as many systems as there will have been diverse principles and, furthermore, not one of them shall be identical with 'reason' as such."¹² The hazards of too much reliance on such philosophical systems by the theologian must be obvious.

What, then, would be the role of reason in theology? According to the Bonaventurian conception, reason has a deductive function. By virtue of certain known truths which are divinely revealed reason advances to a knowledge of some new truth which is intimately connected with and virtually contained in those truths. Reason, therefore, reveals the implications of supernatural truths. These new truths are known as theological conclusions, and thus become part of theology. These theological conclusions "constitute the proper field wherein reason is apt to participate in the transition of faith towards intelligibility."¹³

The cautious approach of the Seraphic Doctor should not be conceived, however, as ruling out philosophical systems. He himself found them useful in his theology on many an occasion. He did not hesitate to resort to various Aristotelian constructs. Sometimes he would accept them as they were; at other times he would subject them to a profound revision. The norm for their acceptance, rejection, or modification was a comparison between the data of faith and the statements of philosophers. The philosophical systems,

¹¹ *Transiency and Permanence: The Nature of Theology According to St. Bonaventure* (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1954), p. 141.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 123.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131.

therefore, may be of value for the theologian in their parts rather than in their totality as distinctive syntheses.¹⁴

Some may be tempted, perhaps, to disagree with this fine distinction of St. Bonaventure between the role of reason and the role of philosophical systems. But one must be forced to admit that if this distinction had been maintained by all the medievalists and if it were maintained by the neoscholastics of our own day many problems would have been obviated and would be obviated for the theologian. The Seraphic Doctor was keenly aware of those problems and their origin.

Summarizing briefly what we have said thus far, we might state that, firstly, the tract *De Deo uno et trino* is not to be "overpowered" with philosophy even though its close affinity for a philosophical tract seems to encourage it, and, secondly, when philosophy is utilized by the theologian it is to be understood in the sense of reason rather than in the sense of a philosophical system.

II

Let us now proceed to a discussion of three specific problems. What has preceded may enable us to understand at least two of these problems with greater clarity. These problems deal with the existence of God, the nature of God, and, finally, the contributions of Franciscans to *De Deo uno et trino*.

Existence of God

The first specific problem has to do with the existence of God. It has several facets which must be explored. The first concerns the knowability of God's existence. The traditional textbook usually sets out with that well-known excerpt from the *Dogmatic Constitution on Faith* of the Vatican Council and then adds the corresponding *Canon* which reads: "If anyone shall say that the One True God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason through created things: let him be anathema."¹⁵ The Vatican Council thus made it a matter of faith that human reason can come to know God with certainty by the

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 141-142.

¹⁵ Sess. 3, ch. 2, Canon 1 (Denzinger, 1806).

medium of created things. The Vatican Council restricted its wording to "known with certainty . . . through created things." In the *Oath against Modernism*, the profession of faith contains more exact language: "I profess that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty, and even demonstrated, by the natural light of reason through things that are made (Rom. 1, 20), that is, through the visible works of creation, as a cause through its effects."¹⁶ Here the expressions "demonstration" and "as a cause through its effects" are added. The same expressions appear in the *Humani Generis* of Pope Pius XII when he says: "It is well known how highly the Church regards human reason, for it falls to reason to demonstrate with certainty the existence of God, personal and one."¹⁷ A few sentences later he describes that philosophy whose fundamental tenets "have been elaborated and defined little by little by men of great genius," and then adds: "For this philosophy, acknowledged and accepted by the Church, safeguards the genuine validity of human knowledge, the unshakable metaphysical principles of sufficient reason, causality, and finality, and finally the mind's ability to attain certain and unchangeable truth."¹⁸

While an interpretation of the above citations seems so deceptively simple—and that is precisely the type of interpretation usually given—there lurk for the unsuspecting theologian, and perhaps even for the philosopher, many critical questions in the background. What, for instance, is the precise meaning of the expression "known with certainty"? If it doesn't equate with "demonstration," then what is the meaning of "certainty"? Is it to be accepted in a metaphysical, moral, or physical sense? There is considerable difference between these types of certainty. And if it does equate with "demonstration," then what is its exact meaning? Scholastics distinguished between *probatio*, *persuasio*, and *demonstratio*.¹⁹ Here, too, the distinction is of major importance. Which is it to be? These questions are of vital interest to Franciscans, especially in the light of the fact that some of our deepest thinkers would

¹⁶ *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, 2 (1910), p. 669.

¹⁷ N. Y.: Paulist Press, 1950, p. 14, n. 45.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 15, n. 46.

¹⁹ Cf. Damascene Weberling, *Theory of Demonstration According to William of Ockham* (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1953).

not grant that certain truths can be "demonstrated."²⁰ Then, what is to be said of the "as a cause through its effects" invoked in the *Oath against Modernism*? What is to be said of the principles "of sufficient reason, causality, and finality" as invoked in the *Humani Generis*? These principles demand extremely careful analysis before their validity and limitations can be recognized.²¹ This careful analysis, unfortunately, is not found in our traditional texts.

These questions, and the answers to them where possible, must be considered in dealing with the knowability of God. The price of neglect in this matter is necessarily a faulty interpretation of the *magisterium* of the Church.

Rational Arguments

Another facet of this area involves the use of rational arguments or proofs for the existence of God. Should our theologians adduce in the text proper rational arguments for God's existence as worked out by the medievalists and neo-scholastics? It is our suggestion that with our present curricular setup they be dropped from the theological text altogether. We offer the following reasons for this suggestion.

At one time or another in the course of his studies, the seminarian must make a serious, philosophic approach to the arguments for God's existence. They must be examined thoroughly and exhaustively, and within a general frame of reference conducive to an understanding and a critical approach. The most propitious time and place for such a venture is certainly not the theological course *De Deo uno et trino*. It can be most fruitful only within the atmosphere of the philosophical curriculum, where it unquestionably does belong. This seems to be a definite instance where a theological tract can be "overpowered" with philosophy. This also seems to be an instance where St. Bonaventure's distinction between reason and philosophy might apply.

Furthermore, what arguments or proofs do we generally find in our theological texts? Ordinarily, these texts will number and

²⁰ Cf. Sebastian Day's discussion on "Knowledge of God According to the Vatican Council," *Franciscan Studies*, III (1943), pp. 372-373.

²¹ Cf. Boehner, "Existence of God According to Borgmann," *Franciscan Studies*, III (1943), pp. 378-381.

describe several types of arguments for God's existence and without further ado will simply pronounce them as false and invalid. Then they will adduce the *Quinque Viae* of St. Thomas—and here, too, without too critical an investigation will simply pronounce them as true and valid—to the exclusion of any other proof which may have been elaborated in the course of time. The general result is that in the mind of students the *Quinque Viae* take on the aura of dogmatic certainty and validity. Are we entitled to such naivete? Are we entitled to such smugness and complacency in reference to these arguments? What guarantee do we have that they are beyond the pale of very serious criticism? That they are not beyond the pale of serious criticism must be obvious to anyone who has been reading current literature on the subject. Father Van Steenberghen, for example, a Thomist by his own admission, discusses the arguments of the Angelic Doctor and then summarizes as follows:

In Question II and the following questions of the *Summa Theologica* we can find all the elements required to elaborate the metaphysical proof of the existence of God. But these elements are scattered and are often mixed with other elements which are rather questionable or quite unacceptable. No one of the five ways is sufficient by itself. No one of the five ways can be presented as it stands, as a complete rigorous proof of the existence of God. The first two have to be developed with the help of the later questions of the *Summa*. The other three need to be corrected and completed. In any case, if we separate the *quinque viae* from their general context, and especially if we separate them from subsequent questions of the *Summa Theologica*, we mutilate the work in a way which is both dangerous and unjustified. We should not be surprised at the imperfections which we have uncovered in the statement of the *quinque viae*. They are the unavoidable consequences of the historical environment in which St. Thomas lived and worked.²²

This constitutes a rather kindly and conservative estimate of the arguments. Interestingly enough, while Father Van Steenberghen suggests that the arguments be developed in the light of other questions of the *Summa* to insure their validity, he himself does not do so. He embarks on his own argument.²³ Other critics have been less kind and conservative. A brief perusal of history of philosophy affords an abundance of evidence to this effect.

Substituting the argument of John Duns Scotus from his *De*

²² *Ontology* (New York: J. F. Wagner, Inc., 1952), p. 153.

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 140 seqq.

Primo Principio, or any other argument for that matter, for those of St. Thomas will not solve the problem. While we recognize the reasoning of the Subtle Doctor on this point as much more accurate and valid and while we see in it a fine sample of the best thinking the Middle Ages produced, nevertheless we are not justified in accepting his proof as dogmatically true. It, too, has its weaknesses which should not be overlooked. Thanks to the critical and progressive spirit of the Franciscan School, these weaknesses have been frankly acknowledged and every attempt has been made to develop a scientific demonstration which could weather any type of a critique.

But why must a theologian insist on incorporating into his text some particular argument for God's existence? Is it called for? Has the *magisterium* of the Church ever passed judgment on any particular rational demonstration? If she has, then the theologian not only could, but would even be obliged to do so. But she has not. Our Holy Mother the Church has not gone beyond the words of St. Paul on this subject. She has merely defined that God's existence *can* be known with certainty. And, on occasion, as we saw above, reference is made to such items as the principles of sufficient reason, causality, and finality. Since, then, the Church has officially concerned herself with these points, these constitute legitimate subject-matter for the theologian. He should give these points as adequate and as exhaustive a treatment as he can. He should spare no effort in discussing the knowability and demonstrability of God's existence and whatever might be pertinent thereto. But it is not necessary for him to incorporate into his text any specific arguments. At the moment at least, that seems to be beyond his province.

It is interesting to note how closely the attitude of St. Bonaventure seems to approximate this view. In the words of Gilson, the Seraphic Doctor was more interested in the principle of causality as such than in the starting point or the particular manner in which the argument would be developed. The emphasis is on the involved principle, not on the elaborated proof. Given this principle of causality, "it matters little what starting point the reason chooses. Things are deficient in being not accidentally, or according to one or other of their properties: they are essentially inadequate and incapable of self-sufficiency. So that if reason, armed with the

principle of causality, sets out to develop the manifold relations binding cause and effect, any reflection on any property of the thing caused leads at once to the cause."²⁴ Thus the proofs which St. Bonaventure bases on things of sense are offered with a definite unconcern. "In any one of these lines of proof," continues Gilson, "he treats the starting point as a matter of comparative indifference: and no one of them is worked out with anything remotely resembling the carefully dovetailed argumentation of St. Thomas."²⁵ Further on he adds: "Just as he (Bonaventure) does not mind which created thing he takes as his starting point, so he is not concerned to construct logical proofs to any great degree of elaboration."²⁶ The official declarations of the Church, with their emphasis on knowability and the principles involved, rather than on some commitment to a specific proof, seem to confirm the general ideas of St. Bonaventure.

Attributes of God

The second specific problem is an inquiry into the proper ordering or disposition of parts in the second area of *De Deo uno*, namely, the attributes of God. It is obvious that this second area, from the philosophical viewpoint, will be determined by the first area, the existence of God. Any valid demonstration for God's existence will not merely prove that God exists: it will tell us much more about Him. Thus, the *Quinque Viae* inform us that God is the prime mover, the first cause, the necessary and supreme being, who has ordained the whole universe. Naturally, it will no longer be necessary to deal with these characteristics of God when studying His attributes. And what is discovered about God in evolving the demonstrations for His existence will also supply the principle whereby the attributes will be classified or ordered. If, however, one were to adopt the Franciscan approach to the problem of God's existence, he would begin by developing his metaphysics with the aid of a method known as conditional reduction and by the use of the disjunctive transcendentals. And thus, as he would arrive at

²⁴ *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, tr. Dom I. Trethowan (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1940), pp. 123-124.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

his conclusion of God's existence, he would already know that God is absolutely permanent, immutable, uncaused, independent, nonconditioned, being of itself, necessarily existing, pure act, substantial, simple, and enjoying every pure perfection in the highest possible degree. With this approach, therefore, the entire section on the nature or attributes of God assumes a different orientation and proportions. In other words, once one commits himself to a specific argument for God's existence, he simultaneously commits himself to a definite content and disposition of parts in dealing with the attributes of God.

This seems to be but another instance wherein philosophy can "overpower" theology. Accept some particular argument, or set of arguments, for God's existence in your theological tract, and you thereby determine on philosophical grounds how your theological tract on God's attributes shall be worked out and ordered. And what, you might ask, should be criminal about this procedure? If we keep in mind that we are dealing with theology, with revealed truth, about which there can be no question, and if we keep in mind the prudent distinction of St. Bonaventure between reason and philosophical systems—then the answer to this question should be patent.

We have already suggested that the theological tract *De Deo uno* would fare better without any professional discussion on a rational demonstration for God's existence. This, naturally, rules out any predetermined classification of God's attributes. What principle, then, can be utilized for such a classification, for a classification simply must be? In this matter, as in the previous specific problem, we could be on no safer ground than basing our solution on the *magisterium* of the Church. And the Church has committed herself on this point. Perhaps this commitment does not enjoy in its formal notion or *ratio* of classification the niceties of logic and the embellishments of philosophy. But the truth-value is there. The certainty is there. And both are based, not on fallible reason, but on the infallible teaching authority of the Church. The theologian cannot ask for much more.

We would, therefore, suggest, that the general plan for dealing with the attributes of God be centered about the positive and explicit declaration of the Church. To this end, we might with profit

utilize that convenient and summary definition of the Vatican Council, namely:

The holy, Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one, true, living God, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, omnipotent, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in intellect and will, and in every perfection; who, although He is one, singular, altogether simple and unchangeable spiritual substance, must be proclaimed distinct in reality and essence from the world; most blessed in Himself and of Himself, and ineffably most high above all things which are or can be conceived outside Himself.²⁷

With this statement as a guide, there will be little danger of becoming confined by the shortcomings of some philosophical system. Yet there will be sufficient play for the role of reason—and in its more appropriate function as the *ancilla theologiae*.

The Franciscan School

There remains one more topic for discussion: the contributions of the Franciscan School to this theological tract. Actually, this writer would like to believe that whatever has been said thus far is the result of the spirit of the Franciscan School. We have considered the “overpowering” of theology by philosophy in content, the necessity of postulating a distinction between reason and philosophical systems, the prudence in insisting upon the bases of any argument for God’s existence rather than upon some particular demonstration or set of demonstrations, and the ordering of the attributes of God, not according to the peculiar demands of some philosophical system, but rather according to the teaching authority of the Church. You may have observed that what lies behind each one of these points is the fact of a greater trust and confidence in theology rather than in philosophy. Or, worded another way, you might describe it as a lack of complete trust and confidence in purely philosophical knowledge. And this, incidentally, happens to be one of the characteristics of the Franciscan tradition. We read the following on the subject from the pen of Father Boehner:

A glance at the Franciscan tradition, from St. Bonaventure down to Ockham, reveals this spirit of sound Christian distrust in purely natural philosophical enterprise—a distrust which led the Franciscan Doctors, not

²⁷ Sess. 3, ch. 1 (Denzinger, 1782).

to fideism or scepticism (as some would have it), but to Christian criticism.²⁸

This Christian criticism is not scepticism, insists Father Boehner, and if some should think that it is, then some people's definition of scepticism could do with a little overhauling. Furthermore, he continues, it is this critical attitude which naturally leads to a clear and sharp distinction between philosophy and theology.²⁹ A failure to apply this distinction with all possible rigor can only result in hybrid conclusions, or, perhaps, even in a hybrid science, which in our day should no longer be tolerated.

These incidental contributions, however, fade away into insignificance when we consider what unquestionably is the most penetrating piece of theology that has reached us from the Middle Ages. It is especially the contribution of the subtle John Duns Scotus. It is the teaching which characterizes the Franciscan theological synthesis. As a matter of fact, it is the Franciscan theological synthesis. It is a concept which wells out of the profoundest mystery of the Most Blessed Trinity and flowers into the universal Primacy of Christ and the unique position of our Blessed Mother.

Duns Scotus begins to weave together the fine threads of this monumental doctrine as he discusses the relationship between the Divine Persons. The point of departure is the fact that God the Father is perfectly happy in the knowledge and enjoyment of His divine Essence and, therefore, perfectly happy in the enjoyment of Himself, needing no one else for His happiness and sufficiency.³⁰ In spite of the happiness that He enjoys in Himself, the Father does not content Himself with a blissful repose in the enjoyment of His Essence, but there is rooted in His very Essence the urge to communicate Himself. And knowing and willing the divine Essence as an essence to be communicated to the Son means simply to know and will the begetting of the Son, since the begetting of the Son is the communication of the divine Essence by the Father to the Son by way of the intellect.³¹ But the divine Essence is to be expressed also in the Holy Spirit. The mutual love between Father and Son is

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 220.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

³⁰ *Ox.*, 3, d. 32, q. unica, n. 6 (15, 433).

³¹ *R.P.*, 1, d. 6, q. 2, n. 5 (22, 142).

completed through the act of spiration which produces the Third Person of the Trinity.³²

What is the motive of this communicative activity of God both within and without Himself? Since God is perfectly happy in the knowledge and enjoyment of His divine Essence, the motive of begetting, breathing forth, and creation cannot be an increase of perfection or bliss. We simply cannot admit that God stands in any need of further perfecting Himself or of rendering Himself still happier.³³ The only possible motive of God's communicative activity is the divine Essence Itself as an essence to be communicated. Father Mueller describes this motivation as follows:

God knows nothing and wills nothing other than His divine Essence and all things for Its sake alone. It is the *ratio* and the motive of all divine activity, especially of this communicative activity, both within and without the divine Being. The divine Essence tends to the communicating of Itself, and because God consents to all the tendencies rooted in His Essence, the divine Essence Itself becomes the motive for the Father's communication to the Son and Their joint communication to the Holy Spirit. The divine Essence of its very self is the cause of the divine movement, and this property belongs to it simply because it is formal Goodness, the highest Goodness. It is the property of goodness lovingly to communicate itself. Every goodness wishes to give in a manner and measure befitting its own richness and fullness. Accordingly, in the divine Being as infinite Goodness there is that striving to communicate itself infinitely because "*summe activum est summe diffusivum sui*." The Father, therefore, by reason of His Essence, is moved to communicate Himself infinitely to the Son, and by reason of their Essence Father and Son are directed to impart themselves infinitely to the Holy Ghost. Scotus thus gives his synthesis a characteristically Franciscan coloring by asserting that the essence of the Godhead is love: "God is formally love and formally charity, and not only effectively so."³⁴

The motive, therefore, of God's communicative activity is His own Essence. This Essence as Goodness tends to communicate Itself, and since this Goodness is infinite it tends to communicate itself in an infinite manner, as it does to the Son and Holy Ghost. This Goodness as willed by God becomes the object of love. Hence Scotus could so appropriately say that God is love, not merely in the

³² *Ox.*, 1, d. 12, q. 1, n. 17 (9, 869).

³³ *Ibid.*, 3, d. 32, q. unica, n. 5 (15, 432).

³⁴ "A General Synthesis of the Theology of John Duns Scotus," tr. Elias Koppert, *The Cord*, VII (1957), pp. 22-23.

manner in which He works, but formally. Love, therefore, moves God to communicate Himself.

God is not satisfied to communicate Himself merely within by having a plurality of loving persons in the Trinity; He also desires to communicate Himself without—through creation. This communication moreover will be logical and orderly. All the purposes of divine willing and predestination are arranged in order according to their greater or lesser proximity to the final end of love which the Trinity wills. "Anyone who wills in an orderly way," says Scotus, "first wills the purpose and then, closer at hand, those things which are more immediately connected with the purpose. And since God surely wills in the most orderly way, this is the way He wills."³⁵ Hence those creatures which enjoy a greater or lesser proximity to the final end of love will enjoy respectively a greater or lesser love of God. God, therefore, loves all things in differing degrees. Father Mueller adds:

The final *ratio* of degrees of divine love for creatures lies in this, that God desires a hierarchically graduated order in creation, and therefore imparts a corresponding degree of grace and glory to each. He whom God wishes to take a higher position is endowed with a greater grace, and hence also with a greater love, than he who is to take a lower position.³⁶

Thus are established the order and sequence in predestination.

With these principles John Duns Scotus has laid the groundwork for his magnificent theological structure. It is a structure which has its basis in the life and love of the Most Blessed Trinity. This divine Essence communicates itself for the sake of itself within itself and without itself. It communicates itself without itself according to a very rational order—the order and sequence in predestination. Now the remaining theological pieces shall fall into their proper place. There shall be Christ, the "*opus summum Dei*," one being outside the Deity to which God gives Himself infinitely; there shall be Mary who occupies the second place in the divine plan, being most closely bound to Christ and standing nearest to Him, ranking above Adam and Eve; and there shall be angels and men. But a discussion of these theological pieces we leave to others.

³⁵ *R.P.*, 3, d. 7, q. 4, n. 4 (23, 303).

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 54.

It is not difficult to see how inadequate would be our treatment of the theological tract *De Deo uno et trino* without a profound study of the concepts so sketchily outlined above of Scotus' view of God which is really the heart of his synthesis. It sets the stage for the remaining theological tracts and binds them together into one unified and integrated whole. Over and above that, and this is its most significant asset, it establishes the relationship between God and man as one of love. As a matter of fact, as Scotus indicates, revelation and theology are destined to make known to us the loveliness of God Who is our end and goal.³⁷ This is the *desideratum* of our times. This writer cannot conceive a more appropriate conclusion to this paper than the very Franciscan plea on this point by the Jesuit, Raoul Plus. It is a lengthy quotation, but its contents are worthy of space and your patience. It reads:

It is a sad fact, but a person can study a whole semester "*de Verbo Incarnato*" without even once becoming astounded or excited, without even once experiencing within himself feelings of wonderment and love. All that one seems to hit upon is the cold, bare armour of concepts. The theological tracts are taken through one after the other, just as the most beautiful flowers are taken in botany according to the herbarium; and yet the reality that would render theology comprehensible is so full of life. Why is this life so little lived? How does this remarkable capacity of man to live a double life develop constantly to conceive of God with the intellect and yet scarcely in that very act to think of God, hardly to wish to surrender oneself to God? Let us be on our guard against the tawdry attainment of neatly separating life and study; we should live what we think. There is nothing more that study demands. Surely methods and enthusiasm, lectures and sermons, are different things. But even if they are different, they gain nothing if they are to march side by side all too stubbornly separated. . . . By means of meditation on the subjects of study, that which is dead shall become living, Christ shall rise. An urge to do should be born of a dogmatic text from Denzinger, or from a citation from the Fathers. Woe to the science that does not lead to love. We dare not pass over truth with half a soul, especially when it is a case of these truths. We cannot do enough in their regard; we must comprehend them with all our being.³⁸

³⁷ *Ox.*, Prol. q. 4, n. 29 (8, 257).

³⁸ *In Christus Jesus*, tr. M. Schwarz (Regensburg, 1927), pp. 115-116.

SELECT QUESTIONS ON THE FINAL CAUSE OF THE INCARNATION

DOMINIC UNGER, O.F.M.Cap.

In any synthesis of theology according to the Franciscan masters a very important place will always be held by the tract of Christology. In such a Christology the first place will be occupied by a treatise on the final cause of the Incarnation.

In 1942, the writer presented a detailed state of the question on the Absolute and Universal Primacy of Christ for the Franciscan Educational Conference.¹ Since then very much has been written on this subject. Most of the literature was occasioned by an article published by the eminent mariologist, Gabriel M. Roschini, O.S.M., in the *Marianum*.² He proposed a theory on the primary reason of the Incarnation which he hoped would reconcile the Thomists and Scotists. Actually it touched off a great controversy. Thomists and Scotists alike attacked the theory as wholly inadequate, satisfactory to neither School.³ The result of the controversy, however, has been, I believe, that a number of the points that enter into this whole problem have been put in clearer light.

I shall try to present the latest developments and positions in

¹ Dominic Unger, O.F.M.Cap., "Franciscan Christology: Absolute and Universal Primacy of Christ," *Franciscan Studies*, 2 (1942), 428-475.

² J. M. Rocca, O.S.M.—Gabriel M. Roschini, O.S.M., "De ratione primariae existentiae Christi et Deiparae," *Marianum*, 4 (1941), 3-31. Fr. Rocca is the originator of this opinion, which he discussed with Fr. Roschini, who then espoused it and published it. Later it appeared in book form (Romae: Officium Libri Catholici, 1944, pp. 11-44), together with the criticisms and replies that it occasioned. Our references will be to this book. Fr. Roschini published a summary article of his view of the whole controversy, "Intorno alla questione sul cosiddetto motivo dell'Incarnazione," in *Miscellanea Francescana*, 48 (1948), 296-305.

³ Giovanni Francesco Bonnefoy, O.F.M., *Il Primato di Cristo* (Milano: Marzorati, 1957), 121 pp., gives a careful and critical evaluation of studies on the Primacy of Christ since the middle of the 19th century, together with a select bibliography.

regard to this perennially interesting problem in the form of select questions.

Basic Problem

QUESTION I: *What precisely is the basic problem in the discussion about the primary reason of the Incarnation, or its primary motive, or about the Absolute Primacy of Christ?*

Some authors treat this matter under the idea of the Absolute and Universal Primacy of Christ. That may be done. However, since the Primacy of Christ cannot be discussed or determined without considering the final causes of the Incarnation—in fact, these final causes are the essential elements of the Absolute Primacy—the more basic problem is, “What is the primary proximate final cause of the Incarnation?”

We are not asking about the ultimate final cause of the Incarnation, namely, God’s infinite goodness and glory. We take that for granted. We are interested in the proximate end of the Incarnation, that is with Christ and men as the subjects for whom the Incarnation was willed.

Actually, God did will Christ for the benefit of others, as is most evident from Sacred Scripture (Gal. 4:4; John 18:37; John 13:15), and from the dogmatic teaching on the redemption of the human race through Christ. So the question is whether God willed the Incarnation primarily for Christ’s own glory and that independently of sin, and only secondarily for man’s salvation or whether He willed it essentially for man’s salvation and only secondarily for Christ’s glory.

That this is a problem of final causality was universally accepted. Father Roschini, however, in his attempt to reconcile the Thomists and Scotists, insists that the basic problem is the primary reason of the Incarnation. And by *reason* he does not mean final cause, but an element of efficient causality. He maintains that this primary and universal reason of the Incarnation is God’s free choice of the entire present world order, including the Incarnation.⁴

If Father Roschini wishes to interest himself in such a primary and universal reason for the Incarnation, he may. But the rest of

⁴ Roschini, *De ratione*, *op. cit.*, fn. 2, *passim*, but especially pp. 27–28.

the theologians are not interested in it. They are interested in the legitimate and answerable question, "Was Christ willed primarily for His own glory or for the redemption of men?" Father Roschini's primary and universal reason simply sidesteps the problem of the Thomists and Scotists, and can therefore not reconcile them.

Our problem, furthermore, concerns the present world order, not some hypothetic world order. We are not interested, in our main thesis, in what would have happened if Adam had not sinned. We are interested in what actually did happen in the world order in which the angels were saved and glorified, and in which men were redeemed. We may, however, once we have settled the main issue, deal with the hypothetical problem, too.

These two aspects of this problem, the present world order and a hypothetical world order, should be treated separately. This has not always been done in the past. Too many authors mixed the two aspects together in one treatment and seemed to be directly concerned more with the hypothetical case. It would be wrong, however, to think that they had no interest in or comprehension of the absolute and present case. They definitely did. The Scotists used the present, absolute predestination of Christ for His own glory as a proof for Christ's coming in the hypothetical world without Adam's sin. The Thomists used the present, conditioned predestination of Christ essentially as Redeemer to prove that He would not have come if Adam had not sinned. It is to Scotus' credit that he clearly and directly treated the present, absolute predestination of Christ for His own glory.⁵ Here, too, as for the Immaculate Conception,

⁵ Modern authors who insist on keeping the hypothetical problem distinct from the absolute predestination of Christ are these: Déodat Marie de Basly, O.F.M., *Le Sacré-Coeur*, (Paris—Lille, 1900), *passim*; see the fifth and revised edition by Léon Seiller, O.F.M., *Le Sacré-Coeur exposé selon la doctrine du Bienheureux Jean Duns Scot* (Paris: Editions Franciscaines, 1946), 108 pp.; Déodat Marie de Basly, O.F.M., *Pourquoi Jésus-Christ?* (Paris-Rome, 1903), 482 pp., *passim*, especially pp. 394-429; Père Raymond, O.F.M.Cap., "Le motif de l'Incarnation," *Etudes Franciscaines*, 28 (1912), 186-201. Roschini, *De ratione*, *op. cit.* in fn. 2, *passim*; Carmelus ab Iturgoyen, O.F.M.Cap., "De Incarnationis motivo ac de Christi Domini Primatu," *Collectanea Franciscana*, 7 (1937), 161-178; 342-356; especially pp. 176, 344; *idem*, "Un Dúptico teológico-Franciscano: El Primado universal y absoluto de Jesu Cristo y el Primado universal y relativo de María," *Regina Immaculata* (Romae: 1955), pp. 48-82; the foremost advocate today is Jean Fr. Bonnefoy, O.F.M., in his numerous works: "Primauté absolue et universelle de N.S. Jésus-Christ et de

the Subtle Doctor had the vision to see the problem in its true light.

So our thesis reads: God, who predestined Jesus Christ to be the Son of God for the ultimate end of God's own glory, predestined Him for the primary proximate end of Christ's glory, and therefore absolutely and first in all creation, and that in the present economy of creation and salvation.

This basic thesis will, naturally, be followed by others: on Christ's being willed as the final, exemplary and mediatorial cause of all creatures; and on Christ's being willed as Redeemer of mankind, primarily for His own glory, secondarily for the good of mankind.

The sum of all these primacies is the Absolute and Universal Primacy of Christ.⁶

Most Accurate Term

QUESTION II: *In view of what we said in answer to question one, what is the most accurate term under which to treat this matter? As is well known, in the past scholars of all theories have used various terms: motive, final cause, end, reason, cause. What is to be said of these?*

The term *motive* is technically not accurate. We speak of a motive for the actions of human agents, because they can actually be moved by some creature to perform an action. But God cannot really be moved to action by any creature good. The word *motive* can, therefore, be used of God's actions only in an anthropomorphic sense as a synonym for final cause. Hence, it should rather be avoided.

Father Bonnefoy has, therefore, rightly insisted on the inaccuracy of this term for our problem.⁷ He was followed by others, such as Father Roschini.⁸ But it seems we must guard against exaggerating

Très S. Vierge," *Bulletin de la Société Française des Etudes Mariales*, 4 (1938), 44-47; "Raison de l'Incarnation et primauté du Christ," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza), 46 (1943), 103-120, especially pp. 107-109; "La Question Hypothétique: Utrum si Adam non peccasset . . . au XIII^e siècle," *Revista Española de Teología*, 14 (1954), 327-368; *Il Primato di Cristo*, *op. cit.* in fn. 3, pp. 65-74.

⁶ Cf. Unger, *art. cit.* in fn. 1, pp. 430 ff.

⁷ Cf. Bonnefoy, "Primauté absolue" *art. cit.*, in fn. 5, p. 43; and "Raison de l'Incarnation," *art. cit.*, in fn. 5, pp. 104f.

⁸ Roschini, *De ratione*, *op. cit.*, fn. 2, pp. 23-25.

the danger in the use of this term. No theologian, certainly no Scotist, who used this term in our problem ever dreamt of ascribing to God the imperfection of being moved by a creature. It is easy to prove from most theologians that they used *motive* as a synonym for final cause. Many of them have both terms in the same context or even same sentence. The use of this term did not mislead them into a false state of the question.⁹

Father Bonnefoy and Father Roschini prefer to use the term *reason*. Father Roschini, of course, cannot use the term *final cause*, because he insists that the problem is not one of final causality. For him *reason* is a very convenient term.

Reason is in our problem an accurate term. It was used for the discussion almost from the beginning. St. Bonaventure treated the matter under this term.¹⁰ But *reason* cannot be considered the most precise term technically. It is too generic, and therefore vague. A quick glance at a Scholastic dictionary will reveal that scholars like St. Thomas used *reason* for all the causes in general or for any specific cause in particular. But, since it is certain that our problem is one of final causality, why waste time with such a generic term as *reason*? Father Bonnefoy would allow also *cause*.¹¹ But the same objections hold against this as against *reason*.

Our question is one of final causality, and so the most accurate and precise term is *final cause* or *end*.

God's Supreme Goodness

QUESTION III: *Some authors speak of the primary end of the Incarnation as God's supreme goodness. How does that line up with saying that the primary end is Christ's glory?*

Both are true. The difference lies in this that in the one case the matter is viewed with God as the end-recipient (*finis cui*); in the other case it is viewed with Christ as the end-agent. With God as

⁹ Cf. e.g., Claudius Frassen, O.F.M., *Scotus academicus* (Romae: 1720), vol. 7, pp. 242-260; Bernardus a Bononia, O.F.M.Cap., *Institutio theologica iuxta omnia fidei dogmata et D. Subtilis Scholastico nervo instructa* (Venetiis: 1746), lib. 3, tr. 2, q. 1, pp. 30-35.

¹⁰ St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 1, art. 2, quaest. 2 (*Opera Omnia* 3, 21-28): "Quae fuerit incarnationis ratio praecipua?"

¹¹ Bonnefoy, "Raison de l'Incarnation," *art. cit.*, in fn. 5, p. 108.

the end-recipient it is true to say that the primary end of the Incarnation is the *supreme* communication of His goodness, or God's *supreme* glory.

We must emphasize that it is the *supreme* glory, such as can be had only through an Incarnation, which God willed absolutely without making it dependent on any creature good. He willed this supreme manifestation of His glory prior to any lesser manifestation of His glory, with no essential dependence of final causality on any lesser manifestation of His glory.

By such emphasis we avoid confusing this problem of final end with that of ultimate end, which is God's glory in general, and which is the same for the Incarnation as for any other creature.

Needless to say, we are not arguing for an exaggerated optimism, as if God had to become Incarnate if He willed to create a universe. We merely assert that God, as a matter of fact, did will to become Incarnate in the universe, and that He had to do so with no essential dependence of finality on any creature. Christ was predestined prior to all creatures and absolutely, simply because God willed His own glorification in such a supreme manner, and willed that more than He willed His glorification through all the rest of creation taken together. God willed to manifest His goodness in a supreme manner in the Incarnation, so that His goodness might be glorified in a supreme manner by the love and adoration of the Sacred Heart of Jesus.

Authoritative Documents

QUESTION IV: *Are there any authoritative documents in favor of Christ's glory as the primary end of the Incarnation? Are there any officially approved prayers that express this doctrine?*

I should like to consider the documents in their chronological order, including also the liturgical prayers or other officially approved prayers. These are, of course, of a different category than the doctrinal pronouncements of the popes, but they are approved by the popes for the whole world. Such prayers are usually the result of doctrinal development and an expression of the doctrine for the particular age in which they originate.

First, let us look at a few liturgical prayers that have been

advanced as objections to the Franciscan doctrine. In the Nicene Creed used at Mass we profess that God's Son descended from heaven "propter nos et propter nostram salutem." The Thomists have insisted that this gives the adequate reason for the Incarnation, namely, our redemption. Scotists have had no great difficulty in refuting such an interpretation. P. Chrysostome, O.F.M., thinks that the first phrase ("propter nos") gives the reason for the Incarnation as such, namely, absolute mediation for men apart from sin; while the second phrase ("et propter nostram salutem") expresses the motive of redemption. In a Creed, he argues, unnecessary words are avoided. If both phrases referred to the redemption, there would be a useless repetition.¹²

It seems unnecessary to make such a distinction in order to refute the Thomists. If both phrases express the redemptionist motive, they do not necessarily give the complete and primary final cause of the Incarnation. Besides, the word "salutem" had a broader meaning, not synonymous with redemption, at the time this Creed was composed, as is clear from St. Athanasius' writings.¹³ Salvation through grace does not necessarily presuppose sin, as does redemption. So Christ was willed as Mediator "for us" and "for our salvation" absolutely, even prior to the foreknowledge of Adam's sin. This liturgical prayer, then, causes no difficulty whatever for the Franciscan doctrine.

In the well-known *Exsultet* of Holy Saturday the deacon chants exultantly: "O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est! O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!" This too has been advanced very often as a proof that the Church considers the redemption the essential reason for the Incarnation. But quite falsely. From the preceding context ("O inaestimabilis dilectio caritatis: ut servum redimeres, Filium tradidisti!"), it is certain that the sin of Adam is considered necessary in the sense that God could show His immense love for us by redeeming us from that sin. The fault is called a happy one because it, poetically, merited for us such a great Redeemer. Now all that is

¹² Chrysostome Urrutibéhéty, O.F.M., "*Le motif de l'Incarnation et les principaux Thomistes contemporains* (Tours: Cattier, 1921), p. 255.

¹³ Dominic Unger, O.F.M.Cap., "A Special Aspect of Athanasian Soteriology," *Franciscan Studies*, 3 (1943), 30-53; 171-194; especially pp. 191-193.

equally true even if, as we hold, Christ had been predestined absolutely prior to sin. Sin was then still the occasion for God's showing His immense love for us and for Christ to be so great a Redeemer. In fact, in this view of the Scotists the work of the Redeemer shines with a brighter light, namely, against the background of His absolute predestination. The hymn does not state or even imply that redemption was the only and primary reason for the Incarnation.

On the Feast of the Divine Maternity, in the hymn for Lauds we chant:

Ob perditum nostrum genus
Primi parentis crimine,
Ad inclitum Matris decus
Te Rex supremus extulit.

The Sovereign King, the stanza says, elevated Mary to the excellent honor of Mother of God on account of the human race that had fallen because of the sin of the First Parents. That is quite true, not merely in the sense that this was the temporal occasion of Mary's elevation to Divine Motherhood, but also in the sense that the redemption of the fallen race was a useful end of the Divine Motherhood. But that does not mean that this end was the essential and primary end for Mary's elevation. The stanza would be true even if Mary, as we hold, had been elevated to the dignity of Divine Motherhood prior to that fall and for a higher primary reason.

There is, then, nothing in the official prayers of the Church that can be advanced as a certain argument against the Franciscan doctrine. On the contrary, there are prayers that are either best explained in the light of the Franciscan doctrine or that directly express some phase of that doctrine.

In the Roman Ritual for the blessing of the corner stone of a church we read the following prayer:¹⁴

Domine Jesu Christe, Fili Dei vivi, qui es verus omnipotens Deus, splendor et imago aeterni Patris, et vita aeterna: qui es lapis angularis de monte sine manibus abscisus, et immutabile fundamentum: hunc lapidem collocandum in tuo nomine confirma: et tu, qui es principium et finis, in quo principio Deus Pater ab initio cuncta creavit, sis, quaesumus, principium et

¹⁴ *Rituale Romanum* (1952 edition), titulus IX, cap. 9, p. 568.

incrementum et consummatio ipsius operis, quod debet ad laudem et gloriam tui nominis inchoari: Qui vivis. . . .

The prayer expressly states that Christ is the "beginning" in whom God the Father created all things in the beginning. Christ is considered the Foundation of all creation on whom God built the entire creation. And as the Foundation Christ would be the final cause of that creation as well as its Mediator. Not merely the idea but the very working of this is taken from the innumerable passages of the Churchmen in the patristic age who stated this doctrine and argued for it, using metaphorically and mystically the first verse of the Bible: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." For them this "beginning" was Christ. Of course, that interpretation of Gen. 1:1 was far-fetched, but it was a conveyor of the patristic doctrine.

It is plain that this is to be understood in the prayer of the God-man as such, and not merely of His divine nature or person. The context has in mind Christ as God-man, which is confirmed by the fact that the five phrases for describing Christ are taken from Sacred Scripture, where there is reference to Christ in His human nature as well as divine.

On the Feast of the Holy Name of Jesus all Franciscans recite a Sequence with these words:

Coelos fecit, terrae molem
Jesu nomen, atque solem,
Et coeleste gaudium.

Angelorum ingens coetus,
Protoplastesque perfectus
Fuit Jesu nomine.

The Name of Jesus, which can refer only to the God-man, made the heavens and the mass of the earth and the sun in the sense that the God-man was their final cause. He created the heavenly joy, and the immense assembly of the angels and the First Parents were perfected by the Name of Jesus in the sense that He was the Mediator of the angels and of the First Parents from the beginning. The angels received their heavenly joy through the God-man.

This doctrine is contained, likewise, in the eighth lesson for the same Office of the Holy Name, taken from St. Bernard: "Idem quippe angeli Salvator et hominis; sed hominis ab incarnatione,

angeli ab initio creaturae.”¹⁵ Christ was the Saviour of the angels as well as of men: of the angels from the very beginning of creation, namely, when they were put to the test and had to believe in Christ.

Papal Documents

The first papal document that I have found which can be quoted in favor of the Franciscan doctrine is the Apostolic Letter, *Ineffabilis Deus*, of Pope Pius IX for the Immaculate Conception, Dec. 8, 1854. In it the Pope made the now famous statement that Mary’s “origin was preordained by one and the same decree with the Incarnation of Divine Wisdom.”¹⁶ For that reason, he explained, the Church in her Offices and in the Eucharistic Sacrifice uses passages of Scripture for Mary that speak of the eternal origin of Incarnate Wisdom, Christ. Pope Pius XII quoted this phrase in his Apostolic Constitution for the definition of the Assumption.¹⁷ No longer can there be any doubt that Jesus and Mary were predestined together in one decree from all eternity. That obviously and necessarily implies that all others were not predestined with them in that first decree, but after them.

Now if it had been possible for God to predestine Jesus and Mary eternally only after the foreknowledge of Adam’s sin, this statement of the Pope might still be true. But its obvious meaning is that both were predestined eternally prior to all other creation, certainly in the first plan of creation.

The Pope, moreover, begins the Bull with these words:

From all eternity He foresaw the most sorrowful ruin of the entire human race which would follow from the transgression of Adam. And so in the mystery hidden for ages, He determined to perfect the first work of His goodness in a more hidden mystery through the Incarnation of the Word, so that man who had been led into sin by the cunning wickedness of the devil, might not perish contrary to His merciful design, and that which would be lost in the first Adam might be more happily restored in the Second Adam. In view of this, from the beginning and before the ages, God chose and appointed a mother for His Only-begotten Son. . . .¹⁸

¹⁵ St. Bernard, *In Circumcisionem Domini*, Sermo 1, n. 2 (Migne P.L., 183, 133D).

¹⁶ Cf. *Acta Pii IX* (Romae, Ex Typographia bonarum artium et in Typographia Vaticana 1854), vol. I, part 1, p. 599.

¹⁷ Pius XII, *Munificentissimus Deus*, *Acta apostolicae sedis*, 42 (1950), p. 768.

¹⁸ *Acta Pii IX*, *op. cit.*, in fn. 16, p. 597.

The Pope seems to imply very clearly that God had willed the Incarnation from the very beginning. He says that God decreed to perfect the first work of His goodness, namely, the work of creation and elevation of man to grace. He willed to do that "in the mystery hidden for ages." That mystery is the union of all mankind in Christ. The words are from St. Paul, Colossians 1:26. Now that mystery existed from the beginning. In that same mystery, which already included the Incarnation, God decided to perfect his first work by a still more hidden mystery, namely, of the redemption. That twofold "in mysterio a saeculis abscondito," and "sacramento occultiore" would be an unintelligible duplication if the first did not refer to the mystery of the Incarnation prior to the fall. How could God perfect his first work in the mystery of the Incarnation by a *more* hidden mystery, if both referred to the redemption only?

Later the saintly Pontiff writes of Mary:¹⁹

To these eulogies they [the Fathers] have added very noble words . . . for the Virgin Mother of God would not be conceived by Anna before grace would bear fruit, since it was proper that she be conceived as the firstborn, from whom "the Firstborn of every creature" (Col. 1:15) would be conceived. . . . They testify too that this same Virgin is, and is deservedly praised as, the first and peculiar work of God which escaped the fiery arrows of the evil One.

According to this, Jesus is the Firstborn of every creature, as St. Paul styles him. But since He was conceived of the Virgin Mary, it was proper that she should be firstborn too, namely, predestined with Christ before all creatures, and consequently conceived in grace. She is also the first and peculiar work of God not merely because of the great dignity of her Immaculate Conception, but because she was predestined as the first and peculiar work of God, and so escaped the fiery darts of Satan and was conceived Immaculate.

Pope Leo XIII in one of his many Rosary letters to the world, *Augustissimae Virginis*, Sept. 12, 1897, has this to say of Mary:²⁰

God predestined her from all eternity to be the Mother of the Word who would assume human flesh. For that reason He so highly distinguished her among all the most beautiful things that were in the triple order of nature,

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 611.

²⁰ Leo XIII, *Acta sanctae sedis*, 30 (1897/98), 129.

grace, and glory, that the Church rightly applies to her these words: "I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the Firstborn before all creatures" (Eccl. 24:5). But when first the world began and the authors of the human race had fallen into sin and all their offspring had been infected by the same sin, she was established as the pledge of peace and salvation that were going to be restored (Cf. Gen. 3:15).

Christ's Vicar here states that Mary was decreed from all eternity to be the Mother of the Incarnate Word, and therefore she was made the most beautiful in the order of nature, grace, and glory. "For that reason," namely, because God so exalted her in every order of creation, the Church rightly ascribes to her origin the words of Ecclesiasticus, which express Mary's priority in God's mind from all eternity, before all other creatures, necessarily in final causality, since it was not in time. That passage, then, equivalently states that Mary was the first predestined of all creatures.

After that, and in contrast to that, the Pope states that when world history actually began to unfold and the First Parents had fallen and the whole race had been infected by that sin, God established Mary as the pledge of peace and salvation that would be restored to the human race. Her existence in God's plan prior to this need as a pledge of salvation is obviously and certainly intended by the Pope in the first part. Her existence as such was independent of the fall of Adam. She had been predestined as Mother of the Word Incarnate prior to all creatures. After sin came, that same Mother was made the pledge of our salvation. It is difficult to see how any other meaning can be read into this papal document.

Indulged Prayers

In the official collection of indulged prayers there is one to Christ the King.²¹ Its opening words are these: "O Christ Jesus, I

²¹ *Enchiridion Indulgentiarum* (Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1952), n. 272. See the writer's discussion of the meaning of this prayer: "A Prayer for Peace to the Prince of Peace," *American Ecclesiastical Review*, 104 (1941), 57-63; and "A Prayer to Christ the King," *Am. Eccl. Rev.*, 107 (1942), 296-305. It is amazing how some can read into the line in question efficient causality on Christ's part instead of final causality. Dr. Breen translated: "Through Thee were made all things that were made"; Father Power read: "All that has been made has been created by Thee." Cf. Joseph Mutch, *The Acolyte*, 8 (1932), April 16, p. 10. Thomas A. O'Connor, S.J., "The Prayer to Christ the King," *Review for Religious*, 2 (1943), 281-296, has in general well chosen comments, but in regard to our line he misses the main idea. He speaks of Christ's efficient

acknowledge you as King of the universe. Everything that has been made has been created for you." This second line expressly and undeniably states that Christ Jesus, the God-man, is the final cause of all creation. Fortunately it was not worded so: "You are the final cause of all created things." Some might have twisted that to mean that all created things must be orientated toward Christ, without their having been created for His sake from the beginning. As the words stand they cannot be twisted into that limited meaning of final cause. They express outright that everything that has been made *has been created* for Christ's glory; that is, everything owes its very existence to Christ's. As we have shown elsewhere, in that case it follows necessarily that Christ was the first predestined, and that for His own glory primarily. It is interesting to note that this prayer was composed and propagated by Père Chrysostome, O.F.M., who wrote very much in defense of Christ's Absolute and Universal Primacy. In 1906, August 6, he obtained a partial indulgence from St. Pius X for it. Pope Benedict XV renewed that on May 13, 1916. Pope Pius XI granted the prayer an unusual favor by enriching it with a plenary indulgence to be gained each day on the usual conditions. So this prayer has a very high doctrinal value.

It was Pius XI too who granted a partial indulgence for an aspiration to St. Michael the Archangel: "St. Michael, first defender of Christ's Kingship, pray for us." Père Chrysostome was counselor to the person who obtained this indulgence in 1927.²² Now, the great Archangel could have been the first defender of Christ's Kingship only during the trial of the angels. He fought against Lucifer and the bad angels and was victorious, as is related in Apocalypse 12:7-9, to which the aspiration obviously alludes. The battle must have been about Christ as King of the angels. Any later battle in the history of the human race, about which we really know nothing, is out of the question, because then Michael would no longer have

causality in creation (according to John 1:3), of His absolute power over all creatures (Dan. 7:13; Isa. 9:6-7), of God's goodness as ultimate end of creation (Prov. 16:4; John 1:16; Psalms 18:2). Why not speak of Christ as the proximate end of all creation? That is what the prayer expressly asserts, and nothing else.

²² *Enchiridion Indulgentiarum* (1952), n. 443. Cf. Bonnefoy, "Un précurseur de la dévotion au Christ-Roi: Le Père Chrysostome Urrutibéhéty, O.F.M. (1853-1935)," *Studi Francescani*, 8 (1936), 411-427; cf. p. 422, fn. 2.

been the first defender of Christ's Kingship. The battle during their trial supposes, then, that the angels had a revelation of Christ as their King; Lucifer rebelled against Him; Michael and the good angels fought in His defense and were glorified through Him. That involves the truth that Christ had been predestined as Mediator and King of the angels prior to God's foreknowledge of Adam's sin. So this is another official prayer undeniably in favor of the Franciscan teaching.

This same pope in his world-letter on Christ's Kingship, *Quas primas*, Dec. 11, 1926, extolled Christ as King of all creation, including the angels.²³ If that is true, it is at least highly probable that Christ was intended as King of all creation from the very beginning. Otherwise there would have been a vast change in God's whole plan of the universe—a change introduced because of sin. Before sin, puny man would have been lord of creation; after man's sin, the God-man would have occupied that position!

In the same encyclical the Holy Father insists that Christ is King over all creation by the very fact that He is God's Son, by virtue of the hypostatic union.²⁴ By that very fact, then, Christ must be the final cause of all creatures in the economy in which He would actually exist; certainly in the sense that all creatures of that order would have to be orientated to Him and give glory to Him. But in view of the principle that the most excellent being of an order must be willed first and as the final cause of the others, Christ would have to be willed first and as final cause of all creatures in the sense that they would be given existence primarily because of Him.

Pope Pius XII

Our present Holy Father offers us a number of passages for consideration. We must begin with a sermon that he preached while Cardinal Secretary of State for Pope Pius XI. This sermon, of course, does not have the value of a papal document; it has, however, a high theological value, coming as it does from a great theologian and Papal Secretary. It was delivered to a large pilgrimage at the church of S. Luigi dei Francesi in Rome, November 28, 1937. It was first published in *La Croix* of Paris; then in the *L'Osservatore*

²³ *Acta apostolicae sedis*, 17 (1925), 595, 596, 600.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 596, 598f.

romano, Dec. 8, 1937. In 1939, it was published in a book of discourses by Card. Pacelli, after he had been elected pope.²⁵ It has been republished a few more times. The Pope has, in other words, not retracted this doctrine.

The occasion for the sermon was the seventieth anniversary of the Association of Our Lady for a Happy Death. The Cardinal developed God's plan in regard to Mary, by which he very clearly taught the Franciscan doctrine, so clearly that we need but quote it at length.

The first thought that comes to us on the topic of Mary, the Saint among all the saints, is this: Eternally, before every other creature, God had her in mind. He loved her, He chose her in order to enrich her with gifts as much as a creature can be enriched. This is the mind of the Church when she applies to Mary, with all the reserve that Faith commands, what the author of Proverbs has said of God's Son: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning. I was set up from eternity, and of old before the earth was made. The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived: neither had the fountains of waters as yet sprung out. The mountains with their huge bulk had not as yet been established: before the hills I was brought forth." (Prov. 8:22-25).

Wishing to create the world, at the beginning of time, in order to diffuse His love and to bring it about that there would exist other beings besides Himself who would be happy, God, before all things—if one may speak thus, according to our manner of seeing and acting successively—God before all things cast His eyes upon Him who was to be their Head and King. He decreed that, to redeem the human race from the servitude of sin, the Word, born of the Father, consubstantial with the Father, should become incarnate and live among us. There is God's masterpiece, the most excellent of His works. Whatever the date and circumstances of His manifestation in time would be, that is certainly what He willed first, and in view of which He made all other things (Col. 1:15-17).

Since, however, He desired that this unique object of His good pleasure be born of a woman, He cast upon you, O Mary, a glance most sweet, and predestined you to be His Mother. Eternally, the material world appeared to Him as the palace of Christ, our Head; the angels and men as His servants; Christ Himself as the Son and royal Prince; and you, O Virgin, as the most worthy Mother of His Son, God's Mother: *Sancta Maria, Mater Dei!*

²⁵ Eugenio Card. Pacelli, Segretario di Stato di Sua Santità, *Discorsi e Panegirici* (Milano: Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero," 1939), 633-634. See J. Fr. Bonnefoy, O.F.M., "Sa Sainteté Pie XII et la primauté du Christ et la T. S. Vierge, *Studi Francescani*, 37 (1940), 3-6; and Dominic Unger, O.F.M.-Cap., "The Absolute Primacy of Christ and Mary according to Pope Pius XII," *Franciscan Studies*, 8 (1948), 417-420.

Thus, my brethren, Christ and His Mother are indissolubly united in their entire history and even in their predestination. God never thought of or willed the one without the other. Both are the fruit of the same design.

Has Pope Pius XII, as Pope, taught anything similar? Three documents of the Holy Father make a distinction between the Incarnation as such and the redemption. In his first world-letter (*Summi Pontificatus*, Oct. 20, 1939), he wrote:²⁶

The same Apostle of the Gentiles shows that the unity of the human family is due to the bonds by which we are joined to the Image of the eternal and invisible God, the Son of God, in whom "were all things created" (Col. 1:16); and it is due, likewise, to one and the same redemption which Christ bestowed on all by His most bitter sufferings, when He restored the original friendship with God, which had been broken off, and reconciled men with the heavenly Father (cf. 1 Tim. 2:5).

Here the Pope notes two unities. The second is through the redemption of all men by Christ, God's Son. The first is through that same Son of God but already at creation, inasmuch as all things were created in Him, according to the teaching of St. Paul. This first unity is effected by God's Son inasmuch as He is the exemplary cause of creation and also the final cause: all things were created "in Christ." But God's Son is for this first unity also Christ as God-man, not merely in His divine nature, because it is only as such that He is the visible Image of the invisible God, and it is as such that St. Paul, quoted by the Pope, regards Him. It is in this sense that the Pope, as Cardinal, used Col. 1:15-17 (see above). Christ, then, as God-man, was the principle of unity for mankind already at creation, because He was the exemplary and final cause of all creatures.

In his world-letter on the Mystical Body, June 29, 1943, Christ's Vicar spoke of the redemption as the reason for the Incarnation,²⁷ but he did not set this down as the exclusive reason or the primary reason. In fact some passages remind one forcefully of the sermon he preached while Cardinal. He stated that Christ "is loved by God more than all men, all angels, and all things created."²⁸ He assured

²⁶ Pius XII, *Summi Pontificatus*, *Acta apostolicae sedis*, 31 (1939), p. 427.

²⁷ *Acta apostolicae sedis*, 35 (1943), cf. pp. 204-208.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, 209.

us that, though the Mystical Body exists for our usefulness, its ultimate purpose is the glory of God and of Christ:²⁹

And so, just as the Son of the Eternal Father came down from heaven for the everlasting salvation of all of us, so He established the Body of the Church, and enriched it with the Divine Spirit to care for and achieve the happiness of immortal souls, according to the words of the Apostle: "All things are yours; but you are Christ's and Christ is God's" (1 Cor. 3:23). For just as the Church is formed for the good of the faithful, so she is destined for the glory of God and of Jesus Christ, whom He sent.

We must note that he appeals to St. Paul's doctrine about Christ as the final cause of all creatures in 1 Cor. 3:23. The same doctrine, about Christ's glory as the final cause of the Church and her members, is contained in these words: "Now the end is most exalted: the continuous sanctification of the members of His Body for the glory of God and of the Lamb, that was slain" (Apoc. 5:12-13).³⁰

The Incarnation as such, apart from the work of the redemption, shows God's immense love for mankind:³¹

Now God's Only-begotten Son embraced us in His eternal and infinite knowledge and everlasting love already before the world began (cf. Eph. 1:3). To demonstrate this love in visible and most admirable manner, He united to Himself our nature in hypostatic union, so that "in Christ our own flesh loves us," as Maximus of Turin remarks with a certain candid simplicity.

In his Christmas message to the whole world Dec. 24, 1955, our Holy Father had this to say:³²

Now mankind cannot reject and forget, with impunity, God's coming and dwelling on earth, because that is essential, in the economy of Providence, for the establishment of order and harmony between man and what belongs to him, and between this and God. The Apostle St. Paul described the totality of this order in an admirable synthesis: "All are yours, and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's" (1 Cor. 3:23). Whoever would desire to allow God and Christ to fall out of this indestructible plan, retaining of the Apostle's words only man's right over creatures, would cause an essential break in the Creator's design.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, 222.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, 226.

³¹ *Ibidem*, 229f.

³² *Acta apostolicae sedis*, 48 (1956), 29.

Obviously the Pope is not speaking of a world order that followed Adam's sin, when the Incarnation was supposed to have been decreed to bring unity and order into the world plan. No; the Pontiff is speaking of an order established already at the beginning of creation. The principle of that order was Christ, the God-man, who was the final cause of all creation, according to 1 Cor. 3:23. So, the Vicar of Christ here comes back to an idea that seems dear to him: Christ is the final cause of all creation, and as such the principle of unity, of order, of harmony, in the world.

It is not surprising, then, that the Holy Father called Mary God's Masterpiece, the most marvellous of all creatures:

Do not fear to exalt too much her who is resplendent in eternity as God's Masterpiece, the most marvellous of creatures, the brightest mirror of the divine perfections.³³

In giving birth to Mary, she [St. Anne] has given to mankind the most marvellous of creatures, the most holy of women, God's Masterpiece. Is that not enough for you to love her and honor her in a unique manner?³⁴

As we noted earlier, in his Apostolic Constitution on the Assumption, the Pontiff repeats the idea of Pius IX that Mary was predestined together with Christ in one and the same decree. Obviously, prior to all other creatures. That is an idea that is dear to the Holy Father. In that sense he called Mary "the Firstborn of the Father" in his radio message to Fatima, May 13, 1946.³⁵ In the new Office for the Assumption, he approved these words for the hymn in Vespers:

O prima, Virgo, prodita
E Conditoris spiritu,
Praedestinata Altissimi
Gestare in alvo Filium.

This is a very obvious allusion to Eccl. 24:25 and a poetic expression of it: "I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the firstborn before all creatures." Mary was the firstborn, certainly not in time, nor merely in dignity, because the most excellent of creatures, but

³³ Discourse to the Congress of the International Sodality of the Children of Mary Immaculate, July 17, 1954, *Acta apostolicae sedis*, 46 (1954), 492.

³⁴ Radio Message to the Pilgrims of Britany at the Shrine of Sainte Anne d'Aray, July 26, 1954, *Acta apostolicae sedis*, 46 (1954), 497.

³⁵ "Benedito seja o Senhor," *Acta apostolicae sedis*, 38 (1946), 266.

in the intention of the Creator, having been willed before all other creatures. This is the doctrine the Pope preached when yet Cardinal.

Again in the Office for the Queenship of Mary, approved by this Pontiff, the hymn for Matins has these words:

Princeps opus formosior
Verbo creanti praeinites,
Praedestinata Filium,
Qui protulit te, gignere.

That extols Mary as the first work of the Creator Word, and the most beautiful. This is again a poetic expression of the doctrine of Mary's predestination before all creatures. And so the Virgin Mother "shone before" the Creator Word, namely, as exemplar for all creatures. That was not merely after the fall, but at creation itself, because she is exemplar for the Word as Creator ("Verbo creanti praeinites"). In the third stanza Mary's cooperation in the work of redemption is described. The second stanza, therefore, deals with her dignity and role as God's Mother even apart from redemption.

In his world-letter promulgating the Feast of Mary's Queenship, Oct. 11, 1954, the Holy Pontiff extols Mary as the Queen of all creation precisely because she is God's Mother. He also states that there is no doubt that the Most Holy Mary surpasses all created things by her dignity and that she possesses a primacy, next to her Son, above all creatures.³⁶ In keeping with what we said earlier about Christ's primacy in virtue of His Kingship, as explained by Pius XI, we can say that Mary's primacy demands that God willed her as the firstborn of all creation, together with Christ, and as the final cause of all creation. This is not forcing the Pope's words. It is the logical conclusion from what he wrote; and he himself teaches it expressly elsewhere.

In an address to Genoese pilgrims, April 21, 1940, the Holy Father addressed Mary as follows:³⁷

You, the august Sovereign of the Church Militant, Suffering, and Triumphant; the Queen of the Saints. . . . Through you the white rose of

³⁶ *Ad Caeli Reginam*, *Acta apostolicae sedis*, 36 (1954), cf. 627, 630, 635.

³⁷ *Discorsi e Radiomessaggi di Sua Santità Pio XII*, vol. 2, 2 Marzo 1940—1 Marzo 1941 (Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana), p. 85.

paradise sprouted; through you began the new era of mankind, which made loom the Church's garden of lilies, of violets, and of flowers of the sweetest and most wonderful perfumes.

In the original Italian, "per" could express mediatorial or final cause. It seems that directly mediatorial cause was meant. But that would necessarily involve final cause. If the white rose of paradise sprouted through Mary's mediation, then it did so also for Mary's glory; and *vice versa*. That the white rose is the state of innocence in paradise is certain because of the contrast with the new era of mankind, obviously after Adam's sin, which is also ascribed to Mary. By necessity, then, Mary had to be in God's mind prior to Adam's sin. This passage is an equivalent statement of Mary's absolute predestination, prior to and independent of Adam's sin, as Mediatrix already of our First Parents' grace of innocence.

The decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, approved by the Pontiff, for the safe procedure to canonization of Blessed Ignatius of Laconi, Capuchin lay brother, in 1951, begins with a quotation from a sermon of St. Lawrence of Brindisi on St. Francis:³⁸

St. Lawrence of Brindisi commented on this passage of the Gospel: "Learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart; and you will find rest for your souls" (Matt. 11:29). "Every saint and chosen soul, he wrote, is like Christ; for St. Paul said: 'Those whom God has foreknown he has also predestined to become conformed to the image of his Son, that he should be the firstborn among many brethren' (Rom. 8:29). For in that sense is to be understood this: 'God created man according to his image, according to the image of God he created him' (Gen. 1:27); that is . . . according to the image of Christ, 'who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature' (Col. 1:15)." And so Christ's human nature, "which was the first creature in the divine mind, was the archetypal exemplar of human nature, not only in regard to its natural being, but also in regard to its supernatural being of grace and glory.

If Christ's human nature was the exemplar of man's nature in its natural being as well as in its supernatural being, then only one conclusion is possible: Christ was in the mind of God the Creator before the fall of Adam was permitted, and so with no substantial dependence on sin and redemption.

In conclusion to these papal documents, we can state that we have in them at least a beginning of ecclesiastical documents in favor of

³⁸ Sacred Congregation of Rites, *Acta apostolicae sedis*, 43 (1951), 604.

the glory of Christ as the primary final cause of the Incarnation and of the Absolute Primacy of Christ.

Christ Willed Absolutely

QUESTION V: *A number of the Thomists admit that Christ was willed as the end of all creation, and some even hold that He was willed prior to other creatures, as that end, but He was still not willed absolutely, but with essential dependence on sin and the need of redemption. Are we able to refute this position convincingly?*

Yes. First, most of the Thomists who hold that combination limit the idea of "end of all creation." For them this does not mean that all creation was willed to exist in view of Christ's existence. According to them Christ was not the *raison d'être* of all creation. Christ is merely the goal toward which all creation must tend, toward which it must be orientated. Christ was willed essentially for the redemption, but once He was willed in the world plan, all creation from then on had to be orientated toward Christ.³⁹ That is a far cry from the idea that all creation was willed to *exist* for the sake of Christ; if it had not been for Christ's existing in God's mind, nothing of creation would have been willed.

That watered-down idea of Christ's being the final cause of all creation is, of course, easily reconciled with the Thomist theory about Christ's being willed essentially for the redemption. But then such a view of Christ as final cause of creation is in direct opposition to the rather certain doctrine, based on Sacred Scripture, expressed in official prayers of the Church, taught expressly by Churchmen and innumerable theologians, that Christ is the final end of the existence of all creation.⁴⁰

³⁹ A modern representative of these is R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., "De motivo Incarnationis," *Acta Pontif. Academiae Romanae S. Thomae Aq.*, 10 (1945), 7-23, 30-35; *idem*, *Christ, the Savior*. A Commentary on the Third Part of St. Thomas' Theological Summa; translated by Bede Rose, O.S.B. (St. Louis: Herder, 1950), pp. 86, 88, 95. For a critique of various Thomists on this point see Bonnefoy, *Il Primato di Cristo*, *op. cit.*, in fn. 3, pp. 43-53; 98-104.

⁴⁰ Jean-Baptiste de Petit-Bornand, O.F.M.Cap., *Pro ludium de Primatu Domini Nostri Jesu Christi et causa motiva Incarnationis*; translated from the French by Ambrosius a Saldo, O.F.M.Cap. (Barcinone: 1902), 306-317. Chrysostome Urrutibéhéty, O.F.M., *Christus Alpha et Omega: seu de Christi universali regno* (Rome-Lille, 1910, 2d edition), pp. 185-197. Francesco M. Risi,

Really, then, it is only those few Thomists who would admit Christ as the final end of all creation in the strict sense, and who would still claim that He was willed with essential dependence on sin, who need be refuted here.⁴¹ They have attempted to reconcile the fact that Christ was willed for our redemption and that all creatures were willed for Christ, by the principle of the mutual relation of causes.

True, there is such a thing as mutual relation of causes. St. Thomas acknowledged it;⁴² and Thomists appeal to him for our present problem,⁴³ though he did not have recourse to this principle for this problem. In a set of causes the efficient cause is related to the final cause, and *vice versa*. A painful cutting is related to a healing, and the healing is related to the painful cutting. The painful cutting is the efficient cause of the healing, which is the final cause. The painful cutting effects the healing. The prospect of healing moves the agent to the painful cutting.

But in that case these causes (efficient and final) are not related to each other with no priority in the mind of the agent. The end is always first in the agent's mind. The healing is prior to the cutting in the agent's mind. So the efficient and final causes are mutually related, but the final cause has priority.

But that type of mutual relation of causes is of no value here, because ours is a mutual relation of two final causes. There is a mutual relation of final causality between the soul and the body. The soul is the end of the body and exists for the good of the body. But the body is the useful end of the soul, since the soul gives life and help to the body.⁴⁴ Though we admit such a mutual relation of an essential and a useful final cause, we insist that it is not without a priority. The essential end is the real end, and it must be prior in the agent's mind to the useful end. Both ends cannot be simultaneous

Ord. S. Joan. a Deo, *Sul motivo primario dell'Incarnazione del Verbo* (1898, 4 vols.), *passim*. Unger, *art. cit.*, in fn. 1, pp. 441-449.

⁴¹ J-B. Gonet, O.P., *Clypeus theologiae thomisticae* (Parisiis: Vivès, 1876), *De praedestinatione*, disp. 2, art. 1, 9, n. 50. Salmanticenses, *Cursus theologicus*, tract. 21, disp. 2, dub. 1, n. 5, p. 267; n. 29, p. 291.

⁴² St. Thomas, *Metaphysica*, 5, lect. 2; *Summa theologiae*, par. 1, q. 23, art. 5.

⁴³ Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *art. cit.* in fn. 39, pp. 14-16; and "Causae ad invicem sunt causae," *Angelicum*, 9 (1932), 21-43.

⁴⁴ *Idem*, *art. cit.* in fn. 39, p. 16.

in the agent's mind. In God, of course, there is no priority of time, but there is a priority of final causality.

And so, granted that the essential end of the Incarnation is Christ's glory and is mutually related to the useful end—man's redemption—these ends cannot be simultaneous. The essential end must be prior to the useful end in God's mind. Moreover, that is true here by greater reason, since simultaneity would be a contradiction in terms. If Christ is the essential final cause of all creation, He must have been willed prior to all creatures, because the end is first in the intention of the agent. If He was not first, then, in spite of all the words to the contrary, He was not the final end of all creation. On the other hand, if He was willed essentially for the useful end of the redemption, then He could never have been willed prior to all creation and as the essential end of that creation. If such a plan were possible at all, at most all creation would, *post factum Incarnationis*, be orientated to Christ, but that would not fulfill the certain doctrine that Christ is the final cause of all creation for its very existence.⁴⁵

Given, therefore, the certain doctrine that Christ is the essential end of all creation, there is no escaping the conclusion that Christ was willed prior to all creatures and absolutely, that is, with no essential dependence on sin or the need of redemption.

No Escape

Resting on a solid basis in Sacred Scripture, a large number of Churchmen and theologians taught that Christ was the Mediator of Adam already in innocence, the object of his faith and the source of his grace and the hope of his glory.⁴⁶

QUESTION VI: *Granted this doctrine, is there any intelligent escape from the conclusion that Christ was predestined to exist absolutely and primarily for His own glory?*

⁴⁵ Père Chrysostome, O.F.M., "Le motif de l'Incarnation d'après l'*Angelicum* et l'*Ami du Clergé*," *La France Franciscaine*, 15 (1932), 361-408; *idem*, *op. cit.*, in fn. 12, pp. 124-149. Bonnefoy, *Il Primato di Cristo*, *op. cit.*, in fn. 3, pp. 98-104.

⁴⁶ Cf. Jean-Baptiste, *op. cit.*, in fn. 40, pp. 151-172; Chrysostome, *op. cit.*, in fn. 40, pp. 61-80; Risi, *op. cit.*, in fn. 40, vol. 4, pp. 170-178; Unger, *art. cit.*, in fn. 1, pp. 454-458.

If Christ functioned as Mediator for Adam in paradise prior to the fall, inasmuch as Christ-to-be was revealed to him and he had to accept Him through faith and received his grace in view of Christ's future merits, and hoped in eternal glory through Christ, then Christ had to be present in the plan of God already prior to the foreknowledge of sin and the need of redemption. It is then thoroughly impossible for God to have willed Christ essentially for the redemption.⁴⁷

St. Thomas' idea that God revealed to Adam the fact of Christ's coming but not the reason (namely, the redemption)⁴⁸ is absurd and most unbecoming to an intelligent God. It is purely and simply a *Deus ex machina*, to avoid admitting the absolute predestination of Christ.

Christ's Own Glory

QUESTION VII: *Again, if Christ was already revealed to the angels in their time of trial, and if the bad angels rejected Him as their King and Mediator, and if the good angels accepted Him and were for that reason admitted to beatific glory, is it possible to deny that the primary end of the Incarnation was Christ's own glory?*

First, let us note that this doctrine of Christ's being the Mediator of the angels in regard to essential glory from the beginning has a very solid basis in Sacred Scripture and in the ancient tradition.⁴⁹ It has been held by very many theologians, and is being admitted by more and more theologians every day. So it is very solidly probable to say the least.

But then it would have been impossible for God to will the Incarnation so that it would have existed only on condition that Adam would sin and God would will a redemption. By logical priority Christ had to function as Mediator for the angels prior to God's foreseeing man's sin and willing the redemption. What had taken

⁴⁷ Unger, *ibidem*, pp. 457f.

⁴⁸ *Summa theologica*, 2-2, q. 2, art. 7.

⁴⁹ Cf. Jean-Baptiste, *op. cit.*, in fn. 40, pp. 147-151; 158-172; Risi, *op. cit.*, in fn. 40, vol. 4, pp. 87-148; Constantin-M. Baillargeon, O.F.M., "A propos d'une opinion sur l'objet du péché de Lucifer," *Studium Franciscanum de théologie*, Montréal, 6 (1944), 137-180.

place, in God's plan, prior to Adam's sin, could not be undone after that sin. Christ had already functioned as Mediator of the angels, and would continue to do so.

Mediator of Angels and Men

QUESTION VIII: *All Christ's acts in the present order were meritorious in virtue of His death, by which He redeemed mankind. How, then, can we say that He merited for the angels and for Adam in innocence without being forced to hold that He redeemed them too?*

Christ's bloody sacrificial death was redemptive not merely by the fact that it was a bloody death, but because Christ so intended it. The same acts of Christ could be redemptive or only preservative by virtue of Christ's intention to redeem or preserve, respectively, depending on the condition and need of those for whom He was meriting by those acts.

From the beginning God willed Christ to be the Mediator of the angels and of man, even in paradise. The mode of the actions by which He would merit was determined by the status of His actual existence. Just as the Incarnation in substance was willed from the beginning, but the mode of that existence was determined absolutely only after the foreknowledge of sin and the need of redemption. Since Christ actually came into the world when man had already sinned and needed to be redeemed, especially by the sacrificial death, He actually merited by these acts not merely the redemption of man, but also the preservation of the angels and of man in paradise. The intention, the end He had in mind for these, acts makes all the difference in the world as to whether they would be merely meritorious or also redemptive, and satisfactory.

Arriving at Certainty

QUESTION IX: *Does the hypothetical position, If Adam had not sinned, God's Son would, or would not, have become incarnate, place the problem outside the present world order? Whether it does or does not, can we have any certainty about the answer?*

Authors are not agreed at all whether that hypothetical position places the problem outside the present world order. The Thomists,

of course, unanimously hold that from their view it does not place the problem outside the present world order. Most of the Scotists have held through the centuries that in their view, too, the problem is still in the present world order. In fact, only within the last half century or so, some Scotists began questioning the matter. Déodat Marie de Basly, O.F.M., in the beginning of this century, insisted that the hypothetical case is outside the present world order and that God has not revealed anything to us about it, and so we do not know what would have happened.⁵⁰ Father Bonnefoy⁵¹ and Father Roschini⁵² urge that we drop the discussion about the hypothesis, since we cannot know anything about it. De Basly and Bonnefoy insist that Scotus was already aware of this and for that reason approached the problem from the angle of Christ's absolute predestination.

I shall not discuss further whether the hypothetical position is outside the present world order or not. That is, after all, not the important point. The important and practical point is whether we can know anything about the matter, regardless of whether it is in or outside the present world order.

Certainly God knows what He would have done if Adam had not sinned. And it is certain too that God could have revealed that knowledge to us and we could have grasped it. The question, therefore, is, Did God reveal anything to us about it? Those who insist that we drop the whole discussion about the hypothesis, do so because they claim we can know nothing about it, since God has not revealed anything to us about it. Even St. Thomas in one place takes that stand.⁵³

⁵⁰ De Basly, *Pourquoi*, *op. cit.*, in fn. 5, pp. 394, 415, 433-444, 470-471; *idem*, "Le vrai motif de l'Incarnation. Scot aussi loin des Scotistes que des Thomistes," *Revue Duns Scot* (1911), 149-151; 167-171; 180-182; 198-201; 213-215; and with same title, *L'Ecole Franciscaine* (1912), 14-17; 33-34; 37-41; 49-53; 62-64.

⁵¹ Bonnefoy, "Primauté absolue," *art. cit.*, in fn. 5, pp. 44-47; *idem*, "Raison de l'Incarnation," *art. cit.*, in fn. 5, pp. 107-109; *idem*, "Discussio relationis Reginaldi Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *Acta Pontif. Academiae Romanae S. Thomae Aq.*, 10 (1945), 24f.; *idem*, "La place du Christ dans le plan divin de la création," *Mélanges de science religieuse*, 4 (1947), 257-284; 5 (1948), 39-62; cf. pp. 273, 43ff., 52; *idem*, "La question hypothétique," *art. cit.*, in fn. 5, 327-368; *idem*, *Il Primato di Cristo*, *op. cit.*, in fn. 3, pp. 65-74.

⁵² Roschini, *De ratione*, *op. cit.*, in fn. 2, pp. 25-26; 104f.

⁵³ *Commentarium in Epistolam ad Timotheum*, cap. 1, lect. 4: "Nescimus

But it seems to me that God actually did reveal, in the Scotist theory, what He would have done if Adam had not sinned. All the Scotists who argue from the absolute predestination of Christ to the opinion that Christ would have existed even if Adam had not sinned, admit that revelation.

It is revealed at least virtually in the revelation that Christ is the essential end of all creation. As long as God intended to create any part of the present world order even if Adam had not sinned, He would have had to will Christ, because Christ is the final cause of this world order. Christ had to be the first in God's plan, as end, and He would have had to be the last to be discarded from that world plan, if anything would be cancelled in it. To put this argument negatively, if Adam had not sinned and if Christ would then not have existed, nothing of creation could have existed, because Christ is the essential end of this creation.

This line of reasoning was advanced already by Bartholomaeus Durandus, O.F.M.Obs. († 1714):⁵⁴

Si Adamo non peccante, Christus non venisset, ut vult Gonet, sequeretur quod Adamo non peccante, Deus nihil creasset, sed hoc est falsum. Tum quia peccatum esset causa motiva creationis. Tum quia Deus non operatus fuisset omnia propter semetipsum, quod est inauditum. Probatur sequela. Deus voluit, et fecit omnia propter Christum; ergo si homine non peccante, Christus non venisset, nec ea quae propter Christum facta sunt; unde si omnia propter Christum facta sunt tanquam propter finem qui, et Christus non fuisset, Adamo non peccante, nihil fuisset.

But a century earlier St. Lawrence of Brindisi had preached this:⁵⁵

Therefore, even if Adam had not sinned, Christ would have come into the world; or else, if he had not sinned, the world would not have been created, since all things were created on account of Christ.

Unless, therefore, someone can advance a convincing proof to the

quid ordinasset [Deus] si non praescivisset peccatum." Still St. Thomas thinks the negative answer probable.

⁵⁴ Durandus, *Clypeus scotisticae theologiae* (Massiliae: 1685), vol. 3, tractatus 4, disputat. 4, p. 421.

⁵⁵ St. Lawrence of Brindisi, *Mariale (Opera Omnia 1)*, p. 80. Cf. Dominic J. Unger, O.F.M.Cap., "The Absolute Primacy of Christ Jesus and His Virgin Mother according to St. Lawrence of Brindisi," *Collectanea Franciscana*, 22 (1952), 145.

contrary, I shall continue to hold with the great Scotists of the past that Christ is the essential final cause of all creation, and so, if God would have willed any creation whatever even if Adam had not sinned, He would have had to retain Christ in His world plan. Christ was the final cause of that entire world plan.

Can the Thomists have any certainty about their conclusion? They maintain this hypothesis: If Adam had not sinned, God's Son would not have become incarnate. That conclusion is based on their opinion that the primary end of the Incarnation was the redemption of man from sin.

Evidently one cannot argue that God made the Incarnation depend on the condition of sin and the need of redemption, and so, as long as Adam would not sin, there would have been no Incarnation. That would be a very anthropomorphistic manner of viewing the problem. God did not have to await the fulfilment of the condition, Adam's sin, before willing the Incarnation. He foresaw the entire world plan eternally; He also foresaw that in the world plan He chose the condition of sin was fulfilled. And so, if He had chosen a world plan in which there would have been no sin, the whole world plan would be different. Take away sin from the Thomist world plan and there is no longer any unifying final end for the whole plan. Christ as Redeemer is the end of the Thomist world plan only after foreknowledge of Adam's sin. Before that, man himself was that final end. That is the difference between the world plan of the Thomists and the Scotists. In the Scotist world plan Christ is the final end of all creation before as well as after Adam's sin.

Thomists, however, might argue with some probability that if it is true, as they think, that Christ was willed essentially to be the Redeemer, then God would not have willed Him if there had been no sin and if God had wanted a world plan without sin. That conclusion seems probable, as St. Thomas held. However, it can be true only inasmuch as the basis of it is true: Christ came primarily and essentially to redeem men. We deny this basis, so the conclusion drawn from the hypothesis cannot be true and cannot be a reality.

Contradictory Doctrines

QUESTION X: *Can anyone who limits the Incarnation to*

the redemption speak of an Absolute and Universal Primacy of Christ?

No, they cannot. Those Thomists who make the redemption of man the essential end of the Incarnation and still speak of an Absolute and Universal Primacy hold contradictory doctrines. If Christ was willed essentially for the redemption that means that His very existence as God-man depended on the condition of sin, and He was not willed absolutely. If He was not willed absolutely, His primacy was not absolute. Nothing in the world order prior to the foreknowledge of sin could come under Christ as final cause, or as exemplary cause, or as mediatorial cause.

Because of that very thing His primacy cannot be universal in the same sense as it is for Franciscans. For Thomists the angels and our First Parents in paradise do not come under Christ as exemplary and mediatorial cause, just as they do not come under Him as final cause. Whole books, therefore, to the contrary, such a primacy cannot be universal.

In view of this, the two adjectives, absolute and universal, cover the same ground, though from a different angle. *Absolute* looks at the matter from the view of not being conditioned by any creature, especially not a sinful action of a creature. *Universal* looks at it from the view of the creatures who come under Christ's Primacy. Often we use both adjectives. We add *universal* in order to emphasize the fact that all creatures come under Christ's Primacy in regard to all causalities.⁵⁶ Really, *absolute* is the necessary and sufficient adjective to describe accurately Christ's Primacy as defended by the Franciscans. And since this is a title for a very important prerogative of Christ, I believe we should capitalize it when using it in the sense of the Franciscan doctrine, Absolute Primacy, just as we capitalize Immaculate Conception.

From all we have written, it is clear that the Thomists can speak of a Primacy for Christ. But it should be equally clear that they

⁵⁶ Father Bonnefoy seems to have been the first to use the title "Absolute and Universal Primacy" in his article cited in fn. 5. Independently of Fr. Bonnefoy, whose work I had not seen because of the war, I used the same title in my article of 1942 (fn. 1), through the influence of St. Bernardine's use of "universal" with Christ's Kingship, and Jean-Baptiste du Petit-Bornand, O.F.M.Cap.'s title *Prohodium de Primatu* . . . (fn. 40).

cannot rightly, without contradicting themselves, ascribe to Christ an Absolute Primacy, and consequently, neither a Universal Primacy. Writers should, then, be careful to distinguish clearly between the two. Certainly, theologians who follow the Scotists' teaching on the absolute predestination of Christ should never speak merely of the Primacy of Christ, if they actually mean the Absolute Primacy of Christ.

Roschini's Contribution

QUESTION XI: *Since much of the literature of the past fifteen years on this subject was occasioned by the theory presented by Father Roschini, it seems fit to ask, Did Father Roschini contribute anything new to the solution of the age-old problem?*

I hope to treat this question more at length elsewhere. For the present I wish merely to summarize my view. Father Roschini contributed nothing *new* to the problem that would help to solve it. He emphatically insists that the primary and universal reason for the Incarnation is God's free choice of the entire universe, in which are included the Incarnation and sin and redemption. That the Incarnation depended on God's free choice, as on its efficient cause, no theologian ever denied, or would ever dare deny. The theologians never questioned that; but neither are they interested in that point. They are interested in the final cause of the Incarnation. So, Father Roschini's primary reason is not a common denominator that might serve as a basis for a compromise of the Thomists and Scotists.

Even Father Roschini realized this. That is why his real attempt at reconciling the two schools is by his principle that the Incarnation and redemption are related in the one simple decree of God by a simple connexion. But from all that Father Roschini has written in explanation, it is certain that he meant these two things are simultaneous, in time, in God's one decree, and consequently had to take place in the present world economy. But again, that solves nothing. No Thomist or Scotist ever denied that in the one, simple, actual decree of God all the elements of the universe, including the Incarnation and the redemption, are present simultaneously and eternally. There is no distinction of time in God's decree. The problem of a distinction and a priority in virtue of final causality is still wide open. That is the problem here. Roschini contributes

nothing to this problem that the Scotists have not thought of long ago, from whom he actually borrowed what he does present. As for treating the whole problem from an absolute view, in place of the hypothetical case, Scotus was ahead of Father Roschini by about six centuries.

Notwithstanding that Father Roschini said that the problem of the particularistic ends of the Incarnation are not important in this matter, he did write very much about them and insisted on the Absolute Primacy of Christ, especially that Christ is the final cause of all creation. This is, of course, nothing new to Scotists. But Father Roschini's insistence on it will help to win many advocates for the doctrine.

THE PREDESTINATION OF OUR LADY IN THE FRANCISCAN SCHOOL—A SURVEY

KILIAN F. LYNCH, O.F.M.

This paper aims to review the notion of the predestination of Our Lady as presented to us by Franciscan authors in the main over the course of the past seven centuries. Important Franciscan authors, we regret, fail to appear, while at the same time the opinions of authors other than Franciscan find mention. This is due to the inaccessibility of some authors, available only in remote libraries, as well as to the unexplored scope of our topic—such material as we had at hand of necessity had to serve our purpose. The authors mentioned, however, should reflect the general trend of thought over the centuries—authors again, of necessity, in theology being mirrors of their milieu. At the outset, mention may also be made of this, that our paper is an historical review, and as it goes without saying, the bristling controversies and restless problems running through the lines of the authors we quote, as side issues to the substantial topic, must not engage our attention; otherwise, the point of our paper would become lost in digressions. The present topic has not been treated sufficiently to be mature enough for such elaborating development; the main point must suffice for the present. The explanation given the statements of any authors throughout the paper are not presented as a statement of personal conviction; whatever conclusion we may arrive at personally finds its place at the termination of the paper. Throughout, we present simply a review of the opinions of writers over the centuries.

Twelfth Century

In order that the texts that we shall later on adduce with reference to Our Lady's predestination may be seen to have had a motive in tradition giving them impetus and origin, it seems well to recall first what some few authors of the twelfth century had said with refer-

ence to the predestination of Mary's Divine Son, since the Son and the Mother being correlatives suggest one another's existence; in the natural order of things a son postulates a mother, and a mother postulates an offspring. As is well known, two authors from the first half of the twelfth century centered creation in its purpose around Christ for His glorification. The first Rupert of Deutz (†1135) writes:¹

It is to be said religiously, reverently to be heard, that for the sake of crowning this Son of man with glory and honor, God created all things. . . . Therefore, He is the cause, on account of which cause namely, God created all things. And how beautifully, how venerably He had called the sacrament hidden from all ages in God who created all things. . . . But the cause why He had made all these things was hidden in God, and therefore the cause itself is rightly called a sacrament, since this was hidden in God, that is known to God alone, that on account of which He had created the angels and ordered the fabric of this world.

But now He had made it known to the angels in the heavens and to mankind on earth, that through whom were all things made, because of Him also all things were made.

From a strict contemporary of Rupert, namely, Honorius of Autun (†1136), comes a very much greater development in the line of this same theory. The essentials of his thought are brought out in the following passage:²

The Disciple: Since it is reasonably proved that the ruin of an angel was not the cause of the creation of man, and that man was not created for an angel but for himself, I would like by the same authority of concomitant reason to be taught whether Christ would have become incarnate if man had remained in Paradise. For since all Scripture calls out Christ to have come in flesh for human redemption, it is thought that He would never have come in flesh if man, whom He was to redeem, had not sinned, and so it appears that the sin of man was the cause of the incarnation of Christ. Which, if this is so, then that sin was not an evil, indeed a great good, the cause on account of which God was made man, and consequently man God.

The Master: The whole world shouts that the sin of man with its many miseries was not a good but the highest evil. For whence does death with all its disasters reign in the world except on account of the sin of man? And therefore the sin of the first man was not the cause of the incarnation of Christ, but rather was it the cause of death and damnation. But the cause of the incarnation of Christ was the predestination of human deifica-

¹ *De Gloria et honore Filii hominis*, P.L. 168, c. 1624.

² *Libellus octo quaestionum*, P.L. 172, 1187.

tion; from eternity indeed it was by God predestined that man should be deified, the Lord saying, "Father, you have loved them before the constitution of the world," to be understood, "to be deified through me."

But just as God is immutable, so also is His predestination immutable; it was necessary, then, that this one become incarnate that man be able to be deified. And therefore it does not follow that sin is the cause of the incarnation, but this rather follows, that sin could not change the decision of God with reference to the deification of man. Indeed the authority of Sacred Scripture and manifest reason declare that God would have assumed man even if man had never sinned. . . .

If therefore Christ would have come in the first state, neither He nor man would have ever died, but already deified, the number of the tenth order being completed, he would have been associated with the angels, which indeed would have thus been done, if tempted man had not sinned. But Christ foreknowing man was to sin, and by this to die, wished therefore to come in the second state and die, that He might redeem man from death, and reduce him to the state of life. And therefore he is said to have come for human redemption, since unless he by dying had destroyed death, man would never have received the state of life after guilt. Therefore, the incarnation of Christ was the deification of human nature, His death the destruction of our death, His resurrection the reparation of our life, and in this wise according to the Apostle, "Just as in Adam all have sinned, so in Christ all are brought to life again."

For Rupert of Deutz then, all things were created for the sake of crowning the Son of man with honor and glory; He is the cause of the creation of all things, the reason present at the creation of the angels, and the designing of the world. This sacrament, or sacred thing, a hidden design of God, remained concealed in God until it became revealed in Christ.

The Disciple in the dialogue of Honorius of Autun touches the issue itself when he asks whether Christ would have become incarnate if man had remained in Paradise; the Scriptures, and by that token in this terminology tradition, appear to say that Christ would not have come had man not sinned, since He came to redeem; sin would appear a good, then, the cause of the Incarnation and its effects. Honorius, or at any rate the Master in the Dialogue, promptly replies that the sin of the first man was not the cause of the Incarnation of Christ, but rather did the Incarnation have as its cause the deification of man. Man was predestined to be deified from eternity; the cause of the Incarnation was the predestination of human deification. But, the deification of man was to take place by the assuming of flesh by the Son of God; God in his decree for

human deification being immutable, or his predestination being immutable, sin did not alter His decision. If there had been no sin, Christ would then have deified mankind by coming as immortal; sin being foreseen, He came as mortal to restore life by redeeming from death. The predestined deification of man consequently took place by the uniting of human flesh to the Son of God, and concomitantly also the destruction of death and the reparation of immortality.

Robert Grosseteste

In England, a century later, the question of the connection of original sin with Christ's coming finds rejuvenation, with a profession of novelty on the part of the debater, Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, and teacher to the friars at Oxford, who proceeds to debate the issue of the predestination of Christ in his question *De cessatione legalium* (1231-35). The following couple of texts amply illustrate his mind on the topic:³

From these and such like reasonings it could appear to be astrued that God would have become man although man had never sinned. Which, whether it be true or not, I know that I do not know, and I do not a little lament my ignorance in this part. As we have said above, I do not recall that I have seen anything determined by our authors on this point. Nor do I wish nor dare without express authority to discuss anything in such an arduous question, since a very likely reason could soon escape the smallness of my ingenuity and of my science. . . .

and again:

However, whether God would have been man, even if man had not fallen, none of the sacred expositors determine in the books which I have as yet inspected, unless my memory fails me. But, they would appear to insinuate rather that if man had not fallen, God would not have been man, and therefore, God became man only that he might repair fallen man.

However, although Grosseteste in the concluding paragraph just quoted appears very reluctant to favor the coming of Christ outside the hypothesis of sin, he, nonetheless, throughout the question offers such an abundant argument favoring the possibility of such an hypothesis, that this appears to be the hypothesis he too favors, or

³ Cf. D. Unger, O.F.M.Cap., "Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, (1235-1253) on the Reasons for the Incarnation," *Franciscan Studies* 16 (1956), p. 16 and p. 4.

at least an hypothesis that greatly impresses him. At any rate, he shows the survivance of the issue in the consciousness of tradition, bringing it into the heart of the theology of the thirteenth century.

This much may be said from the preceding texts: they evidence a tradition of the Latin world inserting already from the twelfth century the Incarnate Word of God into membership of the human family outside the occasion of sin. The discussion of the predestination itself of a Mother for that Incarnate Word comes into focus, as writers on the topic point out, in passages found throughout the writings of St. Bernard (†1153). The texts usually cited run as follows:

Because of her all Scripture was made; because of her the whole world was made; and she is full of the grace of God; and through her man is redeemed; the Word of God was made flesh, God humble and man sublime.⁴

An angel was sent to a virgin in mind, a virgin by profession, a virgin moreover such as the Apostle describes, holy in mind and body. Not newly or fortuitously found, but elected from eternity, foreknown by the Most High, and prepared for Himself, cared for by the angels, foresigned by the fathers, promised by the prophets.⁵

Each of these texts indeed exhibits something remarkable spoken of Our Lady, namely, "because of her the world was made," she was not "newly or fortuitously found but elected from eternity," "foreknown by the Most High." In other words, we see a special predilection for the Mother of the Incarnate Word from all eternity in the mind of God, and the manifestation of this predilection in time, in the creation itself of the world, in the wording of the Scriptures, and in general of the working out of the special spiritual providence of God with respect to men. These appear as the ideas foremost in the mind of the Mellifluous Doctor; a similar eternal destining of Our Lady in the Divine Mind manifests itself in the anonymous *Tractatus de conceptione B. M. Virginis*.⁶

Whatever we might understand, whatever we might conceive in our mind, whatever we might speak with our mouth, is very little and as nothing to those things which are due to you by right. For you were foreordained by before every creature in the mind of God, so that as the most chaste of

⁴ Cf. Lepicier, *Tractatus de Beatissima Virgine Maria*, p. 22.

⁵ *P.L.* 183, 63, n. 4.

⁶ *P.L.* 159, 315.

all women you might bring forth God Himself true man from your flesh, so that to all after His, your, Son, you might reign glorious, having become the Queen of Heaven, so that you might prepare to the lost world the way of recuperation and the enrolment of eternal life.

This text together with the preceding ones from St. Bernard, certainly indicates the awakening on the part of theology to a special præelection of Mary, to a special prerogative, in virtue of which she becomes segregated from mankind in general, and with Her Divine Son, accedes to a special category of choice in the decrees of God.

As to the actual popularization of the term 'predestination' as referring to Our Lady in the Latin writings of the early-middle Scholastic period, the works of St. John Damascene in translation become informative. The Burgundio version of the *De fide orthodoxa* (translation composed *vs.* 1153-1154) has the following text:⁷

Ipsa enim praeeterno praevisivo consilio Dei praedeterminata et diversis imaginibus et sermonibus prophetarum per Spiritum Sanctum significata et praepraedicata, in praedeterminato (one manuscript B has '*praedestinato*') tempore ex davidica radice germinata est, propter eas quae ad ipsum factae sunt repromissiones: . . .

A thirteenth-century manuscript of the text, then, among the oldest manuscripts, since with but one possible exception no manuscript goes beyond the thirteenth century,⁸ speaks of Our Lady's birth in a 'predestined time' (a 'predetermined time' according to other versions); again, according to the text, she was 'predetermined' in the 'preeternal foreseeing counsel of God.' Again in a *Sermo de nativitate B.V. Mariae*, of the same author, the following text occurs in translation:⁹

Dignitatem tuam praecognoscens universorum Deus, te proinde dilexit, dilectamque praedestinavit, atque extremis temporibus produxit, ac Deiparam Matrem, suisque Filii ac Verbi nutricem fecit.

What rudiments of an early Latin translation may lurk behind the translation of Mingé's edition of this sermon we do not know; but as comparison with the Greek text may show, the present text

⁷ *De fide orthodoxa*, version of Burgundio as edited by Eligius M. Buytaert, O.F.M.Cap., 87 (*Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series*, n. 8) (St. Bonaventure, Louvain, Paderborn, 1955), p. 318.

⁸ Cf. *ed. cit.*, p. XXXIII.

⁹ *P.G.* 96, 671.

does state that God foreseeing Our Lady's dignity, predestined her the beloved one, to bring her to existence in the course of the centuries as the Mother of God. In line with this same thought in the same edition of the *De fide orthodoxa* of St. John Damascene quoted above, a dominion over all creatures accedes to Our Lady:¹⁰

Essentialiter principaliter et vere Dei genetrix, et domina omnium creaturarum dominans, ancilla et mater conditoris existens . . .

The popularization of the notion of Our Lady's eternal election, with the use of the term 'predestination' makes its appearance again in the sermons of St. Anthony of Padua¹¹ († 1231):

Behold how great the dignity of the glorious Virgin, which merited to be the Mother of Him who is the firmament and beauty of the angels, the fairness of all the saints. Let us say, therefore, 'The throne of glory of the Most High from the beginning, that is, from the constitution of the world, she is predestined the Mother of the Lord God in power after the spirit of sanctification, Whence it is added: the place of our sanctification, the expectation of Israel. The Blessed Mother Virgin was the place of our sanctification, that is, of the Son of God who sanctified us.'

This brief text from St. Anthony of Padua in its almost seeming terseness and matter-of-factness, certainly deserves attention and signal attention with reference to the predestination of Our Lady. She, the expectation of Israel, the place of our sanctification, in so far as she is the place of Her Son, our sanctifier, was predestined from the constitution of the world to her position as Mother of God, Mother of our Sanctifier. If the sermon we are about to quote be authentic, St. Albert the Great likewise finds words to express for Mary a predestination of special significance:¹²

She from the beginning and before the centuries came forth from God, since for this that she might become the Mother of the Son of God she was predestined from all eternity; and therefore, nothing soiled could enter into her. For it was becoming that she, who was the future Mother of God, should be holy and immaculate.

An eternal predestination belonged to her with the beginning of

¹⁰ Cf. *ed. cit.*, ch. 87, p. 323.

¹¹ Cf. edition of Marian sermons of St. Anthony by Antonio Maria Josa, p. 50.

¹² *In nativ. B.M.*, s. 3, 1 (Borgnet 13, 563a); cf. Bruno Korosak, O.F.M., *Mariologia S. Alberti eiusque coaequalium* (Romae, 1954), p. 148.

time, before the centuries, and that to the Divine Motherhood. Hence, she must be preserved holy and immaculate from her predestination to this prerogative. In the light of the future history of the sanctification of Our Lady the terms 'predestined' and 'immaculate' here conjoined certainly amaze one, if this sermon truly belongs to St. Albertus Magnus. Another writing, the *Mariale* for long attributed to Albert, but now become anonymous, and dating to the lifetime of Albert, and after 1241, also speaks of Our Lady's predestination:¹³

The Blessed Virgin is the Mother of all goods . . . for she was predestined before the centuries that she might be the beginning from which every created thing was recreated.

The beginning of the recreation of creation, or in other words, the Mother of all goods—as such did Our Blessed Lady find her eternal predestination in God.

Though the Seraphic Doctor does not anywhere in his extensive authenticated mariological writings apply the term 'predestination' to Mary, he does however find use for the text we have already seen in St. Bernard, which text speaks of an eternal choice on the part of God for His Mother and in the line of tradition envisages that predestination.

Therefore does he (St. Luke) name the Virgin, so that it might be shown that she was prepared, not fortuitously found. Bernard: She is not newly or fortuitously found, but elected from all eternity, foreknown by the Most High, prepared for Himself, and preserved for Himself, foreknown by the fathers, promised by the prophets.¹⁴

The same text finds repetition in his *De donis Spiritus Sancti*.¹⁵ The writings of the Seraphic Doctor, therefore, though not using the term 'predestination,' show consciousness of a special predilection or pre-election of Mary, finding for it expression in the words of a century-old tradition. A sermon printed in Peltier's edition of the writings of St. Bonaventure, *Sermo de Beata semperque Virgine Maria*, is alert

¹³ Cf. *Mariale*, ed. Borgnet, qu. 145, vol. 37, p. 206; concerning the history of this work, cf. B. Korosak, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-18.

¹⁴ *Comm. in Evangel. Luc.* c. 1, n. 45 (*ed. maior*, Vol. VII, p. 22a).

¹⁵ *De donis Spiritus Sancti*, vol. VI (V, 484b).

to the predilection and preelection, and applies the actual term 'predestination' to this:¹⁶

"Look at the heavens and if you can count the stars," (Gen. 15, 5), etc. The regal Virgin born from the davidic line, predestined from eternity, by God and preelected before other creatures, prefigured by the patriarchs, foreannounced by the prophets, saluted by the angel, and preached by the Apostles, as most worthy of all praise, more than any tongue may be able to say, so that to all those things which can be said of her who is made the Mother of God, it is always less [than what is due].

The regal Virgin of the Davidic line, 'predestined from eternity by God, and preelected before all creatures' deserves such honor and our grat encomiums fail to express adequately her due praise. In her, predestination supplies the motive of this great honor. Granted the dubious authorship of this sermon, the foregoing constitutes the only advertence the Seraphic Doctor has made to the predestination of Our Lady, the scantiness of which is truly remarkable in the light of his not meagre Marian writings.

While the outstanding doctors of the next three-quarters of a century, namely, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, did not explicitly discuss the question of the predestination of Our Lady—what we have just said previously being kept in mind with reference to St. Bonaventure—nor, at least, as far as the Angelic and Marian Doctors are concerned, use the term 'predestination' in speaking of her place in the providence of creation and sanctification, nonetheless, it is well to advert, that, according to the expressed mind of each of them, a well-defined place for that predestination, and indeed for such a singular predestination as the Scotistic School awards her, may be found in their scientific theological writings.

St. Thomas

The Angelic Doctor, the Prince of Theologians, remarks earlier in his *Commentary on the Sentences*:

Some however say that since through the Incarnation of the Son of God not alone was freedom from sin made, but also the exaltation of human nature and the consummation of the entire universe, therefore even sin not having existed, for these causes the Incarnation would have taken

¹⁶ *Ed. Peltier*, t. 14, p. 106.

place. And this also with probability can be sustained. III *Sent.*, d. 1, qu. 1, art. 3, ed. Moos, p. 22.

Later in the *Summa Theologica* as indeed elsewhere, while he manifestly favors as the purpose of Christ's coming solely the redemption of mankind, he yet continues to extend the same liberty of probability to the opinion spoken in the *Sentences*:

I answer that it is to be said that some with respect to this have differently opined. For some say that even if man had not sinned the Son of God would have been incarnated. Some however assert the contrary, to whose assertion one should the more assent, it would appear. For those things which proceed from the will of God alone, over and beyond everything due to a creature, cannot become known to us except in so far as they are handed down to us in Sacred Scripture, through which the divine will is made known. Whence, since everywhere in Sacred Scripture from the sin of the first man the reason of the Incarnation is assigned, more conveniently is the work of the Incarnation said to be ordained by God in remedy against sin, so that sin not having existed the Incarnation would not have been, although the power of God is not limited to this; for God could become incarnate even sin not existing. *Summa Theologica*, III, q. I, art. 3.¹⁷

Although the theology of the Angelic Doctor finds its orientation from the hypothesis that Christ's coming was for man's redemption purely, as we see, nonetheless, from the texts both of his *Commentary* and of his *Summa Theologica*, he does uphold the possibility of another tenable opinion, the opinion, namely, that the exaltation of human nature and the consummation of the entire universe, awaited the Incarnation of Christ as its cause; "this with probability can be sustained." The power of God, he says, is not limited to the existence of sin for calling into existence the Incarnation of Christ, "for God could have become incarnate even sin not existing." One should the more assent, however, he says, to the opinion that the Son of God would not have become man had man not sinned. In the full consciousness of the incessant pounding out of the opinion which St. Thomas personally favored, it becomes refreshing to remember that he did himself indicate the valid probability of another opinion, different than his own, both in his *Commentary* and in his *Summa Theologica*.

¹⁷ Cf. Ottawa edition, *ibi*, col. 2418a.

St. Bonaventure

From the *Commentary on the Sentences* of the Seraphic Doctor, the following text suffices:

Some wished to say that with respect to the incarnation one may speak in a twofold way. For the incarnation is the assumption of flesh; but of the assumed flesh one may speak in a twofold way, either with respect to the substance, or with respect to the defect of passibility. If one speaks of it with respect to the defect of passibility and mortality, they say that the principal reason of the incarnation was the redemption of human kind. For unless man had sinned and fallen and was to be redeemed, Christ would not have assumed mortal flesh. But if we should speak of the incarnation according as it bespeaks the assumption of human nature, speaking simply, they said thus, that the principal reason of the incarnation was not the liberation of human kind, since even if man had not sinned Christ would have become incarnate, but the reason of it is the multiple perfection arising from the dignity of this work. For the incarnation makes for the perfection of man, and consequently for the perfection of the whole universe, in this, that it completes and gives completion to human kind, according to that which has reference to nature, and according to that which has reference to grace, and according to that which has reference to glory. . . . And by reason of this multiple perfection which arises from the work of the incarnation it was congruous that God should become incarnate. And since this multiple perfection not only looks to the state of fallen nature, but indeed also looks to the state of nature well instituted, therefore if man had not fallen, nevertheless God would have become incarnate, since thus it suited man to be perfect, according to nature, and according to grace, and according to glory, as if he were in the lapsed state, and in a certain wise more, and this according to this opinion. . . .

But it was the opinion of others that the principal reason of the incarnation is the reparation of human kind, although there are many other reasons of congruity annexed to this. For this is the main one with respect to all, since, unless human kind had fallen, the Word of God would not have become incarnate. And the reason of this is that the incarnation of God is of superexceeding dignity; and therefore since there is there some excess, the mystery of the incarnation would not have been introduced, unless the opposed excess had preceded to be corrected and restored through it. Whence unless God had lost the sheep, He would not have descended from heaven to earth.

The Seraphic Doctor however concludes:

. . . therefore it is to be conceded that as the foresaid authorities and reasons show, the principal reason of the incarnation was the redemption of human kind, although many other reasons of congruity are annexed to this reason. *III Sent.*, d. 1, art. 2, qu. 2. (*ed. min.* pp. 19-21).

The quite thorough question of the Seraphic Doctor has much

wider ramifications than these few translated texts lift out, but these at least manifest the Seraphic Saint as giving recognition to two opinions on the probable reason for the Incarnation. According to the first opinion, since the absence of Christ would leave any consequent state of man in a sense a fallen state, akin to that of our first parents after sin, the dignity of the work of the Incarnation itself was something necessary as complementary to, supplementary to, or consummative of, creation itself. The creation of human kind, and consequently of the universe itself, finds its completing perfection in Christ, and that, whether we consider man with reference to nature, or with reference to grace, or with reference to glory. However mankind be considered, it is a fallen race without Christ. However, since the Incarnation bespeaks a superexceeding dignity, an excess of some kind, it postulates an opposed excess which it came to correct and restore. The Seraphic Doctor on this and other reasons elects, then, for an Incarnation postulated by a fallen man. His opposition to an Incarnation irrespective of sin cannot be considered absolute, however, and even his question itself on this topic affords reason valuable to such an hypothesis.

These two great doctors of the thirteenth century, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, can then have a positive value toward the doctrine of the predestination of Our Divine Lord irrespective of sin, and undoubtedly as so intimately connected with this, toward the predestination of His Most Holy Mother, and whatever adamant opposition they—and especially the Angelic Doctor—may be posited as placing, in the light of a later theology, that opposition may in the light of these their own writings themselves be said to be colored with a strong tinge of probability. Such a *mise au point*, we believe, has its significance in the thread of this paper.

Blessed Raymund Lull (1315) in his quite personal manner of writing consummates the line of thought proceeding from Rupert of Deutz with respect to the predestination of the Incarnate Word outside the hypothesis of sin, when he proceeds to place the Mother with the Son in the primal decrees of God respecting creation. The following passage from his *De articulis fidei*, somehow, though, inadequately, express his interpretation:¹⁸

¹⁸ Cf. *De articulis fidei*, in Raymundi Lulli Opera, Argentorati, 1651, pp. 945, 946, 949.

The divine wisdom since it is the most perfect, knows and comprehends that greatest love which God can have for human nature; it is necessary then that the divine will loves the act of that greatest love which wisdom knows, so that between the divine will and the wisdom there be a concordance, but the greatest grade of love which divine wisdom knows it can have for human nature is that it should unite human nature to itself in the union of a supposit; therefore, the will loves that grade; and if it loves it, it will make it; therefore, there will be an incarnation. . . .

Human nature, therefore, participates more since it is the child of God with the person of the Son of God than with the person of the Father or the Holy Spirit, neither of whom is the child of God, since also the person who must become incarnate and assume human nature must be born, as is proven in the following items, and nativity better and more properly belongs to the Son than to the Father, or the Holy Spirit. Likewise, the incarnation better and more properly belongs to the Son than to the Father, or the Holy Spirit. . . .

In the second place, we prove that he must be born of woman. For every true nativity of man is from a woman, for it belongs to a woman to conceive and to support conception, and to nourish and to bring forth the nourished; but this is not of the nature of man; but the person of the Son of God must be conceived a true man, and born a true man; therefore, he must be born of woman. . . .

In contemplating human nature, the divine wisdom is aware of the greatest love it can accord it. The concordance between the will and the wisdom postulates the will willing that greatest love in act, *viz.*, the personal union of human nature with the divine through the Incarnation. Nativity belonging to His nature to the Son, the Son thereby becomes the subject of implementation of this divine act of love. That the Son be true man requires a true nativity, from a woman, Our Blessed Lady. Whatever may be said of this ratiocination of Lull, it posits the Incarnation of a divine Person as associated with human kind through the Incarnation of the Son of God, and the nativity of that Divine Person from a human mother. These two are posited as the exemplification of God's greatest gift of love, with which human nature was destined to be adorned.

Duns Scotus

We may finally quote the Subtle Doctor, Duns Scotus, through whose influence the opinion removing the necessity of sin from the event of the Incarnation of Christ gained a momentum which carried it across the centuries; a few brief quotations suffice:

Without prejudice it can be said that since the predestination of anyone to glory must precede naturally from the part of the object the foreknowledge of sin, or of the damnation of anyone, according to the last opinion stated in dist. 41 of the first book, all the more is this true of the predestination of that soul which was predestined to the highest glory; for universally one ordinally willing first appears to will that which is nearest the end, and thus since he first wills glory to someone than grace, so also among the predestined, to whom he wills glory ordinally he would first appear to will glory to him whom his wishes to be next to the end, and thus to this soul he first wills glory than he would will it to any other soul, and first to any other glory and grace than he would foresee the opposite of these habits to him.

But all the authorities can be explained in this wise, namely, that Christ would not have come as a redeemer, unless man had fallen, nor perhaps as passible, since there was not any necessity that that soul glorious from the beginning to whom God had forewilled not alone the highest glory, but also what was consort to that soul (translator's note: *unio ista in Verbo in ordine ad gloriam*, cf. *ibid.* ed. Balic, p. 2) that it should have been united to a passible body. But neither would a redemption have to be made unless man had sinned; but it does not appear that God had predestined that soul to such glory on account of this alone, since that redemption or glory of a soul to be redeemed is not such a great good as is that glory of the soul of Christ; nor is it likely that such a highest good in beings be only occasioned because of a less good alone, nor is it likely that he should first have preordained Adam to such a good than Christ, which would follow however. Indeed, and that more absurd still would follow, namely, that in predestining Adam to glory he should have first foreseen him to fall into sin than he should have predestined Christ to glory, if the predestination of that soul was only for the redemption of others.

It can therefore be said that first according to nature than he he had foreseen anything with respect to the sinner, either concerning the sin or the punishment, God had forechosen to the celestial curia all whom he wished to have both angels and men, in certain and determined grades, so that no one is predestined only because another is foreseen to fall, so that thus no one must rejoice on account of the fall of another. Oxon. 1. III, dist. 7, qu. 3 (ed. Balic, *Theologiae Marianae elementa*, p. 4-7).

The following brief text from the *Opus Parisiense* or *Reportation of Paris* reflects another well known argument of Scotus:¹⁹

I say therefore thus: First God loves himself, in the second place he loves Himself in others, and this is chaste love; in the third place he wishes himself to be loved by him who is able to love him in the highest way, speaking of someone extrinsic to himself; and in the fourth place he foresees the union of that nature which must love him in the highest way, even if no one should fall.

¹⁹ Cf. ed. C. Balic, *Theologiae marianae elementa*, p. 14-15.

The opinion of Scotus redounds to this. God predestining the elect to glory does not condition his choice, or determine it, consequent to anyone's reprobation. The consummate glory of Christ through the hypostatic union constituted the end in view of God. His decree respecting all predestination willed this first; then, willing all predestination by design, He willed the predestination of others to glory with respect to the predestination of Christ. Again, predestination to glory for all, namely, the end, came anteriorly in design to predestination to grace, the means. The plan of predestination, then absolute, does not as such rest upon, or depend upon, preceding sin, since the plan of predestination frustrates the occurrence of any sin whatever. Sin, then, in any event, lies outside the special providential plan of God respecting all predestination. This applies also to original sin respecting predestination of Christ. Furthermore, Christ's having a passible body cannot connect a redemption necessarily with the Incarnation, since neither the hypostatic union nor the soul of Christ postulated any such body. He became passible in body, therefore, only for the redemption, but not for the incarnation. Scotus finds several convincing motives to bolster his predestination theory. Since the glory of Christ's soul so far exceeds the glory of a redeemed soul, the former cannot have been willed merely for the latter. The hypostatic union, with all its consequences cannot merely have been occasioned by such a lesser good as a soul to be redeemed. The consequent hypothesis likewise would posit God's predestining Adam to glory anterior to Christ—something of itself most unlikely. Finally, what Scotus calls absurd, again in the contrary hypothesis, God would have willed the predestination of Christ to glory only subsequent to foreseeing Adam to fall. Contrary to all this, then, God decreed His plan respecting the predestination of all to the heavenly court in all its outline before any prevision of sin, such that none depend for their predestination on the fall of others. From his *Reportatio* we find another reason for the absolute predestination of Christ, namely, the will of God to be loved by someone capable of loving Him in the highest way, the soul of Christ, which will determined the existence of Christ and others regardless of sin.

However these reasons of Scotus may appear to us, the influence of his defense of a notion already present to the tradition of ecclesi-

astical literature became sufficient to provoke its adoption by a formidable army of succeeding theologians, who resolutely proceeded to push it as a rudder across the six centuries of succeeding Christology. Scotus himself did not breathe one word of the predestination of Our Lady. But such an embedding of Christ necessarily in the family of human kind, as his theory demanded, falling with such a resolute defense in a literature already germinating that idea, as we have seen, and already fostering it along the style of Scotus, as for example in Raymund Lull, inevitably found the Mother to couple with the predestination of the Son in the most natural bloom of Scotus' thought. His disciples were to do this for him.

His favorite disciple, John of Bassolis († 1333), makes this explicit uniting of Our Lady to Scotus' theory on the predestination of her Son. The following brief passages quoted from Fr. Balic's²⁰ article on the history of that predestination brings this sufficiently into evidence:

Si homo non peccasset nihilominus Virgo fuisset mater Dei. Sed hoc supposito Deus fuisset incarnatus; ergo etc. Probatio maioris, quia si homo non peccasset adhuc beata Virgo praedestinata fuisset, sicut dictum est de Christo, et in secundo gradu post Christum.²¹

Again:²²

She would never have been predestined to such a grade of grace and glory unless she had been foreseen to be the mother of God; therefore, etc. You will say: Therefore the prevision of the maternity of God was the reason of the predestination. I say that I do not intend to say this, but, whether this prevision was the reason or not, whether it preceded or whether it followed the predestination, it suffices that with respect to this same person, it was congruent that such grace, and such glory, and the divine maternity, should concur; therefore, etc.

Outside the event of sin, Bassolis says, Our Blessed Lady would have come into existence, and as the Mother of God, predestined in the second place, after Christ. The order of predestination to grace

²⁰ Cf. Charles Balic, O.F.M., "La Predestination de la Tres Sainte Vierge sans la doctrine de Jean Duns Scot," *La France Franciscaine*, IIIe serie, (1936), t. XIX, p. 114FF.; cf. p. 116.

²¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 116, Bassolis, III *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 5, Parisiis, 1517, f. 195a.

²² *Ibid.*

and glory places Christ first, Our Blessed Mother next, and then others; wherefore, the association of the divine maternity with her who held the second place of grace and glory in God's eternal predestination, becomes in all wise suitable. The Scotistic theory grows with Francis of Mayronis²³ († 1328) positing the eternal predestination of Christ with Our Lady's sanctification included in that predestination, she being his predestined Mother:

I say that (Mary was sanctified) in a quadruple way, namely, first, in the active predestination of God, since just as from all eternity He predestined His Son to become incarnate, so He preordained His Mother to be sanctified.

An eternal predestination of the sanctification of Our Lady arose from her association with the eternal predestination of her Divine Son. Elsewhere, in the *Sermo de laudibus sanctorum* he places Our Lady as the first willed, after that Son:²⁴

Just the same as the light the most beautiful, the most noble, the most diffused of material creatures, had been the first willed, in the same way the Virgin who is the most beautiful, the most noble, and the greatest of intellectual creatures, had been the first willed.

A strict contemporary of Mayronis, Ubertino of Casale († 1330), the vacillating figure and well-known author of the *Liber vitae crucifixae Jesu*, offers several texts bearing on the predestination of Mary. We have chosen the following as indicative of his thought:²⁵

Indeed blessed Jesus just as He created all marvellous things in wisdom, so too that Blessed Virgin His Mother He so created in time such as He had chosen her in His most Holy eternity. . . .

But, although the Son of God could have assumed flesh from whatever matter He wished, it was most consequent however that He should accept flesh from the most Blessed Virgin, first. . . . A fourth reason can also be added; since by this the eternal predestination which had chosen the Blessed Mother to the dignity of the maternity with virginity, in this way fulfilled this itself, exalting her above every pure creature inestimably.

The Most Blessed Virgin, the living arc of divinity, exists the first creature predestined.

²³ Francis de Mayronis, *Serm. de conceptione*, ed. Alway Astorga, p. 223.

²⁴ *Sermo de laudibus sanctorum*, ed. Venetiis, 1493, f. 95r.

²⁵ *Liber vitae crucifixae Jesu*, (s.f.), Venetiis 1485; the quotations appear in the following order, *Lib. I*, cap. 6, *Lib. I*, c. VIII, *Lib. I*, cap. II, *Lib. I*, cap. VIII.

Furthermore in this word 'obumbrabit tibi' that which He will overshadow is contained, that is, he expresses all the way around that not alone will the Virgin be purged in herself from the root of the fomes, and perfected in every virtue, ineffably, but also that this shadow will be extended to the circumference of all the elect and of the sons of God, so that all may be purged and perfected according to that measure according to which they are inviscerated in Christ and conceived from the maternal flesh.

The appearance of Our Blessed Lady in time corresponded to what the divine choice had endowed her with from eternity. This divine choice rested in a divine maternity with virginity whereby eternal predestination had exalted her above any creature whatever save the sacred humanity of Christ. As the living arc of divinity she is the first predestined creature. Conceiving Christ of the Holy Ghost, the shadow of the Holy Ghost extends itself not only to her, but purging her from everything of sin, and exalting her ineffably above all others, it makes her and Christ together the progenitors of all the elect, or, again, it makes her the Mother not alone of Christ, but of His Body, the elect. Her spiritual maternity flows from her divine predestination to the divine maternity, and from all eternity.

The following text of John Baconthorp († 1348) has its interest in so far as it shows the presence of the notion of the predestination of Our Lady coupled with the belief in her having contracted original sin:²⁶

For although as a daughter of Adam and descended (from him) by natural filiation, she had contracted original sin; however, as she was predestined as the future Mother of Christ, Anselm holds that she did not contract it, in the tractate entitled *De conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis*. . . .

A pervading alertness to the Blessed Mother's predestination whereby her immunity from original sin became assured speaks by contrast with the preceding text of Baconthorp through the following lines from Petrus Thomae: († 1350)²⁷

Secondly, since the Virgin as the Church holds, was holy before she was born, which is not stated except for the fewest of the predestined; in the

²⁶ Quod. III, qu. 12 (cf. Archangelo De Roe, 'Il dottore dell'Immacolata' in *Regina Immacolata*, Romae, 1955), p. 112, n. 10.

²⁷ *De conceptione B. Mariae Tractatus* (ed. Alva y Astorga, p. 231), *Lib.* II, pars II, chap. IV, and *ibid.*, *Lib.* III, c. XVIII (ed. cit., p. 274).

third place since the Virgin among all the predestined was singularly privileged, therefore some argument could conclude the suitableness of some excellence of the Virgin which could not conclude to a similar excellence in other predestined. It is, therefore, apparent that it became the Holy Spirit, Who prepared a dwelling place in the flesh of the Virgin for the Son of God, to preserve this Virgin from every contagion of sin.

Indeed, Mistress, whatever we should understand, whatever we should conceive in our mind, whatever we should profess with our mouth, is very little and indeed as nothing. You, I say, in the mind of God, were pre-ordained before every creature, so that of all women, you the most chaste, should bring forth God Himself true man from your flesh; so that beside your Son, become the Queen of heaven, you should reign, so that you might prepare a way of reparation, and the benefits of eternal life to a lost world.

From the singular privilege of predestination accorded the Virgin, Petrus Thomae argues to her Immaculate Conception. The singular privilege of predestination resided in the divine maternity; for that, was Our Lady elected before all creatures, 'to bring forth God Himself true man' from her flesh. As a consequence to this privilege of predestination, Our Lady reigns beside her Son as Queen of Heaven, and a means of grace to the world.

Toward the end of the same century Bartholomew of Pisa († 1401)²⁸ reiterates the same predestination when he writes:

Concerning the first fruit, that the Blessed Mother is predestined by the Lord before all, this is apparent from Solomon, Prov. 8, "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning," and it follows, "I was set up from eternity," etc. Through that of Syrac, Ecclus. "I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the firstborn before all creatures," and it follows, "From the beginning and before the world was I created, etc." And since Mother Church places this as said of the Virgin, the proposition is apparent.

A striking text from early in the first half of the fifteenth century, and from the pen of the extremely popular preacher, Bernardine of Siena, († 1444) sustains, enriches, and serves to establish popularly the doctrine on the question of Mary's predestination:

Whence from this it manifestly becomes clear that every corporeal nobility conceded to human kind in Adam by the Lord, was principally given that it might descend by many generations unto the Virgin, and through the Virgin Mother be terminated in Christ. . . .

²⁸ *Liber conformitatum Vitae Mariae et Iesu* (s.f.); we quote ms. version of Franciscan Institute Library.

And that I might enclose all in a brief word, I do not doubt but that all the liberations and indulgences made by God in the Old Testament, God made only out of reverence and love for this blessed girl, by which God had preordained her in his predestination from eternity to be honored before all His works.²⁹

Any physical comeliness belonging to human nature belongs to it as given it by God in Adam that it might envelop the Virgin Mother of Christ, and thus envelop Christ. The reverence and love of God for the Mother of His Divine Son, moved God in the history of mankind to spare mankind that mankind might bear this girl preordained by divine predestination from eternity—as the Mother of the Son of God—to be placed in honor before all His creation.

St. Antonine († 1457), the contemporary saintly bishop of Florence, a member of the Order of Friars Preachers, wishes to adorn Our Lady likewise with a singular predestination as we see from the following texts:³⁰

In this book (of predestination) there is not a priority of time, so that the divine mind should first know one and then afterwards another, but a priority of dignity, so that that may be said to be first written which is disposed as being more noble and more perfect to be done. . . . And in this wise the Blessed Mother can say, 'In the head of the book,' namely of divine predestination, 'it is written of me,' since from eternity God foreknew and foreordained that a Virgin should be conceived and born in His time who would be more holy than the universal pure creatures even the angelic, so that she would be more excellent in grace and glory than every pure creature; whence it is sung of her, 'Elegit eam Deus et praelegit eam,' preordaining from eternity and pre-choosing her, that is, before all others He disposed to make (her) more excellent. In the generations therefore of the centuries, according as the things to be created were disposed in the divine mind, there was the memory of this Virgin from all eternity as something most singular.

and again:

In the second place the Blessed Mother is said to be a book by reason of its writing. For the writing of a book is nothing other than the "em-papared" word, (*verbum inchartatum*), that is, incorporated in paper, and represents the Word of God incarnated in the Virgin. . . . This book, the Blessed Mother, was in the right hand of God, that is, in the predestination of God and in preelection to all, written with habits inside in the

²⁹ *Ed. Quaracchi, 1950; Tome II, p. 372; Serm. in Fer. Quar. post Resurr.*

³⁰ *Summa theol. IV, c. 4, tit. 15 (ed. Veronae, 1740), pp. 928-929, and ibid., c. 5, p. 938.*

soul, and with the acts of the virtues outside, or exteriorly in her exterior conversation. The seven seals are the seven figures of her most holy nativity. *Ibid.* p. 938.

Though the divine predestination of Our Lady did not involve a priority of time, but rather a priority of dignity, nonetheless, from all eternity in the mind of the Most High a priority was hers, her priority as being something most singular, more holy than all other creatures including the angels, and as someone written first on the book of predestination to be conceived and born in God's good time. In the predestination of God, by preelection to all, she, a book, inclosing the Word of God, was written by God interiorly in habits of grace, and exteriorly in acts of the virtues, such as worthily to adorn the office of her divine maternity.

Robert of Carraciolo

The sermons of another author and preacher of the second half of the fifteenth century, Robert of Carraciolo († 1475) manifest a remarkable development of attention to the topic of Our Lady's predestination. The existence of the Mother of God's Divine Son preceded in the Divine decision existence with respect to any other creature—the inclusion of the Incarnate Son of God being understood as enclosed in the decree of existence with respect to the person of His Mother:

Thus God before anything of creatures in his firm and immutable will had proposed to create a most holy virgin girl who would be the future mother of His Only-begotten Son, the residing place of the Holy Spirit, the gate of Paradise, and the Queen of Heaven.³¹

Robert then proceeds to interpret the meaning of such a predestination:

And if it be said that she (the Church namely in applying to Our Blessed Lady well-known texts from Eccles. and Prov.) speaks with reference to the being which she had in the divine mind, not in the proper genus, neither in this wise should we have spoken the truth, since according to the doctrine of Dominus Bonaventure, I Dist. 1, all which are now, and which were produced by God, and will be produced until the end, were from all eternity in God according to causative power and according to

³¹ *Sermones de sanctis*, ed. (Venetiis, 1490), *Sermo de conceptione Virginis*, f. 80r.

the presence of similitude, which however have from time actual existence. The elements thus and the celestial bodies, the angels and men, and all those things which are, were in the divine mind before they were; therefore this does not any more belong to the most worthy Virgin than to the rest of creatures. And if we should say that the Virgin was in her proper being or genus before every creature, then the adversaries of our religion or of our faith can laugh at us, since the Blessed Virgin was born from Joachim and Ann in the sixth age of the world. . . .³²

To this objection Robert proceeds to supply an answer, quoting St. Augustine as indicating four ways in which one thing may be prior to another, the fourth being *dignitate vel electione*:

The Blessed Mother was therefore prior to every creature except the created nature of her beloved Son by election of dignity . . . and if it be said that the angels are more excellent and have greater dignity than men, since they are intellectual substances, how can the Most Holy Virgin exceed the angelic sublimity, to this we can answer from the words of St. Bonaventure, I, Dist. 40, in the question whether God could make the Virgin better, that the Blessed Virgin can be considered in a threefold way, first with respect to the state of her natural condition, and thus she was placed a little less than the angels. For an angel according to its essential nature is more powerful than the Virgin. In the second place with respect to the grace of conception, which was given her that she might conceive Christ and be His Mother most true, and in this respect she transcends the dignity of all creatures, of all men, and of all angels, for in this one consent when she said, "Behold the handmaid of the Lord," she merited more in consenting to the conception of Christ than all creatures, either angels or men in all their acts, motions and thoughts. And indeed all whosoever merited, could not merit more except, according to the diverse states, the glory of eternal felicity. But this Virgin by her most glorious consent merited the primacy of the world, the dominion of the universe, the extinction of the fumes, and the plenitude of all graces, gifts, and virtues, the sceptre of the kingdom over all creatures, fecundity in virginity and the maternity of the only begotten Son of God, and that she should be adored in the Kingdom of heaven with an adoration more worthy than dulia. In the third place the Blessed Virgin can be considered with reference to the excellence of her glorification, since as the Church sings, 'the Holy Mother of God is exalted above the choirs of the angels to the celestial kingdoms.' For she namely was that singular individual, that although not in nature, however in grace, and glory, is placed to preside over the angels. But the dignity of grace and all the more the dignity of glory incomparably transcends the dignity of nature. . . . I dare to say that because of the Virgin conceived in the divine mind for many thousands of years before she was born, the human race was preserved in being. . . . But because of the outstanding reverence which He had for the Virgin, since He loved her from eternity above all the creatures to be

³² *Ibid.*, f. 80r.

created, which were not to be united to God, our first parents were preserved and were not reduced into nothingness. The reason is that this girl was in the loins of Adam according to seminal reason, and the potency of producing this girl was impressed on our first parents until it should be brought into act. For from her had to be born Jesus, who was in Adam only according to corpulent substance, but who must be brought forth from the Virgin and from none other. God therefore was indulgent to our first parents nor did He annihilate them, since thus the Blessed Virgin would not have been born, and consequently, neither would Jesus or God have vested human flesh. Therefore through this noble creature God saved our first parents, from the first transgression, and Noe from the flood, and Abraham from the slaughter of the kings. . . . And briefly, all the indulgences and liberations made in the Old Testament, I do not doubt but that God made, only for the love and reverence of this girl whom God had preordained from eternity to preside over all his works.³³

In a beautiful passage, Robert continues to indicate further the necessity of Our Lady's coming to complete the perfection of the world, or rather to be the completion of its perfection:

Therefore the power of the Holy Spirit was in the Virgin, who in the conception of her Son filled all natures and parts of the world with ultimate perfection. And indeed God in the creation of the world produced nothing imperfect, but all things were perfect as their nature demanded. However, the consummation of ultimate perfection was delayed until the birth of the Virgin, and reserved to the Virgin alone. For beings desired the most noble being, spiritual things the most noble spirit, rational things the most noble thing rational, conceptions the highest conceptions, nativities the greatest thing nascible, and briefly all creatures sought the best. But all these existing imperfect thus was it provided for the world in a woman blessed above all who by her only childbearing brought the highest and last perfection to all genus of things. And it is to be adverted to that this girl brought such perfection to the universe that it is not capable of any ulterior perfection. Neither can God perfect this world with any further perfection. And if the Father himself and the Holy Spirit were to be born of a woman nothing of perfection would accrue to the world, since whatever there is of divinity, whatever there is of deity, whatever there is of eternity, all had been diffused in the world and produced through the Virgin, in that eternal supposit that the Virgin Mary generated. Neither is it a great thing to the Virgin that she brought the last perfection to the perfection of the world, since even to the author itself of the universe, she added some perfections, as for example, to the eternal principle of inconception a beginning, to the divine eternity a temporal period, to immense infinity corporeal quantity, to eternal comeliness a new beauty; to her therefore alone it belonged as a Virgin to conceive Christ, and to be His most admirable mother. . . . For although the Blessed Virgin was also superior to the angels in acceptionation by divine predestination, and in so

³³ *Ibid.*, f. 80v.

far as the dignity was concerned to which she was divinely chosen, she was however inferior to them in virtue of her state, since she was in the state of the present life, the angels however in the state of the fatherland.³⁴

A brief résumé of the thought of the preceding passage must suffice. Before all creatures God proposed to Himself or decided to create the Blessed Mother of His Only-begotten Son. Though everything created or to be created existed from all eternity in the mind of God, the Blessed Mother existed therein with a priority over all other creatures, the created nature of her Divine Son excepted. Any such priority of dignity does not emanate from her natural condition, inferior as it is necessarily to the angelic, but rather from her divine conception, in acquiescing to which she merited a dignity as Mother of God, transcending that of angels and men in all their acts, and motions and thoughts. Whereas their merit must terminate with the glory of beatitude, hers by her divine conception reaches unto the primacy of the world, the dominion of the universe, the plenitude of all grace and virtue, the sceptre of the Kingdom above all creatures, and a title to a species of veneration exceeding that due all other beatified, saving the human nature of her Son. The dignity of her grace and glory surpassing any inferiority she possessed by nature exalts her to a position transcending the rest of all creation placing her in election to glory beyond the angels. Because she was chosen as the first and most worthy she became endowed with the divine maternity, and endowed with it, she ascended to her position as the first and most worthy of the chosen. The indulgence granted our first parents in their Fall, and in the succeeding falls of the human race, found its restraining hand in the love and reverence with which God looked to that Virgin to be born of the human race, looked to the fruit beyond the stem, to Mary whom He had destined through that race to arise as Mother of His Divine Son. Finally, in a passage redolent of poetic extravagance, the preacher Robert indicates how the world reached its last perfection in the advent of Our Blessed Lady. Before that advent, or until her creation, creation itself was as yet deprived of the most noble being, the most noble spirit, the most noble thing rational, the highest conception, the greatest thing capable of being born, or in a word, the best in what-

³⁴ *Ibid.*, *Sermo de maternitate Virginis*, f. 90v.

ever category of being we may please to speak of. In Mary, to each of the foregoing the best was given. Indeed, in that Son's human nature belonging to time, were found the perfections which belong to things only of time because in a sense they were the perfections of the divine, or united to the divine in the Person of Christ through Mary.

Sympathetically considered, allowance being made for the genre of his writing, nothing injurious to the faith may necessarily be seen in the artistically penned lines of the last paragraph translated. And finally, certainly it must be said that there is no doubt but that Robert of Carraciolo's attention to the predestination of Our Lady marked a milestone in the history of that doctrine from the many elements he introduced into its delineation.

Pelbartus of Temesvar

Another writer well-known in the history of mariology from the close of the fourteenth century evidences the same extended interest in the topic of Our Lady's predestination, namely, Pelbartus of distant Temesvar in Hungary³⁵ († 1504):

The first mystery is, therefore, said to be of the divine preordination, how namely the origin of Our Blessed Mother is preordained from eternity and preconceived in the divine mind. For this, indeed, is one great dignity of the Blessed Virgin, whereby through the mouth of wisdom she is glorified in the epistle of this solemnity as it is written, Prov. 8, 'The Lord,' he said, 'possessed me,' namely by his immutable will and election, 'in the beginning of His ways, before he made anything,' that is from eternity, before God himself had created anything; whence is it added, from the beginning, namely from the creation of the world, from eternity was I ordained, namely that I should be the Mother of God, and 'of old,' namely eternally, before the earth was made, that is before every corporeal thing created. 'The depths were not as yet,' that is the profundities. For the whole altitude or profundity which is from the ephemeral sky to the centre of the earth is called an abyss because of immensity, and all creatures, corporeal and spiritual, with comparison to altitude can be styled abysses, as the doctors say. For the depths were not as yet, that is neither heaven nor the earth nor the angels, who were also called abysses, because of the excellence of their substances, and I namely Mary was already conceived, namely in the mind of the maker. From all of which it shines forth that before every creature the Blessed Virgin was preordained and conceived in the mind of the creator that she should become the Mother of God and of Our Savior Jesus Christ, which is to her the highest glory.

³⁵ *Stellarium coronae*, lib. 5, pars I, art. 1, c. 1.

Our Lady's great dignity rests in the immutable will and election from all eternity on the part of God, prior to His election of all else, by which He had willed her and chosen her for His Mother. In the mind of the Maker of all creation, spiritual and corporeal, the conception of Mary already preceded when the origin of others was determined. Her highest glory belonged to her in the divine will prior to the conception of all else, her glory namely as the fore-ordained Mother of God, of Our Savior Jesus Christ. Pelbartus conceives of this predestination in line with the Scotistic theory with reference to Christ.³⁶

The first star is, therefore, said to be the causal reason of election, since Blessed Mary is elected because of sinners unto the mother of God, since Jesus Christ because of sinners came unto this world, on the testimony of Luke 5. Therefore, the Blessed Mother herself is in a certain sense bound to us in recompense for such a great benefit received from God for us, or because of us. It is stated thus: whether if our first parents had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. To this question many doctors said that God would not have become incarnate if man had not sinned. If therefore you hold this, I have the proposal, that namely the Blessed Mother was not elected for the divine incarnation, that she should be the Mother of God if man had not sinned, and consequently she is bound to sinners to show mercy for the benefit of election received on the occasion of them. But since our doctors hold with Scotus, in the III Sent., stating that even if man had not sinned, nevertheless, God would have become incarnate, from the Virgin, the most powerful reason of which is, that God from all eternity predestined Christ, and preordained his soul, that is of Christ, to the glory of the highest union, namely of the divine, and also from all eternity foresaw Adam and his fall. If therefore Christ was predestined and promised only because of this that Adam was to fall, the most absurd of things would follow, namely that the soul of Christ would have joy on account of the fall of Adam. . . .

Pelbartus does not share then the mind of those doctors of his time who would place the motive of Christ's and consequently of Mary's election in the fall of man. As a consequence to such a theory he envisions Our Lady as returning thanks to the sinner for his occasioning the Incarnation which secured her election; the soul of Christ, and of Mary then would, humanly speaking, rejoice at the occurrence of sin, the sin of Adam occasioning their existence. The predestination of Mary prior to the decreed existence of the spiritual or corporeal creation secures his approval. With a certain naïveté he

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Lib. XII, pars 2, art. 3.

proceeds to find in the intervening sin a motive, or rather cause of merit and glory for her arising from her consequent association with Our Divine Lord's sacred humanity as well in the ordinary commerce of life as in His Passion:³⁷

nonetheless the offense of man was the occasion of the highest merit and reward and glory of the Blessed Virgin, since if man had not sinned, the Blessed Virgin would not have acquired so many merits as she has now bathing Christ, feeding Him, and suffering with Him. . . .

Her further prerogatives proceed to arise as emanating from her primal immense dignity reposed in her eternal predestination to divine Motherhood:³⁸

The first reason is said to be that of the highest dignity, since the Blessed Virgin from all eternity is preordained, and finally in time so established or created, that she is of such great dignity, perfection and goodness, of such beatitude and glory, that she should become the most worthy habitation of the omnipotent God, most excellent by the plenitudes of all grace and sanctity throughout the entire world as the true Mother of God, and consequently the Queen of heaven and of all the angels, and the mistress of the entire world and of all creatures. . . . Since therefore she was elected from eternity to be the Mother of God, the Queen of heaven and of the angels and the mistress of the world, and to be lifted up with such ineffable grace in the present and glory in future, that she should be exalted excellently above all pure creatures, wherefore in her creation, and in the origin of this blessed Virgin, her most glorious soul was to be disposed with such a capacity, that it should receive the whole plenitude of grace and glory in such broadness, and that it should be apt to receive it to the extent that a creature not as yet beatified and not united to God in the union of a person can receive, since according to Aristotle, (II *De anima*), the acts of the active are in a 'patiens' which is well disposed. Whence God created the soul of the Blessed Mother in the highest nobility and perfection, most acute in intellect before all pure men, the most capable of grace in her powers after the soul of Christ, so that as Jerome says in the Sermon on the Assumption, 'The whole plenitude of grace which is in Christ comes into the soul of Mary, although otherwise and otherwise, since in Christ as in the head influencing, in Mary as in the neck transferring it to the body, the Church.' Oh how marvellous is this that one most holy girl should be more capable than the entire machinery of the world, the heavens and the earth. O what a lofty dignity of Mary that God should so have forechosen her and preordained her so that through her all grace and every good should be transferred into the members of the entire Church, as the devout Bernard expressed, saying: 'God placed the plenitude of all good in Mary, so that if there is anything of grace, if

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Lib. XII, pars 2, art. 3.

³⁸ *Lib.* V, pars III, art. I.

there is anything of salvation, if there is anything of hope, in us, it is, we know, by redundance from her.³⁹

Mary eternally preordained and created in time that she should be the most worthy habitation of the omnipotent God, had to be, on account of such dignity, disposed by divine wisdom and power, such that through a plenitude of grace and sanctity she would become, consequently upon becoming the Mother of God, the Queen of Heaven, and of all the angels, and the Mistress of the entire world, and of all creatures. Her soul was, then, in accordance with her dignity created such as to be capable of the highest grace and glory of which any soul not hypostatically united to God can attain to, or become capable of. To this excellence of her capacity for grace next only to the soul of Christ, is added a capacity of intellect surpassing that of any other human being. Upon these dignities of Our Lady follows that whereby as the neck of the Mystical Body she transfers or serves as the channel through which the plenitude of the grace of Christ must flow to the other members of His Body.

Finally, on account of Christ only, and His Blessed Mother, was the world created:

Since the omniscient God knew from eternity that the rational creature would fall from beatitude, and that he would abuse all things of the world, through vice, so that he would become delinquent in all things as we know from experience, since, therefore, God knew that the whole world would be placed in evil, and was indeed so placed on the testimony of Scripture, Job 2, and was to fall away from its end, which is beatitude, I dare to say that God would not have created the world, had He not foreseen it to be repaired through Christ and His Mother and saved, since, as Aristotle says in *II Physics*, God and nature do nothing frustratedly. But, that is frustrated which does not attain its end, and thus the created world if it were not preordained to be repaired after ruin would have been made frustratedly, since it would not have attained its end, which is beatitude. Which end of beatitude indeed it would have attained, and did attain, through Christ and His Mother. So that I may speak boldly, it was only on account of Christ especially, and on account of His glorious Mother, that God gave being to things and created the world.⁴⁰

The ultimate destiny of man in creation being final beatitude, the sin of man would by its intervention frustrate the design of God with respect to mankind in any such hypothetical creation as would

³⁹ *Lib.* V, pars II, art. II, c. V.

⁴⁰ *Lib.* II, pars II, c. 2.

exclude the entrance of Christ, by divine foreknowledge God foreseeing hypothetically such ensuing frustration would have by nature necessarily averted it. God intercepted such hypothetical frustration of His design, or rather any such frustration became obviated, speaking objectively, by the very plan of God itself, not decreeing first the existence of a world, to be on the hypothesis of sin remedied by an ulterior decree of a Redeemer, but rather decreeing an existence to His Incarnate Son in human nature, and to that Son's glorious Mother, and a supervening existence to the rest of creation for and on account of them. *Paucis verbis*, without the creation of Christ and His Mother, and their predestination, any creation would from its foreseen frustration have receded from the possibility of existence. The passage of Pelbartus has its interest in the reversal of concept it gives all creation, making it not an end in itself of God, but rather Christ and His Mother the end, and the rest purely for and through them.

St. Joseph of Leonissa

The popular Capuchin preacher St. Joseph of Leonissa († 1612) intersperses throughout his sermons a plentiful reference to the predestination of Our Lady:

In this book of divine predestination we say that the Blessed Virgin was written and declared more than all the other creatures, because not alone was she predestined to grace and glory, but still beyond this to the divine maternity.

Truly God made great things in Mary; with the greatness of His Wisdom He predestined her, *Necdum erant abyssi et ego iam concepta eram* (Prov. 8:24); with the greatness of His goodness He elected her, *Elegit eam Deus et praelegit eam* (*Brev. Rom.*); with the greatness of His power He preserved her from all sin, actual and original, *Tota pulchra es, amica mea, et macula originalis non est in te* (Cant. 4:7).

Mary the Virgin is the first conceived, and generated and brought forth in this Church of God, daughter of the Father, spouse of the Holy Spirit, Mother of the Son, advocate of the sinner, guide of the just. Oh, what a nativity is this. Truly we can say that we have a great mystery in this church of God having Mary the Virgin. Virgin, Mother of grace, Mother of mercy, protect us from the enemy and receive us in the hour of death.

For since hatred as they say is the subtraction of grace, if God even for the briefest time in his thought should have subtracted from her this grace of preservation, something of hatred would have been shown toward her. It is apparent however that for the loved one there is the communication of grace, since according to St. Bonaventure, . . . God loves us not with a

love of affection, but with a love of communication, which is twofold, namely of nature and of grace, and God from eternity loved her before men, therefore He communicated this grace to her before others.

Priests were also anointed, and Christ is the High Priest, Who offered His Body to the Father upon the wood, so that with this divine holocaust He might reconcile men to the Father; and of this holocaust the greatest and the principal part had Mary, His Mother, who gave Him in her body flesh and blood, which the High Priest according to the order of Melchisedech offered on the altar of the Cross.⁴¹

Because she was predestined to the Divine Maternity, and not alone to grace and glory, the name of the Virgin Mary was declared as written in the book of all the predestined before all; she came first. Out of divine wisdom she was predestined; out of divine goodness elected; out of divine power preserved from sin. In the Church of God, as the consort to the Trinity, she was the first thought of that she might be in a special way the daughter of the Father, the Mother of the Son—the Divine Maternity, and the Spouse of the Holy Spirit—the Mother of Grace and of Mercy. The “Church of God” was so planned divinely, (and by the Church of God, St. Joseph evidently means first the Church militant, since he speaks of sinners, but in a fuller sense doubtlessly the Church triumphant, or the Church of the elect) that the Virgin Mother was the first conceived and brought forth among its members. Since God loved her with an eternal love He precluded any interruption of His love for her, exempting her from the contraction of original sin by bestowing upon her “the greatest and principal part” of the holocaust of His Passion. The perpetual love directed upon her by her predestination precluded any interruption by divine hatred, or the intervention of sin. The predestined Daughter of the Father, Spouse of the Holy Spirit, and Mother of the Son, she abides forever in her person “a great mystery” in the adornment of the Church of God.

St. Lawrence of Brindisi

The popularity of the same theme of the predestination of Our Lady pervaded by the coloring of Scotistic thought manifests its

⁴¹ The following quotations are from Balduinus of Amsterdam, “Doctrina de Imm. Concept. B. Mariae Virginis in scriptis ineditis S. Joseph a Leonissa, O.F.M.Cap.,” *Regina Immaculata*, Romae (1955), pp. 343, n. 81, p. 352, n. 129, p. 360, n. 155, p. 372, p. 358, n. 1.

popularity as a theme for preachers likewise throughout the sermons of St. Lawrence of Brindisi⁴² († 1617):

But how noble did Mary appear in the heaven of the divine mind, "A great sign appeared in the heavens, a woman clothed with the sun," than which there is nothing brighter. . . . For not alone to grace and glory with the holy angels and the elect of God was she predestined and elected, to the first and supreme grade of grace and glory after Christ, but to the maternity of God that she should be truly a Theotocos . . . the predestined mother of Christ, predestined together with Christ, the firstborn of every creature, before every creature. For Christ was predestined as the Son of Mary, and at the same time Mary the Mother of Christ.

And indeed Mary was in all things like unto Christ with respect to nature, with respect to grace, and with respect to glory; with respect to nature, she was of the same nature as Christ, with respect to grace for she also was holy, filled with grace and the Holy Spirit, and with respect to glory like unto Christ, as the moon unto the sun, the Queen to the king, "Astitit regina a dextris tuis." Mary even like unto Christ in predestination. . . . Like in predestination since Christ was predestinated not as God, but as man the Son of Mary, therefore together with Christ Mary is predestined.

Therefore in this wise Christ wished to honor His mother and as an equal. Indeed just as God created the moon like unto the sun, Eve like unto Adam, so God predestined the Most Holy Virgin as like as possible unto Christ, from all eternity, and in time He brought this about, by creating, calling, justifying, and magnifying or glorifying, for "Whom he foreknew," Rom. 8:29. Mary is similar to Christ and above all the other elected souls in predestination, in vocation, in justification, and in glorification. But Christ is not predestined in so far as He is God, but in so far as He is man; therefore in so far as He is the Son of Mary, and thus together with Christ is the Virgin Mary predestined.

Predestined and elected to the supreme grade of grace and glory after Christ, as the predestined Mother of Christ, Mary succeeds in predestination immediately to Him; "predestined together with Christ," "for Christ was predestined as the Son of Mary and at the same time Mary the Mother of Christ," like unto Him by sharing the same nature, by being filled with the Holy Spirit and grace, and by being destined to reflect His glory as the moon that of the sun. Christ wishing to honor His Mother before all, predestined her from eternity as like as possible unto Himself, wishing "to honor her as an equal." "Thus together with Christ's belongs her predestination.

⁴² *Sanctorale, Op. Om.* 9, 639, cf. D. Unger, O.F.M.Cap., "The Absolute Primacy of Christ Jesus and His Virgin Mother according to St. Lawrence of Brindisi," *Collect. Francisc.* 22 (1952), p. 117.

In the following paragraph he speaks of the same Virgin as "holding the second place in predestination" and, as a consequence, being the second in glory, she becomes the second in grace, less than Christ, but greater than all other creatures:

The Virgin Mary is less than Christ, as the sun the moon, but greater than all other creatures as the moon appears greater than the other stars. For just as Christ is the first of the predestined, the Virgin Mary holds the second place, since Christ is predestined as the Son of Mary . . . for whosoever in the archetype holds the superior place in divine predestination and also the superior place in the glory of Paradise, this one has attained unto greater grace in this world. The Virgin Mary holds the second place in predestination, and in the glory of Paradise after Christ; therefore thus also in grace.⁴³

The same thought finds expression in the following passage:

Thus may one wonder and exclaim from wonderment, What is woman that thou art mindful of her, that you visit her? For you have crowned her with honor and glory over the works of your hands, you have subjected all things under her feet, whom you have not placed a little less than the angels, but whom you have exalted over all the angelic orders, clothed with the sun and crowned with effulgent stars. A miracle indeed of divine love toward the Virgin. He had predestined her above all the saints, since He had predestined her to the highest grade of grace, to the highest grade of glory, to the highest grade of dignity, so that she should be the true daughter, the Spouse and Mother of God, the Lord of the Angels, the Queen of all the saints. The divine predestination was, as it were, the iconography, the first form and exemplar, the archetype of the entire Church of the elect of God. When the Lord gave to Moses the exemplar of the divine sanctuary, first of all he spoke of the arc of the creature, the living arc of Deity.⁴⁴

Our Lady possessed the highest grade of grace, of glory, of dignity, that she might be the true daughter of God, the Spouse of God, the Mother of God, the Queen of the Angels, and the Queen of all the Saints. As the living arc of divinity she became the first of creatures elected. In a brief passage, outlining the care with which the divinity prepared Our Lady for her predestined place, and the spiritual richness with which the same divinity endowed her soul that she might be the worthy Mother of God's Son, the same im-

⁴³ *Op. Omnia* I, 97ff., cf. D. Unger, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁴⁴ *Op. Om.* I, 347, cf. D. Unger, p. 119.

elling consciousness of the predestination of Our Lady to the second rank after Christ betrays itself:⁴⁵

Wherefore just as He said of Christ in the transfiguration: This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased, hear Him, so also of the Virgin, This is my daughter, indeed my beloved spouse, in whom I am well pleased. For Mary is similar in every wise to Christ, as the moon to the sun, as Eve to Adam, similar in predestination, in vocation, in justification, in glorification. . . . Of Christ Paul said that He is a compendium of all the goods of God. . . . For whatever God found of beauty and of good in men and angels, He collected all in Christ, as He did in the creation of man, who therefore is said to be a microcosm, a little world. So also is He shown to have done for the Virgin, in the Apocalypse of St. John, where the Virgin is shown adorned with all the luminaries of heaven, her whole body clothed with the sun, under her feet the moon beautiful and full, on her head a crown of stars. But what does this indicate but that whatever of virtue, sanctity, goodness God found in the Church, and in paradise, in men, and in angels, he took it for adorning the Virgin with the dignity of the Only-begotten Son, so that she might be a paradise of the delights of God.

Lawrence was a preacher, and used the artifices of a preacher to paint this parallel between Christ and His Mother. What he actually does say is this, that all the richness of graces scattered throughout the Church, or throughout Paradise, are found collected in the soul of Our Lady, the spouse of Christ, the first predestined one after Him, the supreme motive all the while of such a lavishing of spiritual richness seeking its origin in her divine motherhood. The analogy of comparative similarity of Mary to Christ, "in predestination, in vocation, in justification, in glorification," seeks to express remarkably the unicity of decree ordaining their concomitant existence. The same linking of Our Divine Lord and His Mother in a predestined Incarnation involving her as the second in the grade of predestination, and its motive, appears when he states:⁴⁶

Hence therefore, he says, those whom he had foreknown . . . he predestined to become conformed to the image of his Son, as if Christ were the exemplar from eternity of all the predestined. But the exemplar must first be that the building may be, or it must be before any construction of which it is the exemplar. But if Christ is predestined as St. Paul says, "Who was predestined the Son of God in power according to the spirit of

⁴⁵ *Mariale, Op. Om.* t. I, p. 350, cf. D. Unger, p. 125.

⁴⁶ Cf. Unger, p. 137.

sanctification," he is not, therefore, predestined as God, but as man . . . therefore as the Son of Mary. Wherefore it is necessary that Mary be predestined with Christ, so that if Christ have the first place in predestination, Mary obtains the second. Thus, from the side of Adam, Eve was formed similar to Adam; by the grace of Christ Mary is predestined, and as such she is predestined that she might be the worthy Mother of the Only-begotten Son of God.

Through the grace of Christ Mary obtains her predestination, and in such wise that just as Christ as man attains the first place in the realm of predestination, so does Mary accede to the second place after Him. All the predestined are such after the image of Christ; that they be conformed to that image by predestination, He must take on the image of man; that He do so He must receive that image from Mary, a woman, and in doing so, she thereby accedes to the second place in predestination after Him.

Though the thought of these authors becomes repetitious, nonetheless, as an element in the tradition of the centuries, their deep consciousness of the predestination of Our Lady, and the deep coloring it imparted their entire doctrine mariologically, manifest strikingly the preponderant influence of this point of predestination in the milieu of their writings. The predestination for them becomes the stepping stone to the various other privileges of Our Lady; it becomes a prism by which her various other privileges may be brought to perception.

Francis Suarez

A contemporary of the preceding author, the Doctor Eximius, Francis Suarez († 1617) in his *De Mysteriis Vitae Christi*, devotes the following extensive passage to the discussion of Our Lady's predestination, a passage we here quote in full, since it manifests the treatment of one of the outstanding theologians of all time accorded this topic:⁴⁷

First therefore it is certain that the Blessed Virgin was from eternity elected and predestined both to grace and glory, as well as also to the dignity of the Mother of God, before all her foreseen merits. This is manifest partly from the certain belief by which it appears that all the predestined are chosen without their proper merits; and partly from those

⁴⁷ *De Incarnatione*, Pars II, *Mysteria Vitae Christi* (Venetiis, 1746), t. XVII, Disp. I, sectio III.

things which we had said tom. 1, disp. 8, where we showed that the Blessed Virgin in no wise merited that she should be chosen as the Mother of God. And the Fathers intend to teach this truth when they say that the divine Word had chosen a Mother to Himself and had ordained her from eternity by His will alone. . . . In the second place it is said that the Blessed Virgin in our way of understanding was first predestined according to reason and elected that she should be the Mother of God, than to so much grace and glory. This conclusion is also clear, those things supposed which were said in the preceding section, and which we have explained concerning these signs of reason in the aforesaid article 3. For, therefore, the Blessed Virgin was predestined to such grace and glory since she was elected to be the Mother of God. For the order of execution manifests the order of intention. But, in fact such grace and glory was given to the Blessed Virgin that she should be thus disposed as was becoming to the Mother of God; therefore was she elected to so much grace and glory since she was forechosen to be the Mother of God.

In the third place therefore I gather that the Blessed Mother was elected both to the maternity as well as to such glory *per se* and absolutely before foreseen original sin. . . . And it is proved from those things said in article 3, first, since it is more likely that all are predestined to be elected to grace and glory before the foreseen original sin, therefore all the more certain is it that the Blessed Mother was in the same way elected to glory; therefore also to divine maternity. The second consequence appears since election to the maternity anteceded in the order of end, as has been shown. The first, however, is proved since either among the elect there is not any order, but all were elected at the same time in the same sign of reason, or if some reason of order can be considered, the election of the Blessed Mother should rather antecede than follow the election of others since it is higher and more excellent, and looking toward the greater glory of God. Whence St. Bernardine of Siena, *serm.* 51, *de B. Virgine* c. 4, says, "You were predestined before every creature in the mind of God, so that you might bring the God-man himself into being." . . . In the second place it is proved, because Christ the God-man is predestined or elected before foreseen original sin, therefore also His Mother. The consequence is proven since not only by himself was he predestined as man, but also as the Son of Man; but this mode of incarnation, namely, that He should come into existence in the womb of a virgin, and that God should have a Mother on the earth, does not include an imperfection flowing from sin; it could, therefore, be intended by itself, as the incarnation itself, and therefore to that extent did it fall under that intention or election, in so far as the foreknowledge or original sin is understood to antecede. Whence does the Holy Church accommodate to the Virgin that testimony which we have explained in the above mentioned place with reference to Christ, "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways," and that, "ab initio et ante saecula creata sum," etc. Since the Mother namely was not disjoined from the Son, even in the divine election. . . . Conjectures then also can be added. The first, since if the grace and the glory of the angels is intended itself by God before the prevision of all sin, why not all the more the most excellent grace and glory of the Blessed Virgin, and consequently the dignity of mother? The second, since this dignity is singular

and distinct from every other created thing, therefore, intended *per se*. The third, since in this wise the divine grace toward human kind is made more illustrious, since God was not contented to assume human nature, but he also wished to honor a created human person, to the extent that it was capable in the nature of a person. And therefore of itself God intended both. The fourth, since, if the generation of other men was intended by itself, as we have taught above with Augustine and St. Thomas, why not all the more the human generation of Christ from a mother? The fifth then, that just as a woman was made from man alone, and was intended by God of itself before sin, so the generation of a man from a woman alone, which would not be any less wonderful, of itself should be intended because of the perfection of the divine works which arises from such a marvellous variety. . . .

In the fourth place it is gathered from what has been said, what must be answered to one inquiring whether if man had not sinned, the Blessed Virgin would have been the future Mother of God? For it must be said that if reason is had only of that first election, since the Blessed Virgin is elected by herself, in virtue of this she would have been, even if man had not sinned, just as other men would have been and their generations. Since that election and its motive did not involve anything necessarily dependant upon sin, and all the conjectures first adduced persuade this; but if the whole reason of the divine providence is joined to this election, and the foreknowledge of future sin, at least conditioned, then truly sin can be said to have been necessary that the Blessed Virgin might be the Mother of God, Which doctrine is apparent from those things which are said of Christ in a similar question; there is the same proportionate reason.

According to the Doctor Eximius, then, an eternal predestination to grace and glory incorporated in the dignity of the Divine Motherhood, and this anterior to any foreseen merits on her part constituted the prerogative of Our Lady. Her predestination to the Divine Motherhood preceded that to grace and glory, or contrariwise, her election to grace and glory rests in her election to become the Mother of God. Again, her election to the divine maternity and its consequent grace and glory preceded foreseen original sin; her election preceded rather than followed the election of any others because it is a higher election, more excellent, and looks more to the greater glory of God.

That the predestination of Mary preceded the prevision of original sin, Suarez indicates by several assertions: first, since the predestination of Christ preceded the prevision of sin, and since His predestination as the *filius hominis* included that of a human mother, and nothing inherent to the notion of His coming involved the inclusion of sin; both the Son and the Mother attained unto

predestination prior to the consideration of sin; again, the Church adapts or applies even to Mary as well as to her Son the well-known texts of Prov., and the other sacred books, which of itself insinuates the association of the Mother and the Son in the mind of the Church as a correlative predestination; if the predestination of the angels anteceded the prevision of sin, all the more so the surpassing dignity of the predestination of the Mother of God; the Divine Maternity as a dignity singular to creation directed toward the consummation of the works of God postulates its being willed of itself as a singular distinct reality—that is, not in, or out of, association with sin; the surpassing excellence of divine grace arrays itself not alone in uniting human nature to a divine person, but also in elevating a human person as such to the pinnacle of dignity, namely to the divine Motherhood—hence, such an excelling work of God postulates of its intrinsic worth its being willed outside the mere provocation of sin. Finally, the election of Our Lady involving no connection with sin as such, could have been willed simply outside the positing of any sin, just as the rest of mankind could thus have been willed. If, indeed, the complete providence of God be considered, Our Lady, or the coming of Our Lady, fits into that providence which includes sin, “or the foreknowledge of future sin, at least conditioned,” and as such she enters as the Mother of the Redeemer. These, we believe, constitute the essential points of the question of Suarez on the predestination of Our Lady; his question is succinct, and reflects, as we see, the reasoning of Scotus, and the mingling of the literature on the matter that these pages convey. His question enhances handsomely the literature on the predestination of Our Lady, arraying it as something specifically singular, disengaging it from the notion of sin, and uniting it with the predestination of Christ by placing it in an order with that of Christ in all wise special, and above the order of all other predestined beings.

Seventeenth Century

The seventeenth century becomes one particularly rich in theologians of the predestination of Our Lady. Here we shall merely run down some texts from authors in the main Franciscan to confirm the continuity of the idea as it perseveres and unfolds

itself: John of Carthage († 1617), an author of Scotistic conviction on the predestination of Christ, writes as follows:⁴⁸

Moreover, indeed, if from another heading we contemplate the predestination of the Blessed Virgin in so far namely as she was elected and predestined not alone that she should be the Mother of God, but as His coadjutor and individual companion in the redemption and reparation of human kind, it is not difficult to glean therefrom her unsullied conception. For reason itself confirms this; for when God decreed that His Son was to become man from the Blessed Virgin, it was consequent that He predestine nothing more immediately than the Mother . . . since the dignity of the Mother of God is so outstanding, that in its way it must pertain to the order of the hypostatic union of the human nature with the Divine Word.⁴⁹

The decree respecting the predestination of the Son secured the immediate predestination of the Mother. Such is the dignity of the Mother of God that it elevated Our Lady through that maternity to the order of the Hypostatic Union. Moreover, since her predestination extended not only to the maternity, but likewise to sharing with her Son the redemption and reparation of human kind, for which she was also predestined, her privilege of the Immaculate Conception became assured.

Here we may likewise quote two contemporary authors, P. Correa and Nuñez de Castro;^{49a} Correa writes:

And if on the other hand we consider the predestination of the Virgin, inasmuch as she was not only selected to be the Mother of God, but also for the purpose that she should be the single helper and individual companion in the redemption and reparation of human kind, it is not difficult to collect from this her Immaculate Conception.

Nuñez de Castro states:

According to this the Most Holy Virgin after her Son comes to be of the predestined the first, and predestined for this before the prevision of

⁴⁸ *Homil. sacr.* pars I lib. 2 hom. 3 (II, 7b); cf. W. Sebastian, *De B. Virgine Maria universali gratiarum mediatrice* (Rome, 1952), p. 48, n. 59.

⁴⁹ Cf. Sebastian, *loc. cit.*, p. 40, n. 6.

^{49a} P. Correa, *Triumphos ecclesiasticos*, pars I, disc. 8, concept. 8 (Olissipone, 1617, 171a, quoted by W. Sebastian, O.F.M., *De B. Virginis Maria universali gratiarum mediatrice*, Romae, 1952 (*Bibliotheca Mediatricis B. V. Mariae*), p. 48, n. 40; Fr. Nunez de Castro, cf. Sebastian, *ibid.*, p. 43, n. 21, where he quotes *Discursos predicabiles para los domingos de Adviento y principales fiestas*, (Vallisoleti, 1643), 123c.

original sin . . . as first-born of all creatures. In consequence of this you will realize that if the Eternal Wisdom shouts of her, "Ego ex ore Altissimi prodivi, primogenita ante omnem creaturam," and since Christ and Mary are one same flesh, and the glory of one is the glory of the other, these words that are spoken of the Son suit so well the Mother that they adjust to her as if they were coined only for her.

The value of the first text lies in the connection it places between the predestination of Our Lady, the redemption and reparation of man, and the Immaculate Conception; the predestination being posited, the others unite themselves to it. According to de Castro, Our Lady, "predestined the first," "before the prevision of original sin," "the firstborn of all creatures," can have the passages of Sacred Scripture coined to foretell the Incarnate Wisdom applied to her on account of her predestination as if they were in fact spoken directly of her.

St. Francis De Sales

St. Francis de Sales similarly caught up by the allure of the Franciscan theme proceeds to popularize it in this *Treatise On The Love of God*:⁵⁰

Now of all the creatures that that sovereign omnipotence could produce, he thought good to make choice of the same humanity which afterwards in effect was united to the person of God the Son; to which He destined that incomparable honor of personal union with the divine majesty to the end that for all eternity it might enjoy by excellence the treasure of His infinite glory. Then having selected for this happiness the sacred humanity of Our Savior, the supreme providence agreed not to restrain His goodness to the only person of His well-beloved Son, but for His sake to pour it out upon divers other creatures, and out of the mass of that innumerable quantity of things which He could produce, He chose to create men and angels to accompany His Son, participate in His graces and glory, adore and praise Him forever. And inasmuch as He saw that He could in various manners form the humanity of His Son, while making Him true man, as for example by creating Him out of nothing, not only in regard of the soul, but also in regard of the body; or again by forming the body of some previously existing matter, as He did that of Adam and Eve, or by way of ordinary human birth, or finally by extraordinary birth from a woman without man, He determined that the work should be effected in the last way, and of all the women He might have chosen to this end, He made choice of the Most Holy Virgin Our Lady, through whom the Savior of

⁵⁰ *Treatise on the Love of God*, in *Library of St. Francis de Sales* (London, Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, Ltd., 2nd ed.), pp. 74, 75, and 79 (Book II, ch. 4 and ch. 6).

our souls should not only be man, but a child of the human race. Furthermore, the sacred providence determined to produce all things as well natural as supernatural in behalf of Our Savior in order that angels and men might by serving Him share in His glory. . . .

He also foresaw clearly that the first man would abuse his liberty and forsaking grace would lose glory, yet would He not treat human nature so rigorously as He determined to treat the angelic. . . . But in order that the sweetness of His mercy might be adorned with the beauty of His justice, He determined to save man by way of a rigorous redemption. And as this could not properly be done but by His Son, He settled that He should redeem man not only by one of His amorous actions which would have been perfectly sufficient to ransom a million million of worlds, but also by all the innumerable amorous actions and dolorous passions which He would perform or suffer till death, and the death of the cross to which He predestined Him. . . .

And thus He first of all destined for His most worthy Mother a favor worthy of the love of a Son, who being all wise, all mighty, and all good, wished to prepare a Mother to His liking, and therefore He willed His redemption to be applied to her after the manner of a preserving remedy, that the sin which was spreading from generation unto generation should not reach her. . . . Whence as a garden of election which was to bring forth the fruit of life, she was made to flourish in all sorts of perfections, this Son of eternal love having thus clothed His Mother in gilded clothing, surrounded with variety, that she might be the queen of His right hand, that is to say the first of all the elect to enjoy the delights of God's right hand, so that this sacred Mother as being altogether reserved for her Son, was by Him redeemed not only from damnation but also from all peril of damnation, He giving her grace, and the perfection of grace, so that she went like a lovely dawn, which, beginning to break, increases continually in all brightness until perfect daylight.

In the thought of St. Francis de Sales, God determined to communicate Himself externally by uniting Himself to some created nature because His infinite goodness of itself and by itself tends toward communication. Of the different possible communications, the most excellent appeared that of engrafting and emplanting a creature in the divinity, making the eternal communication interior to God in the Trinity replicate itself somehow exteriorly. For this God chose the sacred humanity of Christ, of the Word, that throughout eternity it might by personal union with the Divine Majesty enjoy by excellence the treasures of His infinite glory. The goodness was not restrained to the Son alone, but for His sake communicated to men and angels existence by creation that they too might share in the graces and glory of the Son, and thus adore Him and praise Him forever. For the realization of this, God chose the

person of a Virgin Mother, chosen from among those destined to adore and praise Christ. Foreseeing the Fall of man, God then willed the redemption of that Mother after the manner of a preserving remedy. He preserved for her, or in her, the innocence Adam lost, and at the same time made her to enjoy excellently the effects of His Redemption. All this, that she might be the Queen of His right hand, the Queen of angels and men, "the first of all the elect." Wherefore, through His preservative redemption God's divine Son maintained her original predestination. These *paucis verbis* represent the thought of the Salesian Doctor; written in 1616, in a treatise of undoubted popularity across the past three centuries, their significance in the thread of this paper becomes apparent.

An influence hearkening back to his confrere Suarez reveals itself in Cornelius of Lapede when he proceeds to interpret the text of Prov., "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways," as follows:⁵¹

The Lord created and possessed the Blessed Mother as the Mother of Christ, since the Mother was not disjoined from her son also in the divine election. Which Andrew of Crete would seem to insinuate: This is the declaration of the more profound things of the divine incomprehensibility; this is the scope which was thought out before the centuries. Therefore, the Blessed Mother was predestined eternally that she might be the principle, that is, that is the first princess and mistress of all pure creatures.

What Cornelius says carries absolutely nothing of originality; both the quotation from Andrew of Crete and the interpretation of Prov. 8 in this light were to be found in ever so many theologians of the time, his possible source being Suarez. His statement remains, however, terse and to the point: the Blessed Mother enjoyed an eternal predestination that she might be the Princess, the Mistress, of all creation, angelic, human etc.; in this position she is placed by God before every other creature. John Seranno († 1637), a Franciscan theologian and contemporary of Cornelius, proffers the traditional Scotistic thesis:

The first thing therefore that God wished in this order was the hypostatic union of the Divine Word with our flesh. . . . In the second sign, as the most immediate to the God man, and better and superior to all pure creatures, God wished the Mother of the Incarnate Word, who could not

⁵¹ *Comm. in Prov. Sal. c. 8, p. 181, ed. Antwerp, 1871.*

be accused of sin. . . . In the third sign He predestined the elect to grace and glory. . . . In the fourth sign God saw that all men coming from Adam by propagation except Christ by His nature, and His immaculate Mother by the merits of His Son, were to fall in Adam. . . .

Therefore, since Christ the Lord must hold the primacy in all things ad extra in dignity and perfection, and His most pure Mother must exceed all other things, the consequence becomes apparent, that Christ the Lord was wished in the first place, and in the second place the Mother of Christ, and then all other creatures. . . .

If the Mother of God and the ever Virgin Mary was not elected unto the Mother of God before all pure creatures, and predestined to this, she was necessarily elected to such a great dignity after the prevision of sin . . . but from this second the highest inconveniences follow, in the first place that the dignity of the divine maternity, than which a greater cannot come to a pure creature, was occasioned by sin, and thence, that God did not look unto her first but unto sin. Then, that not left to himself, but forced by sin, God would have predestined and wished such a dignity; and moreover finally, since God must hold sin in the highest hatred, He would have the rather wished His Mother not to be than to be.⁵²

First according to Sarano in the decrees of God came the hypostatic union; in the second sign of His will He decreed the Mother of the Incarnate Word, and this by reason of her place as the most immediate to the God man, and as holding superiority over all creatures else; next in the order of His divine decrees came the elect. If Our Lady's predestination to the Divine Maternity succeeded in its order of election to others, then it follows that the noblest of dignities possible to any creature, that of being the Mother of God, received its occasion only from sin, and that the mind of God fell upon sin prior to her existence. Constrained by sin, to use a human way of speaking, God turned His gaze upon the existence of His mother. Would His hatred of sin not then rather have provoked Him again humanly speaking, to obliterate any conjectured existence of Mary? Echoing this thought of Scotus, such an immense dignity in retribution, or as the sequel to sin, redounds, he intimates, to the absurd.

The same coupling of Christ and Our Lady in a corelative predestination finds its renewal repeatedly in lesser known authors: P. de Abreu remarks:

⁵² *De Immaculata prorsusque pura sanctissimae semperque Virginis Genetricis Dei Mariae Conceptione, Libri quinque*, Lib. IV, Neapoli, 1635, cf. C. Balic, "La predestination," *loc. cit.* p. 123, n. 2, p. 123, n. 4, p. 123, n. 4, where the quotations translated above may be found in the order indicated.

In predestination after Christ His Mother holds the first place as the closest joined to her Son.⁵³

According to Franciscus Felix:⁵⁴

The Blessed Mother is a natural daughter of Adam, in so far as she has being from him, through seminal propagation. . . .

but her possession of grace arises from another title, a higher title:⁵⁵

Forsooth, grace is given to her by a higher title, namely, because she is the Mother of God, by reason it was congruent that her grace should not depend upon the merits of Adam; for indeed she was the Queen of Adam himself, by which dignities she was exempted from the laws of others. . . .

Though a daughter of Adam by nature, being the Mother of God, she is a daughter, not of him, but only of God by grace, or in grace, such that she does not lose original justice in Adam; such election to divine maternity secured its holder by a higher title from a merely conditional reception of divine grace subject to loss by descent from the original stock of mankind: her reception was absolute though depending on the redemption:⁵⁶

the grace which God had decreed to give to Adam, was not given absolutely but conditionally, that is if he should not eat of the forbidden tree, he would pass it on to his posterity; if however he did eat, he would loose both for himself and his posterity, except the Virgin, who was already then elected as the Mother of Christ. . . .

How the predestination of Jesus and Mary united, in a certain sense, finds expression with a homiletic warmth in the sermons of Mautini of Narni,⁵⁷ Preacher to the Apostolic Palace, appears as follows:

⁵³ *En las palabras de la Virgen nuestra senora, De Verbo "Quia fecit mihi magna,"* c. 2, Gadibus, 1617, 153d, cf. W. Sebastian, *De B. Virgine Maria, op. cit.*, p. 40, n. 7.

⁵⁴ *Tentativae complutenses*, tract. 2, c. 11, deff. 5, n. 14 (Compluti, 1645), 554; W. Sebastian, *op. cit.*, p. 50, n. 49.

⁵⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Cf. C. Balic, "La predestination," p. 122, n. 1, where he quotes *De divina Verbi Incarnatione, tractatus singularis ad mentem Doctoris Subtilis* (Paris, 1641), p. 50.

⁵⁷ *Prediche fatte nel Palazzo Apostolico* (Rome, 1632), cf. W. Sebastian, *op. cit.*, p. 42, n. 14.

And here we consider for the sake of the argument of which we now treat, that the Apostle in a marvelous way had bound and linked together the Son and Mother in the predestination of Christ, calling Christ first incarnated and then predestined, to show that just as in the predestination of Christ according to the flesh the Mother became embraced, without whose sonship one could not be predestined to the sonship of God, and thus by nature of the correlatives . . . in the predestination of the Virgin to the divine maternity the infinite person of the Word became embraced, without the hypostatic union of whom the Virgin could not be called Theotocos, nor consequently be predestined to the infinite dignity of being the Mother of God.

The Mother became embraced in the predestination of the Son, the Son in the predestination of the Mother; the interest of the author lies in an intertwining of the two predestinations, one being interlocked in the other, and leading to the other's existence. A simultaneity of decree, which of course respects the hierarchy of dignity involved, is implied.

Angelus Vulpes

Of Franciscan theologians to deal with the predestination of Our Lady, Angelus Vulpes certainly in the opinion of authors generally takes a place of first prominence. His views have already been presented by Frs. Balic and Sebastian; here we merely present some few texts to show how thoroughly the thought of Our Lady's predestination impregnated his entire mariology, and served for him as for so many as the stepping stone to her other privileges. The following few texts, we believe, illustrate adequately his fundamental mind on this point:

Thus one ordinately willing, from the same Scotus . . . in the order of his intention first intends the ultimate good of his work, in the second place the good nearest to it, in the third place the good less remote from it; therefore God the most ordered order, rectitude by essence, first outside Himself intended the ultimate good of the Virgin Mary, convening to Himself in the supreme order of the hypostatic union, such as is the divine maternity, as something substantial—from what has been said. In the second place the ultimate accidental good nearest to this, such as is the good of glory, prerequired at least congruently under the plenitude from that substantial good. In the third place, the good of grace, sanctifying absolutely under that plenitude. And then the good of innocence, under the same plenitude, always on account of the exigency of that supreme substantial good of the divine maternity. . . .

Just as Christ was the first willed by God from all eternity *ad extra* in

the order of intention, the God-man as the end of the beginning of all creatures, so the Virgin Mary was first wished as the Mother of God, so that she also should come forth from the mouth of the Most High the firstborn before all creatures, and therefore rightly the Holy Spirit speaks of her person "before all the hills," namely the angels, "I came forth," namely in the order of the divine intention, and just as Christ in that order was the first predestined, so that He might be the God-man in that supreme order, than that He was in the highest way beatified, in the highest way gratified, so the Blessed Virgin was the first predestined that she might be the Mother of God, then fully beatified, full of grace, and therefore "elected as the sun." . . .

In the first sign of nature God decreed to communicate Himself hypostatically by a communion in the highest way possible substantially outside Himself, in His entire omnipotence, to this specified individual, under a human species, in the womb of Mary, conceiving miraculously. . . . Hence in the same sign He likewise decreed this person of Mary absolutely future as His Mother.

In the second (sign), by reason of the requirement of natural filiation this man was efficaciously ordained to the highest grade of glory; similarly Mary, by reason of the exigency of the divine maternity, to its full grade, and consequently to all the supernatural gifts, habitual or actual, unto the grade of innocence commensurate to each substantial dignity of the supreme order, on their part, and likewise to all the most intense acts of the virtues, under actual most efficacious divine helps.

In the third sign angels and men were elected, loved, and predestined, in a certain and determined number materially and formally to a certain determined grade of glory in the grace of Christ Himself and Mary His Mother, since they are supposed as the first loved, elected, and predestined, after the manner of an end of all possible things outside God in any genus, and this was the special motive of predestining them, that there might be among themselves diverse future members of the one mystical body in the genus of nature, of grace, and of glory, under that one head Christ, and Mary His Mother, as it were under one neck, always united with its head, as appears from the question of St. Thomas cited later, from whom always in this order most rightly and ordinately of the intention of God, they should all receive the influx of natural, moral, and supernatural life. . . .

. . . therefore it supposes Christ first wished by God in the supreme order of the hypostatic union as the principal motive of choosing, loving, and predestining, all outside himself. . . .

. . . Neither did God vaguely in a confused way from all eternity love this man signified by the name of Christ, but thus to be so conceived in the womb of Mary, and then likewise, from what has been said, He wished her as His Mother before He had loved the angels or men in their grace, and therefore it supposes Mary also with Christ first elected to the maternity as the mistress of Glory, and consequently as the Queen of predestined angels and men.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ *Sacrae theologiae summa Johannis Duns Scoti Doctoris Subtilissimi et*

Though the style of Vulpes in the original and consequently in the translation most certainly manifests a likeness for the vagueness of expression, his ideas themselves appear sufficiently clear and well-developed: in the order of intention Christ is the first willed by God eternally, and the Virgin Mary with Him willed as the Mother of God, such that He was first willed and predestined as the God-man, and then adorned with commensurate graces, and She first willed as the Mother of God, and then consequently with the graces commensurate with this. In other words, the ultimate good of the Virgin Mary was the divine maternity; accidental to this good were, first, the good of glory, then the good of grace, and then the good of innocence, all bestowed in their plenitude on the demand of the ultimate good, the maternity itself. The same thought finds expression again in the last passage translated: As the first thing outside Himself God decreed the hypostatic union—to communicate Himself in the highest way possible and substantially to this individual in the womb of Mary; hence in the same “sign of nature,” as he says, the existence of Mary His Mother was decreed. In the second sign, Jesus and Mary were each ordained or ordered to the grade of glory commensurate to their dignities, and then to the grade of grace and all the supernatural endowments following upon these respective grades of glory; then, in the third sign, angels and men were elected and predestined to become members of the one mystical body under the one head Christ, and Mary his Mother. Just as Christ was the first willed by God as the principal motive in the choosing and predestining of all others, so too must the predestination of Mary His Mother take precedence in predestination to that of all others, be they angels or men, since her election to the Motherhood of Christ and the Queenship of the predestined universally of itself by its nature posits such an anterior predestination. In virtue then of her same predestination to the divine maternity her other prerogatives secure their origin:

The Virgin Mary not alone in this supreme order of glory is believed to be predestined before the angels, or men, as the highest part, after the manner of a neck, under the head Christ in the whole mystical body of the Church, . . . but in this supreme order, substantially divine, (she was

commentaria, (Naples, 1646), t. III, pars 4, vol. 12; the quotations in order are, p. 273, p. 275, pp. 284–285.

first predestined to the maternity of God, then to the plenitude of glory, of grace and of innocence), from which it follows, demonstratively, that she was first predestined as the mother of God from all eternity in the order of intention, than as the future natural daughter of Adam.⁵⁹

The whole mystical body of the Church, which for Vulpes extends to the angels, has as its head Christ, and as its neck Our Blessed Lady; she constitutes the connection of the head with its members, and as constituted in such an office, her predestination succeeds immediately after the head, in which position she may serve in the office of mediatrix. This, at least, finds adequate expression in the passage. Following likewise upon her singular prerogative in predestination, appears her Immaculate Conception:⁶⁰

from Scotus the Virgin Mary from the foreseen death of her Son is said to be preserved from all guilt negatively, which would have been present if she were not elected Mother of God. Secondly, it does not imply a contradiction that Mary the Virgin should be said to be preserved from all guilt on account of many rights, or causes, although primarily by right alone of the divine maternity, or of the predestination to this.

The right alone of the divine maternity or predestination to it secures her exemption from the effects of man's primal sin, effects which should have been present, he says, should her election as the Mother of God not exclude them. Her title as co-redemptrix again finds its foundation in the same predestination:

In the ninth (sign) from the primary motive of willing Christ as the natural head of all creatures, and Mary likewise, as his parent, as the co-head, He laid down to redeem all men from the servitude of sin, even miraculously outside the order of the hypostatic union, on account of their proper merits, through the sacrifice of the bloody death of the same Christ, with the proper consent of Christ and Mary His Mother. Whence He finally decreed this miraculously that Christ should come in the passibility of flesh, and likewise Mary his Mother, so that she might become the coredeemer, also she, of the entire human race. From all of these certain deductions, even in the school of St. Thomas, two things appear against him (namely the adversary Vulpes is attacking) most certain, the first, that Christ the God-man, in virtue of His primary love, election, predestination, was absolutely to come in the nature of things among the glorified angels and men, even if Adam had not sinned. The second, that Mary His parent was absolutely to come in the state of most full grace and innocence in virtue of the same efficacious love, election and predestination, in the first sign to the dignity of the maternity of God.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

Whence, the third point results, that Mary in our first parents factually did not receive original justice, nor lose it to them, in so far as, in the third sign, she is supposed to be ordained by God to its plenitude, so that from her plenitude it should be poured forth to angels and men in that very state. . . .⁶¹

The hypostatic union having been decreed, God decided to endow Our Lady miraculously with passible flesh enabling her to suffer, so that He being the natural Head of that race, and she the co-head, and the race being redeemed by the consent as well of Jesus and Mary, He would become the Redeemer and she acquire the title of co-redemptrix. On the intervention of sin, God willed the Head and the co-head of our race a passible body, that by the bloody sacrifice of Christ resting on the consent of Christ Himself and the co-redemptrix, that race might be redeemed. Only the intervention of sin then, bringing as a consequence the Redemption, extended her function of co-redemptrix, as him that of Redeemer; the passibility of body for each rested on the same contingency. While such passages abound in Vulpes illustrative of the prerogatives and titles of Mary proceeding from her predestination, we shall quote for the present merely the following as enclosing within itself a kernel all of what the Scotism of the time wished to affiliate to her supernatural destiny as the predestined Mother of God:⁶²

Both Mary by reason of the maternity of God as well as Christ by reason of the hypostatic union with the personal subsistence of the Son of God, appertain to a supreme order substantially divine above the order of glory, grace and nature; whence, they scarcely communicate with our first parents and the rest of men in specific nature. Indeed, in that supreme order just as Christ so also Mary is the end not only of the grace and glory of the angels, and of men, but of their natural existence, under the order of pure nature, so that Christ and Mary hold themselves in the simple species, at least, on account of its integrity, as the meter and measure of all existing under it. Of Christ this is certain from the Apostle, II Cor., ch. 3, and Coll., ch. 1; of Mary it is at least equally certain, if not more certain, since from her is born Jesus who is called Christ.

The following text from John of Zamora († 1647), a contemporary of Vulpes,⁶³ sustains the same conviction regarding the immediate sequence of Our Lady's predestination to that of her divine Son:

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 309.

⁶³ *De eminentissima Deiparae Virginis perfectione*, lib. 2, c. 2, n. 3 (Venetiis,

This therefore being placed that Christ the Lord was first in divine predestination, it can very easily be comprehended by what pact the Virgin Mother was predestined immediately after Him and before all others, since from the highest necessity by which the Mother is glued together with the Son, the predestination of the Son by a certain necessary consequence draws the predestination of the Mother together with it. For indeed that Christ in so far as He is predestined as man, could not be man according to the prescription of divine wisdom unless He should be born from a mother, and hence by that itself that He was predestined that He should become man, at the same time also the Mother was constituted from which he should become man.

The divine predestination of Christ preceding, that of His Mother followed in immediate sequence, prior to all others, since the predestination of the Son, which was absolute, involves within itself that of the Mother, the one being glued as it were to the other; in the predestination of Christ to the hypostatic union, the incarnation of His Mother entered the divine decrees. Francis Guerra († 1658), a contemporary to the preceding, states as follows:⁶⁴

And from the mouth of the Subtle Doctor. . . . For he in III, d. 7, q. 3, and d. 19, qu. un. excellently teaches that the predestination of the elect to glory came before the foreknowledge of sin. It rests on this firm foundation: Since one willingly ordinally first wills the end, and then those things which are nearest the end, since therefore the highest end of all things is the glory of God, for God works all things because of himself, since that nearest to this end is the glory of the predestined, hence it is that this state must be the nearest in the volition and intention of God efficaciously willing His glory. . . . But since among the predestined, Christ the Lord was easily the first and the principal one, as next to God and His glory, . . . and next after Him the Blessed Virgin, the Mother of God, vindicates to herself a place from the thought of the same Doctor, thus are the ways of the Lord ordained, in our way of thinking.

God of necessity willing His own glorification in all his decrees, wills this end in the decree of predestination; but as most expressive of that glory and as most directed to it, the predestined Christ appears, and next after Him the Mother of God vindicates to herself a place; God, consequently, as the glory of Christ and Our Lady shows, in the order of intention first willed Christ's predestination, then that of Our Lady as next manifesting the glory of God. Anterior to sin then first in the will of God by predestination glory

⁶⁴ *Maiestas gratiarum ac virtutum omnium Deiparae Virginis Mariae*, lib. 2, tract. 2, diss. 1, (I, Hispali, 1659, 421a), cf. W. Sebastian, *De B. Virgine Maria*, loc. cit., p. 40, n. 4.

came to Christ, then Our Lady, then the rest of the predestined. The spiritual conferences of Louis d'Argentan (publ. 1680)⁶⁵ exhibit the dominating purpose of the predestination of Mary in the working out of the entire plan of God for the salvation of the elect as follows:

Let us examine the matter to its depths, we find that Jesus is in effect the only tree of life, which produces and which carries in its branches all the elect; but there are only two great roots, by which it draws all its substance which makes it live, all the vigor which renders it so fecund, and the good savour which it gives to its fruits. One of these roots is planted in heaven and unto the very breast of God, the other is planted in the bosom of the most Holy Virgin.

He upon whom all the elect rest for their predestination is Christ; again, He rests in turn upon the breast of God and the bosom of the Blessed Mother.⁶⁶ Or, again,

She is through her Son and in her only Son, one of the two principles which concur to the effective execution of this predestination and of the salvation of all the elect; because, just as it is absolutely impossible for Jesus Christ to accomplish the predestination of a single man without the aid of His eternal Father, since without Him He would not be God, so too it is impossible for Him to accomplish it without the succor of his most Holy Mother, because without her He would not be man.

"Jesus and Mary conceived in the same bosom, that is to say, in the same eternal decree of God, inseparable from one another" antecede all the predestined, since these two constitute the two principles for the effective execution of all predestination; and just as He depends on His divinity flowing from the Father to effectuate the redemption, so too must He depend on His humanity assumed from His Mother that the implementation of the redemption might be accomplished.

Another pangyrist of the period M. de Castillo supplies a less mild, and at the same time cogent expression of the Scotistic theses, when he writes:⁶⁷

⁶⁵ *Lectures spirituelles sur la devotion a la tres-sainte Vierge Marie*, disposees par P. Goedert, Paris, 1901, 36; cf. W. Sebastian, *op. cit.*, p. 41, n. 10.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Tract. panegyricus de Sanctissima Maria domina nostra, in Debbora et Iakhele Testamenti heroissis et celebratissimis feminis collectis, adumbrata*, pars I, illustr. 1, n. 38 (Genuac, 1690), 25a cf. W. Sebastian, p. 44 (*op. cit.*) n. 23.

In the first sign of nature of His intention absolutely and efficaciously God willed and predestined the man Christ hypostatically the future Word of God, and that this man was to be born of this woman the Virgin Mary; whence since this man was elected to the dignity of the Son of God, so also this Virgin to the dignity of the Mother of God.

. . . From what has been said you will educe that Mary our Mistress in the supreme counsel of the divine mind in the first sign if nature was predestined and elected immediately after Christ as the worthy Mother of the Word to be incarnate, absolutely in the superior order of the hypostatic union even if the Word itself, Adam not sinning, in virtue of this same decree were to assume impassible flesh. As a consequence then in the fifth sign she was willed objectively by God as the future Mother of the Savior and Redeemer.⁶⁸

With a will absolute and efficacious, God first willed and predestined Christ hypostatically the future Word of God, and His birth from a woman, the Virgin Mary. Even outside the event of sin, in the supreme counsel of the divine mind, the predestination of the Mother of the Word Incarnate followed immediately upon the absolute predestination of Christ, and in this hypothesis to assume impassible flesh. Such a firm and unequivocal expression of personal conviction in the publication of spiritual conferences cannot but be mildly surprising when looked at in retrospect. The *Meditations*⁶⁹ of Caesarius, of about the same period, are redolent of the same strain of thought:

For if Christ is the first of all, the God-man, His Mother who is the Mother of God must necessarily be first after Him, for while God wished to become man, He also wished to have a Mother.

Eighteenth Century

Passing on to the next century, the eighteenth, we find one of the most outstanding mariologists of the century sustaining the broad outlines of the now traditionally Scotistic thesis: Salvator Montalbanus of Sambuca († 1726), writes:⁷⁰

And if we recur to the predestination of the Virgin, laid down before that of any other creature, in virtue of which she was elected and preselected

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, and W. Sebastian, p. 44, n. 24.

⁶⁹ Caesarius, A., *Meditationes de vita sanctae Virginis, . . . et Sancti Ioseph Sponsi ejus*, Coloniae 1666, med. I.

⁷⁰ *Opus theologicum* t. II, *De eminentissima Deiparae redemptione* (Pannoni, 1723), pp. 394-395.

by God to the divine maternity, before anything was deliberated about the coming of Adam, as we shall show later, then likewise must it be said that the Blessed Virgin did not require proximately speaking any privilege or favor that she should not be comprehended under the common law. For in case antecedently to the constitution of this law the Virgin is presupposed elected as the future Mother of God, and so predestined after Christ to the highest grace and glory below the grace and glory of Christ's, consequently she was not any longer capable of comprehension under the common law, and that, because she was elected as the Mother of God, she could not be treated as a woman of the flock, but also since that pre-election to the highest grace and glory was not possible with comprehension under the common law, since all comprehended under such a law could sin, as factually with Adam they had sinned in Adam, and thus also could be condemned; but the Blessed Virgin was so elected that she would never sin, or better, that she would never be able proximately to sin. Therefore, according to this doctrine the immunity of the Blessed Virgin from the common pact and law was a privilege radically contained in her previous predestination and election to the divine maternity. In vain, therefore, have the authors of the adverse opinion striven to show that the Blessed Mother, from this that she did not sin, did not require sanctifying grace in order not to incur the original stain. But it remains indeed to show that a doctrine of this sort is not false, as they say, since they themselves attest that its opposite would appear to be supposed by all Catholics, attributing to the greatest of grace the preservation of the Mother of God from original sin. . . .

The predestination of Our Lady to the Divine Maternity, a predestination anteceding that of Adam to existence, secured for her election to the highest grace and glory below the grace and glory of Christ. Such an anterior predestination exempted her from the common law by exclusion; it rendered her incapable of comprehension under that law. Comprehension under the common law included the possibility of sinning, a possibility repugnant to her destined prerogative as Mother of God, since such a maternity radically comprehends absolute sinlessness. As we shall later see, such a privilege of immunity from the universality of sin did not, however, render her immune from the Redemption wrought by her Son.⁷¹ Akin to the foregoing passage is the following:

In the same exact way now is it to be laid down with respect to the exception of the Virgin. Although Christ and the Virgin are excepted, the Son and the Mother, the Queen and the King, for one and another reason, they are, nonetheless, both excepted, so that under the universal terms pertained to the matter of original sin, they are in no wise comprehended, neither indeed in the sacred text, nor by the Fathers, especially Augustine,

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

in so far as he expressly protests in favor of the Virgin as we have observed. And indeed omitted for now are those arguments by which we shall show this most fully in its own place, we would like to call to mind only the outstanding dignity of the person of the Virgin, and to pass before our mind her most noble station. Is she not indeed the true Mother of God, the Empress of the world entire, the most worthy Queen of all, both angels and men, and of their first parents, and again from all eternity elected and preordained to the most eminent pinnacle of this sublime grade? Therefore, if only on this motive alone she would be excepted from a law common to the others, . . . for those privileges which, as it were, by nature belong to Christ as man, belong to her by grace. For universal laws although for different reasons do not make subject to themselves either the prince or his consorts.

Such is the dignity of the Mother of God that it places her in some wise on a par with Her Son toward the enjoyment of sinlessness. As eternally elected and ordained to the pinnacle of the highest grace, she becomes Empress of the world entire, the Queen of Angels and of men, the Queen of Our first parents themselves, in a word, on a certain par with Christ as His eternally elected consort. But the prince and his consort are exempted from the common law. The parity of privilege rests on this, that what belongs to the God-man by nature, in virtue of her predestination belongs to her by grace; such a parity places her above the law. How beautiful a concept Montalbanus has of this the divine maternity of Our Lady appears from the following passage attributing her a dignity which he styles 'somewhat infinite':

Indeed from the divine splendor of Christ the effulgence of the Blessed Virgin grows rather than lessens in the eyes of all, since from this that she is the Mother of God, she has a somewhat infinite dignity, wherefore she was seen by St. John, clothed with the sun, and therefore proclaimed as a great sign.

The infinity here spoken of cannot, and does not of course, cast any umbrage on the only infinity truly spoken of God; it does, however, serve to signally express that her association with the Son of God as His predestined Mother endowed her with a dignity far more sublime than anything arising from the privileges themselves of grace and glory, and assigns her to an order immensely superior to that shared by anyone except the God-man and His immaculate Mother. From this sublime prerogative of her divine maternity again her other prerogatives flow:

Indeed as Suarez says, the Mother was not ever disjoined from the Son in divine election, . . . and therefore the virgin is there immediately compared to the mystic sun of the Church, figured indeed in that material sun, which comparison, therefore, likewise involves the first. It must, then, be said that the Virgin together with Christ was from all eternity elected, and before every creature, . . . and this before the fall of Adam was seen, or indeed that it was seen that Adam should fall. In virtue of which same election manifestly the Blessed Virgin was likewise predestined to that plenitude of grace and preeminence of glory, which she in fact possessed, by which she is likewise placed as at the same time ordained to the office of mediatrix and coredemptrix for the salvation of the whole world. And thus so much is it not the case that she should have any moral dependence from Adam, than that rather to the contrary each first parent should recognize the highest dependance from her, with their whole posterity, not alone with respect to their gratuitous being, but also with respect to their very natural being itself.⁷²

Not disjoined from her Son in divine election, and from all eternity elected, before all creatures, our first parents and the human race of which they were the progenitors even for their natural existence depend upon her and her Son; were it not for the predestination of the Mother and Son, no others would have been destined to existence: thus in a certain sense, by being the Mother of the first predestined one, she became the Mother even of our natural race. The plenitude of grace and glory incumbent upon her predestination, guaranteed her accession to the position of Mediatrix, and, sin intervening, that also of co-redemptrix, for the salvation of those to be saved. Thus then rather did the intervening sin weigh down the original dependence of Adam and his posterity upon her originally planned existence. This dependence in the development, we may say, of her office of co-redemptrix, Montalbanus explains when he writes:⁷³

Thus the Blessed Virgin was first predestined to perpetual sanctity and innocence from the merits of Christ independently of His passion and death; she was decreed as confirmed in the succeeding signs on account of the foreseen sin, by His passion and death, in the privilege of the same preservation and immunity—to be confirmed by that passion and death. Whence since the merit of Christ on account of the passion and death was more excellently and perfectly in her, hence in this second case the Blessed Mother was preordained to greater gifts of grace and glory, since she should be the Mother of the Redeemer to suffer and die for relieving men from the fall, and thus she should have to sustain the most atrocious

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 252.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 448.

martyrdom of heart, and in her way to cooperate as the coredeмпtrix with Christ for obtaining for us forgiveness and salvation. . . .

The fall of man rather than lessening the glory of Our Lady by any intervention of sin, augmented it rather by substituting the means of her sanctification, the merits of Christ independently of His passion and death, most excellently and perfectly toward her. Through these merits as coming through His passion and death she became endowed with the office of co-redemptrix, furnished with grace to undergo a martyrdom of heart for the redemption of mankind. Thus did her office of mediatrix remain, with the accessory office of co-redemptrix, preserving for her her predestined position as the mystical neck of the entire Church, to which Christ as the Head presides:⁷⁴

thus was the Virgin elected after the manner of the sun, that she might be the queen of all the saints and angels, and that from her through her all must receive the light of grace and sanctity, according to the statement of St. Bernard: God wished us to have all through Mary, as the mystical neck of the entire Church, to which as a Head Christ presides.

This brief résumé of the mind of Montalbanus may find a fitting conclusion in the sober beauty of the following passage, revealing the depths of glory which his principles led him to find in the Mother of the Incarnate Word:⁷⁵

In the second sign therefore God wishing from a virgin Mother and without the work of man to conceive Christ the Lord by the Holy Spirit, He chose Mary for this, and predestined her to such great dignity, and at the same time to the grace and glory congruent to this dignity. Thus that if Christ were predestined to be the Son of man, the Blessed Virgin was predestined that she might be His Mother, if Christ as the King, the Blessed Virgin as the Queen, if Christ as the Sun, the Blessed Virgin as the moon, if Christ as the Head of the Whole Church, from whom all grace should flow into the members of the Church, the Blessed Mother as the neck by means of which each grace would be communicated to the other members. . . .

Carolus Del Moral

From a contemporary of Sambucensis, namely Carolus del Moral (†1731), the pervading preoccupation with the predestination of

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 429.

Our Lady found in the mariology of immediately preceding authors perseveres:

We may say that the primary motive of the coming of Christ, and in virtue of which He exists, with His most Holy Virgin, was the highest communication in the highest way possible of the divine goodness and of the attributes of God, and so impelling that in virtue of this, Christ the Lord and the sacred God-bearer would have existed even if no other creature were to exist, angelic or human.⁷⁶

An absolute predestination of Christ and his Mother as manifestative of the communication of the divine goodness in the highest way possible—this constituted the primal will of God. This absolute predestination became accommodated by divine dispensation to the fall of man.

Christ the Lord repairing by His merits the angelic ruin to predestined man, and restoring the fallen man to the state of grace, that they might be saved, was without doubt the head of the predestined; but, Christ Himself shared with His Mother that with Him, and dependantly from His merits, she should become also, by her own proper merits as a Mother, one to repair the angelic ruin to predestined man and one to restore fallen men to the state of grace.⁷⁷

Christ, the Head of the predestined, shared with His Mother the restoration of the angelic ruin and the restoration of grace to man; dependently upon His merits, she consequently on her own proper merit, participated in that reparation and redemption. This constituted a supervening excellence to Our Lady, already destined for existence with Christ outside the hypothesis of sin; (in sententia nostra de adventu Christi Domini adhuc Adamo non peccante). It was, moreover, Moral's personal conviction that Our Lady's election in the foreknowledge of God to the dignity of the divine maternity, itself found its reason in her personal merit:⁷⁸

The reason of this is a priori, since whether in our belief of the coming of Christ the Lord, Adam not sinning, or in the contrary belief, it is true that the existence of Christ the Lord was not essentially absolutely dependent from this Mother numerically, but that He could not rather be from God

⁷⁶ *Fons illimis theologiae scholasticae Marianae* (Matriti, 1730), p. 338, cf. C. Balic, "La Predestination," p. 133.

⁷⁷ *Fons illimis*, tract. 2, disp. 2, qu. 3, a. 3, n. 47 (I, 375a), cf. W. Sebastian, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

⁷⁸ *Fons illimis*, p. 361b; cf. Sebastian, *op. cit.*, p. 81, n. 38.

alone, or together with a second cause from this other one or that, since according to the most common philosophy, the same effect can be produced from a twofold efficient cause, it could be produced not from this but from another. Whence He could absolutely carry out the decree of the Incarnation of the Word either Christ the Lord being produced by God alone, or together with another second cause, which would not be this Virgin numerically from which He is now *de facto* born. Therefore it holds that this Virgin must merit that from her rather than from another the Word is temporarily generated according to humanity, without it being that the advent of Christ the Lord to the world absolutely and simply should depend on her merit.

The priority in dignity of the divine maternity to which Our Lady was predestined over the gifts themselves of grace and glory which surrounds it:⁷⁹

The hypostatic union with carnal and corporeal humanity is substantial, which is more perfect than a spiritual union, which is only moral and affective; but the union also of the maternal relationship is substantial terminatively with God and a divine person. For indeed just as in a substantial personal reason human nature is united intrinsically with a divine person as with a substantial complement, so the Blessed Mother by reason of her maternity is united terminatively with a divine person as with the total substantial terminus of his substantial generation. . . .

In the second place since the gifts of grace and of glory cannot unite a creature with God more than in an effective moral line, but this uniting even in so far as it is most perfect cannot attain unto the perfection of a substantial joining terminatively with God making Him truly and properly a relation by filial relationship, therefore. More stringently thus: The gifts of grace and of glory however much they grow in perfection cannot ever attain to equating the perfection of the hypostatic union in the nature of a gift, since they can only join a creature with God in an affective moral line, always in an order inferior to the substantial union of the hypostatic order, but the joining of maternal relationship with the divine person of the Word is terminatively substantial pertaining to the hypostatic union, as no one may deny. Therefore, however much the gifts of grace and glory grow in perfection of the divine maternity in the manner of a gift, but with respect to this they are always of an inferior order.

The Blessed Mother by reason of the relationship of substantial generation attains a relationship physically to a divine Person. Though from a different aspect the relationship involved both in the hypostatic union and in the maternity becomes physical and substantial, the divine person in Christ supported a human nature and

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, disp. 2, qu. 1, a. 3, n. 25, I, p. 136b; cf. W. Sebastian, *op. cit.*, p. 139, n. 88.

the physical person of Mary gave birth to the Divine Son of God substantially united to that nature. Such a physical substantial relationship exceeds in dignity the affective moral relationship present to grace and glory. The former terminates at a substantial physical entity; the latter at an accidental moral entity. In fact, the gift of the divine maternity entitles Our Lady more to eternal life than the gift of sanctifying grace itself:⁸⁰

. . . it is more congruent to concede eternal life to one having the supreme gift giveable to a pure creature, constituting the supreme joining with God below the joining of the hypostatic union, than to concede it to one having another less gift not thus constituting one a relative and joined with God. And the divine maternity is such a supreme gift, and constitutes the Virgin as supremely conjoined, below the hypostatic union, with an infinite person . . . for the entity of grace does not have, nor cannot it give, such a supreme joining even divinely; therefore, it is more congruent that eternal life be given to the most Holy Virgin having the maternity of God than having the physical entity of grace. . . . Therefore with respect to the formal moral being of sanctity, the maternity of God is a better proportioned matter than the physical entity of grace.

Sanctifying grace even in the absolute power of God cannot give an intimacy of relationship to the divine which would be equivalent to the relationship of maternity possessed by Our Lady through the maternity of her Son. Absolutely speaking, then, the gift of beatitude, or eternal life, belongs to Our Lady more from her maternal relationship than from its consequent endowments in the order of grace. The maternity of God coming second only to the hypostatic union in intimacy to Him, forms a more proximate matter for the information of the sanctity of the beatific vision than the physical entity of grace itself. The principle involved is one of union. The closer one becomes to God by His gifts the closer does one become a matter to be informed by the ultimate gift of beatitude; the divine maternity offers materially a closer relationship deserving that it be informed by the ultimate form of beatitude.⁸¹

All the closer does one come to the principle in any genus, all the more does one share the effect of that principle; but in the genus of union, the

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, tract. I, disp. 3, qu. 1, a. 4, n. 74, (I, 229a), cf. W. Sebastian, p. 143, n. 92.

⁸¹ Tract. 1, disp. 2, qu. 1, a. 2, n. 10 (I, 129a), cf. W. Sebastian, *op. cit.*, p. 139, n. 87.

Blessed Mother by reason of the maternity precisely as such approximates closer to God than by reason of any other gift distinct from the hypostatic union uniting a creature with God with the union of relationship properly and strictly such as is the maternity or the gift of the maternity, it being the case that any other unites only perfectly and purely morally.

In virtue of the gift of the divine maternity sharing so intimately in the effectuation of the hypostatic union, her other prerogatives follow in consequence:

As Campo-Verde well argues that that gift by reason of which other gifts are due to a creature in the highest grade is more excellent and perfect than they; but the maternity of God, by itself and segregated from other gifts, is the gift by reason of which the other supernal gifts are due to the Blessed Mother in the highest degree . . . of parity with the hypostatic union. For this union exceeds all other supernal gifts in perfection, by this, that on account of its excellence all other supernal gifts must be predicated of it in the highest degree. Why, therefore, if they are due to the maternity will this not itself also exceed the gifts themselves in perfection? The minor is proved: that from which the holy fathers rightly infer the highest grace and other gifts in the highest grade in the Blessed Virgin is the reason on account of which they are due; but as it becomes apparent from the authorities placed above, the maternity of God by itself taken separately from the other gifts is that on account of which the holy fathers rightly infer in the Blessed Virgin the highest grace and the other gifts in the highest degree. Therefore, the maternity in the way spoken of is the reason on account of which the other gifts are due to her in the highest degree. . . .

. . . It is repugnant that the thing rooted exceed its root in perfection; but the supernal gifts in the highest degree possible to a pure creature given to the Blessed Virgin are rooted at least morally in the maternity of God. Therefore, it is repugnant that the supernal gifts in the highest degree possible to a pure creature exceed the maternity of God in perfection. It is, therefore, of all the gifts greatest and negatively highest. This also is the reason on account of which the hypostatic union is the greatest of all in the nature of a gift. If, therefore, it is efficacious with respect to the union, why does it not enjoy the same efficaciousness with respect to the maternity?⁸²

That which lies as the cause of other gifts given a creature in the highest degree, must be a gift greater than they; the gift of our faculties has as its cause the gift of human existence; the gift of the hypostatic union constitutes the motive of the immensity of graces which surrounds it in the soul of Christ. Wherefore, having in the mind the conclusions of the author in the passages cited above, the

⁸² Cf. *ibid.* tract. 1, disp. 2, qu. 1, art. 2, n. 10 (I, 133b-134), cf. W. Sebastian, *op. cit.*, p. 103, n. 156.

gift of the divine maternity, exceeding as it does the gifts surrounding it, lies as their causal foundation, and constitutes the greater gift, provoking the giving of the lesser. Del Moral here wishes to oppose the opinion of those constituting the excellence of the divine maternity in the complexus of graces surrounding it; in opposition to any such opinion he strenuously asserts as the *raison d'être* of these gifts the maternity taken physically, in virtue of which they supervene, as in the case of the hypostatic union with reference to the person of Christ. Whence, the predestination of Our Lady to the physical maternity antecedes that of her predestination to the supervening gifts, and posits the very reason itself for their existence. The roots of these supervening gifts lie at least morally in, not by physical necessity, the maternity of the Son of God, and if the tree exhibits such great perfection, the foundation which gives it its growth and elegance, the substratum which supports and nourishes it must be of an equivalent, and indeed, in this case, a greater perfection. It would be incongruous for such a flowering of gifts to come forth from a root not having them in germ: "That gift for which others are given must be more perfect and excellent than the gifts themselves."

As a final word, Del Moral like his predecessors, sees in the predestination of Our Lady the origin of her manifold offices for the predestination of the elect in any dispensation:⁸³

But, the special work, in the highest way meritorious, at least congruently, of our salvation, and of that of all the predestined, by which God wished her to be with His Son a helper, a reparatrix, and a restorer, of nature to the state of grace and to cooperation in the redemption, I find the fathers to have assigned and specified as that act by which the will of the Mother of God concordant to the will of the eternal Father gave her Son to the world, and in consent with that Son offered him for the salvation of the world.

But, as we have seen already, that Virgin was assigned as the consort of her Son antecedently to the fall; her offices then of restorer, helper, reparatrix, mediatrix, and co-redemprix, supervene upon the initial dignity of predestination to the divine maternity.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, tract. 2, disp. 1, qu. 3, art. 3, n. 41 (I, 372b); and W. Sebastian, *op. cit.*, p. 103, n. 156.

Vergilius Sedlmayr

The Scholastica Mariana of Vergilius Sedlmayr († 1772) likewise merits to be quoted here, particularly since it opens its considerable treatment of mariology with an extended discussion of Our Lady's predestination. He finds that predestination first in the proper sense of the various texts of Sacred Scripture applied liturgically to the Mother of God:⁸⁴

I say: The predestination noted is applied to Our Blessed Lady rightly in Sacred Scripture. This is proved in the first place by quoting those places themselves in Sacred Scripture which Luther noted, namely, Prov. 8, vs. 22, where it is said, 'Dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum, ante quidquid faceret a principio.' In which words Scripture speaks of possession before the beginning of the world, which is by predestination in the mind of God, and when it says 'Possedit me' the Blessed Mother is understood properly, namely from the mind of the Church, the holy expositors and the Fathers. For although this whole place is accustomed to be explained also of uncreated Wisdom, however most properly it also can be understood of the Blessed Mother, especially if the whole context be read.

He grounds his contention for such an interpretation on the possibility of a multiple literal sense in Sacred Scripture, adducing the authority of St. Thomas and of St. Augustine to support his interpretation; his interpretation of this possibility need not detain us further here. The same allusion to these texts as indicating the person of Our Lady finds repetition over and over:⁸⁵

. . . This is confirmed from the Book of Ecclesiasticus, ch. 24, where it is had vs. 5, 'Ego ex ore altissimi prodivi primogenita ante omnem creaturam,' that is, from the mind of God predestining, in which I am predestined before every pure creature conceived, and that the Virgin Mother might the more clearly be expressed, it is added vs. 12, 'qui creavit me requievit in tabernaculo meo,' namely God in my womb nine months. And vs. 14, 'ab initio et ante saecula creata sum,' where the word 'created' is not so properly applied to uncreated Wisdom, since Christ cannot be said simply to be created, as to the Blessed Mother; therefore, since the Scriptures in these places speak properly of predestination, they are to be attributed properly also to the Blessed Mother.

The predestination of Our Lady preceded that of "angels and men" "created before the centuries began," "the firstborn of every

⁸⁴ *Scholastica mariana, in Summa Aurea de laudibus B. V. Mariae* (ed. Bourasse), vol. 7, cf. col. 779-780.

⁸⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, col. 781.

creature," she was to be "the Mother of the saints, just as Christ the Prince Father and head of the saints":⁸⁶

The Blessed, Virgin is therefore said rightly to be created before the centuries began, and indeed as the firstborn before every creature, and specifically before angels and men, according to that of Prov. 8, 25, 'Ante colles ego parturiebar'; St. Augustine lib. 1, De Trinitate, c. 12 reads: 'Before the hills he generated me, that I should be the Mother of the saints, just as Christ is the Prince Father and the Head of the saints.

His second proof for Our Blessed Lady's predestination consists of a series of quotations from tradition, from the fathers of the Church, interpreted in the light of his own interpretation of the passages from Sacred Scripture; we shall, however, pass on to the third proof where he supplies an abundance of argument from reason:⁸⁷

It is proven in the third place from reason. God loves creatures and discerns respecting them in that order in which they exceed each other in goodness, and serve for more greatly manifesting the glory of God, since He made them for this, Prov. 16, and the Blessed Mother as the Mother of God, exceeds all pure creatures in goodness and dignity since to be united to God in the nature of a natural Mother—which belongs to her—is something greatly higher and more estimable in just judgement, than to be united only by reason of being an adopted Son, which belongs to angels and to men. . . . Therefore God loved the Blessed Mother, and in the series of predestination He discerned concerning her before all pure creatures, and consequently she is predestined before every pure creature. This is confirmed after the Apostle, II Cor. 4, 15, all things are for the elect, 'Omnia propter vos, et electi propter Christum,' Ad Heb. 2, 10, and by this itself also because of the Mother of God, of Christ, as more worthy in the entire order than all the elect.

As the natural mother of God exceeding all creatures in dignity and goodness God discerned concerning her in the series of predestinations anterior to any pure creatures, predestined before all others, all other things are for her and her divine Son.

She owes her endowment in natural gifts to her divine maternity, supreme in the order of graces, first in the order of intentional decree.

For therefore God gave to the Blessed Virgin such a nature, endowed with so many natural gifts, since He chose her as Mother, and, therefore, on

⁸⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, col. 785.

⁸⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, col. 786.

account of the Divine Maternity, which is supreme in the order of grace with respect to pure creatures. . . . Therefore, the maternity of God, or the Virgin Mother as Mother as God, is the first in the order of the intentional decree, and thus before every pure creature.⁸⁸

It is proved in the second place, since to the Blessed Mother by reason of the divine maternity, such perfections, powers, and operations are given to the faculties of her soul, that they exceed not alone all men, but all the angels, otherwise specifically diverse from men in their mode of operation . . . Therefore, if the Blessed Mother were not the Mother of God, she would not have existed with these perfections in the state of nature. Neither may you consider this diversity in perfections to be only accidental, for it is to the contrary that such a cumulus of perfections, and such a grade of actuality as is found in them, seeks another soul numerically as root, and thus another substantial being numerically, and, therefore, there would have been a substantial difference.

Her predestination anteceded Adam and Eve and their sin, "coming in the first sign before all creatures."⁸⁹

I answer, that it is the case . . . that the Blessed Mother was predestined in the first sign before all creatures, and thence also before Adam and Eve and their sin, which is also confirmed by this reason, that the decree of permitting the Adamitic sin did not have a motive of divine glory, and favorable to man, prior to the decree of permitting Christ as the Redeemer and His Mother. For what would have come to God by way of glory from this alone that He should permit man to fall? It would, however, have, indeed, if He permitted the fall for this preconceived end, that through Christ he might rise again far more felicitously. . . . Wherefore, the predestination of Christ and His Mother is prior by the causality of final cause, in so far as they are means for a reparation more felicitous than the sin of our first parents, and thus there is nothing to prevent Christ and His Mother being the cause of all the elect commonly, although in the order of execution our first parents preceded Christ and His Mother.

From the point of view of final causality Christ and His Mother preceded in their predestination all others, since the reparation they were to perform outweighed by its felicity the sin of our first parents and their consequences. To decree the creation of mankind destined to fall anterior to the decree of 'permitting' Christ the Redeemer and His Mother would have neither a motive in divine glory nor in conceivable profit to man.

The singular predestination of Our Lady and of her Divine Son anteceded any merits on their part; all the rather did their worthiness in the concept of God predestining them establish them as King

⁸⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, col. 786; for following quote cf. col. 801.

⁸⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, col. 804.

and Queen, with their attendant servants chosen by predestination from the rest of rational creation to eternal glory:

... and such merit the Blessed Mother is not believed to have had in relation to others, who precede her in the execution (of creation); there is another merit of pure dignity and majesty, in so far as Christ and the Blessed Mother already in the first sign before every pure creature were antecedently considered worthy that as King and Queen they should have their servants, and because of them some are chosen for eternal glory . . .⁹⁰

Christ and the Blessed Mother merited habitual grace and essential glory for the angels by a merit of dignity looking to the final cause, in so far as the angels are created, and endowed with grace and glory, because of Christ and Mary. This is the common assertion of theologians.⁹¹

Finally, we may quote the following paragraph with respect to the order of creation involving our Blessed Mother and the rest of creation:⁹²

I say: God in predestining specifically the Blessed Virgin used many decrees, according to reason. It is proved first by the authority of Sacred Scripture, which in Eccl. 24, 5, as appeared in the preceding article, calls her 'the firstborn before every creature,' which first of all cannot be understood except of eternal primogeniture in the mind of God predestining, since in temporal execution she cannot be the first born, and, therefore, God with respect to the Blessed Mother had many decrees according to reason, in so far as He first discerned her to be generated, and other creatures after and because of her. Then Scripture says that God in predestining the Blessed Virgin as mother looked upon some motive cause, namely humility, according to Lk. 1, 48, "He had regarded the lowliness of his handmaid." Therefore, since the cause precedes the effect in the order of nature, God first wished to discern the humility of the Virgin, and then dependently from it the maternity. It is apropos of this that St. Bernard in *Sermo* 3, *Salve*, openly asserts, "Because of Mary every creature was made, because of her the whole world was made." Therefore, God decreed first Mary and then the other creatures, and thus there are many decrees with respect to the Blessed Mother and other predestined because of her. . . .

It is proven in the second place on the authority of the Fathers, among which St. Augustine takes the first place both in the place just cited, as well as in *Tract* 8 in St. John, where he says, "before the Son was born from her in predestination He knew the Mother," and "just as He knew her as His Mother so He chose her to be the Mother of the whole world," which words he adds *Sermo* 39 *Ad fratres in eremo*. If therefore she must

⁹⁰ Cf. *ibid.*

⁹¹ Cf. *ibid.*

⁹² Cf. *ibid.*, col. 783.

be the Mother of all in the mind of God predestining, by this itself that she is the Mother of the Savior, then she must precede all in predestination. Other fathers speak in the same way.

Thus, according to Sedlmayr, to Mary in the mind of God predestining an eternal primogeniture belonged in the order of intention He first discerned her to be generated and other creatures after and because of her; as a motive cause of her predestination God looked upon her humility.

These are the statements of Sedlmayr, although he at the same time devotes an article in the present question to explicitly proving that Christ would have come if Adam had not sinned: "I say first that Christ would not have come if Adam had not sinned." Art. 7.

To resume his ideas briefly, the passages of Sacred Scripture, so often alluded to by the Scotists to affirm the predestination of Our Lady, find a literal application to that predestination in a sense proper to them, since Sacred Scripture, he says, can support such another proper sense; in fact, they more properly apply to this predestination than to the uncreated Wisdom, or the Verbum, since He is not properly created. This predestination can be understood only of the eternal decree of God, since the decree of her existence in the order of execution evinces no such conceivable predestination. Again, in predestining her as His mother, He predestined her to be the Mother of all; whence in predestination she precedes all. Her prerogative to which she was predestined, the divine maternity, excels the prerogative of any creature else, which terminates at adopted sonship. But, God loves creatures, and decides with respect to them in the order in which they share His goodness and manifest His glory; the divine maternity excelling then the adopted sonship both of angels and men in so far as true maternity to God excels sonship adopted by Him. She by her maternity outrightly excels them, and was predestined by God antecedently to them. She in predestination, again, precedes others in such wise that they exist predestined for her, under Christ, of course. "The elect are for Christ and also for His Mother." In the divine design Christ and Our Lady must be the Rex and Regina, the King and the Queen of the elect, the Father and the Mother of the elect, He the King and Head of the Saints, and she the Queen of the Saints. First in the order of predestination came the divine maternity; upon this the gifts of

nature and of grace concomitant with this dignity follow; these in turn antecede any proper merits of hers by divine predestination. They absolutely so constitute a substantial reality in the person of Mary in view of the divine maternity, that were this not to be, she would not have existed. While Christ would not have come were man not to have sinned, neither would man have existed were God not to have planned or predestined Christ and Mary, since such an existence would have been futile for man and derogatory to the glory of God. These, in brief, represent the kernel of Sedlmayr's thought on the predestination of Mary.

St. Alphonsus Liguori

St. Alphonsus Liguori († 1787), coming at the wane of the golden age of the later Franciscan period of theological activity, with a certain candid *sang-froid* offers with the inevitable and inimitable touch of the centuries a balance to all that preceded him, which is not without being refreshing:⁹³

In the first place it was fitting that the eternal Father should create Mary free from the original stain, because she was His daughter, and His first-born daughter as she herself attests: "I came out of the mouth of the Most High the firstborn before all creatures," for this passage is applied to Mary by the Sacred interpreters, by the Holy Fathers, and by the Church Herself on the solemn festival of her conception.

Whether she be the firstborn on account of her predestination together with the Son in the divine decrees, before all creatures, as the school of the Scotists will have it; or the firstborn of grace as predestined to be the Mother of the Redeemer according to the school of the Thomists, all agree in calling her the firstborn of God. Which being the case it was not meet that Mary should be the slave of Lucifer, but that she should only and always be possessed by the Creator, as she herself attests: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways." Hence, Mary was rightly called by Denis, Archbishop of Alexandria, one and sole daughter of life: *una et sola filia vitae*, differing in this from others who being born in sin are daughters of death.

Alphonsus Liguori does not espouse the Scotistic theory at any time; in this text he accords the divergent notions on the predestination of Our Lady level probability; the Scotists see in the predestination of Our Lady her being the firstborn of creatures together

⁹³ *The Glories of Mary*, English transl. (P. J. Kenedy, New York, 1902), pp. 337-338.

with her Son; the Thomists of his time accord her the first place in grace as the predestined Mother of Christ. For him she is predestined as "the firstborn of God," "always possessed by the Creator," "possessed in the beginning of His ways." Beyond a singular predestination as the Mother of God entitling her to special prerogatives such as the Immaculate Conception, St. Alphonsus does not specify ulteriorly how he understands this predestination beyond styling it, or indicating that it is, a predestination to be "the firstborn of God."

We quote a few authors from the nineteenth century to show the turn of continuity there of the notion of the predestination of Mary, authors who remarkably enough mirror the ideas we saw previously among the outstanding authors of Scotistic leanings. Though an ascetical writer rather than a professional theologian, Frederick Faber († 1863), on account of his influence in the devotional reading of English-speaking countries, merits consideration. We may quote several passages from his writings,⁹⁴ passages already brought to light by D. Unger, O.F.M.Cap., which for the sequence of thought, find well-merited repetition:

If there had been no sin, still the Second Person of the Holy Trinity would have been made man. Jesus Christ was eternally predestined to be the king of angels and of men, the Sovereign of all creation, in right of His created nature, even if there had been no fall and no redemption.⁹⁵

The first creature, this sacred humanity, was not only the primal creature, but it was also the cause of all other creatures whatever. It was the central creature as well as the first. All others group themselves around it, and are in relation with it, and draw their signification from it, and moreover are modelled upon it. Its predestination is the fountain of all other predestinations. The whole meaning of creation equally with the destinies of each individual creature is bound up with this created nature, assumed to a divine person. It is the head of creations, angelic, human or whatsoever other creation there may be. Its position is universal, for it couples all creations on to God.⁹⁶

The first step outside of God, the first standing point in creation, is the created nature assumed to the divine person. Through this as it were lay the passage from the Creator to the creatures. This was the point of union, the junction between the finite and the infinite, the creature blending unconfusedly with the Creator. . . . Its predestination is the foundation of

⁹⁴ Cf. Dominic Unger, "Christ and His Blessed Mother in God's Eternal Design according to Frederick W. Faber," *Marianum*, XVII (1955).

⁹⁵ *The Precious Blood*, ed. Baltimore, 10th, p. 107, cf. D. Unger, p. 15.

⁹⁶ *Bethlehem*, ed. Baltimore, 30th, cf. D. Unger, p. 16.

all other predestinations. The whole meaning of creation equally with the destinies of each individual creature, is bound up with this created nature, or whatsoever other creation there may ever be. Its position is universal for it couples all other creations on to God.⁹⁷

So it is with Mary. She lies up in the fountainhead of creation, almost at the very point where it issues from God; and amid unbearable coruscations of the primal decrees of God she rests, almost without color or form to our dazzled eyes, only we know that she is there, and that the divine light is her beautiful clothing.⁹⁸

And when the time for Mary's advent came, that the Immaculate Conception was the first grace with which the divine persons began their magnificent work of adoring. It was a new creation although it was older in the mind of God, as men would speak, than the firstborn of the angels or the material planet.⁹⁹

Moreover, it was always part of His intention that the Creator should become part of His creation; that the uncreated Person should really and truly assume a created nature and be born of a created Mother. This is what we call the mystery of the Incarnation. It is this which makes creation so magnificent. It was not merely a beautiful thing which God made as an artificer, and which He set outside of Himself, and kept at a distance from Himself to look at, to admire, to pity, and to love. He always intended to be part of it in a wonderful way. So that there would always have been Jesus and Mary, even if there never had been any sin.¹⁰⁰

She was their eternal idea (viz. of the Three Divine Persons), nearest to that idea which was the cause of all creation, the idea of Jesus; she was necessary as they had willed it to the realization of that idea. . . .¹⁰¹

The glorious, adorable, and eternal Word, in the ample range of his unrestricted choice, predestined the Bosom of Mary to be His home, and fashioned with well-pleased love the Immaculate Heart which was to tenant it with Himself.¹⁰²

The sacred humanity of Christ, the firstborn creature, the primal creature, was the cause of all other creatures. It is the central creature around which others group. In it creation is united to God without fusion; and its predestination is the fountainhead of all predestinations. The created nature of Christ assumed to a divine person is the first step outside God. Here Mary lies "almost at the very point" where creation issues from God in Christ. The idea of Christ was the cause of all creation; the idea of Mary rests in the

⁹⁷ *Bethlehem, ed. cit.*, p. 27, cf. D. Unger, p. 3.

⁹⁸ *Bethlehem, ed. cit.*, p. 54 ff., cf. D. Unger, p. 4.

⁹⁹ *Bethlehem, ed. cit.*, p. 59, cf. D. Unger, p. 4.

¹⁰⁰ *The Precious Blood*, Baltimore, p. 17ff., Unger, p. 4.

¹⁰¹ *Bethlehem, ed. cit.*, p. 58; cf. D. Unger, p. 16.

¹⁰² *Bethlehem*, p. 57; cf. Unger, p. 4.

primal decrees of God, next to the idea of Christ, "because she was necessary as they had willed it to the realization of that idea." There would always have been Jesus and Mary, even if there never had been any sin, "since that an uncreated person should assume a created nature and be born of a created Mother," was always part of the intention of God with respect to His creation. Among all possible creatures whom the Eternal Word might have chosen for the implementation of Himself, the idea of God hypostatically sharing human nature, that Word predestined the "bosom of Mary to be His home." Finally, in the light of the foregoing, the inevitable concatenation of Her other privileges to that of her eternal predestination had by the logic of his principles to find its assertion from Faber:¹⁰³

that Our Blessed Lady was not included in the decree of sin . . . that she was immaculately conceived, flow from it as a simple consequence ('simple consequences' in the original because of the context).

John Henry Cardinal Newman (†1890)¹⁰⁴ of the same land assigns a predestined place as Mediatrix of graces within the Kingdom of Christ to Mary:

He said, "Woman what have I to do with thee? My hour is not yet come." That is the hour of His triumph, when His Mother was to take her predestined place in His kingdom.

Passing across to France about the same period, we find the following text from the pen of Nicholas:^{104a}

One can absolutely conceive Jesus Christ without the elect; one cannot conceive Him without Mary; because He is her Son, and He would not have been without her. God without her would not have been man, and for the same reason man would not have been God. Because, once again, He is as man the predestined Son of God, and not alone as man but as the Son of man, that which He would have been only by His Mother, only by Mary.—The predestination of Mary to the divine maternity. These two predestinations are necessarily connected and correlative; they interlace in the one same decree.

¹⁰³ *The Blessed Sacrament*, Baltimore 31st ed., p. 63; cf. Unger, p. 12.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. J. Friedel, *The Mariology of Cardinal Newman* (New York, 1928), p. 250.

^{104a} *La Vierge Marie dans la Plan divine*, T. 2, c. 3, pp. 61–62 (Paris, 1880); cf. G. Roschini, *Mariologia*, t. II, pars I, p. 17.

The predestinations of Jesus and Mary are correlatives; the one involves the other. Christ is the predestined Son of God by Mary, since He is thus predestined as the Son of Man, the Son of an earthly Mother. The two predestinations interlock even outside the hypothesis even of the elect.

Mathias Scheeben

In the second half of the same century in Germany, Mathias Scheeben (d.1888) evidences a very deliberately thought-out theory on the predestination of Mary.¹⁰⁵ The grace of the divine Motherhood to which Mary was especially predestined differs from every other divine predestination. There is, he says, no hypothetical character inherent to its realization making it dependent on the actual accomplishment of the requisite acts on Mary's part. Analogous to the predestination of Christ, it is, he says, "of a much more unconditioned and irrevocable character" than the predestination belonging to the rest of the elect. The grace specifically suited to this Motherhood, including a confirmation in grace, anteceded any personal activity on the part of Mary; the spiritual relationship of her indissoluble union with God, inherent to her existence at the outset, and directed to the realization of the Incarnation as well as the Redemption through her maternal cooperation, precluded hers being any simple anticipating grace dependent on conditional acceptance, but rather rested on the will of God decreeing absolutely. Its maintenance was secured, its indissolubility guaranteed by grace such that she was from all eternity elected as inseparably espoused to God.

Scheeben likes to speak of this election in the terminology of matrimony. This less happy terminology, not new, but centuries old, in view of Our Lady's indissoluble union to God by grace inclusive of the grace of the divine maternity, as well as that of being mediatrix and co-redemptrix, "co-principle of redemption and of grace," he turns to a more apt value when he applies it to her eternal predestination:¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ We quote *Mariology*, by Rev. M. J. Scheeben, transl. by Rev. T. L. M. J. Geukers, Vols. I and II (B. Herder Co., St. Louis, 1946).

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 198.

This being supposed we may add, and the Church favors this view, that in God's notion of creation, through which He called into being the person of Mary, we find inseparably connected the existence of this person, and her destiny as Mother of God, or rather her existence in the quality of Motherly bride of Christ. . . .

When further the Church in her liturgy draws an analogy between the origin of Mary and that of the incarnate Wisdom, the likeness is to be found first and foremost in this: as seat or vessel of wisdom, Mary is created entirely in and for the union as bride with the Logos, analogously as the humanity of Christ, is created entirely in and for the hypostatic union. The physical being also of Christ's humanity was here determined and actualized by the same decree as that through which its hypostatic union with the Logos and the eternal manifestation of the Logos were fixed and realized.

In the Bull *Ineffabilis* the intrinsic justification of this parallel is brought back to this, that the "origin of the Blessed Virgin was prescribed by one and the same decree as was the Incarnation of the divine Wisdom." These words can mean only that the very existence of Mary was set by God *per modum unius* and in an analogous manner with the existence of the flesh of the incarnate Wisdom.

The notion of creation in God included that of Mary as motherly bride of Christ; the texts of the Old Testament applied to Incarnate Wisdom find by analogy their application to her as the seat of that Wisdom decreed eternally to be actualized in the same decree as the hypostatic union itself, an identical decree involved the existence of the humanity of Christ and the person of His Mother by an association which reached back to an eternity of decree in God.

The association of a 'divine marriage' with the predestination of Our Lady in the writings of Scheeben, a terminology less apt and regrettable, and definitely absent from the main current of the Scotistic writers, had, as it appears, the purpose of lending his personal coloring to his simple restatement of the dominant line of thought of the traditional theology found in his pages, and presented by him minus any allusion to a prompting from Scotistic literature, but profiting from the *uno eodemque decreto* enunciation shining forth from the Bull *Ineffabilis Deus*. We believe that the following grouping of texts from Scheeben's treatment of the predestination of Our Lady show better the dominant lines of the hereditary doctrine, and bear better witness to his place in tradition:

This person was therefore not simply elected as subject, but as coprinciple of the redemption and of grace.¹⁰⁷

In God's notion of creation, through which He called into being the person of Mary, we find inseparately connected the existence of this person and her destiny as Mother of God, or rather her existence in the quality of Motherly bride of Christ.¹⁰⁸

There existed in the mind of God from all eternity the design of making her immediately and forever the bride of God.¹⁰⁹

The meaning and soundness of this thought are evident from the idea of the Church relative to Mary as contrasted with Eve, and also as the reflection of the Incarnate Wisdom. This thought is linked up with the association of Mary with Christ in the same divine decree, indicated in the Protoevangelium, through which was fixed the redemption of fallen man by a new, perfect human couple and the effusion in time of the Eternal Wisdom, arisen from God.¹¹⁰

When further the Church in her liturgy draws an analogy between the origin of Mary and that of the Incarnate Wisdom, the likeness is to be found first and foremost in this; as seat or vessel of wisdom, Mary is created entirely in and for the union as bride with the Logos, analogously as the humanity of Christ is created entirely in and for the hypostatic union.¹¹¹

Mary here receives existence not as an organic supplement only, but also as a material preparation for the existence of Christ or as an inchoatio Christi.¹¹²

The three expressions describing the egress of Wisdom in the Book of Proverbs "He possessed me," or "He made me," "I was set up," or "I was anointed," and "I was brought forth," or "I was born" may in particular be applied to the individual elements which come under consideration in Mary's origin.¹¹³

The grace of the divine motherhood is . . . essentially nothing else than the divine being of her Son, granted to the Mother and infused into her.¹¹⁴

Through it she is, from her creation and in virtue of her origin, also assumed into the person of the Logos as His bride in such a way that she exists only in and through her relation to the divine person of her Son. And this relation conditions and defines her entire existence.¹¹⁵

Later Scheeben speaks of a twofold manner of considering the predestination of Our Lady, without, however, deciding for either:¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 198.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 198-199.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. p. 199.

¹¹⁰ Cf. p. 200.

¹¹¹ Cf. pp. 200-201.

¹¹² Cf. p. 201.

¹¹³ Cf. p. 203.

¹¹⁴ Cf. p. 205.

¹¹⁵ Cf. p. 205.

¹¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 46.

This theory is presented under a twofold form, according to the manner in which Mary's predestination is conceived (*he speaks of a theory of the debitum*) in relation to that of Christ. In the one sense they start from the premise that only *in concreto* is Mary predestined as Mother of the Redeemer of sinful mankind. In that case Christ's redeeming death operated for her not indeed as in sanctification, but only as meriting, while Christ's death still remained the foundation of Mary's privilege. In the other case they say that Mary as Mother of Christ is absolutely predestined with Him irrespective of the decree of the redemption, and thus before and independently of Christ's redeeming death.

The death of Christ, according to one theory, was for Mary the means of her Immaculate Conception, and the means for her meriting; in the other theory she is absolutely predestined with Christ as His Mother even outside the decree of redemption.

With reference, then, to the texts quoted above, the divine motherhood constitutes the object of Mary's predestination. This grace of divine Motherhood is that Divine Son by which she became a Mother. Her relation to her Son causes her existence, and conditions and defines it entirely; that existence has an inseparable connection with her destiny as Mother of God, such that without such a destiny she would simply not come to exist. God designed her eternally to be such a bride and such a Mother, the link uniting Mary and Christ rests in one divine decree, and finds its revelation already in the Protoevangelium. Created as bride of the Logos, Mother of the Incarnate Word, she entered existence as the *inchoatio Christi*; the elements in her origin find their expression already in Proverbs, "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways," etc. In the light of these thoughts Scheeben says in his opening words on the predestination of Mary: "The predestination to the grace of the motherhood in view of which Mary is called in a special manner 'vessel of election' is distinguished from every other divine predestination." Coming in the wake of the many texts we have seen throughout these pages, these statements, coming from the pen of a theologian of note in the second half of the nineteenth century, firmly manifest the survivance of the outstanding idea found so often in the authors we have earlier seen, namely, that there existed a special, eternal, predestination of Mary with Christ, and as His Mother, and in virtue of which her prerogatives proceed to follow; it "conditions and defines her entire existence."

We may now ask how have the ideas on the predestination of Mary presented sketchily throughout the preceding pages fared in our current theology. We do not intend to give here anything like a summary of present-day thought, but rather simply a selection almost at random from some current literature. Abarzuza in his manual of dogmatic theology has the following thesis: "The Blessed Mother was elected by God that she should be the Mother of God independently of the foreseeing of the sin of Adam, so that even if Adam had not sinned, she would have still been predestined as the Mother of God."^{116b} He continues: "The sense of our thesis is, that God already before the prevision of the sin of Adam, chose the Blessed Mother that she might be the Mother of God, so that even if Adam had not sinned, the Mother of God, nonetheless, would have existed."

Campana in his *Maria nel dogma cattolica* states:

And thus before the world existed, before the abysses were created . . . when God was alone in Himself infinitely happy in the consort of the three august divine persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, already since then God thought of Mary, already he carried her in his mind, already he laid down one day to make her the Mother of His Eternal Word, to associate her in the work of redemption, to constitute her the coredeptrix, the mediatrix, the advocate, the mother of human kind.¹¹⁷

He quotes *Ineffabilis Deus*:¹¹⁸

Ineffabilis Deus . . . ab initio et ante saecula Unigenito Filio suo matrem ex qua caro factus in beata temporum plenitudine nasceretur elegit, atque ordinavit, tantoque prae caeteris universis est prosecutus amore, ut in illa una, sibi propensissima voluntate complacuit.

and continues:¹¹⁹

These documents that assert for Mary in the order of predestination the first place immediately after Jesus, are of such weight that there is not any theologian who dares to contradict them. The singular predestination of Mary is a truth admitted with such universality and firmness of consent in the Church, that one cannot call it into doubt without going against the faith.

^{116b} Cf. F. X. Abarzuza, O.F.M.Cap., *Theologia dogmatica* (Chile, 1949), p. 201, for both quotations.

¹¹⁷ *Maria nel Dogma cattolico* (Rome, 1945), pp. 289-290.

¹¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 292 (Italian text).

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 292.

As to the further notion of this predestination, Our Lady, first predestined to the divine maternity, acceded by consequence to the gifts of grace and glory concomitant upon it:¹²⁰

We hold it as most certain that Mary was first predestined to the divine maternity and then to celestial glory . . . celestial glory is by dignity inferior to the divine maternity, and therefore it falls under the predestination of Mary only in a secondary line, as it falls only in a secondary line under the predestination of Jesus.

In the same decree with which God laid down the Incarnation of the Word He laid down thereby indeed the existence of Mary. Jesus and Mary cannot, not even for a moment, be conceived as separated in the thought of God.¹²¹

Every natural existence of Mary was willed in view of her singular predestination:¹²²

Whence it is clear that just as in Jesus also in Mary everything is effected by the providence ruling the supernatural order. And it is clear that in Mary not alone the divine maternity, not alone the extraordinary gifts of grace, but existence itself, the soul, the body, the faculties, every least thing in the long run, is dependant from the predestination. If Mary should not have to be the Mother of God, she would never have existed.

This predestination to the divine maternity constitutes an effect in the supernatural order controlling her very existence, setting her apart with her Son in an order distinctly their own.

Finally, we may quote the following paragraph from Campana, a paragraph which might be read in the pages of many an author of the Scotistic train of thought:¹²³

All things bear the imprint of the divine love and of the divine liberality; but this love explains its marvels outside the divine essence in this order: He first completed with perfections the humanity of Christ; then in view of the humanity of Christ, Mary He repleted with graces; then because of Jesus and Mary, the divine love extends itself to cumulate the other rational creatures with gifts; and for love of the predestined the other things pertaining to the order of nature are duly ordered; this subordination of the effusions of the divine liberality being given, we can justly say that all things pertain to the elect, the elect appertain to Mary, Mary appertains to Jesus, Jesus appertains to God. There is nothing, we repeat, in expressions similar to these that may not be borrowed from the doctrine

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 295.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 297.

the most solid and the most incapable of being combated. And this, nothing else beyond this, the saints wish to indicate, when they exalt in an extraordinary manner the predestination of Mary.

The divine love expressed its imprint exteriorly first to encomb the humanity of Christ with perfection; then, for the sake of the humanity of Christ, that same love encombed Mary with her gifts; finally, on account of these two, every other rational creature came to existence, enshrined in the gift of nature itself, all things being for the elect, who in turn belong to Mary, who in turn belongs to Christ, Who in turn belongs to God. It may be remarked, in passing, that Campana does not hold the Scotistic theory on the predestination of Christ.

Roschini's Mariologia

The extensive *Mariologia* of the well-known present day author, Fr. Roschini, treats quite exhaustively of the predestination of Our Lady. How that predestination is to be understood he states as follows:¹²⁴

In us, therefore, predestination begins there where the natural order ceases. In the Virgin on the contrary all, not alone grace and glory, etc., but even existence itself, the soul, the faculties, etc., were the effects of predestination. For in us the effects of predestination are separable from ordinary providence; for while all men enjoy the benefit of common providence, not all enjoy the benefit of predestination. In the Blessed Mother on the contrary common providence plainly gives place to predestination.

For the primary end on account of which God wished to create the Blessed Mother was not, as for the other predestined, eternal glory, but the maternity of the Divine Redeemer, without which she would not have existed; and, therefore, in one and the same decree by which He laid down the Incarnation of the Word he also laid down the existence of His Mother.

The existence of the Mother entered the one and same decree of the existence of the Son; to this motherhood she was predestined, and not as the other elect the rather to glory; her entire being in the natural order came as consequent upon election to the divine maternity. The supernatural existence allotted her by predestination to the divine maternity engaged her endowments in the natural order, as well as their crowning through the gifts of grace and of

¹²⁴ *Mariologia*, t. II, pars I, p. 18.

glory; in others to the contrary a common providence allots us the benefit of nature whatever may be the outcome with reference to the attainment of the beatific vision. For her the maternity of her son, constituting something more excellent than glory, anteceded to make it the first and immediate object of her predestination:¹²⁵

The first and immediate term of predestination is that which is greatest in any creature. And her divine maternity in the Blessed Virgin is greater than her celestial glory. Therefore, the first and immediate term of the predestination of the Blessed Mother is her divine maternity.

To go on to more recent literature, the following paragraph from a recent author illustrates further the currents of interest which our Lady's predestination continue to motivate:¹²⁶

If then one asks what is the theological reason that constringes one to affirm a participation in the *gratia capitis* for Mary, we have to answer that it is twofold, the divine maternity and the being in collaboration with the Redeemer. The second evidently follows by natural consequence from the first. Truly indeed in the same decree in which Christ was predestined as a Son of God naturally, His Mother Mary was included with Him; because the predestination of Mary pertains intrinsically to the hypostatic order with which it has a natural connection and to which it is intrinsically ordered; seeing that the order of the hypostatic union is not simply constituted from the union of the divine nature with the human in the person of the Word, but also of the integral order of the realities which revolve as internal to it. And among these realities that which most necessarily bespeaks a stringent connection is precisely its production itself; and in the production of the hypostatic order the divine maternity enters. If therefore the divine maternity is teleologically ordered to the hypostatic union, and if it cannot be understood without it, that means to say that it bespeaks an intrinsic connection to that union, as Suarez has already observed in 3 p. dip. I, sect. 2, n. 4: This dignity of mother (he speaks of the divine maternity) is of a higher order, for it pertains in a certain wise to the order of the hypostatic union, it looks to it intrinsically and has a necessary connection with it. And all the reason for the existence of Mary and of her privileges beginning with her Immaculate Conception is to be Mother of Christ, that is of the Incarnate Word. As the Church says (Comm. Fest. B.V.M., the verse of the III Noctr.) *Elegit eam Deus et praelegit eam*. He had elected her, as all the predestined, but before all time, with the preeminence of grace and of sanctity above all creatures whatsoever, and with a dignity and a mission which cannot be sundered in its connection with the Firstborn among the predestined, with whom she forms a single cause of predestination, because her predestination is

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ M. Bartolomei, O.S.M., "Il problema sulla partecipazione della grazia capitale di Cristo alle Beata Vergine Maria," *Ephem. Mariol.*, 1957, p. 293.

intrinsically bound up in the predestination of the Son of Man. By a singular and unique privilege the Immaculate one is redeemed only by Christ; the universal redemption regards instead all the others, and is operated by Christ and Mary together forming an adequate principle of universal redemption, in which actively and efficaciously Mary shares.

From what has been said one deduces clearly that in the causal order the predestination of the Virgin preceded that of all others predestined, since all the others predestined have been predestined in view of Christ and of Mary; and that Mary by reason of her divine maternity occupies a mediate plane (nearer to the Firstborn, Jesus Christ, among the predestined) between the predestination of Christ and that of other men.

The predestination of Mary is intrinsically bound up with the predestination of her Son because the predestination of Mary bespeaks an intrinsic connection with the hypostatic order, an intrinsic connection consisting in this, that for the production of the hypostatic union an integral order of realities revolve bearing a stringent connection to its production, among which signally enters the divine maternity itself, the dignity of mother. Her dignity and her mission cannot be sundered in its connection with the First Predestined One, Christ, because as His Mother her predestination is intrinsically bound to His. From this predestination to the divine Motherhood her other prerogatives follow, her Immaculate Conception, her being Co-redemptrix. She, first redeemed, with Christ proceeds to redeem others; these two unique predestined ones are the means for the predestination of all others. The order, first Christ, then Mary, then others, but she, predestined in the same divine decree with her Son preceding all others in predestination.

Quite recently, Prof. Philips of Louvain has treated of the grace of predestination of Our Lady, and sought to specify it more accurately. The gift by which Our Lady was sanctified, *gratia Matris Redemptoris*, agreeing in general with the grace of her divine Son, and with that of the rest of mankind, as sanctifying grace, differs in order, if not indeed in species, and not merely by a more or less, from these other two graces.¹²⁷ We quote this writer briefly:

Neither is there absent an analogy between our grace and the grace of the Mother of God, by which it may be said to emanate above us immensely. The blessed Virgin is the daughter of the Eternal Father beautiful and beloved before all. With relation to Christ the Lord her maternal dignity

¹²⁷ Gerardus Philips, "De electione B. V. Mariae," *Alma socia Christi*, vol. III (Rome, 1952), pp. 1-20, cf. p. 8.

exceeds our fraternal quality interminably. And what shall we say of the familiar intimacy toward the Paraclete, where it manifests itself that the Spirit in the sanctuary of the Virgin not alone inhabits by sanctifying, but fills up the mystery of the Incarnation in it?

It is taught in our tracts that the Mother of God reached unto the borders of the Trinity. Is the conclusion not imposed from this that the grace of the Trinity in her attained in every wise to a superior order? For the peculiar presence of the divine persons effectively and productively realize supernatural wonders.

. . . He (her Son) did not love her more, but in another and higher way. Therefore, he extolled the Blessed Mother to a superior order of graces. In which special order the predestination of Mary takes concrete form.¹²⁸

Out of comparison with the grace of her Son, the author postulates for Mary this special order of grace, first, out of her intimacy to her Son, by analogy with that Son's intimacy to God, and the consequent special excellence of His grace:

Mary is not as her Son the principle of graces, but she is that creature which freely and not materially only bore and opened the principle and font from which all men are divinized. Therefore, she did not have simply a greater quantity of the divine largesse, but she possessed grace in another way, namely with a special gift.¹²⁹

Again, out of comparison with that Son, whose nobility of soul and its operations in His full consciousness of His divinity required the highest grace lifting Him to the summit of divine fruition, whence the Blessed Mother though not sharing the beatific vision, but living by faith, enjoyed nonetheless a quasi-experience of the Divine Persons, where her loving knowledge of the Holy Spirit, the Word and the Father was immensely more vivid and certain and sublime than the spiritual struggling of the rest of mankind:¹³⁰

It is not a quantitative or intensive difference only, but there is question of a diverse actuation, in the order itself of the gift conceded. . . . The grace of the Mother of the Redeemer must be acknowledged as by its very nobility reaching beyond every grace of the adopted, since it implies a different kind, and an eminent knowledge and love of Christ as of the Father and the Spirit.

In the third place, such a singularity of grace in the Virgin

¹²⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

¹²⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 12.

¹³⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

proceeds from her habitude to human kind, as in the case of the diversity in Christ from his habitude to mankind as Redeemer.¹³¹

Theologians well teach that the grace of Mary pertains by reduction (reductive) to the hypostatic order, not indeed because of the identity of the supposit, but because of the intimacy of real and spiritual maternity. So we are reduced to the preceding assertion: Our predestined Mother, united to us indefectibly, stands fundamentally however more on the part of Christ, since in a singular way she is engrafted unto His mystery. . . .

Mary therefore did not have simply more abundant grace than other members, nor did she obtain the gift of first member in a series of equals, but actually and by title she enjoys the grace of the universal mother, since she willingly existed the Mother of the universal Redeemer. Such is the election and predestination which the Most High knew of the new Eve beside the new Adam.

In retrospect, just as Christ through the hypostatic union possessed an introductory exigency for the sanctification of His human nature in the highest way, so too Mary as Mother of Christ, the most intimate to this font of graces, and opening it to us, possessed a title connaturally inducing the highest sanctity and virtue, and possessed this as an ontological disposition, efficacious, and irrepressible. Again, her consciousness of her dignity, of the transcendence of her Son, of the miracle of her maternity, transposing itself into a quasi-experience in her adoring knowledge of the divine Persons, lifted the operations of grace in her above any staggering inspirations of the rest of mankind. Such an intimacy of knowledge and love bespoke a capacity of grace in her eminently superior to that of the merely adopted son. Finally, just as in Christ there resides the *gratia capitis*, the font and principle of our grace of adopted sonship, so too in Mary as our predestined Mother, whose consent extended from Nazareth and Bethlehem to Calvary's cross, and from the cross to all mankind as Mediatrix, there resides the grace, not merely of the first in an order of equals, but of the Mother of all, of the Mother of the Universal Redeemer. Hers is the grace of an adiutrix, co-redemptrix, mediatrix extending its office to all men. Fr. Philips closed his paper with the resume:¹³²

The Onlybegotten Son of God not alone resided in the bosom of Mary,

¹³¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 15 and p. 17.

¹³² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 20.

but was born from her consenting, and together with Him the salvation of the world came forth from her. This is her election and predestination.

At the recent International Marian Congress held in Rome, 1955, T. Plassmann presented a paper entitled "Uno eodemque decreto" in which he states:¹³³

That we may enunciate the state of the question clearly it is to be said that we understand the predestination of the Immaculate Virgin and Mother of God to have been absolute, that is, independent from all the works of God ad extra, not excluding the redemption of human kind. But this thesis clearly and lucidly is not viewed but under the more clear light of the absolute primacy of Christ. Indeed, "the Most Holy Virgin was and remains joined with her Son by the most strict and indissoluble bond," and indeed from eternity and before the centuries, so that, the due proportion of persons being understood, there is one fate of Jesus and Mary.

The author proceeds to offer an interpretation of this thesis in the light of Sacred Scripture.

J. Bonnefoy

During recent years J. Bonnefoy has dedicated many articles to the topic of our Lady's predestination, and presented the views of these articles at many of the recent Mariological Congresses. His interpretation constantly treats of the topic from the speculative point of view. We may present his views briefly as seen in his most recent article.¹³⁴ Bonum est diffusivum sui; hence the fitness of God's producing creatures.¹³⁵ In the Incarnation He communicated Himself fully, "a creature being grafted onto the divinity by the hypostatic union to the Person of the Word,"¹³⁶ making Christ the first willed. "In virtue of the hypostatic union the humanity of Christ would share in the happiness of God";¹³⁷ however, alone "it would be deprived of the divine joy of giving itself, and making others happy."¹³⁸ Out of divine liberality God conceded "His future

¹³³ Cf. T. Plassmann, O.F.M., "‘Uno eodemque decreto’: Maria praedestinata in Sacra Pagina," *Virgo immaculata*, Vol. III, *De Immaculata Conceptione in Sacra Pagina*, Romae, 1955, pp. 174-197; cf. p. 178.

¹³⁴ Cf. John F. Bonnefoy, O.F.M., "The Predestination of Our Lady," *Mariology*, ed. by Juniper B. Carol, O.F.M., Vol. II (Milwaukee, 1957), pp. 154-176.

¹³⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 161.

¹³⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 161.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162.

Christ the sovereign joy of manifesting His liberality and of making others happy,"¹³⁹ by granting "existence to at least one other creature."¹⁴⁰ This other creature, Mary, received from Christ, as His helpmate, a grace of adoption greater than that of any other creature and conceivable only to God. But, "since Christ was to be God, it was fitting that He also should give as God, and that He Himself should grant to Mary the superior joy of giving to others."¹⁴¹ Hence, Mary received the privilege of giving "temporal life to Him from whom she was to receive all that she is and has,"¹⁴² her divine Motherhood. But, "the reciprocal selfdedication of the future Christ and of Mary"¹⁴³ not being able to exhaust the richness of Christ nor the innate goodness of Mary, God decided to give existence to other intelligent creatures on whom Christ and Mary, each in their own way, would bestow their plenitude of love, hence, the creation of men and angels, mankind the future family of Christ and Mary, and the angels their servants.¹⁴⁴ Finally, God decreed the creation of the material universe destined to be the throne and footstool of His Son.¹⁴⁵ Fr. Bonnefoy believes that the traditional Scotistic opinion making no mention of either sin or the Redemption in its initial outlook, and later resorting to conditional decrees, fails from this aspect.¹⁴⁶ Hence, he introduces the concept of a 'gift' to remove the lacuna.¹⁴⁷ Christ by His suffering became the giver, and not merely the distributor of gifts acquired from the Father.¹⁴⁸ By His actions, especially His Passion and death, He merited His own exaltation and glory, and the graces to be dispensed to His Mother, the angels and men, the good angels acquiring their final perseverance and their confirmation in grace from His suffering.¹⁴⁹ He appears not alone then a giver of gifts, and of the greatest of gifts, the pardon of injuries. Hence, to be more perfectly a giver of gifts,

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 163.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid. passim.*

¹⁴⁷ Cf. pp. 161-162 and p. 167, and *passim.*

¹⁴⁸ Cf. p. 167ff.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. p. 166ff.

God permitted sin: "The permission of evil is a positive act of God, and it would be impious to say that God placed this act without a reason, without a proportionate cause."¹⁵⁰ Hence, although God could have forestalled the Fall of man, He permitted it for the greater diffusion of the goodness of Christ, by the "perfect gift of pardoning."¹⁵¹ The same goodness which "constitutes the very depths of the divine nature" decreed Our Lady's part in the Redemption, meriting with Him, *aliter et aliter*, what graces were to be given to angels and men.¹⁵² Furthermore, each member of the Mystical Body may collaborate toward the salvation of others. The Blessed Mother *sub et cum Christo* is the final and secondary cause of everything after her, and the efficient cause *per modum meriti* of all the graces distributed to men and angels; hence, the titles of Mediatrix and Co-redemptrix. We believe the preceding justly represents the theory of Fr. Bonnefoy.¹⁵³

With reference to this theory it may be said that while on the surface, or at a glance, it appears to preserve the lines found in the traditional Scotistic thesis, at heart it quite essentially differs. The Theory of Scotus hinges on the order of universal divine predestination, God first willing the glory of the soul of Christ, as the highest glory, and then others in certain and determined grades after Christ; this action *ad extra* of the Triune God in its execution involved the creation of the natural order, the bestowing of grace, and then the securing of the end intended, the arrangement of the *beati* in determined grades of glory. This in the *Ordinatio*. In the *Reportata* Scotus gives the impulse behind the plan of God, namely divine love, He loves Himself, He loves Himself in others, and thirdly He wishes to be loved in the highest way by someone outside Himself, and finally He decrees the existence of this One, all without consideration of sin. The principle is one of love. The principle of Fr. Bonnefoy, however, is *bonum est diffusivum sui*, which *bonum* he interprets in the existence of the several creatures after the manner of a gift. The first gift was to communicate Himself in a sovereign degree in the existence of Christ. God then extended existence to

¹⁵⁰ Cf. p. 168.

¹⁵¹ Cf. p. 169.

¹⁵² Cf. p. 169.

¹⁵³ Cf. p. 174.

Mary such that Christ could have the divine joy of bestowing upon her a communication of grace residing in its fullness in Him. By exchange Christ would receive from Mary His temporal life, and in a sense existence depending on her consent. God then created others, angels and men, on whom Jesus and Mary could bestow their plenitude of love. In order, furthermore, that the future Christ might know the superior joy contained in the perfect gift of pardoning, God by a positive act permitted the evil of sin, acting with a reason or proportionate cause. Jesus and Mary then proceeded to bestow the means of pardon to all men, all having sinned. Fr. Bonnefoy finally states: "The doctrinal conclusions relative to the predestination of Mary which follow from the deductive synthesis we have suggested are those taught by the ordinary magisterium of the Church."¹⁵⁴ This statement is difficult to quite perceive. The documents the author quotes—the *uno eodemque decreto* phase of *Ineffabilis Deus*, and the address of Cardinal Pacelli, the present Supreme Pontiff gloriously reigning,¹⁵⁵ do not appear to extend themselves to the theory we have just recounted. From another point of view, the "positive act of God permitting evil or sin," "an act placed with a reason or proportionate cause, that the perfect gift of pardoning," as he says, might be exemplified, might conceivably make Scotus and his School blush, at the prospect of the cruelty or the terror such a gift might cost so many. This is a far departure from the unbroken love of God willing a passible Christ that the predestination of the elect to the communication of his love in glory might not be otherwise than planned. We have devoted more extensive space to Fr. Bonnefoy's theory because it constitutes a new consideration of our topic and from Franciscan provenance, and in such a paper as this demands more extensive space. It is a new theory.

Conclusion

We may now by way of conclusion view the theories of the preceding pages against the background of the two documents of the Magisterium of the Church, bearing passages apropos of our topic.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. p. 172.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. pp. 173-174.

We quote from the Bull *Ineffabilis Deus* and *Munificentissimus Deus*. *Ineffabilis Deus* states as follows:¹⁵⁶

Ineffabilis Deus . . . ab initio et ante saecula Unigenito Filio suo matrem ex qua caro factus in beata temporum plenitudine nasceretur eligit atque ordinavit, tantoque prae caeteris universis est prosecutus amore, ut in illa una sibi propensissima voluntate complacuit. . . . Atque idecirco vel ipsissima verba quibus Divinae Scripturae de increata Sapientia loquuntur eiusque sempiternas origines repraesentant consuevit Ecclesia tum in ecclesiasticis officiis tum in sacrosancta liturgia adhibere et ad illius Virginis primordia transferre quae uno eodemque decreto cum Divinae Sapientiae incarnatione fuerunt praestituta.

Munificentissimus Deus states:

Augusta Dei mater, Jesu Christo, inde ab omni aeternitate, uno eodemque decreto praedestinationis arcano modo coniuncta, immaculata in suo conceptu, in divina maternitate sua integerrima virgo, generosa divini Redemptoris socia, qui plenum de peccato eiusque consecrariis deportavit triumphum, id tandem assecuta est quasi supremum suorum privilegiorum coronam, ut a sepulcri corruptione servaretur immunis, utque, quemadmodum iam filius suus, devicta morte, corpore et anima ad supremam caeli gloriam eveheretur, ubi Regina refulgeret ad eiusdem sui Filii dextram, immortalis saeculorum Regis. *AAS*, Vol. 42, 1950, pp. 768-769.

The Bull *Ineffabilis Deus* states that the words of Sacred Scripture which represent the eternal origins of Uncreated Wisdom are applied by the Church in various ways to the origins of Our Lady, which was willed in one and the same decree with the Incarnation of that Divine Eternal Wisdom. The union of Our Divine Lord and Our Blessed Lady finds repeated assertion in the words of the Bull; at once the Most Holy Virgin "is joined with Him in the most strict and indissoluble bond,"¹⁵⁷ in the sempiternal struggle against the serpent; again, the same Lady is "a vessel of election,"¹⁵⁸ to be spared the injuries of man's primal sin; she elected from before

¹⁵⁶ We have used the text of *Ineffabilis Deus* with the English translation published by John Murphy and Co., Baltimore, 1855, *Official Documents connected with the Definition of the Dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary*, cf. *ibid.*, p. 20 and pp. 22-23. For *Munificentissimus Deus*, cf. *A.A.S.*, Vol. 42, 1950, pp. 768-769.

¹⁵⁷ . . . sic sanctissima Virgo, artissimo et indissolubili vinculo cum eo coniuncta, una cum illo et per illum sempiternas contra venenosum serpentem inimicitias exercens . . . *Ed. cit.*, p. 44.

¹⁵⁸ . . . non enim decebat ut illud vas electionis communibus lacesseretur iniuriis . . . *Ed. cit.*, p. 45.

time, from the beginning, prepared for Himself by the Most High, became announced in the first prophecy of Redemption;¹⁵⁹ she is, and is rightly celebrated as she who was the first peculiar work of God;¹⁶⁰ she ought to be conceived as the Firstborn from whom should be conceived the Firstborn of every creature,¹⁶¹ united with Him in an eternal covenant.¹⁶²

Though the Bull does not use the term *predestination* as applied to Our Blessed Lady, nonetheless, its phrase *uno eodemque decreto* applied to Mary's origin, together with the reiteration which the same unicity of decree coupling the origin of Our Lady and her Divine Son finds in its text, and the validity of the one and same divine decree, on the force of the words of Sacred Scripture, in the Sapiential Books taken in some transferred sense, certainly place a signal milestone in the history of the doctrine of the predestination of Our Lady, and give to that doctrine a firm foundation in the very words of the Magisterium of the Church: she willed in one and the same divine decree with her Divine Son "ought to be conceived as the firstborn, from whom should be conceived the Firstborn of every creature." The fact that these words occur in a Pontifical Document defining infallibly the Immaculate Conception of the same Virgin, associating that Immaculate Conception necessarily with the same one divine decree, the one privilege coming from the other, bring out that unity of origin of Mary with her Son, as the core wherein her other glorious privileges lie in germ.

The terminology of *Munificentissimus Deus* far more explicitly expands, or opens up, the doctrine stated tersely and intermittently in *Ineffabilis Deus*. *Munificentissimus* speaks of one and the same decree of predestination, *uno eodemque decreto praedestinationis*; the august Mother of God was united from all eternity by one and the same divine decree of predestination with her Divine Son Jesus Christ. Here the word *predestination* exists and qualifies the one

¹⁵⁹ . . . a saeculo electam, ab Altissimo sibi praeparatam, a Deo, quando ad serpentem ait, 'inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem,' praedictam . . . *Ed. cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁶⁰ . . . eandem esse meritoque celebrari ut illam, quae proprium Dei opus primum exstiterit . . . *Ed. cit.*, p. 45.

¹⁶¹ . . . concipi siquidem primogenitam oportebat, ex qua concipiendus esset omnis creaturae primogenitus. *Ed. cit.*, p. 44.

¹⁶² . . . sempiterno foedere cum illo coniunctam. *Ed. cit.*, p. 44.

and same divine decree. As the crown to the association with Christ in this decree, in its fulfillment in the divine maternity, and as the companion in the Redemption, she conquering death became assumed body and soul to the supernal glory of heaven, where she reigns as Queen at the right hand of the Immortal King of Ages. It should be noted, also, that *Munificentissimus Deus* speaks likewise generally of the *Mater Dei*, the Mother of God, who is the *Socia Redemptoris*, and somehow around that divine maternity locates the concatenation of privileges adorning Our Lady.

Actually enlightened by divine grace and moved by affection for her, God's Mother and Our sweetest Mother, they have contemplated in an ever clearer light, the wonderful harmony and order of these privileges, which the most provident God has lavished upon this revered associate of Our Redeemer, privileges which reach such an exalted plane that, except for her, nothing created by God other than the human nature of Jesus Christ has ever reached this level. . . .¹⁶³

Actually God, who from all eternity regards Mary with a most favorable and unique affection, has "when the fullness of time was come" put the plan of His providence into effect, in such a way that all the privileges and prerogatives He had granted to her in His sovereign generosity, were to shine forth in her in a kind of perfect harmony. And although the Church has always recognized this supreme generosity, and the perfect harmony of graces, and has daily studied them more and more, throughout the course of the centuries, still it is in our own age, that the privilege of the bodily Assumption into heaven of Mary the Virgin Mother of God, has certainly stood forth more clearly.¹⁶⁴

What may be said of the Scotistic theory in the light of these solemn documents of the Magisterium of the Church? Certainly, these documents do not speak in any wise of the predestination of Christ as the first predestined One outside even the hypothesis of sin, and of Mary as His predestined Mother in the same hypothesis; they are silent with respect to such an hypothesis. With respect to the terminology, while some of the Scotists may have used the term *uno eodemque decreto*, we do not know of any who spoke in these exact words. Scotistic authors usually speak of separate decrees, though the point with respect to terminology need not be stressed.

However, as we stated, there is a gradation in the documents;

¹⁶³ Cf. official text of *Munificentissimus Deus*, A.A.S. Vol. 42, 1950, p. 958; for translation given, cf. *The Thomist*, Jan. 1951 (Vol. 14), p. 8.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. official text, A.A.S., Vol. 42, 1950, p. 754; for translation cf. *The Thomist*, loc. cit., p. 4.

Ineffabilis Deus speaks of one and the same divine decree with respect to the Incarnation of Christ and the existence of His Immaculate Mother; *Munificentissimus Deus* speaks in the one single passage of one and the same divine decree of predestination uniting Christ and His Mother from all eternity, and extending itself in act to the virginal maternity itself, the companionship in the Redemption, and the Assumption and Coronation of that Mother finally as Queen of Heaven, sitting next to the King of Ages in glory. While the coming in flesh of the Divine Son of God with His Mother as predestined from all eternity regardless of sin, is not stated, it alone is lacking to fulfill mention of the capital points in the essential completeness of the theory of the Scotistic School. What is stated in 1854 and further developed in 1950, may legitimately be interpreted as lending corroboration to the tradition of the Franciscan School in the broad outlines of the theory of that School. These documents of the Solemn Magisterium are living, not static documents, dealing with the sacredness of revealed truth, and guiding the course of doctrine; the penchant they here manifest with relation to Our Lady's predestination certainly directs toward the broad outline of the theory enunciated by so many of the Scotistic authors. It likewise, however, remains, that they do not definitely approve the Scotistic theory as such since there is no explicit mention whatever of its ultimate hypothesis.

In this paper, in a somewhat hasty manner we have presented the views of many writers with reference to the predestination of Our Blessed Lady. Some of these writers have been elevated to the honors of the altar, they are saints and doctors of the Church; they have come from different lands throughout the Universal Church, and from different times over the past eight centuries. The term *predestination* has been applied doctrinally to Our Lady's origin with the first teacher of the Order, St. Anthony of Padua; by the followers of the Scotistic notion with respect to the predestination of Christ it had been affiliated to that notion, associating the predestination of Mary, the Mother of Christ, with the predestination of Christ as the "first predestined One," the Incarnate Word of God. We have seen that many, not Franciscans, have adopted the Scotistic Theory, some substantially, some with modification, as Suarez for example; some to be greatly influenced by it, but not to

adopt it in the complete Scotistic Sense, as Sedlmayr, Roschini,¹⁶⁵ and others. The purpose of the paper is to evaluate the Franciscan tradition toward a synthesis of Franciscan theology, in this case the tract on mariology being envisioned. The topic of this paper constitutes of course but a single section in such a tract.

In conclusion we would state the following: The traditional doctrine within the Scotistic School which associates Our Blessed Mother with Our Divine Lord, the First Predestined One, as His Predestined Mother, anterior to original sin, may safely be adhered to as soundly probable; and such a predestination of Our Lady to the Divine Maternity around which her marvellous accumulation of graces converge, confers upon the tract on mariology a cohesion and unity greatly aiding its further development.

We have seen that two documents of the *Magisterium Ecclesiae* somehow corroborate this statement in its first part; it is also to be remembered that the predestination of Our Lady theologically did not find professed discussion with the outstanding doctors of the thirteenth century, the Common Doctor, St. Thomas; the Seraphic Doctor, St. Bonaventure; or the Subtle Doctor, Duns Scotus; though the two former scholastically accorded probability to the background of what became the Scotistic theory, while Duns Scotus himself proximately occasioned its origin in the Schools.

¹⁶⁵ The theory of Fr. Roschini is too well known to be repeated here; in his case, as in the case of Fr. Campana, we have sought to briefly show a continuity and reflection of the tradition of, or at least influence of, the writers we had quoted over the pages of the paper. It is impossible here to deal with the special characteristics of each author quoted. The very recently proposed theory of Fr. Bonnefoy for many reasons required more extensive presentation.

* Just recently an extended study of the predestination of Our Lady has been published in *Franziskanische Studien*, 1957, pp. 288-500; we have not had time to profit from this extensive study, viz. *Die mariologische Predestination im Denken der franziskanischen Theologie* by Meinolf Muckshoff, O.F.M.Cap.

ORIGINAL JUSTICE ACCORDING TO ST. BONAVENTURE¹

BERARD MARTHALER, O.F.M.Conv.

In the introduction to the second book of his *Commentarium in IV Libros Sentiarum Petri Lombardi*, St. Bonaventure has, in a brief paragraph, outlined the whole tract on man: the creation of man's body; the nature of the human soul; the elevation of man to a supernatural state; and, finally, man's fall.² In commenting on these topic-headings, the Seraphic Doctor nearly filled a folio volume, which is too lengthy to read you even in the abridged form as it appears in the *Breviloquium*. To keep within the framework of the present discussion, therefore, I have decided to treat only St. Bonaventure's concept of original justice. It is fundamental to the entire tract, and unless one understands the thinking of the Seraphic Doctor on the subject, his "theology of man" cannot but seem confused and inept.

Notwithstanding its importance, the Seraphic Doctor like other medieval theologians did not consider original justice *ex professo*. Any systematic presentation of his views, therefore, must be pieced together from a study of the many isolated passages in which he discusses original justice. St. Bonaventure always associates original justice—and often identifies it—with the endowments which were supra-joined to human nature in the state of innocence. Other passages, especially those dealing with original sin, also throw much light on the topic. I shall treat it under three main headings: 1) the two senses of original justice; 2) the need for original justice; and 3) its relationship with sanctifying grace.

Two Senses of Original Justice

The fact that Peter Lombard and Alexander of Hales were the

¹ This paper is based on the author's doctoral dissertation, *Original Justice and Sanctifying Grace in the Writings of Saint Bonaventure*. It is to be published in the near future.

² II Sent., "Proemium" (II, 4a). N. B. The citations enclosed in parentheses refer to the Quaracchi edition of St. Bonaventure's *Omnia Opera*.

men who had the greatest influence on Bonaventure's thought is of singular importance to a study of original justice as it appears in his writings. In the early years of the thirteenth century, while William of Auxerre and William Prevostin continued to adhere exclusively to the conventional Augustinian view of original sin as interpreted by the Master of the Sentences, Alexander accepted St. Anselm's position which defined original sin as the privation of original justice. Alexander's problem was to reconcile this new Anselmian concept with the Augustinian idea of Peter Lombard and other medieval scholastics for whom original sin was *habitualis concupiscentia*.³

Saint Augustine taught that man's faculties were perfectly ordered among themselves, the lower to the higher, the higher to God. Saint Anselm adopted this traditional teaching, but for the great Archbishop of Canterbury, this rectitude of the lower faculties hinged on the rectitude of the will: the will could control the other faculties only as long as it remained perfectly ordered to God. Whereas Saint Augustine made original justice a disposition of human nature, Saint Anselm made it a virtue of the will.⁴

Both the Augustinian rectitude of nature and the Anselmian rectitude of the will excluded the possibility of rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. For Saint Augustine this meant an exclusion of concupiscence. This rectitude, however, meant something more to Saint Anselm. Besides suppressing every tendency of concupiscence, it made the body so perfectly subordinate to the immortal soul that the body too was capable of not dying (i.e., *posse non mori*). Thus Saint Anselm made corporeal immortality stem from an intrinsic principle whereas Saint Augustine attributed it to the eating of fruit from the "tree of life." Since immortality stemmed from the rectitude of the will, it was for Anselm a result of original justice.⁵

Although such men as Honorius d'Autun and Odo of Tournai tried to introduce St. Anselm's original justice into their systems, only with Alexander, the *Doctor Irrefragabilis*, did the Anselmian doctrine make an effective entrance into the thought of the schools. In trying

³ A. Gaudel, s.v. "Peche Originel," in *DTC*, tom. XII, pt. 1, col. 458.

⁴ J-B. Kors, *La justice primitive et le peche originel d'apres St. Thomas* (Kain, 1922), p. 35. For texts from St. Anselm which develop this doctrine, cf. Kors' work, pp. 23-25.

⁵ J-B. Kors, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

to reconcile the new with the old, Alexander modified both. He embraced St. Anselm's position with the notable exception that, whereas Anselm made original justice to reside primarily in rectitude of the will, Alexander interpreted it in the Augustinian sense.⁶ What for Saint Anselm was a virtue of the will, was for the *Doctor Irrefragabilis* a disposition of nature. On the other hand, Alexander mitigated the conventional Augustinian exposition in so far as he like Anselm attributed both concupiscence and immortality to an intrinsic principle.

Saint Bonaventure seems to have inherited Alexander's problem. When discussing the nature of original sin, he states that it is necessary to reconcile the apparent conflict:

The question is, therefore, essentially what is original sin. Since by both the Master [of the Sentences] and Augustine it is said to be concupiscence . . . while in his work *De conceptu virginali* it is said by Anselm to be *debitae iustitiae carentia* the question is, how can these two positions both be true; and in which of them is it better explained what original sin is.⁷

Several modern scholars believe that Bonaventure following Alexander, resolved the conflict by identifying original justice with the overall rectitude of man. This is the interpretation of Kors and of the Quaracchi Editors, who say that according to the Seraphic Doctor original justice consisted in the rectitude of integrity which formed a certain disposition for receiving sanctifying grace. Kaup follows the interpretation of the Quaracchi scholiasts, and Father Marcello da Gaggio Montano sustains a similar opinion. The interpretation of Saint Bonaventure's thought offered by these authors makes him a slavish follower of the Augustinian view. Catazzo, on the other hand, sees Anselm's shadow across every page that Bonaventure wrote. Consequently he gives greater emphasis to the role of the will in his interpretation of Bonaventure's teaching without, however, taking issue with the interpretation of Kors, Father Marcello *et al.*⁸

⁶ A. Vassallo, *L'essenza del peccato originale secondo la dottrina di Alessandro Hales* (Naples, 1947), p. 33.

⁷ II Sent., d. 30, a. 2, q. 1 (II, 722a).

⁸ J-B. Kors, *op. cit.*, p. 63 (Quaracchi ed., II Sent., "Scholion," p. 24b); J. Kaup, O.F.M., "Zum Begriff der justitia originalis in der alter Franziskanerschule," *Franziskanische Studien*, 29 (1942), 54-55; Marcello da Gaggio Montano, O.F.M.Cap., *Dottrina Bonaventuriana sul peccato originale* (Bo-

A fact that these authors overlook is that the Seraphic Doctor acknowledged two meanings of original justice:

. . . it befalls original justice to be spoken of in two ways; either in so far as it connotes a certain habitus regulating nature in the state of innocence; or in so far as it connotes the thorough-going rectification of all the faculties. In the first meaning, original justice has its being in the reason alone; and thus it is opposed to culpa. In the second sense, it has its being not only in the reason but also in the lower faculties and thus it has to be removed not through culpa alone, but also through punishment. . . .⁹

The Need for Original Justice

God created man for glory, says the Seraphic Doctor. This glory is not, however, to be in the form of a simple handout. Man must merit it. Because man's nature is finite and, therefore, defective and liable to fall, God furnished him with a fourfold aid. In the merely natural order, man could depend on a twofold rectitude: 1) he had a certain innate rectitude of the intellect whereby he could judge rightly; and 2) he had a certain rectitude of will which warned him of evil and spurred him to good. Besides these two natural endowments, God added a twofold perfection of grace—grace *gratis data*, and grace *gratum faciens*.¹⁰

The graces *gratis datae* were many in number and multiple in form: infused knowledge, impeccability in regard to venial sin, immortality, absence of concupiscence and others. Although the Seraphic Doctor says these additional gifts were granted to man because of his defective nature, he does not intend that human nature is incomplete without them. Created nature, he writes, is finite by definition and in so far as finite nature has limitations it is defective. Since every creature is created *ex nihilo*, every creature has limitations and, consequently, no creature is immutable. Corporeal creation tends to corrupt and spiritual creatures, while they are incorruptible by nature, are not immutable in regard to evil. The gift of original justice neutralized the principle of corruption in Adam in so far as possible, but it cannot be said that the nature of man demanded that the natural laws of corruption be suspended.¹¹

logna, 1943), p. 85; E. Catazzo, O.F.M., *De iustitia et peccato originali juxta S. Bonaventuram* (Vicenza, 1942), pp. 5-13.

⁹ II Sent., d. 24, p. II, a. 3, q. 2 (II, 586a-b).

¹⁰ *Brev.*, p. II, c. 11 (V, 229b).

¹¹ II Sent., d. 11, a. 1, q. 2 (II, 280a); d. 24, a. 1, q. 1 (II, 554-555). Cf. R.

Original justice can be said, therefore, to have supplemented the innate limitations of human nature. There is another aspect of original justice as well, namely, in so far as it is a disposition for sanctifying grace. God created all things for His own glory, but He demands honor from His rational creatures in a special way. Because man is rational and created with a capacity to attain eternal beatitude (which consists in possessing the Summum Bonum), he must be especially acceptable to God. All creatures are acceptable to God by the very fact that they are His creatures. Man's destiny, however, is beyond the natural limits of a creature and, therefore, it isn't enough for man to be acceptable merely as other creatures are. For a rational creature, to be acceptable to God means to become a temple of God, adopted as a son, taken as a spouse. All of which implies special condescension on the part of Almighty God. This grace whereby man is made worthy of such surpassing dignity cannot but be gratuitous: *gratia gratum faciens*.¹²

Besides the argument from man's supernatural destiny, the Seraphic Doctor also posits the necessity of sanctifying grace as a means. In our present fallen state we have a greater need of grace than Adam had when he was in the state of innocence. Adam nevertheless needed grace in order to merit. He needed it first because man's efforts are not acceptable to God unless man himself is *gratum*. Secondly, he needed grace because eternal beatitude is so far beyond the reach of mere nature that there is no proportion between the end and purely natural acts.¹³

The ignorance of man's supernatural end, writes Saint Bonaventure, is precisely the reason that the pagan philosophers never reasoned to the existence of original sin. They found a certain natural rectitude in man and they, therefore, supposed that man was directed toward a natural end.¹⁴ This natural rectitude remained even after the loss, through Adam's default, of the supernatural rectitude adjoined to human nature in the state of innocence.¹⁵ The Seraphic

Lazzarini, *S. Bonaventura filosofo e mistico del Cristianesimo* (Milan, 1946), p. 160.

¹² *Brev.*, p. V, c. 2 (V, 253b). II Sent., d. 28, a. 2, q. 1 (II, 682b); d. 29, a. 1, q. 1 (II, 695-696).

¹³ II Sent., d. 29, a. 1, q. 2 (II, 698-699).

¹⁴ II Sent., d. 30, a. 1, q. 1 (II, 716a); q. 2 (II, 719b).

¹⁵ II Sent., "Proemium" (II, 5b); d. 21, a. 3, q. 2 (II, 507b); d. 34, a. 2, q. 2

Doctor again shows that he considered human nature to be complete even minus preternatural and supernatural gifts when he writes that original justice is something positive. It is not the mere absence of guilt (*innocentia privativa*) for it is a positive state which is diametrically opposed to sin.¹⁶

Once it has been established that Adam needed grace even before the fall, the next question is, when did he receive it. Did God create man in sanctifying grace?

After the time of William of Prevoisin, the medieval scholastics became more and more preoccupied with this question. Prevoisin taught that man received sanctifying grace and the natural gifts *simul tempore*, that is, at the moment of creation. Though Saint Bonaventure acknowledges the probability of this opinion, he prefers the other position which he says is more common and more probable. This more common opinion, as explained by the Seraphic Doctor, held that Adam did not receive grace at the moment of creation and hence, that the state of innocence must be divided into two periods: 1) a time when Adam had only *naturalia*; and 2) a time when he had both *naturalia* and *gratuita*.¹⁷

The terminology may be perplexing, but we know from other passages that the Seraphic Doctor most often classified the *gratia gratis datae* among the *naturalia* for they did not raise man beyond the absolute limits of his nature.¹⁸ This interpretation is confined by the fact that Saint Bonaventure says his opinion is the more commonly held. As Bittremieux has pointed out, the opinion more commonly held before the time of St. Thomas was not that God created Adam a merely natural man and then afterwards clothed him with sanctifying grace and the other gifts of original justice in an instant. The common opinion was that man received some gratuitous gifts at the moment of creation and later, when he was sufficiently disposed, the gift of sanctifying grace.¹⁹

(II, 813b); d. 35, a. 1, q. 1 (II, 823b). III Sent., d. 33, a. unicus, q. 5 (III, 723a). *Brev.*, p. II c. 11 (V, 229b).

¹⁶ II Sent., d. 19, a. 3, q. 1 (II, 470b).

¹⁷ II Sent., d. 29, a. 2, q. 2 (II, 703-704).

¹⁸ II Sent., d. 27, dub. 1 (II, 669b); d. 28, *passim* (II, 674-692).

¹⁹ J. Bittremieux, "De instanti collationis Adamo iustitiae originalis et gratiae, Doctrina S. Bonaventurae," *Eph. Theol. Lovan.*, 1 (1924), pp. 169-172.

This is the usual interpretation of Saint Bonaventure's thought.²⁰ At the moment of creation man was clothed with many graces other than merely natural attributes—graces which gave him a preternatural rectitude in his being and in his acting. Sometime later, God blessed man with the gift of sanctifying grace. Although the former graces, *gratiae gratis datae*, did not lift man beyond the limits of his created being, they were, nonetheless, gratuitous because man had no right to them. Present day phraseology calls these gifts preternatural to distinguish them from the strictly supernatural gift of sanctifying grace. While graces *gratis datae* surpass man's *posse* (to use Saint Bonaventure's terminology), they do not raise him beyond the limits of his nature (*esse*).

Original Justice and Sanctifying Grace

The question now arises, what relationship exists between these preternatural gifts and sanctifying grace? Or to state it in another way, what is the relation of sanctifying grace to original justice? This question must be answered in the light of the twofold nature of original justice described above: 1) original justice, in the Augustinian sense, as an overall rectitude of nature; and 2) original justice, the *habitus*, as it is understood by Saint Anselm.

1) *Original justice as rectitude of nature:*

In the view of the Seraphic Doctor, God does not concede sanctifying grace unless one is disposed to receive it. The fact is, moreover, no one sufficiently disposes himself without the auxiliary help of actual grace, or more accurately, *gratia gratis data*.²¹ Although God does not require that infants dispose themselves (the faith of the Church and merits of Christ suffice), God does expect that adults prepare themselves to receive supernatural grace. According to Bonaventure even Adam was not exempt from this axiom. In fact, this is the principal reason on which Saint Bonaventure bases his proof that God did not clothe Adam with sanctifying grace at the instant of

²⁰ Cf., E. Catazzo, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-37; Marcello da Gaggio Montano, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-80.

²¹ *Brev.*, p. V, c. 2 (V, 253b). II Sent., d. 27, dub. 1 (II, 669-670).

creation. Even in the state of innocence man had first to dispose himself to receive sanctifying grace.²²

The varied and various graces *gratis datae* meant for Adam a perfect harmony. The divers constituents of human nature were at peace among themselves; man was at peace with his fellow creatures and this perfect harmony depended on the subjection of his will to God. In this state all inordinate desires, all passions of the flesh, even death itself, were unknown. Man was free from internal contradictions and no principle of decay was in him. The many gratuitous gifts which God provided, perfected him and made it possible for him to overcome the limits of this "defectible" nature. With the less tangible gifts man was able to prepare himself, to dispose his will, in so far as possible, to become worthy to receive sanctifying grace whereby he participated in the divine Godhead.²³ Original justice, understood in this sense, is a disposition for grace.

Original justice gave a certain preternatural order to man's faculties; sanctifying grace raised and elevated him beyond the limits of nature and directed him to a supernatural end. It is in this respect, that is, in regard to this supernatural end, that the two gifts are said to form a single whole. Original justice, accepted in this fuller sense as embracing both sanctifying grace and the gifts of integrity, made it possible for Adam to merit eternal beatitude without obstacles and distractions caused by inordinate affection for himself or for other creatures. In this way, sanctifying grace and original justice complete and perfect each other, forming a unity, not *per modum essentiae*, but through their orientation to a single end.²⁴

2) Original justice, the *habitus*:

Original justice, according to Saint Bonaventure, is also "a certain *habitus* regulating nature in the state of innocence." It seems that he considers original justice in this sense as a *habitus* which coordinated all the varied *habitus* which Adam possessed in the primitive state. It was original justice existing in the will whereby man dominated and controlled his baser instinct, but once the restraint of original justice

²² *Brev.*, p. V, c. 3. IV Sent., d. 4, p. 1 dub. 2 (IV, 104b). II Sent., d. 29, a. 2, q. 2 (II, 703b).

²³ *Brev.* p. II, c. 11 (V, 229b); II Sent., d. 29, a. 2, q. 2 (II, 703b).

²⁴ II Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 2, (II, 658b); d. 3, p. 11, a. 3, q. 1 (II, 125b).

was removed, the passions were no longer passive to the rule of reason.²⁵ (Saint Bonaventure placed original sin principally in the rational faculties for the precise reason that all justice is located in the will.²⁶)

Without sanctifying grace the *habitus* of original justice remained *informis*. The Seraphic Doctor insists again and again that the only formal cause of each and every virtue is sanctifying grace which alone perfects and informs the *habitus* substrative to that virtue.²⁷ He compares it to light and color. Grace coming into the soul and finding a *habitus* of virtue without form (*informis*) gives it form as light reflecting on a colored body informs that body and makes it beautiful. In this way grace informs and makes beautiful original justice, perfecting and completing it. Although the former is infinitely more sublime than the latter, the two together constitute a certain whole which Bozitzkovic terms *justitia originalis meritoria* to distinguish it from *justitia originalis simpliciter*, that is, original justice *informis*.²⁸ It is readily evident that the Seraphic Doctor makes original justice subordinate to sanctifying grace. Grace is the principal element and the essential constituent of original justice. It is the form of the whole.

Conclusion

Thus we have four possible combinations which must be taken into account each time the Seraphic Doctor mentions original justice:

- 1) There is original justice accepted to describe the over-all effect which resulted from the multiple graces *gratis datae* given to Adam. The cumulus of these graces prepared man for the advent of sanctifying grace and in this sense, *original justice is a disposition for grace*.
- 2) As a disposition, original justice gave man a certain degree of rectitude, but since it was subordinated to and prepared man for a higher rectitude, it was in some way incomplete.

²⁵ *Brev.*, p. V, c. 4. II Sent., d. 20, a. unicus, q. 3 (II, 481b).

²⁶ II Sent., d. 30, a. 2, q. 2 (II, 726b); I Sent., d. 45, a. 1, q. 1 (I, 798b).

²⁷ III Sent., d. 36, a. unicus, q. 1 (III, 793a). IV Sent., d. 18, p. II, dub. 3 (IV, 496a).

²⁸ G. Bozitzkovic, O.F.M., *S. Bonaventurae doctrina de gratia et de libero arbitrio* (Marienbad, 1919), pp. 145-146.

Adam received the fullness of rectitude only when he received sanctifying grace. When it is said to connote perfect rectitude, *original justice embraces sanctifying grace* for only through grace is man ordered to a supernatural end.

- 3) Original justice, writes Saint Bonaventure, can also be understood as a *habitus*. Before Adam received sanctifying grace, *original justice was a habitus without form* like color without light.
- 4) Sanctifying grace coming into a soul possessing such a *habitus informis* becomes the form of the *habitus*. The two—sanctifying grace and the formless *habitus*—do not constitute a *unit per essentiam* but there is nonetheless unity in so far as sanctifying grace and the *habitus* act in unison toward a single end. After God infused sanctifying grace in Adam's soul *original justice must be considered a habitus formatus*.

This discussion of original justice, though hardly calculated to interest the anthropologist, is of prime importance in understanding man. Unless we realize exactly what privileges man has forfeited, we cannot understand his present condition. A clear concept of original justice is especially important in order to appreciate the teaching of men like Bonaventure who defined original sin as the culpable absence of original justice.

THE INFUSED VIRTUES ACCORDING TO THE FRANCISCAN SCHOOL

AIDAN MULLANEY, T.O.R.

Although many observations could be made concerning the doctrine of the Franciscan School of Theology regarding the infused virtues, it must be remembered that the Franciscan School partakes of the fruitful scholastic tradition. Nevertheless the teaching of the Franciscan school is characterized by the supereminence of infused charity. This emphasis is, of course, due to the outlook of our Holy Father Saint Francis and most concretely pictured in his life. This seraphic outlook has given rise in philosophy to the teaching of the priority of the will and in theology, from the time of Scotus, the firm adherence to the teaching of the identity of grace and charity, always understanding the distinction made by Scotus: "Charity is that by which its possessor holds God as dear (*charus*)—it thus refers to God, not as loving, but as one lovable; grace is that by which God holds someone pleasing (*gratum*)—it refers to God as one receiving or loving, not however, as one loved."¹ The discussion of this point, however, belongs more properly to a treatment on grace. There is another traditional teaching in the Franciscan School which seems to combine the primacy of charity with the consideration of the infusion of the moral virtues. This teaching seems to have its origin in the Augustinian notion of virtue. It is proposed, therefore, that a consideration of this concept of virtue will help to understand Scotus' denial of the infusion of the moral virtues.

Definition of Virtue

Saint Augustine has given as the classical definition of virtue:

¹ Scotus, J., *Opus Oxoniense*, II, d. 27, n. 4, (Opera Omnia, Vives ed., Paris, 1891-1895, Tome 13, 249): "Charitas dicitur, qua habens eam habet Deum Charu, ita quod respicit Deum, non in ratione diligentis, sed in ratione diligibilis; gratia est qua Deus habet aliquem gratum, ita quod ipsa respicit Deum acceptantem sive diligentem, non autem dilectum."

"Virtue is a good quality of the mind by which we live rightly and which cannot be put to evil use, which God produces in us without our cooperation."² This definition of virtue inspired by Saint Augustine is a clear reference to the infused virtues. On the other hand, we have a second traditional definition of virtue in theology taking its origin from Aristotle through Boetius: "Virtus est habitus animi optimus."³ This second definition refers to the acquired virtues. Here it is necessary to distinguish between what is traditional and what is the later elaboration of the scholastics. The traditional idea of virtue is the notion of a certain permanent principle of good acts.⁴ In his scholarly commentary on the works of Scotus,⁵ Montefortino emphasizes the traditional idea of virtue in his citation and interpretation of Aristotle: "Virtus est quae habentem perficit et opus eius bonum reddit." And also: "Virtus est habitus electivus medii."⁶ Montefortino here clearly interprets the *habitus* of Aristotle by using the traditional concept of virtue just mentioned, that virtue is a habit in so far as it is a principle of activity. Virtue, then, the immediate principle of action, may be described as an operative potency. An operative habit necessarily, then, resides in this potency.⁷ And thus we may conclude with Montefortino, who is a witness to the Franciscan tradition on this point, that the notion of virtue is best explained in accord with the doctrine of Saint Augustine,⁸ "Virtue is a good quality of the mind by which we live rightly and which cannot be put to evil use and which God works in us and without our cooperation." Thus it is clearly seen that the definition of Saint Augustine looks to the concept of infused virtues. Thus in respect to the infused virtue of charity, it is the infused virtue which gives the power to place an act of the

² Augustinus, S., *De Libero Arbitrio*, Lib. 2, cap. 19: PL 32: 1268: "Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur et nemo male utitur et quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur."

³ Cfr. Abaelardus, *Dialogus inter philosophum iudaicum et Christianum*: PL 178, 1651. Cfr. also St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I-IIae q. 56.

⁴ Cfr. Aldama, A. De virtutibus infusis, *Sacrae Theologiae Summa*, (BAC), 712, Matriti, 1953: "Traditionalis omnino est in virtute idea cuiusdam principii permanentis actuum bonorum."

⁵ Montefortino: *Ven. Joannis Duns Scoti Summa Theologica*, (Romae, 1902), Tomus. IV, 290.

⁶ Aristotle, 2 *Eth.* c. 3 and 5.

⁷ Cfr. Lottin, Odon, *Principes de Morale*, T. I, 247.

⁸ Cfr. Montefortino, *op. cit.*, T. IV, 297.

supernatural virtue of charity. The facility or ease in placing such an act is something entirely separate from the power to place the act and such ease or facility in placing an act of the virtue of charity would arise from the repetition of the acts of the virtue. The facility in placing the act of the virtue would in itself constitute the acquired natural habit. That is, from the frequency of the repetition of the act of the infused virtue, the facility of its exercise is acquired.⁹

Scotus' View

The question may now be asked, how will this idea of virtue, traditional in the Franciscan Order, help us to understand the denial by Scotus of the infusion of the moral virtues? First, let us examine the words of the Subtle Doctor: "Although many things have been said concerning the infusion of the moral virtues, namely that they seem to be necessary on account of the mode, the means and the end, nevertheless, every end which they cannot have by reason of their own species, is sufficiently determined by the inclination of charity; the mode and the means are determined by infused faith; *therefore there seems to be no necessity of positing infused moral virtues*, (italics, ours) but acquired virtues only suffice in those persons who are unable to acquire them on account of a defect of free will, because there is no greater reason that these latter should have them than the former."¹⁰

In these words of Scotus it is clear that the infused moral virtues are needed neither on the part of the end, nor on the part of the mode or of the means. They are not needed by reason of the supernatural end, because this is sufficiently taken care of by the presence of

⁹ Cfr. Lercher, Ludovicus, *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae* (Oeniponte, 1942), T. IV, par. 1, p. 131. Cfr. etiam Scotus, *Reportata Paris.* 1, 4, d. 6, q. 9, n. 12 (Omnia opera 15, 382a): "Solum enim ille habitus dat faciliter operari, qui generatur ex actibus nostris . . . ut habitus acquisitus."

¹⁰ "Licet de istis virtutibus moralibus infusis multa dicantur, scilicet quod videntur necessariae propter modum, medium et finem, quia tamen omnis finis, quem non possunt habere ex specie sua, determinatur sufficienter ex inclinatione charitatis, modus autem et medium determinantur per fidem infusam: ideo non videtur necessitas ponendi virtutes morales infusas, sed acquisitas tantum in his, qui habent eas acquisitas vel habere possunt; nec etiam in aliis, qui scilicet non possunt eas acquirere propter defectum usus libri arbitrii, quia non est major ratio, quare isti debeant habere, et non illi." Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense*, Lib. III, d. 36, n. 28, (Vives ed., Paris, 1894.)

infused charity in the soul, which is capable of ordinating the acquired virtues to their end. Neither are infused moral virtues necessary by reason of mode or means, for the theological virtue of faith communicates to the inferior virtues the mode and means of operating in the supernatural order. Thus the acquired virtue would be supernaturalized entirely by the infused theological virtues without any need of the infused moral virtues. Thus for example, the infused virtue of charity supernaturalizes the will in its two primordial acts, the love of the end (the *voluntas*) and the efficacious search for this end (the *intentio*).¹¹ The decisive influence of the *intentio*, which has become supernaturalized by charity, causes *affective* charity to become effective charity.

All that we have thus far considered would even be admitted by those who hold the opinion on the necessity of the infusion of the moral virtues with this exception. Acts of the supernatural order, it is argued, require an immediate and proximate supernatural principle of operation if these acts are to be considered as intrinsically and entitively supernatural.¹²

Seraphic Tradition

How then can the Franciscan tradition explain that the infused theological virtues, and especially infused faith and charity are sufficient stable principles of supernatural action? How are these infused theological virtues sufficient to guarantee a permanent supernatural character to the acts of the moral virtues? The Seraphic tradition would reply to these questions by asserting that the dynamic influence of grace and charity is sufficiently penetrating in the process of the human act to accord to that human act an intrinsically and entitively supernatural character. For grace, it appears, in the opinion of Saint Bonaventure, renders not only the soul pleasing to God, but also the faculties of the soul, its acts and habits. The Seraphic Doctor shows that the cardinal virtues are not only the principles of morally good acts, but by reason of grace, these same virtues elevate the potency of the soul to the performance of meritorious acts.¹³

¹¹ Cfr. Lottin, Odon, *Principes de Moral* T. II, 225.

¹² Cfr. Coerver, Florent, *The Quality of Facility in Moral Virtues* (CUA Press, 1946), p. 14.

¹³ Cfr. S. Bonaventura, *Opera Theologica Selecta*, Liber III, Sententiarum,

In seeking a solution to the problem of the infusion or non-infusion of the moral virtues, clearly we cannot have recourse to the experience of consciousness, for we are dealing with the supernatural which escapes all testimony of the senses. The teaching of the Magisterium of the Church has left the question open.¹⁴ Without a doubt, the opinion which holds the infusion of the moral virtues does provide a balanced parallelism in the supernatural order of that which occurs in the natural order of human activity. But for our part, that is, for the position of the Franciscan school of Theology, it seems well to hold to the Seraphic tradition in emphasizing the dynamic character of the theological virtues well in accord with the scholastic axiom: "non multiplicanda entia absque necessitate."

ed. minor. (Ad Claras Aquas, 1951), d. 33, q. 5, Respondeo (T. III, p. 725): "(Virtutes cardinales) dicuntur virtutes non solum quia habilitant ad huiusmodi opera, (opera moralia), sed etiam quia elevant ad opera meritoria. Secundum autem quod virtutes cardinales dicuntur virtutes, quia potentiam elevant, sic non habent ortum ab assuefactione, sed a divino munere; non a natura, sed a gratia. Quia enim elevant potentiam supra se, sunt supra naturam et actum ipsum potentiae qui inest ei per se; et ideo necesse est quod ab aliquo superiori et potentia et actu ipsius potentiae trahant originem." Cfr. also comment of Lottin, *Principes de Moral*, T. II, p. 225, footnote.

¹⁴ Cfr. Innocentius III, Epistola ad Ymbertum, archiepiscopum Arelatensis, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (Denzinger, Bannwart, Rahner), ed. 28, n. 410, n. 800.

A CURSORY SURVEY OF THE FRANCISCAN CONTRIBUTION TO SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY

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Any comprehensive historical survey and theological appraisal of the evolution, understood in the Catholic sense under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, of the various Catholic tenets on the seven sacraments promulgated by the Council of Trent, must include the names of many Franciscan masters, who have made definite, in some instances monumental, contributions toward a clearer understanding of divine revelation on the one hand, and a more profound perception of certain aspects of the various sacraments on the other. Such an undertaking must be launched only with the strictest impartiality and adherence to the principles of scientific research. A false sense of humility ought not to restrain us Franciscans from manifesting our own achievements in this sphere where they really exist, any more than an erroneous attitude of pride should lead us to make unwarranted statements and extravagant conclusions.

This paper has no pretensions at all: neither an exhaustive study nor a definitive assessment in its field, its ambitions are more modest, and its scope is quite limited. Confined to a smaller area of investigation it is at best only a cursory survey. The purpose of the present study is to delineate in some detail the great contribution of a few Franciscans to the theology of the Christian sacraments. Far from being the last word (in fact it is quite incomplete), it seeks to determine as far as possible, the impact of the teaching of some Franciscan masters on the following aspects of the sacraments: one, the definition of a sacrament; and two, the final, efficient, material and formal cause of the sacraments. This paper begins with a discussion of the Franciscan contribution to the finally accepted definition of a sacrament, which can be considered a turning point in the vigorous development of sacramental theology in the Middle Ages.

CHAPTER ONE

DEFINITION OF SACRAMENT

The history of the development of the notion of a sacrament in the Middle Ages is an interesting one, the main points of which can here be portrayed in brief.

Hugh of St. Victor (†1141)

It is Hugh of St. Victor, who has the undisputed merit of first presenting a definition of the sacraments in the strict sense. In a single formula he summarized, better than any of his predecessors, all the ideas of tradition. Although he offers only the traditional definition, according to which a sacrament is said to be a sign of a sacred thing (*sacramentum sacrae rei signum*), his explanations and commentary conspire to distinguish a sacrament in the wide sense from a strict sacrament.

D. Quid interest inter signum et sacramentum?

M. Signum solum ex institutione significat; sacramentum etiam ex similitudine repraesentat. Item signum rem significare potest, non conferre. In sacramento autem non sola significatio est, sed etiam efficacia: ut videlicet simul et ex institutione significet, et ex similitudine repraesentet et conferat ex sanctificatione.¹

D. What is the difference between a sign and a sacrament?

M. A sign by institution alone signifies; a sacrament represents even through similitude. In like manner a sign can signify, but not confer, a thing. In a sacrament however there is not only signification but also efficacy: so that it may clearly simultaneously signify by institution and by similitude represent and confer by sanctification.

¹ *Dialogus de Sacramentis Legis Naturalis et Scriptae*, Migne PL 176, 35A. See F. Cavallera, "Le De Sacramentis de Hugue de Saint-Victor, rapports du Dialogue et du Traité," *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique*, 41 (1940), 207-210; Damian Van den Eynde, "Les définitions des sacrements pendant la première période de la théologie scolastique (1050-1235)," *Antonianum*, 24 (1949), 214. We acknowledge our indebtedness to the Franciscan author of this article. On the life and works of Hugh of St. Victor, see F. Vernet, "Hugues de Saint-Victor," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, 7 (1927), 239-307.

This synthesis happily resulted in the rejection of other definitions and in the retention of one more comprehensive and true. The introduction of the concept of efficacy was indeed an inspired one, for it more than anything else paved a way to a concise definition of sacraments.

In a later work he presents what he considers a technical definition. Having cited and criticised the traditional concept, to those who are desirous of a fuller and more perfect formula he offers the following:

Sacramentum est corporate vel materiale elementum foris sensibiliter propositum ex similitudine repraesentans, et ex institutione significans, et ex sanctificatione continens aliquam invisibilem et spiritualem gratiam.²

A sacrament is a corporeal or material element presented externally and sensibly, which by similitude represents, and by institution signifies, and by sanctification contains a certain invisible and spiritual grace.

The difference between the two definitions is striking. In the first one there is a description, if not a definition, of a sacrament as a representative and efficacious sign, but there is no further determination of the nature of this sign or its mode of causality. In the second one, however, he expressly affirms that a sacrament is not an agent of grace, but rather its recipient, which contains it in the manner of a vase in virtue of the priestly blessing. Its serious defect consists in assuming only a part of the sacrament for its whole, and in discarding from the number of the sacraments such rites as holy orders and matrimony, which are not composed of corporeal elements. Other theologians will recognize the drawbacks of the definition and will return to the concept of sign, and will strive to bring out in bold relief, in the efficacy of the sacramental sign, the specific features and distinctive characteristics of the definition.³ This will be the great achievement of the anonymous author of the work entitled, *Summa Sententiarum*.

The *Summa Sententiarum* (ca. 1140)

Drawing his inspiration from Hugh's works this author proceeds in

² *De Sacramentis Christiane Fidei*, I, ix, 2: Migne PL 176, 317D. See van den Eynde, "Les définitions des sacrements pendant la première période de la théologie scolastique," *op. cit.*, 216.

³ Van den Eynde, "Les définitions des sacrements," *op. cit.*, 218 f.

similar fashion, in that he too advances from a broad to a strict notion of the sacraments. He improves on the definition and contributes much towards making it more exact. Here in the original Latin and translation is his definition.

Sed ut solis sacramentis competat, sic intelligendum: "Sacramentum est visibilis forma invisibilis gratiae in eo collatae, quam scilicet confert ipsum sacramentum." Non enim est solummodo sacrae rei signum sed etiam efficacia. Et hoc est quod distat inter signum et sacramentum. Quia ad hoc ut sit signum, non aliud exigit nisi ut illud significet cujus perhibetur signum, non ut conferat. Sacramentum vero non solum significat, sed etiam confert illud cujus est signum vel significatio. Iterum hoc interest: quia signum potest esse pro sola significatione quamvis careat similitudine, ut circulus vini; sed sacramentum non solum ex institutione significat sed etiam ex similitudine repraesentat.⁴

But that it may be restricted to the sacraments alone it should thus be understood: "A sacramentum is a visible form of an invisible grace therein conferred, which a sacrament itself confers." It is not only a sign of a sacred thing but it is an efficacy as well. And this is the distinction between a sign and a sacrament. For, that it might be a sign, nothing else is required than that it signify whose sign it is considered, not that it confer. A sacrament however not only signifies but also confers whose sign or signification it is. Again this difference: for a sign can serve for signification alone although it is devoid of similitude, as a cask of wine. But a sacrament not only by institution signifies but also by similitude represents.

The author of the *Summa Sententiarum* surpasses his model in several ways. He gives us first of all a rather precise notion of the effect of a sacrament, namely, grace. He does not furthermore mention, neither in the definition nor in his exposition, the necessity of the priestly blessing for the efficacy of the sacrament. Finally he neglects, in the very definition, the notion of similitude, in order the more to concentrate on the sole functions of sign and efficacy. The differences that existed between the definition of Hugh of St. Victor and that of the anonymous author were not lost upon the theologians of that era. Scholars cited it at great length, and Peter Lombard not only accepted it but even contributed definitive touches.

⁴ *Summa Sententiarum*, IV, 1: Migne PL 176, 117-118. On author of this work see P. Anciaux, *La théologie du sacrement de pénitence au XII^e siècle* (Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1949), 72; D. Van den Eynde, "William of Saint-Thierry and the Author of the *Summa sententiarum*," *Franciscan Studies*, 10 (1950), 242; *idem*, "Précisions chronologique sur quelques ouvrages théologiques du XII^e siècle," *Antonianum*, 26 (1951), 223-229.

Peter Lombard (†1160)

The contribution of Peter Lombard to the definitive notion of a sacrament consists of three parts which hang together rather loosely. The first part he culled from the *Summa Sententiarum*.

"Sacramentum est sacrae rei signum."
... sed nunc agitur de sacramento,
secundum quod est signum. Item,
"sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae
visibilis forma."⁵

"A sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing." ... But here the problem concerns a sacrament according as it is a sign. Likewise, "a sacrament is the visible sign of an invisible grace."

In another definition, or rather in the second part of his concept, he concentrates on the concept of sign, availing himself of two quotations from the works of St. Augustine.

"Signum vero est res praeter speciem, ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire." "Signorum vero alia sunt naturalia, ut fumus significans ignem; alia data;" et eorum quae data sunt, quaedam sunt sacramenta, quaedam non: omne enim sacramentum est signum, sed non e converso.⁶

"A sign however is an object, the external appearances of which suggest the idea of another object." "Of signs however, some are natural, as smoke which signifies fire; others are conventional." Among those which are conventional, some are sacraments; others are not: for every sacrament is a sign, but not vice versa.

In the third part he gives a definition of a sacrament in the strict sense.

Sacramentum ejus rei similitudinem gerit, cujus signum est. "Si enim sacramenta non habent similitudinem rerum quarum sacramenta sunt, proprie sacramenta non dicerentur." Sacramentum enim proprie dicitur quod ita signum est gratiae Dei et invisibilis gratiae forma, ut ipsius imaginem gerat et causa existat. Non

A sacrament bears the similitude of the object of which it is the sign. "If the sacraments would not bear the similitude of the objects of which they are sacraments, they could not properly be called sacraments." That is properly called a sacrament which is a sign of the grace of God and a form of invisible grace, so that it

⁵ *Petri Lombardi Libri Quatuor Sententiarum, Liber IV, Dist. I, i-iv*, ed. Patres Collegii S. Bonaventurae (2 vols., Quaracchi, 1916), II, 745-746. (Hereafter cited as Quaracchi). On life and works of Peter Lombard see J. De Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," *Dict. théol. cath.*, 12 (1935), 1941-2019; Van den Eynde, "Nouvelles précisions chronologiques sur quelques oeuvres théologiques du XII siècle," *Fran. Stud.*, 13 (1953), 110-118.

⁶ *Libri Quatuor Sent., Liber IV, Dist. I, i-iv*: Quaracchi II, 745-746. The two quotations are from St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*, II, i, n. 1-2: Migne PL 34, 35-36.

igitur significandi tantum gratia sacramenta instituta sunt, sed etiam sanctificandi.⁷

bears its similitude and exists as its cause. The sacraments were instituted not only for the purpose of signifying, but sanctifying as well.

A comparison of this definition with its model, found in the *Summa Sententiarum*, demonstrates that it is more explicit and better balanced. In substituting the words, *Ipsius causa existat (gratiae)*, for the paraphrase of the *Summa Sententiarum*, Lombard hardly envisaged the impact this would engender in future generations. Whether Peter is the creator of the phrase, *cause of grace*, is not certain at all, since in the liturgy of his day there were references which might have led him to such a contribution.⁸

Inspired by its predecessors the definition of Lombard was far superior to its sources. It was applied exclusively to the seven Christian sacraments. This position ranked Peter Lombard among the authors who, as St. Augustine, maintained that pre-Christian sacraments did not confer grace.⁹

Such teaching however did not escape its inconveniences. It ran counter on the one hand to the general opinion that marriage does not confer any supernatural effect. Current theology was consequently faced with a dilemma: either it would have to abandon the concept of efficacy in the definition of a sacrament in general; or else it would be forced to eliminate marriage from the number of sacraments in the strict sense. Caught on the horns of the dilemma Lombard accepted both sides: he admitted that all the Christian sacraments are causes of grace; but he also affirmed that matrimony does not confer either grace or virtue, but that it was constituted merely as a remedy for sin alone. On the other hand, Lombard, in subtracting the seven Christian sacraments from among those of the Old Law, was responsible for the inclusion of the latter in the genus of sacraments in the wide sense alone.^{9a}

Alexander of Hales († 1245)

Although the definition of a sacrament construed by Peter Lombard

⁷ Lombard, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁸ Van den Eynde, "Les définitions des sacrements pendant la première période de la théologie scolastique," *op. cit.*, 224.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 225.

^{9a} *Ibid.*, 226f.

was more precise and accurate than that of his predecessors, it still required further elucidation and distillation. This was the task and the noteworthy contribution of that great leader of the early Franciscan school, Alexander of Hales.

The sacraments, Alexander maintains, can be divided into three categories, according as they are considered in the broad sense, in a strict and a very strict sense. In the broad sense, sacrament can designate the mystery of the passion and the resurrection of Christ, which is the unique *sacrum signatum*, which merits the name of sacrament, simply because it is the source from which stems the virtue of the other sacraments. The term sacrament in the strict sense is applied to the sacraments of the Old Law, such as the paschal lamb, which are prognostic signs, quite imperfect to be sure, which do not affect what they signify. In the very strict sense sacrament is identified with a Christian sacrament, a sign and cause of grace.¹⁰

This division corresponds, Alexander affirms, to the classification of definitions which he finds in the writings of Lombard. While he rejects the *sacrum signatum* or *secretum* as improper, he emphatically concludes that the threefold definition of Lombard is possessed of a real difference, in the sense that the first ought to be labelled *communissima*, the second *communis*, and the third *propria*.¹¹

His exposé is noteworthy for its insights. The first notion, designated the *sacrum rei signum*, is so broad that it can well serve to describe any sign of a sacred reality, from the tabernacle or the vases of the temple to the efficacious signs of the New Law. In a special manner they envisage the sacraments of the Old Law.¹²

Less comprehensive, the second definition, *invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma*,¹³ includes the sacraments of both laws. Here, however,

¹⁰ *Comment. in IV Sententiarum, Dist. I, i-iv*, as cited by Van den Eynde, "Les définitions des sacrements pendant la première période de la théologie scolastique," *op. cit.*, 56. On the life and works of Alexander of Hales see *Magistri Alexandri de Hales, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, ed. PP Collegii S. Bonaventurae ("Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi," Quaracchi: Typog. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1951), I, *Prolegomena*, 56*-75*; A. Vacant, "Alexandre de Halès," *Dict. théol. cath.*, 1 (1899), 772-785.

¹¹ *Comment. in IV Sent.*, as cited by Van den Eynde, "Les définitions des sacrements pendant la première période de la théologie scolastique," *op. cit.*, 58.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

Alexander notes this difference: the definition is valid directly for the Christian sacraments; indirectly for the sacraments of the Old Law. In regard to the third definition, which is the personal contribution of Peter Lombard, it designates exclusively, as Alexander says, the seven Christian sacraments, which are both signs and causes of grace.¹⁴

The contribution of Alexander is remarkable for a variety of reasons. His teaching first of all bears eloquent witness to the usage of the term sacrament which is now so restricted as to be hardly distinguishable from actual theology. It furthermore allots to each of the three definitions of Lombard a content and signification which is now well defined. One might say that his great originality consists in his refusal to make of the first two definitions, strictly generic ones. Proof of this is found in his application of them. His genius is apparent in his unmistakable capacity to blaze trails for the future analogical concept of the sacraments.¹⁵

The singular influence of Alexander is very easily perceived in his teaching on matrimony. According to Lombard, matrimony, even though it is numbered among the seven sacraments, does not confer grace. With this opinion Alexander is in disagreement. He does concede that marriage does not by itself produce or augment sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*), but he maintains that since it is included among the seven sacraments, it must necessarily meet all the conditions of the definition of Lombard. It is consequently not only a sign, but also a cause of grace by virtue of the sanctification which the Savior conferred upon it at Cana of Galilee. This sacrament does not escape the definition even though its institution, no less than that of penance, dates from the origins of the human race. Quick to perceive the dilemma he strongly asserts that more efficacy must not be attributed to the nuptial blessing than to the sacrament itself. Inspired by this principle, Hales concludes that matrimony confers upon those who receive it worthily an increase of grace, the spiritual union of charity.¹⁶ Such a solution obviously possessed its advantages. Not only was it, in its remarkable clarity, far superior to the tergiversations of the other era, but it also demonstrated that it is the logic of the definition of Lombard which constrains theology to

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Van den Eynde, *ibid.*, 38.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 14f., and note 1, p. 15f.

harmonize the notion of a sacrament in general with that of the sacraments in particular.¹⁷

St. Bonaventure († 1274)

A cursory glance at the writings of St. Bonaventure shows that he does not devote a special question to the notion and definition of a sacrament. Still he does affirm, without any ambiguity, that a sacrament must be an external sign.¹⁸ In his consideration of the differences between the sacraments of the Old Law and those of the New, he expounds the different opinions and concludes that he prefers that of Hugh of St. Victor, who asserts that they give grace.¹⁹ A sacrament, according to Bonaventure, is a perceptible sign, divinely instituted as medicine, in which under the veil of sensible things divine power operates more secretly.²⁰

The personal contribution of Bonaventure to the problem of the notion and definition of a sacrament can now be summarized. First of all, the term sacrament implies the idea of a sacred sign and can be employed not only in regard to the seven Christian sacraments, but also with respect to the sacraments of the Old Law, the sacramentals, and even for all those things which convey a religious meaning. A sacrament, secondly, in the true and proper sense is always a sign that sanctifies (*signum sanctificans*). This means that it is a sacred reality which signifies and causes grace. By grace here is meant supernatural grace, and not some sort of legal justification. This applies to the sacraments of both Testaments. While the sacraments of both covenants are possessed of efficacy, they do not achieve their result in an identical manner. For before the coming of Christ, the sacraments conferred some grace, but they were neither primarily, nor of themselves, ordained for the conferring of grace. The Christian sacraments on the other hand are efficaciously destined for the conferring of grace. After such a preamble it follows that a sacrament in the

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁸ *Commentaria in IV Librum Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, Dist. I, Pars I, Art. Unicus, Qu. 2, Opera Omnia*, ed. Patres Collegii S. Bonaventurae (10 vols.; Quaracchi: Typog. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882-1902), IV, 14 b. (Hereafter cited as Quaracchi). On the life and works of St. Bonaventure see E. Longpré, "Bonaventure (Saint)," *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique*, 9 (1937), 742-788.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Qu. 5: Quaracchi, IV, 26a.

²⁰ *Breviloquium, Pars VI, i*: Quaracchi, V, 265a.

strictest sense, applicable to the sacraments of the New Law alone, should be defined in the following manner: a sanctifying sign efficaciously ordained for the conferring of sanctification.

John Duns Scotus (†1308)

That Scotus in his discussion of the notion and definition reveals the influence of his Franciscan predecessors is quickly perceived. He expatiates on this problem in his characteristically subtle manner. Unlike the Seraphic Doctor, Scotus devotes a lengthy question to the many problems involved in the notion and concept of a sacrament.

Only a summary of the conclusions of Scotus can be given here. Before he proposes his own definition of a sacrament Scotus first inquires into the metaphysics of the Lombardian notion. A thing is definable, Scotus asserts, according as it fulfills the following five conditions, four of which are positive, and one negative. In regard to the positive conditions, a definition can only be given of an entity, which is possessed of oneness, reality, and universality. And as for the negative condition, the thing to be defined must not be, as he says, *simpliciter simplex*.²¹

The Subtle Doctor concludes that a sacrament is defined even as logical intentions are defined. In such definitions we find the genus and the specific difference. A sacrament, he says, can therefore be defined as a "perceptible sign which by divine institution efficaciously signifies the grace of God or a gratuitous divine effect, ordained for the salvation of wayfaring man."²² Here is his solution to the question. In his definition the three elements, namely: sign, divine institution, and efficacious signification, denote the genus of the thing defined. The term, perceptible (*sensibile*) is the subject; grace, or the gratuitous effect of God, denotes the terminus. All this conspires to give us a definition which is relative.

²¹ *In IV Sententiarum, Dist. I, Quaestio 2, Joannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia*, ed. L. Waddingus (12 vols. in 26; Parisiis: L. Vivès, 1891-1895), XVI, 100f. (Hereafter cited as Vivès). On the life and works of Scotus see A. G. Little, "Chronological Notes on the Life of Duns Scotus," *The English Historical Review*, 47 (1932), 568-582; P. Raymond, "Duns Scot," *Dict. théol. cath.*, 4 (1939), 1865-1947; C. Balić, *Ratio Criticae Editionis Operum Omnium J. Duns Scoti* (Romae: Schola Tipog. "Pio X," 1939), 102; *J. Duns Scoti Opera Omnia*, ed. C. Balić et al. (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950) I, 148ff.

²² *In IV Sent., Dist. I, Qu. 2*: Vivès XVI, 109.

How does the definition of Scotus conform to that of Peter Lombard? That answer the Subtle Doctor portrays for us in the following manner. In the Lombardian definition the term form (*forma*) must be understood in the sense of a perceptible sign, in the same way that the image of Hercules is called the form of Hercules. The term visible, as used by Lombard, must be understood as something commonly perceptible, sensible. Since the sense of sight is more excellent than the other external senses, the term visible is employed. The phrase, of invisible grace, refers to the gratuitous interior divine effect which is given for the salvation of wayfaring man. A few additions to this definition, he says, must be made, in order to qualify still further and more adequately the concept of sign. If there is to be no misconception with respect to the notion of sign, Scotus concludes, the further qualifications, namely, by institution, and efficaciously, must be included: the first in opposition to a sign which has natural signification; and the second, in opposition to an equivocal sign and to a sign which naturally follows that which is signified.²³

By way of conclusion it might be said that Scotus contributed to a fuller and more pellucid understanding of the essential elements of the definition and notion of a sacrament, conceived by his predecessors. Faithful to the Franciscan tradition he repeats unequivocally that a sacrament is a sign and efficacious cause of grace.

CHAPTER TWO

FINAL CAUSE OF SACRAMENTS

The Christian sacraments were instituted for the purpose of conferring the grace of God. Catholic doctrine maintains that the sacraments contain the grace which they signify and that they confer that grace on those who place no obstacle in their way. While all of them give grace, some confer another effect which theologians designate

²³ *Ibid.*, 110.

by the technical term of character. By the final cause of the sacraments are meant both grace and character.

PART ONE: SACRAMENTAL GRACE

The Summa Fratris Alexandri

Sacramental theology reached its greatest development during the Middle Ages and set the stage for the dogmatic pronouncements of the Council of Trent. The Franciscan masters played an important role on that stage and made tangible contributions to a more penetrating comprehension of grace conferred in the sacraments.

The Christian sacraments, according to Alexander of Hales, confer the grace which they signify, because they are both signs and causes of grace. As signs of grace they are divided with respect to the type of grace they confer. Some envisage the turning away from evil; others envision a tendency to good, still others include both. Grace is distinguished in the same fashion: there is a grace for abstaining from evil; a grace for the inclination to do good; and still a third grace for the prosecution of both.²⁴ The grace which is given to aid one to avoid evil is actually divided into three types, and because of this tripartite division there are three such sacraments. The grace which is conferred to do good is in like manner divided into three categories, which will give us three such sacraments. But the grace which is for both is indivisible. The sum total gives us seven sacraments.²⁵

The grace furthermore which is for the avoidance of evil includes three categories, since there exists a twofold evil, the *malum culpae et paenae*. In regard to the *malum culpae*, there are two sins, original

²⁴ *Quaestio de Sacramentis in Genere*, as cited by Kilian Lynch, "The *Quaestio de Sacramentis in Genere* Attributed to Alexander of Hales," *Franciscan Studies*, 11 (1951), 84. On the authenticity of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri* see Victorin Doucet, "The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the *Summa*," *Fran. Stud.*, New Series, 7 (1947), 26-41; 274-312; *idem*, "A New Source of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*," *Fran. Stud.*, 27 (1946), 403-417; *idem*, *Prolegomena in Librum III necnon in Libros I et II Summae Fratris Alexandri* (Quaracchi: Typog. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1948), IV, cli ff.

²⁵ *Quaestio de Sacramentis in Genere*, as cited by Lynch, "The *Quaestio de Sacramentis in Genere* Attributed to Alexander of Hales," *op. cit.*, 84.

and actual. The punishment or *culpa* is for both. Original sin merits a special punishment, the deprivation of the vision of God.²⁶

Baptism, penance, and extreme unction, moreover, Alexander continues, principally are concerned with the turning away from evil. Confirmation, the Eucharist, and holy orders are ordained to enhance and to promote progress in good, while matrimony looks to the multiplication of sons of God. The first triad of sacraments is given as a remedy; the second is actually an office.²⁷

The sacramental grace which is designed to be for the purpose of making progress in good is conferred to the end that we might be united to good. There is, however, a threefold union with good which is touched upon by the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. 11:3). The first consists in a union of a wife with her husband as soon as there intervenes carnal intercourse; the second is the union of man with Christ, which is but a firm cohesion of members with the head; and the third is a union of human nature with divine. In the sacraments this can readily be recognized. In matrimony we possess the first *figurativum*, the consent of both the husband and wife. In confirmation there is the first *significatum*, the union of the members with the head. In this sacrament is given a grace for the purpose of uniting the members with the head. This is why some say that in confirmation a new character is not given, but that the one given in baptism is merely strengthened.²⁸

All the sacraments except matrimony confer grace or the augment of grace. After such a startling statement, Alexander in almost the same breath asserts that to those who are worthy and who are endowed with divine charity there is granted an increase of grace in that sacrament. In fact, in the same distinction he, towards the very end, proceeds to show how the sign or sacrament in marriage efficaciously determines grace for the purpose of that institution.²⁹ Is there confusion here, or what is worse, a contradiction?

It was said before that the current opinion that matrimony affects grace not of itself, but rather because of the nuptial blessing, was

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 85f.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ In *IV Sententiarum, Dist. XXVI*, as cited by Lynch, "The Theory of Alexander of Hales on the Efficacy of the Sacrament of Matrimony," *Fran. Stud.*, New Series, 11 (1951), [76] ff. and [134].

unequivocally rejected by Alexander. How then can one explain the apparent contradiction?

To resolve the seeming contradiction in the doctrine of Alexander we must revert to a distinction between justification *ex opere operato* and *ex opere operantis*. In the Christian sacraments it is not the *operatio*, but the *res operata* that justifies. The justifying element proceeds from the sacrament, and not from the recipient as such.³⁰

That matrimony is in some way a cause of grace is abundantly clear, but how it is a cause of grace is not so clear. If the words of Alexander mean anything to us, we must understand them as affirming that matrimony is a cause of grace not *ex opere operato*, but rather *ex opere operantis*. What does this mean? In the other sacraments while some kind of consent in the case of adults must be present, that consent does not enter into the *opus operatum*, into the sensible sign. Here in matrimony the contract expressed externally becomes the sacrament, the *operatio* expressed in the sacrament. In virtue of the recipient's dispositions the Lord may give grace in abundance.³¹ Even though the solution of Alexander falls short of the ultimate resolution of the problem of the efficacy of marriage in regard to grace, his application of the classical definition to matrimony unmistakably distinguishes the present solution from any previously offered.³²

Each of the sacraments, Alexander affirms, and this includes marriage in the manner indicated, brings sanctifying grace to the recipient, which must be distinguished somehow according to the sacrament from which it proceeds.³³

St. Bonaventure

In the writings of this period the concept of actual grace in connection with the sacraments is the object of no special treatise or inquiry. Authors generally extend habitual grace to the various exigencies of the spiritual life. While theologians expatiated on the nature of the special grace conferred by a particular sacrament, they are hardly concerned about constructing the notion common to sacra-

³⁰ *Ibid.*, [99] f.

³¹ *Ibid.*, [101] f.

³² *Ibid.*, [102], (111) ff.

³³ *Ibid.*, [102].

mental grace. Two reasons accounted for this. In the first place, the doctrine on grace in general and on sacramental grace in particular remained rather confused and in an embryonic stage. The second reason is found in the Lombardian opinion that the sacrament of matrimony does not confer grace, but that it only assumes the role of a remedy for sin. Most theologians and canonists subsequent to Lombard state explicitly that the Christian sacraments, with the exception of matrimony, give grace. Marriage is only a remedy for concupiscence. These inconsistencies conspired to create great obstacles to the fully developed doctrine on sacramental grace in general. When Bonaventure approached these problems, theology was in a period of change and transition in regard to this doctrine. This explains the inadequacy in his doctrine on sacramental grace.

While Bonaventure unequivocally maintains that the Christian sacraments confer the grace they signify, he fails to satisfy our curiosity as to the precise nature of sacramental grace. The term grace, by itself, means sanctifying grace. In the doctrine of Bonaventure this grace is distinguished inadequately from the grace of the virtues. Even though the latter differs from the former in that it embraces the substratum or *habitus* of the virtues which sanctifying grace informs, the distinction between sanctifying grace, the grace of the virtues and sacramental grace is not neatly presented.³⁴

Before he tells us what kind of grace is given in the sacraments, Bonaventure discusses the current opinions. The defenders of the first view maintained that sacramental grace does not differ intrinsically from ordinary sanctifying grace. Here the term sacramental is applied to it simply for the purpose of designating its origin. The second view contended that there exists an essential difference between the two kinds of grace. According to this theory ordinary sanctifying grace has for its object the performance of good works, while sacramental grace is primarily destined for the repairing of the ravages of sin. This means that in the soul there may be two different kinds of sanctifying grace. The Seraphic Doctor took a middle stand insofar as he claims that on the one hand all sanctifying grace is essentially the same, and on the other that sacramental grace is also the effects which they connote. In the same place he distinguishes

³⁴ *In IV Sententiarum, Dist. I, Pars I, Art. Unicus, Qu. 3*: Quaracchi, IV, 17 a; *ibid.*, Qu. 6, p. 27 f.

between the grace of the virtues and sanctifying grace, in that the former adds to the latter the so-called *habitus substratus*.³⁵ While simple at first blush, this is replete with several almost insoluble difficulties.

Current up to the time of Bonaventure was the teaching that the very concept of sacrament includes the notion of grace. But the doctrine as to the efficacy of matrimony was a disparaging one indeed. In exploring this problem the Seraphic Doctor first gives his attention to two current opinions: the one which denies all grace to marriage, reducing the sacrament to a simple remedy for concupiscence; and the other which admits the conferment of grace only in virtue of the priestly blessing. Without tergiversation he rejects both opinions: the first because since matrimony is a Christian sacrament it can be a remedy only through the efficiency of grace; and the second, because if the priestly blessing which is at best only a sacramental could grant grace, *a fortiori* the sacrament itself should confer grace.³⁶

In view of such a stand on the efficacy of matrimony, Bonaventure should not hesitate to conclude, against his contemporaries, that this sacrament causes grace. But he is inconsistent. In one place he asserts that marriage is a remedy in that it excuses an otherwise sinful act, the coitus, from any stain of sin. In addition to this, he adds, it also confers some grace to such as receive it worthily, in the consent of charity, united for the purpose of the procreation of children.³⁷

This answer presents a difficult problem. In the same question he admits that matrimony, by reason of the priestly blessing, confers grace, in contradiction of his other statement, that marriage gives grace by virtue of the consent. What is the difference between the grace bestowed by virtue of the consent and the grace imparted by the blessing of the priest? Bonaventure obliges us with the answer. Matrimony, he reminds us, does not give grace in the same manner as the other sacraments; it merely gives an *auxilium gratiae*, unless perhaps by reason of the accompanying blessing. Marriage, therefore, assures the bestowing of grace when accompanied with the blessing.³⁸

The viewpoint of the Seraphic Doctor on the efficacy of matrimony

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Qu. 6, p. 27 f.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Dist. XXVI, Art. II, Qu. 2, p. 668.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

becomes clear. Matrimony by itself, without the priestly blessing, does not confer sanctifying grace. Accompanied by the blessing it in all likelihood, in virtue of this same blessing, confers sanctifying grace, in the same manner as the other sacraments.^{38a}

Owing to a study of other texts we can make the following statements in regard to the effects of matrimony. Although Bonaventure distinguishes between sanctifying grace and what he calls the aid of grace (*auxilium gratiae*), he also refers to effects proper to matrimony. It is perfectly legitimate to identify the certain gift of grace or the aid of grace with the effects which are proper to the purposes of marriage. What does this mean? It means that, while in other sacraments, sacramental grace and the characteristic effects are conferred by reason of the sacrament itself, in matrimony these two elements are quite distinct. Sanctification here is bestowed by virtue of the blessing; and the special effects, by virtue of the consent.^{38b}

A word about the terminology in regard to the species of grace found in the Bonaventurian system is necessary. In his theory, all supernatural grace which is not sanctifying grace, or *gratia gratum faciens*, is what theologians call, a *gratia gratis data*. In modern theological parlance this can be either an actual grace or a supernatural gift of one kind or another. According to Bonaventure, moreover, all effects, whether psychological, physiological, or purely spiritual, are true effects of grace, if they proceed from sanctifying grace. In matrimony, the aid of grace, the certain gift of grace, and the special effects of grace, are actually identical. The aggregate of special gifts which are required if the matrimonial life is to be full and perfect, is, in Bonaventure's opinion, the certain gift of grace. This cluster of gifts, since it proceeds from sanctifying grace, is really distinct from it.

Unorthodox though his doctrine on matrimonial grace may be, Bonaventure's position is definitely a contribution to correct theological doctrine, if only because it is an obvious improvement on the current viewpoint. Not long before him theologians denied that matrimony confers grace. In his ambivalence Bonaventure could not have arrived at the orthodox doctrine; but he did admit that matri-

^{38a} *Ibid.*, Dist. XXX, Art. Unicus, Qu. 3, Ad Tertium, p. 711b.

^{38b} *Ibid.*, Dist. XXXIX, Art. I, Qu. 3, p. 835; *ibid.*, Ad Tertium, p. 836; cf. also *ibid.*, Qu. 2, p. 834.

mony does confer some gift of grace. While he failed to abandon the prevalent prejudice against matrimony, he was more successful than his predecessors in enervating that prejudicial outlook. His approach to the problem stands distinctly as a bridge between the antiquated opinions of previous writers and the theologically correct one found in the works of St. Thomas.

John Duns Scotus

As far as can be ascertained Scotus remains quite faithful to the Franciscan teaching. The principal end or purpose of a sacrament is the conferring of grace. In every sacrament there is a distinction between a sacrament itself, the visible external thing, and the object of the sacrament (*res sacramenti*), or grace.³⁹

But the question might be asked, What kind of grace is conferred in a sacrament? Sacramental grace is either the first one, *gratia prima*, or the second, *gratia secunda*. Some sacraments confer the first one; others the second directly, and the first indirectly, under certain conditions. The second grace consists in an augment of the first one.⁴⁰

To designate the effects of the sacraments, Scotus employs two distinct terms: one, the grace of God; and two, a gratuitous effect of God. The first is quite clear: it signifies habitual grace. The second is obscure: it is used to describe various effects, such as character and the permanent presence of Christ under the species. Sacramental grace is an accidental grace, one which is inherent in the soul, and can be called the object of the sacrament (*res sacramenti*). In the Eucharist, however, the object of the sacrament is not habitual grace, but the *esse* of the Body and Blood of Christ under the species, for grace in the definition of a sacrament does not refer only to an accidental grace, but also to any free gift of God.⁴¹

The term, sacramental grace, is absent from the works of Scotus, but the reality is discussed therein. Without describing its nature, he treats of it here and there, giving us his opinion in not a few instances. By sacramental grace he means the special aid conferred by

³⁹ *In IV Sententiarum*, Dist. I, Qu. 2: Vives XVI, 110 and 106 a; *ibid.*, Dist. VI, Qu. 9, p. 600 b; *ibid.*, Dist. VII, Qu. 3, p. 704 b.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Dist. XIX, Qu. Unica, Vives XVIII, 649; *ibid.*, 674 a; *ibid.*, Dist. I, Qu. 6: Vives XVI, 222 b; *ibid.*, Dist. XXVI, Qu. Unica: Vives XIX, 168 b,

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Dist. VIII: Vives XVII, 8,

the sacraments. From this one can conclude that the Christian sacraments are perfect in their intension (or intensity) and extension. Sacraments possess the power to signify and to cause grace in high perfection. Their extensive perfection consists in affording a remedy for every spiritual infirmity.⁴²

By themselves the sacraments, with the same efficacy, and in the same degree, confer grace upon everyone. Only the dispositions of the recipient will vary the intensity. This obtains only in the ordinary economy of God. It is possible that a greater grace will be conferred, if God so wills it, to one who is predestined to greater glory.⁴³ In the case of adults, if they are disposed, they receive an effect from the sacraments in proportion to their disposition. An adult regularly receives a larger quantity of grace than an infant, because ordinarily disposed he is said to place a meritorious act, and because he has the will, however small it might be, to receive the sacrament.⁴⁴

PART TWO: SACRAMENTAL CHARACTER

It is a tenet of the Catholic Church that while all the sacraments of the New Law signify and confer grace, some of them grant a special effect which is known technically as the sacramental character, which is imprinted in three sacraments, baptism, confirmation, and holy orders. The second effect in some sacraments is that it is possessed of a special function, distinct from grace, which may be conferred even though grace, for a number of reasons, is not.

The doctrine of the character was accepted in the Middle Ages. Inquiries into its precise nature produced many theories. The Franciscans contributed no little to a proper assessment of the functions and nature of character.

Alexander of Hales

In accord with Lombard's teaching, theologians of this period distinguished three things in a sacrament, namely: the external rite, which they called the sacrament (*sacramentum tantum*) or the sign (*signum tantum*); the grace (*res tantum*); and some effect which is intermediary between the external rite and grace, which they labelled

⁴² *Ibid.*, *Dist.* II, *Qu.* 1: Vives XVI, 239 f.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, *Dist.* IV, *Qu.* 7: Vives XVI, 478 b.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 480,

sacramentum et res, the sign and the grace. Some referred to this as the adornment of the soul, *ornatus animae*.⁴⁵

The manner in which Alexander presents his teaching on the character can be portrayed in the following manner. In baptism, he asserts, three things are present: the *signum tantum*, the exterior washing; the *signatum tantum*, namely grace; and lastly both *signum et signatum*, namely, character: *signatum* with respect to the exterior washing, and *signum* in regard to grace. The sacramental character, as well as the ornament of the soul, is a sign of grace. It requires grace and implants it in the soul when the recipient does not impede it in any way.⁴⁶

Although a sign of the New Law, character by itself is not possessed of the requisites of the nature of a sacrament. It takes on the nature of a sacrament because of the exterior rite, as in baptism, and then is the cause of grace in one who received the sacrament worthily. In three sacraments such a sign is given.⁴⁷

What are the characteristics of character? To this question Alexander gives the following answer. In the three sacraments there is imprinted upon some a spiritual, indelible sign upon the soul. This sign is called character and its principal properties are that it is indelible and distinctive. It is most fitting that such a sign should be imprinted in that sacrament which is typical of our redemption affected through the blood of Christ. Through the character we are distinguished from those not of the faith.⁴⁸

Inquiries into the nature of the character engendered long and sometimes bitter controversy. Even today it is still a moot question. Character, in Alexander's opinion, is a certain quality (*quaedam passibilis qualitas*) which illumines the soul so that it might see better what to believe, and what not. Or else it is a certain quality which disposes and equips the soul for the reception of grace. This quality, he admits, is called by some sanctity, in that it prepares the soul for

⁴⁵ P. Pourrat, *Theology of the Sacraments*, trans. from 3rd French ed. (St. Louis: Herder, 1930), 240.

⁴⁶ *Quaestio de Characterē*, as cited by K. Lynch, *The Sacrament of Confirmation in the Early-Middle Scholastic Period* ("Franciscan Institute Publications, Theology Series," 15; St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1957), 202.

⁴⁷ Alexander, *Quaestio de Characterē*, as cited by Lynch, *ibid.*, 203 f.

⁴⁸ Alexander, *Glossae in IV Sententiarum*, I, as cited by Lynch, *ibid.*, 232.

sanctification. It might be included in the first species of quality, habit.⁴⁹

Since the three sacraments, baptism, confirmation, and holy orders confer sacramental character,⁵⁰ it might be asked whether there is any difference between each one. Alexander maintains that the character of baptism differs essentially from that of confirmation. His reasoning is interesting. Since there is more than an accidental difference between baptismal grace and the grace of confirmation, there must be distinctions between the threefold character, which is the sign of grace.⁵¹

St. Bonaventure

The doctrine of St. Bonaventure on sacramental character follows quite closely the opinions of Alexander of Hales. To the question whether character is impressed by the virtues or by the sacraments, he gives the following answer. Character is imprinted not in the virtues, but rather in the sacraments, not in all of them, but in three. It is a distinctive interior sign, whose characteristic of signifying comes from the visible sign, which is found in the sacraments, and not in the virtues. Three sacraments only envisage the determinate state of our faith: first, baptism, because through it faith is born; second, confirmation, because by it faith is strengthened; and third, holy orders, because through them a multifarious virtue is granted.⁵²

He is in agreement with the common opinion of his day when he affirms that character is an indelible sign, because it is a habit imprinted in a subject which is perpetual, given for the purpose of understanding. The perpetuity of character is principally derived from its condition and nature.⁵³

Essentially character, he continues, is not so much a *passio* or a *potentia*, as a *habitus*, since as a spiritual quality it resides in the soul. The term *habitus* must be understood in a twofold manner: first,

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 233. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 235 ff., where character is called a *figura intellectualis*.

⁵⁰ *Quaestio de Characteribus*, as cited by Lynch, *ibid.*, 206.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 206; see also Alexander, *Glossae in IV Sent.*, I, as cited by Lynch, *ibid.*, 236 f.

⁵² *In IV Sententiarum, Dist. VI, Pars I, Art. Unicus, Qu. 4*: Quaracchi, IV, 143.

⁵³ *Ibid.* Cf. *ibid.*, Qu. 5, p. 145.

proprie, according as it is distinguished against disposition in that it is either perfect or imperfect. In the second manner *habitus* is understood *communiter*, according as it comprehends both, namely: every quality disposing the soul, whether it is *facile mobile*, easily mobile, or *difficile mobile*, not easily mobile. It is accepted in this sense whenever it is said that there are three things in the soul: potency (*potentia*), passion (*passio*), and habit (*habitus*). Residing in the soul disposition is neither potency nor passion.⁵⁴

If habit is taken in the wide sense, character can be said to be a *habitus*. Even when accepted in the strict sense it is also a *habitus*, but because it does not perfect but merely dispose to the ulterior perfection of grace, it is a disposition (*dispositio*).⁵⁵

The function of character, continues Bonaventure, is to signify grace and to prepare for it in a certain manner. This is why it possesses a similitude with grace. It makes all Christians like unto God: it assimilates them to the herd of the Lord, and thus distinguishes them from such as are not of the fold.⁵⁶ In regard to the subject of the character, he is in full agreement with Alexander when he says that it is located in the soul, more precisely in the threefold potency of the soul which bear the image of God. By appropriation it is assigned to the cognitive faculty, which has the power of likening us to God.⁵⁷

John Duns Scotus

Scotus approaches the problem of the character in his usual original manner. In agreement with tradition he accepts the proposition that there exists a sacramental character, but he raises the question whether this doctrine is to be found in explicit form in both the Scriptures and patrology. Although it is not clearly expressed in the usual sources of revelation the doctrine of the existence of the character, because of the infallible authority of the teaching Church, is an article of faith. His merit consists in being the first to present the question in such a manner. In no way does he mean to deny that the truth of the existence of the character is contained in the Bible and

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Qu. 1, p. 136 ff.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Qu. 2, p. 140.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Qu. 3, p. 141.

patristic literature; he merely wishes to affirm that you cannot discover explicit mention in these sources.⁵⁸

Character, according to Scotus, can be accepted in many ways. If we transliterate, character can be called a figure. This is why we speak of the figures with which letters are written as characters. Generally speaking, however, character is employed as a sign. For that reason baptism can be called a character, inasmuch as it is a definite sign. But theologians refer to character as a certain spiritual something impressed by God upon one who has received a non-repeatable sacrament.⁵⁹

What are the properties of character? Character is first of all an assimilative form, he says, in one who has it, and a distinctive form inasmuch as it distinguishes from one who does not possess it. It is moreover a commemorative sign, because of the sacrament which was received; a conformative sign, likening us to Christ, whose sacrament we have received; and an obligatory sign, since it places obligations on him who has received the sacrament.⁶⁰

Character, furthermore, is not the same as grace, nor some infused virtue, say faith, hope, charity, since such virtues are not always conferred upon the recipient of a sacrament which is not reiterable, as in the case of one who unworthily receives holy orders. But character, he assures us, is always imprinted, and it is indelible, but the virtues are not.⁶¹

Controversy about the character in the days of Scotus centered chiefly about its nature. Just what is a character? Having first refuted the arguments of St. Thomas (he even accuses him of contradicting himself), Scotus presents his own position. In one place Scotus demonstrates his uncertainty as to the nature of character. One gets the impression that he has misgivings whether it is an absolute form or merely a relation, since, as he maintains, all the things that have been said about character (that it is a dispositive and distinctive sign, etc.), will hold water even when we assume that character is a relative form. But if it is presumed to be an absolute form, it should be included in the first or second species of quality, that is, either

⁵⁸ *In IV Sententiarum, Dist. VI, Qu. 9: Vivès XVI, 598 ff.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 597 b.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 597 f.

habit or potency.⁶² In view of what the Subtle Doctor says elsewhere it seems quite likely that he favored the opinion that a character is a relative form.⁶³ If it is a real relation, its foundation is the nude soul, either the essence or potency.⁶⁴

Although character is a relative form, or relation, it is by no means only a relation of reason, or a being of the mind, but rather a reality or property impressed upon the soul and intrinsically inhering in it. What Scotus wishes to say is merely that the character comes to the soul from an extrinsic agent, who is God. When he says that it can be designated a relation, he is merely stating that it need not necessarily be placed in the category of quality, but can be located in the category of relation.⁶⁵

In designating the proper proximate subject of character as the will, Scotus breaks with Franciscan tradition. He argues in the following way. Grace is identified with charity and is first in the potency in the will. Together with the form, this disposition is in the one subject susceptible of this form. If character is assumed to be an absolute form, it can conveniently be called a disposition to sacramental grace. As such it fittingly is placed formally in the will. A few reasons can be advanced for this position. The first is, that if character is a sign or the basis of the obligation of the soul with respect to God, it appears reasonable to place it in that faculty whose privilege it is first to be obliged or which is the reason for the obligation. And such is the will, because through it a man obliges himself to something. The other reason is, that character is not a proximate disposition to faith, but to that perfection, which principally likens the whole soul to God, which is grace identified with charity residing in the will.⁶⁶

Future generations of Franciscans will add very little to the insights of Scotus.

⁶² *Ibid.*, Qu. 10, p. 634 ff.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, Dist. XIX, Qu. Unica: Vivès XVIII, p. 618 b.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Dist. VI, Qu. 10: Vives XVI, p. 627 b.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 631 ff.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, Qu. XI, p. 650 f.

CHAPTER THREE

EFFICIENT CAUSE OF SACRAMENTS

In this chapter, called the efficient cause of the sacraments, the following points will be discussed: the institution of the Christian sacraments, and their inherent efficacy, or their causality in the production of grace, as taught by the Franciscans.

PART ONE: INSTITUTION OF SEVEN SACRAMENTS BY JESUS CHRIST

A sacrament, being an efficacious sign of grace, can be instituted only by God, since only He can confer grace. Theologians refer to the power of God in regard to the sacraments as the power of authority, and to that of Jesus Christ, because of His lofty dignity, as the power of excellence. The Church, under Christ and dependent upon Him, is called the secondary ministerial efficient cause, a phrase which though barbarous perhaps best expresses the role of the Church and the priests.

Christians, with but few exceptions, have always affirmed, and the Council of Trent had infallibly phrased the revealed truth, that it was none other than Jesus Christ, who instituted all seven Christian sacraments. Today it is accepted among theologians that Christ is also to be regarded as the immediate author of the sacraments.

If there is universal agreement that it was Christ who instituted the sacraments, there is considerable diversity of interpretation of the key word, *institute*. Exactly what does this term mean? How did Christ actually institute the seven sacraments? Did He expressly fix the sacramental rite, the matter and form, of each sacrament? Some of the older Scholastics, in their inquiries into a few sacraments, such as confirmation and extreme unction, maintained that Christ did not Himself institute them, but merely *indicated* or *initiated* them.

William of Melitona († ca.1260) and St. Bonaventure

The theories of William of Melitona⁶⁷ relative to the institution of

⁶⁷ Modern scholars are of the opinion that the incited Book IV of the

the Christian sacraments have suffered at the hands of theologians. They have been branded as erroneous, if not heretical, by some; as dangerous by others. In this field Melitona's contribution rests largely on the fact that in employing a different approach to a few sacraments, he focussed the attention of modern theologians on some of the problems inherent in the precise notion of what is required in a true institution of a sacrament.

Although after the pronouncements of Trent theologians are pretty much agreed that Christ is the immediate author of the sacraments, there are various opinions about certain questions inextricably bound up with the institution. It is even now asked, What is properly required in a true institution of a sacrament? Did Christ determine specifically (*in specie*) the matter and form of all seven sacraments? Or did He do so only generically (*in genere*), giving the Church authority to determine more specifically the matter and form?

Whatever else might be said about the opinions of William of Melitona, it can safely be affirmed that he holds that Christ intervened in the institution of all seven sacraments. His approach is quite interesting. He divides the sacraments into three groups. In the first he includes those which are the most necessary, such as baptism and the Eucharist, and these Christ instituted in person. The second category includes those which are altogether proper to the New Law, confirmation and extreme unction, which were instituted by the Apostles by virtue of the power they received from Christ. The sacra-

monumental *Summa Fratris Alexandri* (*Alexandri de Hales, Summa Theologica*, ed. Patres Collegii S. Bonaventurae [4 vols.; Quaracchi: Typog. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924-1948]), seems to have been written by William of Melitona. On this question see V. Doucet, "The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the *Summa*," *Francis. Stud.*, New Series, 7 (1947), 26-41; 274-312; Doucet, *Prolegomena in Librum III . . . Summae*, IV, cexl f.; Doucet, "Maitres Franciscains de Paris," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 27 (1934), 542-545; P. Glerieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1933), II, n. 304; Lynch, *The Sacrament of Confirmation in the Early-Middle Scholastic Period*, xliii-lvii; Lynch, "The Alleged Fourth Book on the Sentences of Odo Rigaud and Related Documents," *Fran. Stud.*, New Series, 9 (1949), 87-145.—On the life of William of Melitona, see A. Callebaut, "L'année de la mort du Fr. Guillaume de Melitona," *Archiv. Fran. Hist.*, 19 (1926), 431-434; J. C. Russel, "Dictionary of Writers of Thirteenth Century England," *Bulletin of Institute of Historical Research*, Supplement 3 (London, New York, Toronto, 1936); E. Longpré, "Méliton (Guil. de)" *Dict. théol. cath.*, 10 (1928), 538-540.

ments of the third set, namely: penance, holy orders and matrimony, existed already before Christ, who annexed a sacramental power to them. It is quite obvious that all the sacraments go back to Christ, though not in the same manner.⁶⁸

With respect to extreme unction, William seems to contradict himself, for he says that it was instituted by Christ, and almost in the same breath that it was instituted by the Apostles.⁶⁹ The able theologian Bittremieux suggests the following solution of the difficulty. When William affirms that extreme unction was instituted after the passion, he means an institution of the sacrament properly speaking, perfectly constituted, with matter and form which the Church recognized in it. But before the passion the Apostles conferred an unction upon the sick. This rite was not yet the sacrament, but it prefigured the sacramental rite which would be instituted later.^{69a} Here we have what St. Bonaventure will later call institution by insinuation (*insinuando, et initiando*).⁷⁰

Melitona's opinion on the institution of confirmation, furthermore, has been the cause of disparaging comment in theological writings throughout the years, not all of it conspicuous for Christian charity and scientific evaluation. It is known that according to William this sacrament was instituted under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in the council of Meaux in 845, as far as its matter and form are concerned, to which the Holy Spirit conferred the power of sanctifying. In the opinion of the best interpreters of the mind of the Franciscan Doctor (not all of them Franciscans), this can be interpreted to mean that the above-mentioned Council determined the perceptible

⁶⁸ *Summa Theologica, Pars IV, Qu. 5, Membrum 3, Art. 3*, as cited by J. Bittremieux, "L'institution des sacrements d'après Alexandre de Halès," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, 9 (1932), 235. See L. Guillaume, "De Institutione Sacramentorum et speciatim Confirmationis juxta Alexandrum Halensem O.F.M.," *Antonianum*, 2 (1927), 437-468; Van den Eynde, "De Modo Institutionis Sacramentorum," *Antonianum*, 27 (1952), p. 7 note 1.

⁶⁹ Melitona, *Summa Theol., Pars IV, Qu. 5, Memb. 2, Art. 1*, as cited by Bittremieux, "L'institution des sacrements d'après Alexandre de Halès," *op. cit.*, 237. Cf. Guillaume, *op. cit.*, 445 ff.

^{69a} Melitona, *Summa Theol., Pars IV, Qu. 5, Art. 1*; also *ibid.*, *Qu. 3, Memb. 2, Art. 3, Ad 6*; as cited by Bittremieux, "L'institution des sacrements d'après Alex. de Halès," *op. cit.*, 238.

⁷⁰ *Breviloquium, Pars VI, iv*: Quaracchi V, 269 a. See also Bonaventure, *In IV Sententiarum, Dist. XXIII, Art. I, Qu. 2, Ad Quartum*: Quaracchi IV, 592 b.

sign, the *res sacramenti* having existed in the time of Christ. In the year 829, the Church of Gaul used the imposition of hands in confirmation. But in the year 845, at the Council of Meaux there is a notable change: in canon 44 it is said that the Holy Spirit is conferred by chrism, not by the imposition of hands alone. It is this change that William might have interpreted as an institution of new matter.⁷¹

There is all the probability in the world to assume that St. Bonaventure depends on William to a great extent in his approach to the question under study. The dependence of the Seraphic Doctor and others on his predecessor in many questions is at times servile not only with respect to doctrine, but even as to verbal expression.⁷²

Both Bonaventure and William speak of confirmation as being instituted by insinuation. Is this to be identified with the modern theory of generic institution of the sacraments? The term generic institution can be described as one in which Christ generically determined the signification or the object to be signified, and granted to the Apostles or to the Church the power to choose the apt rites. In this case the will of Christ points to the matter and form of a sacrament in a general way only. In the institution by insinuation, on the other hand, the will of Christ points to the matter and form clearly determined. From this point of view this type can be termed a specific institution, in *forma specifica*, as the theologians phrase it.

The link in the chain of Franciscan tradition, regarding these questions, can best be demonstrated in a comparison between the teaching of William and Bonaventure. Both doctors, to begin with, commence with the principle that Christ instituted all the sacraments. Both distinguish three categories of sacraments, among which one supposes a special kind of institution: the intervention of the Holy Spirit in establishing the matter and form, as well as the intervention of Christ, who willed the particular sacrament and insinuated it. The formula, institution by insinuation, is found in the works of Bonaventure;⁷³ it is absent in the works of William. It should be said that the role

⁷¹ J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio* (Florentiae: A. Z. Veneti, 1769), XIV, 829-830; cf. Guillaume, *op. cit.*, 463 ff.

⁷² Doucet, *Prolegomena in Librum III . . . Summae*, ccxvi. See Bonaventure, *In II Sententiarum, Praelocutio*: Quaracchi II, 2.

⁷³ See *supra*, note 70. Cf. Bittremieux, *op. cit.*, 240 ff.

attributed to the Holy Spirit does not of course exclude institution by Christ.

As for extreme unction, Bonaventure holds that Christ instituted it by insinuation, when He sent the Apostles to heal the sick by anointing them with oil.⁷⁴ Melitona also recognized here the insinuation of this sacrament, but he does maintain that it is quite possible that the Apostles had acted under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Neither one considered this rite as a true sacrament. In its matter and form extreme unction was instituted after the passion, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.⁷⁵

The same might be said in regard to confirmation. Both Franciscans teach that Christ instituted this sacrament by insinuation. According to William Christ instituted this sacrament through the Apostles. Bonaventure says that Christ instituted it by insinuation.⁷⁶ Such a conclusion can be upheld, even after Trent, since it is not proved that Christ expressed himself clearly with respect to this sacrament. The Apostles, aided by the Holy Spirit, could have better comprehended the intentions of Christ.⁷⁷

The teaching of St. Bonaventure can now be summarized. Bonaventure holds a position which in modern parlance is called immediate and specific institution in regard to the matter of the seven sacraments, since it is Christ who introduced or at least approved specifically such matter. The form, one can say, was instituted specifically in regard to two sacraments, Baptism and the Eucharist, and generically with respect to the other five.⁷⁸

The institution, according to the Seraphic Doctor, is immediate but it does connote degrees of perfection. For certain sacraments it is perfect because Christ made the specific choice of both parts of the

⁷⁴ *Breviloquium*, Pars VI, iv: Quaracchi V, 269 a. See also Bonaventure, *In IV Sententiarum*, Dist. XXII, Art. I, Qu. 2, Ad 4: Quaracchi IV, 592 b. Cf. H. Baril, *La doctrine de saint Bonaventure sur l'institution des sacrements* (Montreal: Éditions Franciscaines, 1954), 47 ff.

⁷⁵ William of Melitona, *Summa Theol.*, Pars IV, Qu. 5, Memb. 2, Art. 1; and Qu. 3, Memb. 2, Art. 3; as cited by Bittremieux, *op. cit.*, 237 f. Cf. Bonaventure, *In IV Senten.*, Dist. VII, Art. I, Qu. 1, Ad 1: Quaracchi IV, 164. See Baril, *op. cit.*, loc. cit.

⁷⁶ *In IV Sent.*, Dist. XXIII, Art. I, Qu. 2: Quaracchi IV, p. 591. See Baril, *op. cit.*, 41 ff.

⁷⁷ See Baril, *op. cit.*, 73 ff.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 75 f.

rite and because He at the same time manifested His intentions in a clear and explicit manner. Regarding the other sacraments, this institution was less perfect either because Christ had not made the choice of the form except in general, or because He did not clearly manifest His will.⁷⁹

It ought to be added in conclusion that in Bonaventure's doctrine there is nothing which stands in opposition to the dogmas of the Church. Bonaventure permits the Church a greater latitude concerning the form than the matter of the sacraments. A more penetrating historical research on the subject might reveal that this manner of approach to the problem is nearer the reality.⁸⁰

John Duns Scotus

On several points Scotus abandons the teaching of his Franciscan predecessors. In his opinion Christ is the immediate author of all seven sacraments. He admits of no intermediary in the institution of both confirmation and extreme unction. Neither does he assert that the author of the sacraments had determined the matter and form in a specific manner.

In theological language which eventually is employed in the official pronouncements of the Church, Scotus speaks of the institution of each sacrament by Christ. His opinions are merely an echo of tradition. Baptism was instituted after the baptism of Christ but quite a long time before His passion, even before the disciples began to baptise, although the precise hour is not revealed in the Gospel.⁸¹ Confirmation, he says, was instituted by Christ, either when he spoke the words, "Receive the Holy Spirit," (John 20:22) or on Pentecost.⁸² Unlike Bonaventure and Melitona, Duns Scotus affirms that very likely it was Christ Himself who specified both its matter and form.⁸³

His description of the institution of the other sacraments continues. The Eucharist was instituted by Christ at the Last Supper; penance, promised already in Matt. 16:19, was instituted in the words found in

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *In IV Sent., Dist. II, Qu. 1: Vivès XVI, 244 f.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid., Dist. VII, Qu. 1, p. 690.*

John 20:22-23; matrimony as a sacrament is indicated in Matt. 19:1-9, where Jesus approves and ratifies what God in the state of man's innocence promulgated through the words of Adam. Order appears in Matt. 26:26 ff. and in John 20:19 ff. Two properties pertain to the sacerdotal power: with respect to the true Body of Christ and the mystical body of Christ. Extreme unction was not instituted by St. James, as is sometimes claimed, but by Christ; St. James merely promulgated the sacrament.⁸⁴

Scotus did not consider the historical vagaries which appear in both matter and form of several sacraments, which occupy the talents of modern theologians.

Damian Van Den Eynde, O.F.M.

A penetrating student of sacramental theology, Fr. Damian Van den Eynde, O.F.M., eminent professor of theology at St. Anthony Pontifical University, in Rome, has made contributions of remarkable proportions toward a fuller understanding of the manner in which Christ might have instituted some of the sacraments.

By way of introduction to his theory, professor Van den Eynde reviews briefly the three current opinions dealing with the institution of the sacraments. The first, he says, claims that Christ specifically instituted each sacrament, in such a way that whatever is necessary today for validity came from Christ. The other maintains that Christ immutably and specifically (*in specie*) instituted all the sacraments, but that He granted to the Church the power to impose certain conditions for their validity. The third teaches that Christ immutably and specifically instituted two sacraments, baptism and the Eucharist, and the others either in general (*in genere*) or *in specie mutabili*. Although the last theory appeals to him, he has some misgivings about it, since it does not explain adequately the mutations observed in confirmation.⁸⁵

His contribution is noteworthy and can be summarized as follows. Disenchanted with the classic theories which suppose that Christ in every sacrament expressed His will clearly and manifestly, he offers his own. If Christ is to be formally designated as the immediate author of the sacraments, two factors must be verified: determination

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Dist. II, Qu. 1, p. 244.

⁸⁵ "De Modo Institutionis Sacramentorum," *Antonianum*, 27 (1952), 3 ff.

of the rite and the external manifestation and imposition of His will. But both the intention of Christ and the determination of the rite admit various degrees of perfection. Just as Christ could have determined the rite itself in greater or lesser detail, even so He could have announced and revealed His intention more or less expressly. The modes of immediate institution are to be distinguished by reason of determination of rite and intention. In the first case the institution would be called either specific or generic; and in the second, the institution would be designated as either explicit or less clear. All the classic hypotheses possess a common fault: they assume without proof that in every case Christ expressly and clearly disclosed His intention.

Drawing some inspiration from his Franciscan predecessors, such as St. Bonaventure and William of Melitona, the Franciscan scholar moreover admits an evolution in the sacramental rites. Since he restricts such an evolution however to the apostolic era, which was gifted with the rare privilege of both revelation and inspiration, he enervates the force of the arguments against theories of sacramental evolution. His three conclusions are the result of assiduous research in regard to confirmation, which has always been, and still is, a Pandora's box of great difficulties. First, the sole rite of chrismal unction has been and still is in the Greek and Latin Church the sacrament of confirmation, although in these Churches it was always associated and still is with a previous or subsequent extension or imposition of the hands. Secondly, there is no indication that the Church is possessed of the power to abrogate the substance of this rite, or to supplant it with another equally apt, even though the unction itself is the result of a change from the primeval apostolic imposition of the hand. And finally, there are many strong arguments which lend great support to the opinion according to which the practice of chrismal unction derives its origin from the Apostles, rather than from the Church, notwithstanding the silence of Sacred Scripture.⁸⁶

At this point our confrere suggests words of caution. The triad of conclusions cannot be reconciled if we admit one or the other of the current theories. But they can very readily be harmonized if a few

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 7 f.

factors are presumed: that Christ before His ascension had specifically but rather obscurely determined the unction; and that the Apostles, after a brief period of hesitation during which they conferred confirmation by means of the simple imposition of hands, definitively and by virtue of the revelation of the Holy Spirit, introduced chrismal unction.

This theory is not pretentious; it does not presume to resolve all the difficulties interwoven with the problem. It does not explain, for example, how the Church in post-apostolic period, could have subjoined, to the unction determined specifically by Christ, various elements necessary for validity, such as consignation with the sign of the cross and the admixture of balsam to the oil. The Franciscan scholar intends to demonstrate only one thing. Just because there is the fact of some variation in the sacramental rites, especially that which obtained in the Apostolic era, it does not necessarily follow that the element which was changed is for that very reason to be excluded from the substance of the sacrament; or that the Church is gifted with the prerogative to abrogate, or to change, that element. There is always the possibility that the Apostles, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, by means of this mutation, had brought to a final effect the very institution, which Christ had specifically but less clearly accomplished.⁸⁷

The salient features of his theory can now be presented in résumé. In the first place, it is necessary to add to the commonly held distinction between a generic and specific institution another one—an institution which can be labelled explicit and less clear. Secondly, there remains a serious doubt whether there is any sacrament, other than the Eucharist, whose total and integral substance has been specifically and expressly instituted by Christ. But on the other hand it is equally doubtful whether Christ instituted the substance of any sacrament both generically and implicitly. It seems that for every sacrament some elements were instituted expressly, others less clearly; some specifically, and others generically. Finally, the problem of the institution of the sacraments is so replete with vexing questions that no single theory, but perhaps a marriage of several opinions, will resolve it.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

PART TWO: EFFICIENT CAUSALITY OF THE SACRAMENTS

The Church teaches that the Christian sacraments contain the grace which they signify and confer it, *ex opere operato*, on those who do not hinder its operation. The expression, *ex opere operato*, means that the sacraments operate by the power of the completed sacramental rite.

Before the thirteenth century the schoolmen displayed very little or no interest in the delicate problem of the efficient causality of the sacraments. Even though most of the authors called the Christian sacraments *signum efficax*, not too many thought it worthwhile to elucidate what they really meant by those words. The great authority on sacramental theology, Fr. Damian Van den Eynde, notes that Hugh of St. Victor made an effort in that direction, "but his attempt which reduces the sacraments to mere receptacles and vessels of grace without any real influence in its production, constitutes rather a negation than an explanation of the mystery. Still his opinion was more or less commonly adopted by theologians throughout the twelfth century. Its success was due to the fact that at that time the Scholastics were disinclined to admit that a creature either spiritual or material, even if it be the humanity of Christ, could have a true influence on the production or collation of grace; to them, God alone can effect or confer grace, as He alone can create."⁸⁸ This very easily explains why the sacraments were considered simple vessels, or at most, as prerequisites and necessary conditions for the production of grace.

But in the first quarter of the thirteenth century the attitude of theologians on this point had undergone considerable change. The documents display a wide divergence of opinions.

Theological manuals generally speak of four principal theories of sacramental causality, physical, occasional (conditional), intentional, and moral. They are usually described in the following manner.

In physical causality the sacramental rite is an immediate physical cause of grace. Here the technical term, physical, indicates the objective reality of the efficacy. By employing the sacrament as an instrument God subjoins to its natural powers a created transitory impulse comparable to the movement and direction given by the carpenter's

⁸⁸ Van den Eynde, "Stephen Langton and Hugh of St. Cher on the Causality of the Sacraments," *Fran. Stud.*, 11 (1951), [141].

hand to his saw. In the soul there is produced a certain disposition because of which, provided there is no hindrance, grace is infused by God. In three sacraments this disposition is called the character; in others, the supernatural adornment, which at least by priority of nature requires the infusion of grace.

In the system of occasional causality the sacraments by no means have any influence in the production of grace; they are merely an occasion or *conditio sine qua non* for God to give grace. Placed as conditions only, the sacraments can be said to be causes of grace in the widest sense.

In the theory of intentional causality the sacraments are expressions of the divine intention to sanctify, and by expressing it they produce the sanctity. Some theoretical signs, such as the emblem outside the White House, produce knowledge. Others are practical and produce an effect in the juridical order, as a will, which in the juridical order is efficacious and not merely significative. Such an analogy is applicable to the efficacy of the sacraments, which cause an infallible designation that divine grace should be given, and in the Eucharist that transubstantiation should take place. The foremost modern exponent of this system was the eminent Jesuit scholar, L. Billot.

In moral causality the sacraments act in the manner of moral causes. Because the sacraments have a moral value in themselves they move God infallibly to grant grace to those who receive them. The relationship between the sacraments and grace is not merely God's will and intention to give grace whenever the sacraments are administered, but is something in the sacraments themselves.⁸⁹

Alexander of Hales

In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, the authenticity of which is now accepted,⁹⁰ Alexander of Hales presents a theory on the causality

⁸⁹ Cf. B. Leeming, *Principles of Sacramental Theology* (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1956), 287 ff.

⁹⁰ See F. M. Henquinet, "Le commentaire d'Alexandre de Halès sur les Sentences enfin retrouvé," *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati* ("Studi e Testi," 122; Citta del Vaticane, 1946), II, 359-382; V. Doucet, "A New Source of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*," *Fran. Stud.*, 27 (1946), 403-417; Odon Lottin, "Le commentaire d'Alexandre de Halès sur les Sentences," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 14 (1947), 93 ff.; Doucet, *Prolegomena in Librum*

of the sacraments which, it seems, resembles that of Hugh of St. Victor. In his attempt to transfer the imagery of the natural, material order to that of the supernatural, Hugh created a theory, called the system of *continentia gratiae*, consisting of the following characteristics. In his highly imaginative concept of the sacraments, portrayed in the opening paragraphs of this essay, Hugh sees the sacrament not in the ritualistic action, but rather in the corporeal element, such as water, oil, and the like. By means of a blessing, the pronouncement of the sacramental words over the oil or water, the corporeal element becomes at once the bearer or the subject of supernatural grace. It becomes, as he himself says, the vessel of grace (*vas gratiae*): the vessel or pyx in which divine grace is contained in the physical sense of the word. He then admits that at the precise moment of reception of the sacrament, this sacramental vessel pours out its contents of grace, as it were, into the soul of the recipient.⁹¹

Having discussed at great length the definitions of a sacrament, Alexander asserts that the sacraments are signs and causes of grace. Admitting that a sacrament is not a meritorious cause of grace, Hales asserts that it is on the other hand a material cause (*causa materialis in qua*), comparable to vessels containing medicine, in which grace is the medicine. It is therefore, he adds, both a place and a sign. And even as a virtuous life is the cause of merit, so too a sacrament is the cause of grace.⁹²

If all three, the sacrament, God, and grace, are the cause of sanctification, what is the difference between them? To this question he gives, by way of conclusion, a very interesting answer. It is God, he concludes, who sanctifies as the prime efficient cause; grace as the proximate and necessary efficient cause, simply because it is joined

III . . . Summae, cciii ff.; *idem*, "The History of the Authenticity of the Summa," *Fran. Stud.*, New Series, 7 (1947), 26-42; 274-312; Lynch, "A *Terminus ante Quem* for the Commentary of Alexander of Hales," *Fran. Stud.*, 10 (1950), 46-68.

⁹¹ Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*, Lib. I, ix, 4: Migne PL 176, 322 f.

⁹² *Comment. in IV Sent.*, Dist. I, i-iv, as cited by Van den Eynde, "Les définitions des sacrements," *op. cit.*, 59: "Sacramentum autem non est causa meritoria, licet per gratiam meritum, sed est causa materialis in qua, ut vasa medicinalia, grata autem ut medicina; unde est sicut locus et signum. Item, bona vita est causa praemii, sacramentum autem gratiae."

with what is caused; and the sacrament as the material though not necessary cause in which grace is contained.⁹³

William of Melitona

The elaborate treatment of the causality of sacraments found in the authentic work of William of Melitona is indicative of the amazing evolution of doctrine. This theory, if not conceived by him, is associated with his name, in view of his painstaking development and promotion of it. It is known as the system of *efficacia dispositiva*. That Bonaventure regarded it with the greatest respect is evident from the extreme care with which he explains it and from the laborious preparation of this question. In fact the Seraphic Doctor, in deference to his master, expatiates on the system, not once, but four times.⁹⁴ Although Bonaventure at first apparently accepted the theory, only to reject it in the end, it commanded no little influence and was finally incorporated in the fourth part of the monumental work known as the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*.⁹⁵

In summary, the system of William of Melitona regarding sacramental causality possesses the following characteristics. The sacrament is a sign and cause of grace. It is in the first place a *causa sine qua non* in the production of sacramental grace. What is meant by this *causa* cannot be determined, since William nowhere in his work on the sacraments explains the concept. A clue however to the identity of the type of causality is found in the comparison he introduces between the fire of purgatory which is endowed with a supernatural power or force capable of purifying the soul, and the power of the sacrament for the production of grace. If the soul is to be purified by the fire of purgatory, the fire must have a supernatural power, which would render it capable of directing its operation on a spiritual substance. In much the same way, he adds, the sacrament which is

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 59: "Deus sanctificat ut causa efficiens prima, gratia ut causa efficiens proxima et necessaria, quia semper est conjuncta haec causa cum causato, sacramentum ut causa materialis in qua gratia et non necessaria."

⁹⁴ *In III Sent., Dist. XL, Dubium III*: Quaracchi III, 893 ff.; *idem, In IV Sent., Dist. I, Pars I, Art. Unicus, Qu. 4*: Quaracchi IV, 19 ff.; Assisi MS 186, as cited by F. Henquinet, "De Causalitate Sacramentorum juxta Codicem Autographum S. Bonaventurae," *Antonianum*, 8 (1933), 384 ff.; Henquinet, "Un brouillon autographe de S. Bonaventure sur le *Commentaire des Sentences*," *Études Franciscaines*, 44 (1932), 633-635.

⁹⁵ See *supra*, note 67.

material has a supernatural power to produce grace. It is quite clear that this type of efficacy is identical with the instrumental physical causality of the Thomists.⁹⁶

The sacrament is furthermore an efficient cause of the character or what William calls the adornment of the soul. If this cause is placed in opposition to the above-mentioned cause, it is because he wants to drive home the point that the sacrament is a true and physical cause. This character or adornment of the soul he does not propose as a disposition for the reception of grace, since grace does not demand such a disposition.⁹⁷

Not only is a sacrament an efficient cause, but it is also a disposing cause. What does William mean by this term, *causa disponens*? As employed by him in this connection it does not mean a disposition for the production of grace, but for the greater or lesser efficacy of the sacramental grace already produced in the soul. The question might be raised, What does the sacrament do in this case? It weakens the irksome fomentation of concupiscence and simultaneously strengthens the faculties of the soul. In doing so it removes the greatest hindrance to the workings of grace; it does not remove the impediment to the very existence of divine grace, but rather to its greater operation. It is clear that the sacrament efficiently causes a real disposition for the better operation of grace, and in this sense it constitutes a real cause which disposes for the efficacy of grace.⁹⁸

St. Bonaventure

So many conflicting conclusions about St. Bonaventure's doctrine on sacramental causality have been reached by innumerable scholars over the centuries that it is a formidable task determining his opinion accurately. When Bonaventure began his lengthy discussion of the question he was already aware of the systems of Hugh of St. Victor and William of Melitona. In spite of his great respect for Hugh, the Seraphic Doctor rejects summarily his theory, calling it erroneous. Grace is not contained in the sacrament in the same manner as water

⁹⁶ *Quaestiones de Sacramentis*, as cited by Lynch, "Texts Illustrating the Causality of the Sacraments from William of Melitona, Assisi Bibl. Comm. 182, and Brussels Bibl. Royale 1542," *Fran. Stud.*, 17 (June-Sept. 1957), 253 f.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 255 f.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 257, 260, 263.

might be found in a vessel or medicine in a bottle. On the contrary, the traditional expressions, namely, *continere gratiam*, and *vasa gratiae* ought to be explained in the sense of grace and cause of grace. There is reason enough however why the sacrament can be designated as a *vas gratiae*, or *continere gratiam*, and that is that the sacrament is not the fountain or source of grace, any more than the vessel is the fount or the source of water.⁹⁹

Like Melitona before him, Bonaventure regards the efficacy of the sacraments in the same threefold manner. The sacrament is first of all a *causa sine qua non* of sacramental grace. It is also an efficient cause of the character or the adornment of the soul. And it is finally a dispositive cause not toward the production of grace, but rather for the greater or lesser efficacy of the sacramental grace already produced. Manifesting an ambivalence in this vexing question, Bonaventure concludes that a sacrament cannot be all these things, unless it is also endowed with a supernatural, created power, an absolute quality, which is a physical, not just an intentional entity, added to the sacramental sign but distinct from the uncreated power or divine action that accompanies every sacrament. Because this theory, he concludes, is encumbered with some mysterious created power and quite complicated, it must be regarded as less probable. He cannot for the life of him understand how this absolute quality is given. It is even more difficult to comprehend when it is conferred. It is just as difficult to understand to which component of the sacrament it is granted, whether to the words or to the element, which do not combine to form a physical unity. It is no less difficult to determine how long it lasts.¹⁰⁰

In creating his theory of the *ordinatio efficax* in regard to sacramental causality, Bonaventure reaches the heights of his genius. From what was said above, it is quite clear that for Bonaventure the sacraments do not produce grace physically, neither as a *causa sine qua non*, nor as an efficient cause, nor as a dispositive cause. What he means to affirm is that the power or force by which they are said to confer grace is not an absolute quality or even a physical entity super-

⁹⁹ Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.*, *Dist. I*, *Pars I*, *Art. Unicus*, *Qu. 3*: Quaracchi IV, 16 a.

¹⁰⁰ *In III Sent.*, *Dist. XL*, *Dubium III*: Quaracchi III, 894 ff. See *In IV Sent.*, *Dist. I*, *Pars I*, *Art. Unicus*, *Qu. 4*: Quaracchi IV, 24 a.

added to the sacramental sign. It is not *aliquid*, he continues, but rather *ad aliquid*, which makes it a relation of the intentional order, by virtue of which the sacramental sign is efficaciously directed or destined toward the production of grace. As the human act of reproduction is efficiently directed to the infusion of the spiritual soul, even so is the sacrament efficiently ordained toward the infusion of grace, which God alone produces.¹⁰¹

Between the two members of the comparison established above there is a single difference. Regarding the act of reproduction the *ordinatio efficax* stems from creation, due to the nature of the act itself. In regard to the sacrament it does not follow the intrinsic nature of the sensible action, but rather is due to the divine pact. Whatever the origin of this foundation, whether natural or positive, the *ordinatio efficax* in itself is rightly called a power with respect to the effect toward which it is ordained. The sacrament does not cause the grace effectively or physically; it is simply a relation, a reality of the intentional order: which requires, demands the infusion of grace and as such it is a cause of grace. It is God, then, who as efficient cause, meets the requirements of the sacrament: assisting it with His divine action He produces grace in the soul. If this system is acceptable to the Seraphic Doctor, it is because it affords a simple and clear explanation of such a thorny problem, and better than any other conforms to the principles of both faith and reason.¹⁰²

Many modern theological manuals used in the seminaries identify the theory of Bonaventure with improper causality.¹⁰³ By this they mean that in his system the sacrament is either a *conditio sine qua non* or a moral cause of grace. In regard to the first it can be said that such a condition is never ordained toward an effect. This can be illustrated by an example. In the Church the male sex is such a condition for the reception of holy orders. From this it does not follow necessarily that the male sex is by divine law efficaciously ordained to the reception of the sacrament.

Regarding the second allegation, the *ordinatio efficax* of Bona-

¹⁰¹ *In IV Sent., Dist. I, Pars I, Art. Unicus, Qu. 4*: Quaracchi IV, 23 f.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 24 a.

¹⁰³ Cf. A. Tanquerey, *Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae* (24 ed.; Paris: Desclée, 1938), III, 264; J. M. Hervé, *Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae* (7 ed.; Paris: Berche-Pagis, 1935), III, 447.

venture does not by any stretch of the imagination merit the title of moral causality. In view of the fact that this type of causality is not a physical entity, it can be designated as pertaining to the intentional or moral order. But this does not mean that it is a moral cause. When applied to the efficiency of the sacraments, the technical term, moral cause, implies that each sacrament, inasmuch as it is endowed with an intrinsic value as the vicarious action of Christ, moves God to produce grace. This finds illustration in a check which on presentation at the bank moves the teller to supply the money specified. You will find but a single instance of this idea in Bonaventure. It is found in the comparison between the sacrament and the bond signed by a king. But what must be underscored is the fact that Bonaventure asserts that the bond does not derive its efficacy from its constituted value but exclusively from the efficient ordination received from the king.¹⁰⁴

The conclusion, that in the system of Bonaventure there already exist presages of a theory known today as intentional causality championed by the Jesuit writer, L. Billot, has won the approval of scholars. Such a proposition is corroborated by the eminent Franciscan, Henquinet, who in his searching study of this question on the basis of a manuscript discovered not too many years ago, asserts that such an interpretation is fully confirmed by the autograph in question. He believes that such a position is further strengthened by another text in which Bonaventure mentions intentional causality by name in the phrase, *secundum intentionem*.¹⁰⁵ In Bonaventure intentional causality is certainly less developed. Compared with that of Billot it is implicit. While Billot endows the sacraments with the capacity to produce in the soul a real title, an exigency which enjoys the role of a disposition to the infusion of grace by God, Bonaventure on the other hand merely claims that they are efficiently ordained in such a manner that God must meet the requirement and confer grace.

Richard of Middleton († ca. 1308)

An analysis of the hypothesis on sacramental causality espoused by another Franciscan, Richard of Middleton,¹⁰⁶ reveals that the problem

¹⁰⁴ *In IV Sent., Dist. I, Pars I, Art. Unicus, Qu. 4*: Quaracchi IV, 23 f.

¹⁰⁵ "De Causalitate Sacramentorum juxta Codicem Autographum S. Bonaventurae," *op. cit.*, 405.

¹⁰⁶ On the life and works of Richard of Middleton, see F. Hocedez, *Richard*

had made appreciable progress. Faithful to the position of the Seraphic Doctor, but without his ambivalent attitudes toward some of the other opinions, Richard, in his discourse, portrays his theory in the following manner.

He presents only two opinions. In regard to the first, which he considers both reasonable and tenable, the sacraments act, not as a principal, but rather as an instrumental cause of grace. This agent does not attain grace itself, but merely some disposition for the reception of grace. Inasmuch as it is the instrument of divine mercy, it is endowed with a spiritual power, by means of which it attains the soul itself, to cause in it the above-mentioned disposition. That this is quite possible becomes evident from a few examples, he adds. One example is the corporeal fire in hell which, since it is the instrument of divine justice, has the capacity to act on the soul, which it would not possess otherwise.¹⁰⁷

If he prefers the second opinion, it is because it strikes him as the more intelligible of the two. This theory rejects the proposition that the sacraments are efficient causes of grace, or that they effect some disposition in the soul. The sacraments on the contrary produce grace, because by divine institution they always confer it upon those who receive them worthily. Only in this wise can they be said to confer grace, since they are always assured of divine concomitance which confers the grace.¹⁰⁸

The arguments he employs against the other side are quite interesting. If the sacraments as instruments produce grace or the disposition to it, some power would be present within them, which would be either corporeal or spiritual. Now it cannot be corporeal, because such a force cannot be the proximate principle of acting upon the soul. Neither can it be spiritual, since such a power is not immediately in a corporeal subject. There is no power in the sacraments, therefore,

de Middleton (*"Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Études et Documents,"* 7; Louvain: Spicilegium Sac. Lovan., 1925), 63-119; cf. W. Lampen, "De Richardo de Memiavilla O.F.M., Socio S. Ludovici Tolosani," *Archiv. Fran. Hist.*, 23 (1930), 246 ff.

¹⁰⁷ In *IV Sententiarum*, Dist. I, Art. IV, Qu. 2; as cited by Lampen, *De Causalitate Sacramentorum juxta Scholam Franciscanam* ("Florilegium Patristicum," 26; Bonn: Hanstein, 1931), 34.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 34 f.

by means of which they could even as instruments produce grace or, within the soul, the disposition, to it.¹⁰⁹

Furthermore, if the sacraments could produce in the soul some disposition, he continues, they would do so either by creating or by educating it from the potency of the soul. But a creature cannot create, either as a principal or instrumental agent. The second possibility must also be excluded, because in baptism there is no disposition in the soul for the reception of grace except the character, which however is not evoked from the power of the soul, but created. This is why it is said to be impressed upon the soul.¹¹⁰

Another argument against such a dispositive causality is found in transubstantiation. There is no probability, he says, that here the words of consecration yield a disposition in the bread for the transubstantiation. No such disposition in the bread is necessary. The sacraments, therefore, in much the same fashion, since their essence consists in use, produce no disposition in the soul.¹¹¹

In a certain sense, however, the sacraments can be said to contain and confer grace. They contain grace in so far as the conferment of grace is concomitant with their reception in the very instant of their completion; unless there were some obstacles on the part of the recipient. If the sacraments confer grace, *ex vi sacramenti*, it is not because they are endowed with a certain power, which resides in them, but rather because, when they are received, the divine power by immutable arrangement assists in the soul of a worthy recipient, producing the grace signified.¹¹²

William of Ware († ca. 1308)

In a thorough study of the question, William of Ware,¹¹³ traditionally regarded as the teacher of Duns Scotus, reduces the number of theories to the two more common at the time. The first one affirms that the sacraments do not possess intrinsically any absolute power

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 35.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² *Ibid.* Cf. Hocedez, *op. cit.*, 313.

¹¹³ On the life and works of William of Ware see E. Longpré, "Maîtres franciscains de Paris: Guillaume de Ware O.F.M.," *La France Franciscaine*, 5 (1922), 71-82. Cf. C. Balić, *Les commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des sentences* (Louvain: Bureau de la Revue, 1927), 59, note 5.

to effect anything in the soul. The second holds that the relationship between the sacraments and grace is such that the sacraments induce grace because they dispose to it. It is this position he prefers. Three considerations led him to the conclusion that the sacraments are dispositive causes of grace: its possibility, fitness and actuality.¹¹⁴

Its possibility is apparent from the argument he draws from the capacity of hell-fire to torment souls. Great authorities, which he does not name, claim that hell-fire can effect in the souls of the damned a certain absolute disposition. How a corporeal entity can produce such a disposition has always been a great problem. The difficulty is pretty much the same with respect to the efficacy of the sacraments in the production of grace, a spiritual entity. But since certain great theologians claim that it is possible for hell-fire to achieve such an effect, the same possibility must be attributed to the sacraments.¹¹⁵

The fitness of the theory becomes evident when we consider, he adds, that the Christian sacraments are superior to those of the Old Law, in that they not only signify, but also are said to possess some efficacy. More noble than those of the Old Law, the Christian sacraments are endowed with the capacity to achieve a spiritual effect. In view of this it must be said that such is the case: the sacraments induce grace because they dispose to it, but they do not cause it in the soul.¹¹⁶

Against such a position you can direct two arguments, to which Ware gives these answers. Such a disposition would be either capable of being created, or educible from the power of the soul. This is quite impossible, since in the first place no creature can create. And in regards to the second, it is also impossible, because a natural active power corresponds to every natural passive potency. A natural agent then could set this power in operation, which is impossible. In answer, which further elucidates his system, William asserts that it is neither created nor educed, but rather induced in the soul. An example of such action is found in light which is induced in the medium, not educed from the power of the medium, but which is not created, although it did not spring from something materially. You can say

¹¹⁴ *In IV Sententiarum, Dist. I*, as cited by Lampen, *De Causalitate Sacramentorum juxta Scholam Franciscanam*, 40.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 42.

that it is from something originally. This is what is meant in the conclusion of William, that the disposition stems from such a power originally.¹¹⁷ From these considerations it is quite clear that William perceives in the sacraments a dispositive causality.

John Duns Scotus

Whatever else might be said about the system of Duns Scotus¹¹⁸ regarding sacramental efficacy, and too much has already been written by men who display very little sympathy for, and still less understanding of, the Subtle Doctor, it can be affirmed that he certainly does not espouse physical or occasional causality of the sacraments. His penetrating discussion of the vexing question is an exhaustive one.

If Scotus rejects outright physical causality (without employing the term), he does so for good reasons. To the question, whether the sacraments are endowed with a supernatural power, he gives a negative answer. If there is present in the sacraments, he asserts, some supernatural force, then this power must be present either entire in the whole (*tota in toto*), and entire in every part; or entire in the whole, and as a part in every part. But this is impossible, for only the soul informs the body in such fashion, and such a power would be extensive by accident, a characteristic that would be contrary to the nature of the spiritual power.¹¹⁹

With an irony that is at once subtle and disconcerting, Scotus employs another argument which has reference to the formula found in sacraments, which consists of many words in not a few cases. This above-mentioned power is found to be either the same in each syllable, or different in each syllable. Since it is by itself simple, it would in the first case migrate from syllable to syllable and there remain, even after its subject (each enunciated syllable) ceases to exist. In the second case, since the sacrament does not possess just one power, each syllable causes grace (or adornment) or it does not. That this power should be an aggregate of many powers is quite improbable, since in spiritual things such a power is irreconcilable. Finally no one could

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 39, 42.

¹¹⁸ See Tanqueray, *op. cit.*, 264; and P. Pourrat, *Theology of the Sacraments*, trans. from 3rd French ed. (St. Louis: Herder, 1930), 167 f.

¹¹⁹ *In IV Sent., Dist. I, Qu. 5*; *Vivès XVI, 158 a.*

say which one of these forces, included in the conglomeration, would be the principle causing this supernatural form in the soul. With a deft cut of what might be termed Occam's razor, he destroys the foundation for postulating such a plurality without sufficient necessity, inasmuch as neither reason nor faith demands it.¹²⁰

With equal cogency Scotus attacks the opinion which maintains that in the sacraments there is produced some physical disposition or adornment which would require the infusion of grace. Such a disposition, to begin with, he says, is useless, since grace is created in the soul by God, which even those who hold this tenet must admit. In creation no disposition is required, because it presupposes nothing—creation being the production of an object from nothing, *ex nihilo sui et subjecti*. In the Eucharist, moreover, transubstantiation takes place by reason of divine power alone. But neither the bread nor the words of consecration can produce some sort of disposition as a prelude to transubstantiation, he continues. Just where would this disposition be produced? Certainly neither in the bread and wine, nor in the Body of Christ; not in the Body of Christ, since there would at the outset be no disposition for the effecting of the Real Presence; but neither in the bread and the wine, since the disposition would necessitate transubstantiation, and so simultaneously there would be, and there would not be, transubstantiation; an obvious contradiction.¹²¹

After such a preliminary discussion of the positions of those who champion physical causality under all its aspects, Scotus gives us the salient features of his own theory. In view of what he had already affirmed, Scotus carefully unfolds his system in which the sacraments are real efficacious causes of grace, and not merely by accident. His response to the query is composed of two parts. In part one he says that every disposition necessary for some form can in a certain fashion be called an active cause, or an instrumental cause with respect to that form. Now the sacrament or its reception is such an immediate disposition, without causing any medium between it and grace. It can therefore be designated in a certain way the active or instrumental cause with respect to grace.¹²² This means that it is in a

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 158 f.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 146.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 167 a.

certain manner an active cause, in that it demands not physically but some other way the form. Applied to the sacrament, such a disposition is the reception of the sacrament relative to that form which is grace. Not that the sacrament creates within the soul some physical disposition to grace, but rather that it constrains God to produce grace there. Only from this viewpoint can the sacraments be labelled as dispositions requiring the form: and that is why they are active and instrumental causes of grace itself.

Corroboration for this Scotus manifests in two examples. It is absolutely conceded, he claims, that our merits are the instrumental cause with respect to the reward, and that through our merits this premium is acquired. And yet merit does not actively cause reward in itself, nor some mediate disposition; it alone is the antecedent disposition to the premium, and not as a reason of the receptor. In much the same fashion the reception of a sacrament, because it is a sufficient disposition for the production of grace, can be called the efficient cause of this grace, even as merit is the efficient cause of the reward.¹²³

The concept of motion is his other example. In a certain way, he continues, motion plays the role of a cause with respect to the terminus. It is truly and properly conceded that through motion the terminus is reached, and yet motion does not possess any action toward the causing of the terminus, or any intermediary disposition. It is itself the proximate disposition for the terminus, and not the reason of the receptor. Motion indeed does not produce anything by its own activity because it is merely a succession of one part after another in space and time. If it therefore effects anything, it does so intentionally, not physically. Yet it is called the cause of the terminus. Here is an argument for Scotus' position on the causality of the sacraments.¹²⁴

He furthermore offers another reason for his conclusion. It is based upon the philosophical principle that when something is the cause of a medium for the production of a third thing, both are said to be the cause of the effect. Any agent that causes the proximate disposition toward some form can be said to be in a certain sense the cause with respect to that form. This disposition is then placed in

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 167 b.

the genus of efficient cause relative to the form. In much the same way the reception of a sacrament is the disposition requiring the form, not by reason of some intrinsic form or antecedent adornment, but rather through the assistance of God, who is obliged to produce grace, not absolutely, but by ordinary necessity, since He obliged Himself to do so and He cannot change His designs and judgments. God universally so disposed things, and of this He assured the Church, that He Himself will confer the effect signified upon the recipient of that sacrament. The sacrament can therefore be called an instrument, although it does not possess any active power properly speaking with respect to the terminus, and it is a certain antecedent effect designed for grace: as the motion applied to the saw is the proximate disposition toward the effect of cutting wood, even so the application of the sacrament is the proximate disposition toward the conferring of grace.¹²⁵

In the second part of his exposé, Scotus gives his explanation of the term, power (*virtus*) as used in regard to the sacraments. Because of the altercation among great authorities as to the precise meaning of the term, *virtus*, it can be said that it is in one sense the ultimate stemming from potency. The ultimate of the power of a practical sign is that it signifies efficaciously, antecedently, and infallibly. No practical sign has greater power. But such power can be conceded the sacrament, yet it is not for that reason an absolute form, but merely a relation of conformity between the sign and that which is signified. What precisely is that ultimate beyond which the power of the sacrament cannot extend? Since the sacraments are practical signs of grace, the ultimate in their power is efficaciously, infallibly, and by a priority of nature, to signify grace, as its *signatum*. It is this power that the saints speak of, since the sacraments not in themselves, but by divine institution, are endowed with this power efficaciously to signify grace. But this power is not to be considered an absolute form: it is a relation of conformity between the sign and the *signatum*. This means that the grace which the sacrament signifies is truly and infallibly produced in the soul, provided there is no hindrance.¹²⁶

The position of Scotus becomes clearer in his rebuttal of the objection that the sacraments must be causes *per se*, and not *per accidens*.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 167 f.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 187 f.

If they by their own operation produce nothing physical in the soul, they are not such causes *per se*, but only *per accidens*. Without equivocation Scotus answers that a sacrament is not a mere cause *per accidens*. Even in the other opinion the sacrament is not a cause *per se* of grace, but only by an antecedent disposition. By way of conclusion he adds that if the saints and the great doctors call this external sign the cause of grace, they do so not because they distinguish an ablution in baptism according to its nature, or because they ascribe a greater power to it, than to any other ablution, but rather because they consider baptism according as it by divine institution possesses an ordination to grace. That is why they so define it and assign such differences.¹²⁷

In view of such considerations it can be affirmed, by way of conclusion, that Scotus held what in modern theological literature is known as moral causality, a theory that plays a very important role in modern sacramental theology.

CHAPTER FOUR

MATERIAL AND FORMAL CAUSE OF SACRAMENTS

A Brief History of Doctrine on Matter and Form

A thorough historical research of the theory of the composition of the sacraments is a highly complicated task, but the salient features of this history can here be set down. The introduction of the terms form (*forma*) and matter (*materia*) into sacramental theology is altogether independent of the Aristotelian hylemorphic theory, which in every material substance distinguishes two correlative principles, a matter called the determinable element, and the form which is the determining element or component. In the early scholastic period the terms form and matter were introduced into theology as designations for some parts of the sacramental sign, form for the rites and

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 188 a. See L. Tatara, "Doctrina Joannis Duns Scoti de Causalitate Sacramentorum," *Collectanea Franciscana Slavica*, 1 (1937), 336-359; A. O'Neill, "La causalité sacramentelle d'après le Docteur Subtil," *Études Franciscaines*, 30 (1913), 141 ff.

the words, and matter for the element itself. Each entered into theology by a different route, at a different moment, and nowhere do they appear together, as is the case today. At that time the two terms have no Aristotelian connotation, not even in the analogical sense. Only one (form) found a niche in the structure of such terminology.¹²⁸

Early Beginnings

By and large, general statements, in about the year 1140, regarding the composition of the sacraments appear almost simultaneously with the widespread theological efforts at creating an adequate definition of a sacrament in the strict sense. Two formulas emerge: the first, strictly theological in origin, proclaims that the sacraments consist of an element (*elementum*) or thing (*res*) and a word (*verbum*). The second, with its liturgical stamp, insists that it consists of things (*res*), actions (*facta*), and words (*dicta, verba*).¹²⁹

The first formula is the result of the scholastic analysis of the sacrament of baptism; the second reflects the classification of the sacraments understood in the larger sense, the *sacramenta minora*. In their assessment of baptism some scholastics, quite in accord with the contemporary notions of a sacrament, saw its essence in the corporeal thing (*res corporalis*), that is, in the water which is sanctified by the invocation of the Trinity. This opinion was corroborated by the words of St. Augustine: "Without the word what is water but water? But add the word to the element, and a sacrament results."¹³⁰

This Augustinian text, which was to play an important role in the problem of the composition of the sacraments, was variously employed at this time. The first theologian to use the text to establish the components of baptism or any other sacrament was Gregory of Bergamo. Although he applies the formula to both baptism and the Eucharist he is not aware of the interpretation which will soon prevail in the schools. Contemporaneously there is a tendency to transform the

¹²⁸ Van den Eynde, "The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments in Early Scholasticism," *Fran. Stud.*, 11 (1951), 20. This excellent study is the basis for the conclusions found in our article.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹³⁰ St. Augustine, *In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus*, LXXX, iii: Migne PL 35. 1840. See Van den Eynde, "The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments in Early Scholasticism," *op. cit.*, 4.

words of Augustine into a real principle which would be valid for all Christian sacraments. Evidence of this trend is disclosed in the words of Hugh of Amiens, a contemporary of Gregory, who claims that water, oil, balm become sacraments through the unction of the divinely inspired words.¹³¹

In his discussion of the sacraments in the broad sense, Hugh of St. Victor more orientated liturgically than his immediate predecessors, presents the second formula. He asserts that the sacraments in the broad sense consist of things, actions, and words. Later his efforts to apply this classification to the Christian sacraments will find imitators in future disciples.¹³²

It can no longer be maintained that Peter Lombard was the first theologian to introduce the theory that the sacraments are composed of two parts, the *elementum* and the *verbum*. That distinction belongs to Geroch, famous provost of Reichsberg, who in a work of 1135 asserted that all sacraments consist of two essential and constitutive components. His action, a precipitate one, would result in serious complications. Ignorant of the precise number of sacraments, he could hardly be expected to possess an adequate knowledge of their nature. The term, *elementum*, in the theory of Geroch, means only a physical substance, such as bread and wine. Unwittingly Geroch was responsible for belittling the ritual actions, which in most sacraments are essential, and for excluding from the number of the real sacraments such rites as are performed without such an element or matter.¹³³

Not long after there appeared the anonymous *Summa Sententiarum*, in which is found the theory that in every sacrament there are three kinds of components. The author copies every word from the text of Hugh of St. Victor, but he improves on his model by suppressing the disjunctive form, and by stressing the three components.¹³⁴

The role played by Peter Lombard was a modest one. In asserting that the sacraments consist of two elements, words and things, Peter Lombard shows his dependence on Geroch. This formula, he was

¹³¹ Van den Eynde, "The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments," *op. cit.*, 5.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 6.

¹³³ Geroch, *Tractatus adversus Simoniacos*, XVI: Migne PL 194, 1350 f.

¹³⁴ Van den Eynde, "The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments in Early Scholasticism," *op. cit.*, 9 f.

convinced, lent itself very conveniently to the solution of the vexing problem, the essential constitution of the sacraments. In adopting this theory Lombard was constrained to accept its inherent defects. His contribution is hardly as great as that of Geroch. He knew the exact number of the sacraments and could have corrected the formula in order to make it fit all of them. But he instead accepted it without any correction. This is further proof that Lombard was not so much an original thinker as a compiler.¹³⁵

The Terms: Matter and Form

In regard to the term *forma*, sacramental theology since the second quarter of the twelfth century, has added to the original meaning of form, two new ones, those of rite and formula. The word *forma* means in the first place the external sensible aspect of the sacrament in opposition to its invisible internal reality, called *res*, *virtus*, *efficacia*. In this sense *forma* and *res* are correlative terms, even as their synonyms, *signum* and *signatum*. Extremely popular in the eleventh and twelfth centuries such usage was inspired and employed by the Fathers of the Church.¹³⁶

In the second quarter of the twelfth century, the term acquires new meanings which connect it directly with the ritual actions. It becomes, in some cases, the usual name for the sacramental words. In other instances, it designates not only words, but the complex totality of the ceremonies, which constitute the conferment of a sacrament. Sometimes, but only rarely, the word refers to one particular ceremony or liturgical custom.¹³⁷

Unlike the word form, the term *materia* is during this period very seldom employed in conjunction with the components of the sacraments. In sacramental theology it means the material substance or the stuff from which things are made. The first definite use of the term to express the element of the sacrament is found in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. This term, once introduced, enjoyed immediate success. But at this time it has not yet become the technical term for one of the components of the sacraments. The almost casual usages of the term, in reference to both baptism and the Eucharist, imply the

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 12 ff.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 15 f.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 17.

sense of material element or substance, which would make it a synonym for *elementum*.¹³⁸

Juxtaposition of Terms: Matter and Form

After the death of Peter Lombard, considerable progress was made in the use of the terms *materia* and *forma*, to designate the constitutive elements of the sacraments. The first joint employment of *materia* and *forma* occurs in a work by Eckbert of Schoenau, which was written between 1159–1166. It must have been in use already then, since he introduces it almost casually. But its employment spreads rapidly, so that by the end of the century it is already more common than the synonymous *res* and *verbum*.¹³⁹

In spite of the decided preferences of the theologians for the coupled use of *materia* and *forma*, the terms had not received the Aristotelian meaning identified with them in later theology. They never, up to the time of William of Auxerre, indicate the components of the sacraments as determinable and determinative elements. Synonymous with *res* or *elementum*, the word *materia* always means a physical thing, as water, oil, etc. The word *forma* has but one meaning, that of formula. It would be a mistake to translate the terms *materia* and *forma*, as used in this era, as matter and form. The English equivalents are physical element and formula.¹⁴⁰

The key to the solution rests in the Latin translation of the works of Aristotle. According to Aristotle the terms matter and form stand in strict correlation—the first designates the undetermined element; and the other, the determining principle of the corporeal substance. In the twelfth century the theologians abundantly use Aristotelian hylemorphism even in sacramental matters. "Accustomed to use the Aristotelian formula, they would be inclined to couple the same terms whenever an occasion should arise, even in other contexts and in a different meaning. Such was the case after theology had started to employ the originally independent words *materia* and *forma* as synonyms, among many others, of *res* and *verbum*. In imitation and

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 19 f.

¹³⁹ Eckbert of Schoenau, *Sermones contra Catharos*, VII, iv: Migne Pl. 195, 53 A. See Van den Eynde, "The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments," *op. cit.*, 138 ff.

¹⁴⁰ Van den Eynde, "The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments," *op. cit.*, 142 f.

under the influence of the well-established and much employed Aristotelian expression, it was but natural, and we may say nearly fatal, that among all the different denominations for the two components of the sacrament, they selected *materia* and *forma* in preference to all others."¹⁴¹

With the adoption in about 1230 of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard as the official text by the theological faculty at Paris, theologians became avidly engaged in scrutinizing the terminology and the doctrine allied with the composition of the sacraments. By and large, theology tends to consider all sacraments as compounded in one way or another of two sensible realities. But theologians are sharply divided into two groups. The first group, whose champion and guiding genius was the great Franciscan master, Alexander of Hales, accepted the theory of the bipartite composition of the sacraments in a very broad and analogical sense only, which is open to exceptions. The second, under the leadership of the Dominican master Hugh of St. Cher, attached to it a strictly universal value and assimilated it to the Aristotelian hylemorphic theory.¹⁴²

Hugh of St. Cher (†1263)

The true creator of the theory which envisages in every sacrament a hylemorphic composition is the second Dominican master at Paris, Hugh of St. Cher. It was he who established the mutual relationship between *materia* and *verba* (*forma verborum*) as one of matter and form. Unlike Alexander he defends the thesis of the bipartite and hylemorphic constitution of every sacrament without exception. In fact he even makes the very notion of sacrament dependent upon it. For all its imperfections the solution of Hugh of St. Cher will finally prevail not only in theology but also in the official teaching of the *magisterium* of the Church.¹⁴³

The solution of Hugh of St. Cher was able to achieve final success chiefly for two reasons. In the first place, it embraced the more common doctrine that most, if not all of the sacraments, are confected

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 143.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, *Fran. Stud.*, 12 (1952), 1 f.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 12 ff. On life and works of Hugh of St. Cher, see E. Mangenot, "Hugues de Saint-Cher," *Dict. théol. cath.*, 7 (1927), 221-239. See Lynch, "Some *Fontes* of the Commentary of Hugh of St. Cher: William of Auxerre, Guy d'Archelles, Alexander of Hales," *Fran. Stud.*, 13 (1953), 119-147, *passim*.

either by a real *res* (*materia*) and *verba* (*forma verborum*), or at least by some equivalents, and that of both parts the words are the more important. This fact was recognized by Alexander too. Hugh's application, finally, of the Aristotelian hylemorphic theory to the composition of the sacraments freed the problem from the narrow confines in which it had been restrained. It is Hugh, therefore, who is responsible for transforming the bipartite composition of the sacraments into a hylemorphic one. He identified the formula with the Aristotelian form, the determining factor, and the *materia* with matter or the determinable component. The sacramental constituents which had hitherto been only considered as real or equivalent physical elements and formulas, could henceforth also be designated as matter and form.

In spite of its advantages, the doctrine of Hugh of St. Cher rendered the Latin terms *materia* and *forma*, as applied to the sacraments, very ambiguous. Sacramental theology will henceforth employ these words to designate variously the physical elements and formulas which are used in some sacraments as baptism; the sensible realities which in others, as matrimony, supplant the physical element and the formula; and finally the determinable and the determining elements, the constituents of every sacrament. "It would have been better if theology, in speaking of the determinable and determining parts of a sacrament, had fixed its choice upon the terms *materiale* and *formale*, which Hugh of St. Cher uses occasionally as alternatives for *materia* and *forma*."¹⁴⁴

Alexander of Hales

While mainly traditional the teaching of Alexander of Hales on the composition of the sacraments is so superior to that of his predecessors and contemporaries as rightly to be considered as the first conscious attempt to clarify the general confusion in the field. Although he adopts the Lombardian formula of the *res* and *verba*, he manifests a preference for the more recent terms *materia* and *forma* (*verborum*), which he uses freely, now separately, now in close association, especially in regard to baptism and the Eucharist.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ Van den Eynde, "The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments," *op. cit.*, 22.

¹⁴⁵ *Glossa in IV Sententiarum*, as cited by Van den Eynde, "The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments in Early Scholasticism," *op. cit.*, 3.

For Alexander the terms *materia* and *forma* and their synonyms convey the strictly traditional meaning of physical element and formula. He does not yet speak of the *materia* and *forma* of the sacraments as their determinable and determining elements. To his way of thinking *materia* and *res* are generic terms used to designate such realities as water, chrism, etc.; or the instruments used at ordinations, to the exclusion of the *opera* or ritual actions performed with or without *materia*, such as imposition of hands. *Forma*, as corresponding to *materia sacramenti*, never receives in his vocabulary a meaning other than *forma verborum*, or the formula.¹⁴⁶

Evidently Alexander, while granting to most sacraments a *materia* and *forma*, that is, a physical element and a formula, attaches no absolute value to Lombard's general statement. This is apparent when he states that penance and matrimony are devoid of matter. With reference to the other five sacraments, he is not unreservedly convinced that each of them is essentially performed through the application of *materia* and *forma*.¹⁴⁷

It might be asked: Which sacraments, according to Hales, perfectly conform to the pattern created by Lombard? Only Baptism and the Eucharist fall perfectly into this pattern. Here the essence of the sacrament (better, the sacramental sign) consists of a *materia* (water and the species), sanctified through a fixed formula. In confirmation and extreme unction, the words very likely do not belong to the substance of the sacrament, simply because in their proper form they were not instituted by Christ or the Apostles, but by the Church. Confirmation therefore, in his opinion, consists of the *materia* or chrism only, while extreme unction, in the rite performed with the proper *materia*. The substance of the sacrament of holy orders, at least in the diaconate and the priesthood, is the laying on of the Bishop's hands. This means that neither the *materia* nor the *forma* are essential in the rite of ordinations of deacons and priests. They are simply sacramentals.¹⁴⁸

In the aggregate, the contribution of Hales to the problem is one of great proportions. On sacramental questions he was quite in advance of his times: he not only provided a much clearer and ampler

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 4 ff.

précis of sacramental theology;—he also positively enriched the traditional doctrine with fresh contributions.

His first contribution consisted in his promotion of the cause of all seven sacraments, in that he proclaimed all of them true signs and causes of grace. Whether they are performed in *materia* and *forma*, as baptism and the Eucharist, or in *materia* only, as confirmation, or in a rite in *debita materia*, as extreme unction, or in a rite alone, as holy orders, or by actions without *materia*, as penance and matrimony, if they verify the notion of sign and cause of grace, they are without exception perfectly equivalent sacraments. Of secondary importance to him is the composition in *res* and *verba* of the sacramental sign.¹⁴⁹

Less spectacular, though hardly less important, is his other contribution. He is the first scholastic who maintained that both penance and matrimony, while differing greatly in structure from all the other sacraments, are possessed of a real efficacy with respect to grace. "Though excessive in several respects," says Fr. Damian Van den Eynde, "this attitude was nevertheless instrumental in disconnecting the problem of the notion of the sacrament from that of its composition. It constituted also a healthy reaction against the tendency to cast all sacraments, with regard to their external structure, in the same mold and to reduce them at all costs to one single type. Actually it is at the origin of the theological current which throughout the centuries has always muffled attempts at oversimplifying the problem of the composition of the sacraments."¹⁵⁰

Definitely far more important is his other contribution—his appraisal of the notion of the substance of the sacraments. The formula, or the *forma verborum*, which comes directly from the Church, does not, Alexander maintains, belong to the substance of the sacrament. This will doubtless explain his hesitation at admitting the existence of two sensible constituents in the three sacraments, confirmation, extreme unction and holy orders. His position is not, however, an absolute one. His refusal extends only to the *forma* inasmuch as it has been concretely fixed by the Church, which does not belong to the substance or the *esse sacramenti*, but rather to its *bene esse*. Generally speaking, the form, he is quick to admit, might belong to the sub-

¹⁴⁹ Van den Eynde, *ibid.*, 6 ff.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 7 f.

stance.^{150a} Such an approach envisages the much later theological doctrine that the substance of the sacrament cannot include any specifications which originate from the Church. It also throws into sharper relief the possibility of admitting that the *forma* is an essential component, without including its concrete expression within the sacramental substance. Later St. Bonaventure will admit as much, when he refutes Alexander's opinion.¹⁵¹

Perhaps no other contribution manifests his originality as his ingenious treatment of the difference of the matter in the sacraments. He was the first to discuss it. In the opinion of Alexander neither matrimony nor penance has a true *materia*. The answer to this must be sought in their institution and nature. These two were alone instituted in paradise, when man was not through sin subject to sensible things. Their external sign stems from an internal affection. In matrimony the external words express the internal consent; and in penance the external manifestations of sorrow, especially in confession, express the internal attitude of the contrite soul. That explains why these sacraments are performed without an external sensible *materia*. They possess a quality proper to themselves, in that they alone are confected, matrimony entirely and penance partially, by the persons who receive them. Their *materia* derives from the acts of the subjects.¹⁵²

Alexander's original discussion of the *materia* in these two sacraments shows incontrovertibly that the theology of his day was inclined to broaden the traditional meaning of the word and to apply it to real or possible equivalents of the physical element, such as persons, ceremonies, consent. "Even in the supposition that he did not yet oppose it to a *forma verborum*, his particular view on the constitution of these two sacraments, has deeply impressed subsequent theology." . . .¹⁵³

In conclusion, Alexander's opinions on the composition of the

^{150a} *Ibid.*, 5 note 21.

¹⁵¹ Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.*, Dist. IV, Art. I, Qu. 4: Quaracchi IV, 595.

¹⁵² *Glossa in IV Sent.*, as cited by Van den Eynde, "The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments," *op. cit.*, 9 f.

¹⁵³ Van den Eynde, "The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments," *op. cit.*, 11. Cf. St. Thomas, *In IV Sententiarum*, Dist. XXVI, Qu. II, Art. 1, *Ad Secundum*, *Opera Omnia* (Parmae: P. Fiaccadori, 1858), VII, 921A. Here St. Thomas adopts Alexander's solution.

sacraments include the following observations. In the first place, only two sacraments, baptism and the Eucharist, can be said to consist essentially of a *res* or *materia* and a *verbum* (or a *forma verborum*). While it is altogether possible that all the sacraments consist essentially of two sensible elements, the first being either a *res* (*materia*) or some equivalent rites or acts, and the second a *verbum* (*forma verborum*), in confirmation, holy orders and extreme unction the formula does not belong to the substance of the sacrament.¹⁵⁴

St. Bonaventure

For all its magic and allurements the hylemorphic theory of Hugh of St. Cher on the composition of the sacraments was not immediately accepted and employed by subsequent theologians. In time of course the concepts of the terms *verbum* or *forma* as the determinative part, and the *elementum* or *materia* as the determinable part, would become well entrenched in theological literature on the sacraments. But meanwhile theologians pursue different trends: some cling tenaciously to the traditional terminology; others follow the ingenious innovations of Hugh with reservations. Respectful of tradition always, but ever enthusiastic for achieving progress in doctrine, St. Bonaventure approaches the problem reservedly and with his customary caution. Here in summary fashion is his attitude to the problem.

In deference to Peter Lombard, the Seraphic Doctor frequently affirms that the sacraments consist essentially in words and things (*in verbis et rebus*), or in words and elements (*in verbis et elementis*). Nowhere does he make the general statement that the sacraments are composed of matter and form. He prefers the older terminology of Lombard, which he on occasion defends against the newer technical terms of Hugh of St. Victor, who, it will be recalled from what was said above, distinguishes in the sacraments the triad of concepts: *res*, *facta*, and *dicta*. In one of his responses he greatly stresses the visibility of the *res* or *elementum* in opposition to the audibility of the *verbum* or *forma verbi*.¹⁵⁵

In regard to four sacraments, namely baptism, confirmation, Eucharist, and extreme unction, Bonaventure invariably applies both

¹⁵⁴ Van den Eynde, "The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments in Early Scholasticism," *op. cit.*, 11 f.

¹⁵⁵ *In IV Sent., Dist. I, Pars I, Dubium II: Quaracchi IV, 28 f.*

formulas in the strictly traditional sense. Here in his mind the term *res* refers to the *corporale elementum*, such as water, chrism, bread and wine, and oil, which is applied to the recipient of the respective sacrament. The *verbum* he understands as the spoken word. It is evident that *materia* and *forma* are synonymous with the terms *verbum* and *elementum*.¹⁵⁶

In his approach to the sacrament of penance the Seraphic Doctor yields to the influence of Hugh of St. Cher. He never speaks of *verbum* or *elementum*; neither does he apply the terms *materia* and *forma*. In unequivocal language he points out that in this sacrament there is neither *verbum* nor *elementum*. But there is, he adds mindful of the position of Hugh, something which we might call *materiale* and *formale*. By the first is meant the aggregate of the acts of the penitent; and by the second, the priestly absolution.¹⁵⁷

His discussion, furthermore, of the sacrament of orders reveals his ambivalent attitudes towards the alluring innovations of Hugh. It needs underscoring here that Bonaventure never claims that this sacrament consists in the *verbum* and *elementum*, or in the *materia* and *forma*, or even in the *materiale* and *formale*. In what does it consist? His answer is that essentially it is a *verbum* or *forma verbi* together with a *signum visibile*. His emphasis is easily perceived in the answer he gives to the first objection regarding the *elementum*, when he affirms that the term *elementum* must be assumed in a wider and extended sense, so that it might apply equally to the *traditio instrumentorum* in the minor orders and the imposition of hands in the major orders. The broad sense in which he employs the term *elementum* here explains his usage of the expression found elsewhere that the sacraments consist of words and visible signs and not words and things.¹⁵⁸

Even more characteristic of his ambivalence towards the contributions of Hugh of St. Cher is his inquiry into the sacrament of matrimony. In his opinion its essence lies in the consent expressed by word or by a nod. Since consent is an interior or imperceptible reality, the

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 29a; *ibid.*, *Dist.* III, *Pars* I, *Art.* I, *Qu.* 1: Quaracchi IV, 64 f.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, *Dist.* XVII, *Pars* II, *Art.* I, *Qu.* 3: Quaracchi IV, 441 a; *Dist.* XXII, *Art.* II, *Qu.* 1: Quaracchi IV, 579a; *ibid.*, *Qu.* 2, p. 581a.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, *Dist.* XXIV, *Pars* II, *Art.* I, *Qu.* 4: Quaracchi IV, 627b; also *ibid.*, *Pars* I, *Art.* II, *Qu.* 2, p. 617b.

Seraphic Doctor could not refer to it, in accord with his usual terminology, as an element, matter, or even the visible sign. But since the expression of the consent might be expressed by a word or by some gesture, such as a nod of the head, Bonaventure could not designate it either as a *verbum* or a *forma verbi*. And because one of the two component parts is invisible he could not even think of either of the technical terms *formale* and *materiale*, as he does in his assessment of penance. A close scrutiny of the treatment of the problem reveals at once that he was acquainted with the labored attempts of Hugh of St. Cher to discover a *quasi-materia* and a *quasi-forma* in this sacrament; as witness his statement that matrimony consists in the consent which is the *materiale* and the formula which is the *formale*. Elsewhere he asserts that the sacrament has as its *materia*, legitimate persons, and as its *forma*, consent of the parties.¹⁵⁹

In conclusion, we can safely say Bonaventure prefers the old signification of the terms *materia* and *forma*, *verbum* and *elementum*. This explains why he applies it to only four sacraments. But under the influence of Hugh of St. Cher he applies the new theories to holy orders, when he speaks of *verbum* and *signum visibile*, and to penance, when he refers to the *materiale* and *formale*. In regard to matrimony, acquainted though he is with the newly introduced terms, he remains impervious to the theory of Hugh of St. Cher.

John Duns Scotus

The ideas on sacramental composition developed by both Alexander of Hales and Hugh of St. Cher spread so rapidly that when Scotus began his writings they were in vogue in current theological literature. In his brilliant research on the sacraments Scotus does not have to apologize for employing the hylemorphic theory; he takes it for granted, as the current terminology, and adds his own observations which commanded the respect and admiration of his contemporaries, even as they do in our own day. Unlike Bonaventure, who displays an allegiance divided between the new theories of Hugh of St. Cher and the traditional ones, Scotus utilizes the terms, *materia* and *forma*, but he brings to the rapidly developing doctrine profound and original

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, *Dist.* XXVII, *Art.* II, *Qu.* 2, p. 680b; *ibid.*, *Dist.* XXVII, *Art.* Unicus, *Qu.* 5, p. 694a; *ibid.*, *Dist.* XXVI, *Art.* I, *Qu.* 2, p. 664b.

insights which reflect, as far as can be ascertained, his dependence on his Franciscan predecessors.

Scotus recognized the theory of matter and form as applicable to the sacraments in his discussion of the Eucharist. In whichever sacrament you distinguish between matter and form, he says, the visible sign is said to be its matter; and the words, the form.¹⁶⁰ You look in vain in Scotus' writings for the statement that in every sacrament you have both matter and form. The sacrament, however, is a composite.¹⁶¹ Matter can be defined, he asserts, as that part which coming first is determinable; and form, as that part which coming second is the determining principle. It is characteristic of matter to precede and to be determined; and of form, the other principle, to follow and to determine.¹⁶² In baptism, he continues, there is both a remote matter, the water; and a proximate matter, which is the ablution.¹⁶³ When he refutes the sacramentality of John's baptism, he affirms that such a baptism lacked the form of Christ, and adds that an exterior ablution, such as John's, without determinate words, and pronounced without a determinate intention, is not a sacrament.¹⁶⁴ It is possible, he concludes, to have only one component in a sacrament, as in the Eucharist, which includes only the species of bread and wine.¹⁶⁵

Scotus' application of the hylemorphic theory to the individual sacraments is interesting. In the four sacraments, baptism, confirmation, extreme unction, and ordination (a term he prefers in place of order), there are two components, matter and form. Regarding the first, there is a distinction between remote and proximate matter, which is not found in ordination.¹⁶⁶ In fact in the latter, Scotus discovers a twofold matter and a twofold form. He is of the opinion that it is quite probable that here we have two partial forms, by which is bestowed upon the ordinand the power to confect the Eucharist in the first case, and the power to absolve in the sacrament of penance

¹⁶⁰ *In IV Sent., Dist. VIII, Qu. 1*: Vivès XVII, 10b.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid., Dist. III, Qu. 2*: Vivès XVI, 283.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid., Qu. 3*: Vivès XVI, 324.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid., Qu. 2*, p. 264.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid., Dist. VII, Qu. I*: Vivès XVI, 689; *Ibid., Dist. XXIII, Qu. Unica*: Vivès XIX, 16 f.; *ibid., Dist. XXIV, Qu. Unica*: Vivès XIX, 76 f.

in the second. In this way the twofold matter, and two proper visible signs, are conjoined. The first form has as its matter the giving of the chalice and paten with the host; and the second, the laying on of the bishop's hand upon the head of the ordinand. All seven orders are said to be included in the sacrament of ordination, inasmuch as it is one sacrament only.¹⁶⁷

In the Eucharist, he claims, there is no form at all. It differs from the other sacraments in its mode of existence: the others consist in a certain usage and in *feri*, which would identify the sacrament with its confection, as in baptism, in which, upon its cessation, there remains nothing which is the sacrament. But the Eucharist is something permanent even after the rite. The use of the sacrament (the rite) must not be identified with the sacrament, for the employment of sacramental words in the rite merely gives us the Eucharist. After consecration the matter consists of the Sacred Species, which act as the foundation for the signification, which is formal here as in other sacraments. In the very act of confection of the Eucharist we have the bread and wine on the one hand, and the words of consecration on the other, which might be called the matter and form of the confection. The words of consecration are not to be construed as the form of the sacrament, since the simultaneity of the component elements is not verified. The words of consecration are transitory; the species, something permanent.¹⁶⁸ The parts in the Eucharist, therefore, are not present in the same manner as in baptism: in baptism they are said to coexist at least morally. In the Eucharist, on the other hand, they do not coexist, not even morally. In fact, from the notion of this sacrament, they cannot coexist, because consecration must precede the consecrated species, and while the consecration is taking place, the Sacred Species are not yet present.

The insights of Scotus into matrimony are very brilliant. That sacrament, he claims without hesitation, was instituted by Christ.¹⁶⁹ Unlike some other sacraments, this one does not possess matter in the strict sense. Those who are about to receive this sacrament must not be regarded as its matter, unless the term, matter, is indistinctly

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, *Dist.* XXIV, *Qu. Unica*: Vivès XIX, 76 f.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, *Dist.* VIII, *Qu.* 1: Vivès XVII, 9 f.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, *Dist.* XXVI, *Qu. Unica*: Vivès XIX, 167 f.

understood and applied to both the minister and the recipient, who in this case are the persons entering the matrimonial state.¹⁷⁰

Like his contemporaries Scotus is more concerned with the problem of the determination of the matrimonial form. To the two questions, whether God had imposed upon mankind a certain formula, or whether you can consider every such contract a sacrament, he gives the following answers. If God had strictly determined the form itself, consisting of the very words that both spouses must pronounce if they are to receive grace, it follows, that very often there will be a matrimonial contract which is not a sacrament, since there would be a great divergence in the forms of the contract. If, moreover, the very pronunciation of words is required, certain marriages would be nothing but mere contracts, as in the case of deaf-mutes. He claims that this sacrament cannot be conferred without a determinate perceptible sign and definite words. The Church actually does not admit any kind of sensible sign;—the Church requires *verba de praesenti*. Persons therefore who cannot exchange words, do indeed contract marriage, but they do not receive the sacrament. This principle Scotus applies to the following three categories of persons: those who contract marriage by proxy; those who are deaf-mutes; and to those whose parents entered such a contract for them.¹⁷¹

What is the opinion of Scotus with respect to matter and form in the sacrament of penance? In his viewpoint, this sacrament can be defined as absolution alone, which is a certain definitive sentence, absolving the sinner who is the culprit, not by virtue of the sentence of the principal judge, who is God, but the secondary judge, who is the priest.¹⁷² Because penance can be called a judicial sacrament, or a sacramental judgment, there is no need of precise words, which are necessary in both baptism and the Eucharist; for it is sufficient that the act of the absolving sentence of the judge, the priest, be unmistakably expressed. This easily explains why he maintains that the three acts of the penitent, contrition, confession, and satisfaction, are

¹⁷⁰ *Reportata Parisiensia*, Lib. IV, Dist. XXVIII, Qu. Unica: Vivès XXIV, 384.

¹⁷¹ *In IV Sent.*, Dist. XXVI, Qu. Unica: Vivès XIX, 168; see also *Reportata Parisiensia*, Lib. IV, Dist. XXVIII, Qu. Unica: Vivès XXIV, 384 f.; *ibid.*, Dist. XLII, Qu. Unica, p. 479 b.

¹⁷² *In IV Sent.*, Dist. XIV, Qu. 4: Vivès XVIII, 140b.

not essential parts of the sacrament of penance, although they are inexorably required if the sacrament is to be received worthily.¹⁷³

The sacramental theories of Scotus exerted no small influence on many generations of theologians. And at the Council of Trent they won the respect of many of the Fathers, and although opposed in some instances to the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, they were not censured. In our own day many theologians, not necessarily all of them in the Franciscan Order, subscribe to them in the speculative realm, and in practice many follow their inspiration.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, *Dist. XVI, Qu. 1*, p. 421 a. See also *ibid.*, *Dist. XIV, Qu. 4*, p. 141 a: "Ex hoc patet ratio, quare non est necesse esse ita praecisa verba in isto sacramento, sicut in baptismo, vel eucharistia, quia sufficit, quod exprimatur actus sententiae absolventis, sicut et in iudicio publico non oportet esse limitata verba. . . . Communiter tamen ista verba sunt apta: *Ego te absolvo*; quaecumque alia preemittantur vel consequantur secundum diversam consuetudinem in diversis ecclesiis."

THEOLOGY OF LOVE

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Foreword

The Franciscan Education Conference is attempting to reintroduce into the stream of Catholic theology the thought and work of Franciscan theologians. According to the 17th century Cistercian Theologian John Caramuel, the Scotistic School was more numerous than all schools put together.¹ It is regrettable that today Scotistic opinions are relegated to the fine print when they are mentioned at all. Moreover, there is more to Franciscan theology than the Scotists. It is not with a desire to contradict or oppose but to supplement and enrich, that the Franciscans are attempting a Franciscan Theological Synthesis. It is to be Franciscan, hence it treats of the doctrine of all Franciscans not just Scotist. It is Catholic theology hence it is based on Scripture, tradition and the declarations of the Church. The great theologians of other schools, especially St. Thomas, will not be neglected.

In the matter of sources there is a wealth of Franciscan theology in this country. In the Franciscan bibliography on grace that I have assembled there are well over one hundred sources that are available at St. Bonaventure University.

The Synthesis Commission has discovered that the principle of finality furnishes a *leit motif* for all of theology. In the tract on grace, then, we treat the word grace then answer the question, "why grace?" In other words the final cause is treated first. After that we will deal with the efficient cause. Third, we treat the nature of grace and where it resides. Fourth, the division of grace will be treated.

Our procedure seems a sound one pedagogically because we have a clearer notion of what a thing is if we know why and from whence

¹ (N.B. Unless otherwise noted, reference is to the works of Scotus.) "Scoti Schola Numerosior est omnibus aliis simul sumptis" Joannes Caramuel, *Theologia Intentionalis*, lib. 2, cap. 3, disp. 10 No. 1264, p. 273.

it is. Logically, moreover, we know that the final cause is first in intention.

Introduction

This paper is merely a treatment of some of the points that will need to be developed in a Franciscan Synthesis.

Grace is a much used word since ancient times in both profane and sacred writings.² The various aspects of (*charis, gratia*) grace are retained in the English derivatives, as graceful, gratifying, gratuities, gratis, ingratiating, gratified, gracious, etc.

We proceed from faith and revelation with reason to explain, develop and defend the supernatural reality, the existence of which we are certain through faith. That reality under consideration is God's love and acceptance of us over and above anything that is due to our nature in itself. An acceptance it is that renders us pleasing to Him in such a way that we are supernaturally changed and able to merit. The fact that this grace is something not our due by nature is something that is emphasized in Catholic theology and the gratuitous aspect is brought to the fore explicitly since the time of Augustine. Love does more than is necessary, hence this is called the theology of love. God's love for us renders us lovable and loving. This emphasis on love is according to the spirit of the Seraphic Doctor. Several Scotistic points illustrate this side of the truth. The identification of grace with charity would be an obvious example.³ The possibility, although in the present order of things it is not so, but the possibility of God forgiving sin and reinstating us merely in the natural order, is taught by Scotus. The fact that in the actual order God renders us not only not enemies but actually friends and children shows the superabundance of love.⁴ Even the stress placed on merit as being primarily acceptance by God or divine preordination⁵ shows God's tender love in giving us the wherewithal to be able to merit a reward that exceeds our natural powers.

All of creation is an effect of God's love since God does not have

² Cf. D.T.C. Grâce.

³ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 6, q. 11.

⁴ *Ox.*, L. 2, d. 28; *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 1, q. 6; cf. below final cause, sanctifying grace. (I, B, 2)

⁵ *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 17, q. 3; S. Thoma, *Summa*, I, II, q. 114 a 1.

to create. Grace is over and above creation. It is wholly and entirely a gift of God.⁶ Nor is grace given because of foreseen merits or purely natural good works because this free grace is needed to merit in the first place. Moreover, man needs some gratuitous supernatural movement from God to reach a supernatural state.⁷ Even if a creature is concreated in grace it is always grace and not nature so that it never pertains to or is a necessary consequence of nature.⁸ This gratuitous gift of God to creatures is so excellent that no matter how much the power of the created will is augmented it can never supply the activity of grace or charity.⁹ Angels and men have only a passive obediential potency as regards grace, Scotus teaches, therefore there is no natural necessity that it be fulfilled. (Another consequence is that since it is a passive obediential potency, men although inferior by nature can receive as much and more grace than angels.¹⁰)

These few remarks will show that a study of grace is indeed a theology of love. It is a study of God with superabundant liberality giving us what we do not deserve. Our natures do not necessarily require that we be loved supernaturally by God and that God love Himself through our supernatural love of Him.

This notion of supernatural liberality is extremely important in attaining a grasp of the mystery of grace.

I. THE FINAL CAUSE OF GRACE

In the tract dealing with the one God the Catholic doctrine of predestination is treated, but here we must treat it as the final cause of grace.

A. PREDESTINATION

God is altogether sufficient in and unto Himself. Everything done *ad extra* is for the external glory of God. God wills His glory in all of His workings. A sound principle of Scholastic philosophy verified by human experience used by St. Thomas and enunciated by Scotus is: Whoever wills in an ordered manner the end and those things

⁶ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 22.

⁷ *Ox.*, L. 2, d. 5, q. 1; *Rep. ibid.*; S. Th. *Summa*, I, II, q. 114 a 5.

⁸ *Ox.*, L. 2, d. 23.

⁹ *Collat.*, 11, n. 5. (de Vives 5, 189 b.)

¹⁰ *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 41, q. 1; *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 14, q. 2.

leading to the end, wills first and foremost that end, then other things that are willed for that end. Scotus applying that to grace says God wills first the beatitude of a soul since it is through this eternal beatitude of a creature loving God in heaven that God's glory is achieved. Then God wills grace for that soul since it is through grace that a creature comes to beatitude. Then God wills that the creature use his will under the influence of grace and then all the other things that lead to beatitude are willed.¹¹

The first reason for anyone being in heaven glorifying God for eternity is not the will of the creature, nor grace, not even the grace of perseverance, but these things are dependent on God's eternal decree that such a one would be given eternal life. Why then are some damned? St. Thomas says "God wills to show forth his goodness in those he predestined by way of mercy's pardon and in those He reprobates by way of justice's punishment. And this is the reason why he elects some in glory and others he reprobates. . . . But why he chooses these for glory and those he rejects is only his divine will."¹² Scotus qualifies this but not by saying that acceptance and rejection depend upon the good or bad use of grace by the individuals as foreseen by God. Scotus says this good use of grace by the free will is foreseen precisely because God wills and preorders this good use. Scotus follows Thomas and Augustine in this that the very use of free will depends upon the divine will. He does not, however, like the explanation of showing forth the goodness of God through mercy and justice. God could show forth his goodness by glorifying them without any merit in themselves or another, which he did not do. Moreover in this view it would seem that God permitted evil in order to punish it.¹³

The argument of St. Thomas is however not without valor or beauty even as analyzed by Scotus, because *de facto* there are a variety of degrees in predestination, e.g., that of the humanity of Christ, the peculiar predestination of the Blessed Virgin, of baptized babies dying before they reach the use of reason, etc. In all of these instances we see the goodness of God in His merciful love.

What Scotus does add is light on reprobation. He states that pre-

¹¹ S. Thoma, *Summa*, I, q. 23, a. 5 ad 3.

¹² *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 41.

¹³ *Ibid.*

destination has no reason on the part of the predestined prior to the predestination, but reprobation is different.

First comes predestination and the whole order that leads to predestination, the ultimate end which is perfect beatitude. This is first. Then 'quasi-afterwards' He ordains in an ordered manner those other things which lead to that end. Grace, faith, merit and the good use of free will, all these things are ordered to the end, some more remotely, others more proximately.¹⁴ By way of corollary we can add that although in the order of execution grace builds on nature, in the order of intention, nature is ordered to grace. In the question of reprobation, however, Scotus' analysis is different because damnation would not seem good unless just. Since to reprobate is to wish to damn, reprobation is by some reason of the object, namely the final sin, foreseen. Thus Scotus teaches a negative reprobation, that is, the damned one is not willed as predestined, but the will to damn is only subsequent to the final sin foreseen. Scotus adds that it is not surprising that the process of predestination and reprobation should be different because all good is attributed principally to God, evil on the contrary is ours. Thus for God to predestine without a reason on our part is according to His goodness, but He damns only because of final mortal sin, an evil for which the creature is responsible.¹⁵ Hence the goodness of God is shown. Moreover, no one is taking another's place in beatitude. All who are saved would have been saved.¹⁶

B. SANCTIFYING GRACE

The very fact that God works out this predestination by the infusion of grace which enables a creature to earn beatitude by giving man a supernatural form, a supernatural mode of existence primarily in the will¹⁷ shows God's liberality and regard for creatures. God loves Himself by informing and moving the created will to love Him freely. This enhances the nature of man far above his natural dignity. A noble lover always elevates and never degrades.

1. The Absolute Order

This raising of creatures to the supernatural plane in order to

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*; *Ox.* L. 4, d. 46, q. 1; d. 49, q. 11; *Rep.*, L. 1, d. 41.

¹⁶ *Rep.*, L. 1, d. 41.

¹⁷ *Ox.*, L. 2, d. 26.

have an eternal bliss above their natural powers to obtain, is the greatest work of God if considered from the point of view of what is produced. The principle used to reach this conclusion is once again that of finality. Those things are greatest which are nearest the final end and participate of its perfection. All nature, however, is ordered to grace and glory of the elect, hence glory and grace are the greatest work. Considering the manner of production it seems that creation is the greatest work. In creation nothing is presupposed and it is without instrumental causes.¹⁸ The production of grace is not generally miraculous since it is according to the ordinary, although superabundant mercy of God, and rational nature has a passive potency to receive it.¹⁹

This fact of supernatural life does not minimize the role of man; but the acts of his free will by which he actually merits the eternal beatitude, to which he is predestined, are acts accepted from all eternity and ordered by God to eternal beatitude.²⁰

Man is normally raised to this supernatural level by steps and faith is the first thereof in the order of execution. In the order of intention this faith is consequent to predestination. It is a free gift of God. Scotus verifies this by saying it is not a matter of foreseen merits because baptized infants have no merit, since merit presupposes the use of free will. Nor can one say it is a matter of the merits they would have had they lived, because then the adult dying in grace should be rewarded not for what he did but for what he would do. God sees good use of that future and there is no other reason than that it pleases Him. Here Scotus agrees with St. Thomas.²¹ This liberality of God is shown in the fact that not only the uncreated grace of the hypostatic union but also the highest created grace is given to the soul of Christ without merit.²²

A consequence of this truth is the teaching of Thomas and Scotus, canonized by the Council of Trent. Man cannot merit perseverance since it is high in the order of intention. It is then the principle of merit. St. Augustine, the Doctor of grace, calls perseverance "the

¹⁸ *Ox.*, L. 3, d. 32.

¹⁹ *Ox.*, Prol. q. 2.

²⁰ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 24, q. 1.

²¹ *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 41, q. unica; S. Th. *Summa* I, q. 23, a. 5.

²² *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 15, q. 1.

great gift of God." In the liturgy we pray for it, hence it is a free gift of God and not merited.²³

First, then, God wills glory for a determined number of the elect. He wills first for the elect the ultimate union with Him to the final beatifying end. Second, He orders final grace as in a second instant of nature without which beatitude is not given. Third, He foresees fall and reparation in Christ.²⁴

Some Scotists hold that this grace of perseverance can be merited *ex congruo*.²⁵ It seems tenable that God orders that perseverance from all eternity and orders that men pray for it so that it can be said to be an answer to their prayers.²⁶

This grace of perseverance is a greater grace than the receiving of forgiveness. Not to need forgiveness should inspire greater gratitude to God who gives and conserves.²⁷ Scotus tells that the good angels persevered because God gave them this grace.²⁸

It is necessary in the study of God to see things from God's point of view. Thus in our tract on grace we started out with the eternal loving will of God.

Now we will proceed to see how that will is effected in man. In the present order of things, grace renders us and our acts specially or supernaturally pleasing to God. Grace does not only cover up our sins but renders us actually beautiful. Once again Scotus brings out a point that in the absolute order God could have done otherwise. He could have given us beatitude without merit or without actually rendering our souls pleasing and acceptable in themselves.²⁹ The fact that we are given real spiritual beauty and rendered actually acceptable is evidence of God's love. This is true in the absolute order of things abstracting from sin. The creature would not be supernaturally changed without the special gift which is grace. The absolute necessity in the present order of things for grace on the part of the creature is brought out succinctly by St. Anthony who writes: "*Homo qui sine*

²³ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 2, q. 1; S. Thoma. I, II, q. 114 a. 9; Trent ses 6 ch. 13, and Canon 16 & 22.

²⁴ *Rep.*, L. 3, d. 19.

²⁵ Montefortino, Tom 4, q. 114, a. 9.

²⁶ *Rep.*, L. 1, d. 4; Cf. section I, C, on merit.

²⁷ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 22; *Ox.*, L. 3, d. 3, q. 1.

²⁸ *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 43.

²⁹ *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 17, q. 3.

gratia est non est aptus servitio divino et est quasi homo sine testiculis quia vim generandi bona opera non habet."³⁰ Even if a creature were not in sin he would require grace to have this right to supernatural beatitude, which is a certain participation of God. The soul must receive over and above its nature a part of infinite perfection.³¹ Charity or grace is participation of goodness as a ray is said to be light through participation because it participates in the light of the sun.³² Thus grace consists in the elevation of a created rational nature from the natural to the supernatural.³³ This then is a final cause of grace to elevate a creature that is capable of beatitude to a supernatural state. This is true of men and angels in the present order.

2. End of Grace, Given the Fact of Sin

The sad reality is that man is fallen. Man can freely fall but he is not able to recover or rise from the fall except by grace.³⁴ In doing so God changes the sinner by removing the injustice. Grace formally excludes the privation that is sin. A sinner before penance is unworthy of eternal life. After penance he has a right to it, so that there must be a supernatural something which makes him formally worthy. God does not accept a sinner before penance, but he does after. Certain it is that there is no change in the divine will, therefore there is a change in the sinner.³⁵ Grace then is necessary for the remission of sin.³⁶ Since the absolute power of God extends to everything that does not include a contradiction,³⁷ God could remove mortal sin without the infusion of grace. Grace is not 'natural,' so sin could be taken away by God's restoring man to merely natural rectitude, but in the present order of things when forgiving man, God elevates man to the supernatural order.³⁸ This separability of grace and forgiveness is shown in the state of innocence and in the Angel's grace. In them

³⁰ *Loc.*, In Dom IV p Pent, p. 190 b.

³¹ *Ox.*, L. 3, d. 13, q. 4.

³² *Rep.*, L. 1, d. 17.

³³ S. Bonav. *In Sent.* L. 3, d. 2, a. 3, q. 2. Cf. below nature of grace.

³⁴ *Ox.*, L. 2, d. 28, S. Th. *Summa*, I, II, 109, 7, Council of Orange Dz. 192.

³⁵ *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 17, q. 3.

³⁶ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 2, q. 1.

³⁷ *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 44.

³⁸ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 1, q. 6.

grace exists without forgiveness, hence remission of sin and infusion of grace are not essentially the same thing.³⁹

In the justification of adults there is an act of free will against sin. The ultimate act of contrition which removes sin is simultaneous in time but precedes in nature as an informed act. This is the case because in the order of nature the act must be supernatural since it is a disposition for a supernatural state. By natural power alone there can be a detestation of sin but this is not sufficient for justification.⁴⁰

For justification then, in man's fallen state, remission of sin is among the things required.⁴¹ In the order of intention infusion of grace is prior. God wills our friendship hence He removes the source of enmity, i.e., sin.⁴² Although grace and sin are not immediately opposed by the prescriptions set up by the wise divine love one always excludes the other.⁴³

C. MERIT

God not only elevates man and forgives him his sin but He also ordains that man can merit or earn that eternal life. Man uses his free will in attaining beatitude. We must not forget that fact verified by experience and declared infallible by the Church, that man is free. When we speak of God moving, ordaining, predestining, it is always according to, although above, the free nature of man.

1. Eternal Life

"To merit" means to deserve, to be worthy to gain, to acquire. Merit always implies the notion of justice, it implies a certain equality and a relation. In all merit, then, there is the person deserving, the act, the one giving and the pay or reward. Now the creature cannot earn a supernatural reward unless he is supernaturalized. Grace gives a friendship, a certain community with God. Grace is needed to merit eternal life. This is a dogma of faith. Once again, though, Scotus sees that God could have done otherwise, namely, He could have given eternal supernatural life without earning it by free acts. In the

³⁹ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 14, q. 1; d. 16, q. 2. Cf. Council of Carthage D. 104.

⁴⁰ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 14, q. 2.

⁴¹ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 17, a. 1.

⁴² *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 16, q. 2.

⁴³ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 16, q. 2.

⁴⁴ *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 17, q. 3.

present order God makes us and our acts pleasing and worthy of a reward by infusing grace. God makes Himself our debtor. It is never strict commutative justice but it is a quasi justice. Call it a *quid pro quo* but remember that God gives a part of the *quid*. A master can give more than a servant can earn. The master could accept the servant's inadequate service for a more than just wage on condition that the servant do what is possible. This figure used by theologians does limp because God is not rewarding supernaturally merely natural works. He makes these works to be supernatural then rewards them supernaturally.⁴⁵

There must be a special acceptance on the part of God over and above general acceptance. The act must be a good action freely performed and it must be supernaturally informed, i.e., the person must be in the state of grace. Scotus adds it must be acting according to this form since a person in grace can perform acts which are not according to it. An example that no one would dispute is a venial sin. An example that most Scotists would use also is an indifferent act. An act of natural love of God is, therefore, not meritorious because it is not accepted as beatifying since it is not informed by grace. The will with grace is capable of more; it can perpetrate the supernatural.⁴⁶

If one considers the meritorious act as from the free will of the creature, it is not condigned or in the order of justice because of the great inequality between God and man and between the reward and the work. Considered, however, as from grace the merit is condigned since it is made proportionate and has a certain equality. By divine ordination, then, acts of free will are acceptable for supernatural reward through grace.⁴⁷

While appreciating the part of free will we are not to forget that the principle of merit is grace or charity.⁴⁸ Thus the measure of merit is love and not difficulty. As everything else is good because it is willed by God, thus merit is supernaturally good because accepted by God and not vice-versa. The ultimate complement of merit is in its divine acceptance ordering such acts to reward. The act must be worthy or

⁴⁵ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 46, q. 1; *Rep.*, *ibid.*; *Ox.*, L. 3, d. 18.

⁴⁶ *Quodlib.*, q. 17, n. 3.

⁴⁷ *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 17, q. 3.

⁴⁸ *Ox.*, L. 2, d. 41.

ordainable to the reward which is beatitude but from nature alone the acts are not meritorious. This is true no matter how difficult or noble the acts might be.⁴⁹ A meritorious act is the one accepted by God from all eternity and ordered to eternal life.⁵⁰ Here also must be treated all those things which fall under merit, all those things that can be earned by man.

2. First Grace

Good works performed before one is in the state of grace can be meritorious as ordered to the state of sanctifying grace if they are done under the impulse of actual grace. Such works are not meritorious for eternal life directly. If there is no actual grace then the pure natural good work is a passive preparation for grace in so far that a further obstacle to grace is not posited.⁵¹ In the present order it is impossible for man to merit for himself or others first grace, although God could have arranged otherwise.⁵²

3. Recovery After a Fall

While in the state of grace we cannot merit to be restored if we fall. Grace is not ordered to its own destruction. The basis of merit is the predestination on God's part, but if we could merit reparation condignly to rise from future falls, this would indicate that the preordination of God would in some way be ordered to the fall.⁵³ However, Scotus and others after him, including Bellarmine, speak of a certain merit in a broad sense. Scotus mentioned that all things being equal, a more perfect man who sins seriously rises more rapidly on account of God's goodness. Nevertheless, a more perfect man sins more grievously because of greater ingratitude. His greater perfection is a greater generosity on God's part and this he should appreciate.⁵⁴

4. Can Merit an Increase of Grace and Charity

Since grace or charity is the beginning of beatitude a man consti-

⁴⁹ *Ox.*, L. 3, d. 19, q. unica.

⁵⁰ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 29, q. 1. Cf. above, predestination.

⁵¹ *Ox.*, L. 2, d. 28.

⁵² *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 15, q. 1.

⁵³ S. Th. *Summa*, I, II, q. 114, a. 7; *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 22.

⁵⁴ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 22.

tuted in grace can merit and increase. Grace is the disposition for glory, so who merits glory merits grace.⁵⁵

a. Merits Revived

It is the superabundance of God's mercy that merits always live in His acceptance and the reward due to them will be given as long as the recipient does not block them by a new sin. When the fault is removed the consequence is that the former claim to reward is again in force.⁵⁶

b. Sin Not Revived

What is successive does not render the same numerically. If it did, then contradictories could be simultaneously true. Sin is present only through an act of the sinner, but the act is not numerically revived in the recidivist. Hence merit is revived because it is principally on the part of God's acceptance. The sin is not revived because it is wholly man's.⁵⁷

D. ACTUAL GRACE

1. In Pure and Fallen State

Besides the habitual gift that is sanctifying grace, God gives men supernatural movements ordered to sanctifying grace. In the state of pure nature and in the state of original justice supernatural help is needed because the will seeks the delectable object of the senses. Scotus adds that this does not mean that free will is impotent but it is powerless as compared to God.⁵⁸ In the fallen state grace is needed to fulfill the whole law and to love God supernaturally.⁵⁹ Good works which are a positive preparation for sanctifying grace are done under the impetus of actual grace.

2. In Sanctifying Grace for Meritorious Acts

More is needed than just the spiritual beauty of sanctifying grace even though it resides immediately in the will. It seems that an active

⁵⁵ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 21, a. 1.

⁵⁶ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 22.

⁵⁷ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 22.

⁵⁸ *Ox.*, L. 2, d. 29.

⁵⁹ *Ox.*, L. 2, d. 28.

inclination to determine acts is required. Thus the act as well as the faculty needs to be supernaturalized.⁶⁰ Some, however, hold that the ordinary concurrence of God is sufficient to enable our supernaturalized will to act meritoriously.⁶¹ What is certain is that an act to be meritorious must be elicited according to charity because not every act of a will informed by grace is meritorious.⁶²

3. Natural Goods Can Be Done Without Grace

Will, even in a fallen state, is not totally depraved, so it can do individual natural goods.⁶³

4. To Avoid Sin

Actual grace is needed to avoid all venial sin although any individual sin can be avoided.⁶⁴ To avoid sin actual grace is needed, especially once a man sins mortally he will sin again and again unless aided by grace.⁶⁵

II. THE EFFICIENT CAUSE

Grace then is a supernatural state and an aid ordering us to render supernatural glory to God through a life of charity here and beatitude, the bloom of charity, in heaven. We now consider by whom this grace is produced.

A. GOD THE CAUSE

1. In Himself

Man is incapable of producing grace since it is something above his powers. A creature is less able to produce grace than to produce a human soul.⁶⁶ God produces grace in the actual order of things through Christ and His passion as meritorious cause. For man the instrumental cause is the sacraments.⁶⁷ The good works that are per-

⁶⁰ *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 17, q. 3.

⁶¹ Minges, *Doctrina Phil. et Theol.*, p. 397.

⁶² *Rep.*, L. 2, d. 33; d. 29, q. 2; *Quodlibet*, q. 17; *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 17, q. 3.

⁶³ *Ox.*, L. 3, d. 27.

⁶⁴ *Rep.*, L. 4, d. 21, q. 1; d. 17.

⁶⁵ *Rep.*, L. 3, d. 18, q. 3.

⁶⁶ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 49, q. 11.

⁶⁷ Cf. (66) and *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 2, d. 1.

formed by man, in as far as they are a positive disposition for grace, are from God.⁶⁸

2. Through Christ

Christ is the first born of all creatures, in and through whom all things are and hold together. Christ is the exclusive cause of grace for all others. Christ merits this grace condignly, that is, in the order of justice.⁶⁹ Thus Christ merited first grace for all, although in baptized adults concurrence on the part of the human will is had.⁷⁰ This is the way things are but it does not take away from God's absolute power to produce grace independently of Christ. Whatever God does through second causes He can also do independently.⁷¹ The only grace not merited is that of the Incarnation. Everything else depends on that. St. Bernardine of Siena carries on this doctrine and makes it explicit as regards angels.⁷²

B. MAN'S PART

Man, free agent that he is, has a part to play. Preparation is required on the part of man.⁷³ The adage "God does not refuse grace to one who does what is in his power" is valid if properly understood.⁷⁴ For adults we have a certain insight into this mystery in Bonaventure's statement *Tota est a Deo et tota a libero arbitrio*.⁷⁵ We only dispose our souls for grace but if this disposing is flowing from grace, it is a real preparation. The will is truly active as even when, or especially when, moved by grace.⁷⁶ Ordinarily God gives grace according to the subjective disposition of man.⁷⁷

C. DIFFERENCES IN GRACE

Not all have the same degree or measure of grace. These differ-

⁶⁸ *Ox.*, L. 2, d. 28, q. unica.

⁶⁹ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 2, q. 1, S. Bonav., *Collat.*, de Sep. don. S.S., I. n. 6, Tom V, 457 sq.

⁷⁰ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 2, q. 1; *Ox.*, L. 3, d. 19.

⁷¹ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 15, q. 1.

⁷² *Opera Omnia*, Sermo LX—"De Gloria Angelorum," Vol. II, pp. 353 sq.

⁷³ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 46, q. 2.

⁷⁴ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 1, q. 1; d. 14, q. 2.

⁷⁵ S. Bonav., In L. 2, d. 37, a. 1, q. 1 ad 5.

⁷⁶ *De Rerum Princ.*, q. 6, a. 2.

⁷⁷ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 14, q. 2.

ences are principally on the part of God since God predestines the elect to divers degrees of glory. Not to be forgotten though is the fact that part of that divine plan is that man's will cooperates.⁷⁸

D. MANNER OF PRODUCTION

It does not seem that we should say that grace is created. It is, as can be expected, a unique type of production since it is supernatural. Scotus says that the act of one in grace according to the form of grace is not creation because it is not without the activity of the second cause.⁷⁹ Furthermore, when speaking of the comparative greatness of creation and justification he says that creation is greater as regards the manner of production. Creation is from no subject and is without the cooperation of a subject. In the production of grace, however, there is at least a passive obediencial potency on the part of creatures and there is usually in the case of adults cooperation.⁸⁰ Much research and thought is needed on this question.

III. THE NATURE OF GRACE

A. ACCIDENTAL FORM

Grace is not just something in the will of God. It is God's productive love for us which actually, although accidentally, changes us. The principle is that an agent needs a form according to which he operates. The soul operates supernaturally, hence it has a supernatural form.⁸¹ This grace is a certain form of the soul making it pleasing to the divine will.⁸² It is a habit because it renders the possessor and his acts good.⁸³ This is the stupendous state of man, to have a supernatural form. No matter how great it is to be, to exist naturally, it is not the greatness of divinization. What nature has through creation is little in comparison to the existence it has through grace and glory.⁸⁴

⁷⁸ *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 50, q. 5; q. 6; *Quodlibet*, q. 21; *Ox.*, L. 4, d. 4, q. 7; *Ox.*, 1, d. 17, q. 4.

⁷⁹ *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 17, q. 3.

⁸⁰ *Ox.*, L. 3, d. 32.

⁸¹ *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 17, q. 3.

⁸² *Ox.*, L. 1, d. 17, q. 3.

⁸³ *Ox.*, L. 2, d. 27, q. 1: Cf. Bozithovic who maintains that according to Bonaventure, grace is not virtue but a unique something, S. Bonav. *In Sent.*, L. 2, d. 26, a. 1, q. 5 & d. 27, a. 1, q. 2.

⁸⁴ *Rep.*, L. 3, d. 9.

Grace is really the same as glory, as it is in itself a disposition for glory. It immediately disposes for glory, it orders us to our ultimate supernatural end.⁸⁵

B. GRACE AND CHARITY

The question of the identity between charity and grace or the subject of grace is much too involved to be properly treated here. It is not a matter of excluding grace from the essence of the soul but it is a question of the principle, or better, the immediate subject of grace through which the soul is divinized. In fact all Catholics hold grace as incipient beatitude. St. Thomas in *Ia IIae* places beatitude in an operation and in the faculty of the intellect. Scotus apparently places grace immediately in the faculty of the will.⁸⁶

IV. DIVISIONS OF GRACE

This section is one of great importance and should include the question of liberty under the influence of efficacious grace. The medieval Scholastics have not treated this question in detail nor do they have a uniform division of grace.

Conclusion

We hope that in this paper we have given some idea of how grace would be treated in a Franciscan Synthesis. God willing, in the not too distant future, the synthesis will be completed. The bibliography and references are meant to be a help to students of theology in working over this doctrine.

⁸⁵ *Ox.*, L. 2, d. 26; L. 4, d. 1, q. 1; L. 3, d. 13, q. 4; L. 1, d. 17, q. 3; *Quodlibet*, q. 17; *Ox.* L. 2, d. 26.

⁸⁶ S. Thoma, *Summa*, I, II, q. 3, a. 4.

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THE MYSTICAL BODY OF CHRIST IN THE FRANCISCAN THEOLOGICAL SYNTHESIS

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The doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ is intimately and indissolubly bound up with the mystery of Incarnation and Redemption. If in the eternal designs of God's perfect and unselfish love Christ has absolute primacy over all creation, visible and invisible, if in the eternal decrees of God Christ is Head of all rational creatures, as well as King, High Priest, and Teacher, it is because the Incarnate Word was absolutely predestined to be the Head of His Mystical Body, the Church. The two are inseparable. Christ the Head and the Church, His Mystical Body, are but one man, one mystical person. To separate Christ from the Church, or the Church from Christ, in the divine plan, is to do away with the mystery of Incarnation; it is to dissolve the unity of the eternal designs of God's love toward His Only-begotten Son. For, the Incarnation of the Word is not an event that concerns the assumed human nature alone; it is an event that has for all ages joined indissolubly Christ the Head with His Mystical Body, the Church: the two are one. The Incarnate Word and the Church which is His Mystical Body form, to quote Saint Augustine,¹ "totum integrum quemdam virum," "the Whole Christ." In the Whole Christ all creation gives glory to God; in the Whole Christ all return to the source and font, the Blessed Trinity. The divine plan calls for our union with God and with one another in Christ, with Christ and through Christ. Saint Cyril of Alexandria states: "Through one of

¹ "non ergo illum solum qui est caput nostrum cogitemus, quando audimus Christum loqui; sed cogitemus Christum caput et corpus, totum integrum quemdam virum. Nobis enim dicitur: Vos autem estis corpus Christi et membra, ab apostolo Paulo. Et de illo dicitur ab eodem apostolo quia est caput ecclesiae. Si ergo ille caput, nos corpus, totus Christus caput et corpus" —*Enarr. in Ps.* 58, n. 2 (*Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina*, vol. 39.730). Cf. *Enarr. in Ps.* 54, n. 3 (CC 39.656-657); *Enarr. in Ps.* 17, n. 51 (CC 38.102); *De Doctrina Christiana* 3.31.14 (PL 34.82).

us, the Word has taken up His abode in all of us. He dwells in all in that one temple He took for us and from us, to have us all in Himself and to reconcile all of us, in a single body, with His Father."²

The Church is the fullness of Christ; she is the continuation and the extension of Christ in time and space. When the first bolt of God's love outside of the Blessed Trinity was destined for Christ, the Perfect Adorer of God, it embraced at the same time His Mystical Body, because it was destined for Christ the Head of His Body, the Church. Sacred Scripture and the unbroken tradition of the Fathers from the earliest times teach that the union of Christ and His Church is inseparable: they are but one man, the mystical Christ, the Whole Christ. In his Encyclical *Mystici Corporis* Pius XII teaches that Christ "has gone so far as to liken this union with that marvelous oneness by which the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son."³ As the human nature of Christ is an instrument of His divinity, in similar fashion His Mystical Body, the Catholic Church, is the instrument of the Incarnate Word to continue His work here on earth. In the unity of the Whole Christ God chose the way which would best manifest His love for His Only-begotten Son and for His creatures; the way which would unite man closest to Himself and contribute in the highest degree to the glorification of His Incarnate Son, and in Him unto the perfect glory and love of triune God. God loves us individually but not separately; He loves us in His Incarnate Son, our Head and King, for whom He fashioned His Mystical Body, the Church.⁴

The Whole Christ, therefore, manifests itself as the end, the objective of the whole divine plan even before the fall of mankind was foreseen. The Whole Christ is not the result of original sin; it was not willed by God only after the fall of man, nor was it occasioned by it; it was willed absolutely, just as the Incarnation of the Eternal Word of God the Father was decreed absolutely. The fall of mankind only determined, so to speak, the present phys-

² *In Ioan.* 1.9 (PG 73.161).

³ AAS 35.226. (Note: The English texts of this encyclical are taken from the NCWC edition: Washington D.C., 1943).

⁴ Cf. H. Clérissac, O.P., *The Mystery of the Church* (Sheed & Ward: New York, 1940) 8.

ignomy of the Church, just as in view of the fall of Adam Christ was predestined also as the Redeemer of fallen mankind. Christ was absolutely predestined as Head and King: Head of His Mystical Body, the Church; King of His kingdom, the same Church. Christ is the Head of the Church in the eternal decrees of God as well as in the order of time. By one and the same divine decree Christ and His Body, the Church, have been absolutely predestined.

In the following pages this opening thought, the keynote, will be developed successively in three distinct parts. In the first part a brief summary of the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ will be presented wherein the intimate union of Christ and the Church, that is to say, the mystery of the Whole Christ, will stand in bold relief. In the second part the place of the Church in the Franciscan theology of the primacy of Christ will be explored. The principles of Franciscan Christology will be applied to the Whole Christ. The last part will discuss the prominent position which Ecclesiology should occupy in Sacred Theology.

The Doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ

When we profess our belief in the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Roman Church we make an act of faith in a great mystery of the Christian revelation. The Church which Our Lord established upon Peter is not only a firm, visible social structure with a stable and unshakeable framework; it is more than that, for it is a supernatural living organism fashioned by God after its exemplary cause Jesus Christ, who as such unites the divine nature and the human nature in one person, the Incarnate Word of God. The Catholic Church, an object of our faith, is more than a mere religious society or organization whose purpose is the worship of God; it is more than a society different from all others because it was founded by Christ; it is more than a depository of grace and revealed truth. The Church is not only a society, but also a communion; not only an organization, but also an organism. It is a living body made up of many members who are incorporated to Christ by being reborn of the holy Spirit in the laver of regeneration. It is the Mystical Body of Christ, the mystical Christ upon earth.

The Catholic Church is a mystery of faith and surpasses the capacities and powers of our intellect no less than the mystery of

Incarnation. It is a mystery which during our sojourn on earth can never be completely unveiled, never altogether understood, nor adequately expressed in human language. Our act of faith in the Church has for its object a unique supernatural reality which contains in itself two essential elements, the divine and the human, the invisible and the visible, the internal and the external. It is only through the supernatural virtue of faith that we are able to grasp somewhat the inner greatness which marks the Church. The inner nature of the Church, as M. Scheeben notes,⁵ is absolutely supernatural, as is that of the God-Man, Christ; for, despite the visibility of His sacred humanity and of His rôle as the Divine Legate sent by God, it is only through faith that we can arrive at and know the true nature of Christ, God-Man. This is the reason why the Church, although conformable to other human societies in its outward juridical organization, differs essentially from these in its innermost character, and excels them as grace excels nature. This is the reason, too, why its unity, its power, its vitality and its organization are so matchless, sublime, and beyond comprehension. Just like Christ, her exemplar, the Church is a mystery of faith, but at the same time visible by its means, its functions, organs, and in its members. She is human and divine in her essential visibility, without division and without confusion. The Church is the Body of Christ, and Christ is her exalted Head; all who enter it become members of Christ so that, linked together with Him and with one another, they may share in the divine life and glory of Christ, and thus become one son of God. From eternity God decreed that Christ and the Church be one, one man.⁶ To express this truth more strongly, the Church is Christ continuing to live in the world: it is a mysterious yet essentially visible perpetuation of the incarnation of the Son of God and of His redemption.⁷

Union of Christ with His Church

The doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ is before all else a

⁵ *The Mysteries of Christianity*. Translated by C. Vollert, S.J. (B. Herder Book Co.: St. Louis, Mo. 1946), 540.

⁶ "unum voluit esse hominem Deum Christum et Ecclesiam"—St. Augustine, *Sermo* 45, n. 5 (PL 38.266).

⁷ Cf. J. C. Gruden, *The Mystical Christ* (B. Herder Book Co.: St. Louis, Mo. 1938), 7.

prodigy of the most intimate and unparalleled union of Christ with His Church.⁸ It constitutes the mystery which Saint Paul has received from Christ; it is his Gospel,⁹ namely, to make known to all the design conceived by God from all eternity, but revealed only in the Gospel, to save all men without distinction of race, identifying them with His well beloved Son in the unity of the Mystical Body.¹⁰

When St. Paul was struck down on the way to Damascus, "he heard a voice saying to him: Saul, 'Saul, why persecutest thou me?' Who said: 'Who art thou, Lord?' And he: 'I am Jesus whom thou persecutest.'"¹¹ Saul was persecuting the Church in her members; Christ identifies Himself with the persecuted Church. By persecuting the Christians, Paul was persecuting Christ. This implies the existence of a certain mystical identity of Christ with the Church, a union so close, so unique, so mysterious, that the Apostle uses one imaged expression after another to try to bring home to his hearers a fuller realization of the stupendous truth which had been revealed to him. He uses the analogy of the human body,¹² of bride and bridegroom,¹³ of a building and its foundation,¹⁴ of vine and branches,¹⁵ to render more vivid the truth he wants Christians to understand. Each of these comparisons expresses a particular aspect of the union established by God between Christ and His Church. But the analogy of the human body is the truest and best description. It is the one most frequently used by the Apostle and employed

⁸ Cf. E. Mersch, S.J., *The Whole Christ* (Bruce Publishing Co.: Milwaukee, 1938), 3.

⁹ F. Jürgensmeier, *The Mystical Body of Christ* (Bruce Publishing Co.: Milwaukee 1939), 19 f.

¹⁰ Cf. F. Prat, S.J. *The Theology of Saint Paul*. Translated from the 11-th French edition (Burns Oates & Washbourne: London, 1938), 2308. See also W. Goossens, *L'Eglise Corps du Christ d'après Saint Paul* (Paris: 1949); E. Mura, *Le Corps Mystique du Christ. Sa Nature et sa Vie Divine*. 2 vols. (Deuxième édition. Paris: 1936-1937); A. Wikenhauser, *Die Kirche als der Mystische Lieb Christi nach dem Apostel Paulus* (Münster im Westfalen: 1937).

¹¹ Acts ix. 4-5.

¹² Cf. S. Tromp, S.J., *Corpus Christi Quod est Ecclesia*. Editio altera (Romae: 1946), 75-86.

¹³ Cf. Tromp, *op. cit.*, 26-53.

¹⁴ Cf. Tromp, *op. cit.*, 59-68.

¹⁵ Cf. Tromp, *op. cit.*, 53-59.

by the Fathers of the Church. It is richest and most complete, for it combines and includes the meanings of the other figures of speech.¹⁶

The Church is a "Body"

The Church has been so constituted that it may be likened to a body.¹⁷ Indeed there is more than one reason for this similarity. A body is not formed by any haphazard grouping of members but must be constituted of a variety of organs or members which differ in perfection and function, and are arranged in due order; for this reason the Church is called a body, because it is formed by the coalescence of structurally united parts, and because it has a variety of members reciprocally dependent.¹⁸ Again, in a body the multiplicity and variety of members are brought together into a harmonious union by means of ligaments that join them together, and chiefly by the inner principle of life which informs all and each member individually; in a similar way the multitude and variety of the members of the Church are joined together not only by external bonds, but also by the internal ligatures of faith, hope, and charity. Moreover, as in nature a body is informed and vivified by a vital principle; so for this reason the Church is compared to a living body because it is vivified by an internal principle from which all supernatural life flows and is diffused in its members. Furthermore, in a human body the members are linked together in such a way as to help one another, and when one member suffers, all other members share its pain, while the healthy members come to the assistance of the ailing; in the Church the individual members do not live for themselves alone, but also help their fellow members, and all work in mutual collaboration for their common good and for the building up of the whole body.

There is yet another reason for the Pauline analogy of the human body. The body is given its own means to provide for its own life, health and growth, and for the same of all its members; in like manner Christ has provided in a marvelous way for His Church, endowing it with the sacraments.¹⁹

¹⁶ J. Anger, *La Doctrine du Corps Mystique de Jésus-Christ d'après les Principes de la Théologie de Saint Thomas* (Paris: 1934), 23-24.

¹⁷ Pius XII, *Litterae Encyclicae* "Mystici Corporis" (AAS 35.204).

¹⁸ *Id.* (AAS 35.200).

¹⁹ *Id.* (AAS 35.200-202).

The Church is the Body of Christ; Christ is the Head of This Body

The Catholic Church is not only a body, but, as Saint Paul frequently states,²⁰ the body of Christ, and Christ is the head of the Church, which is His body.²¹ The Pauline analogy emphasizes the divinely revealed truth that the supernatural relationship between the Church and Christ, her founder, is analogous to that of head in relation to the body in a human organism.

There is a threefold relation between the head and body. Three proper functions may be assigned to the head. First, the head occupies a position of pre-eminence over the other members of the body. It dominates and governs them. Secondly, the head is the seat of the body's vital activity, the source of its vitality and vital energies. All the members of the body live, grow, and perform their proper functions because of the vivifying power which descends from the head. Thirdly, the head is united to the body by internal, physical bonds, and in the same way the members are joined to one another. The head and the body form one living organism, one whole; neither the head nor the body is complete without the other.

This triple role eminently befits Christ as the head of His body, the Church. First, by reason of His pre-eminence: Christ, as the Word of the Eternal Father, is the "first-born of every creature";²² by His glorious resurrection, a victory over death, He has become the "first-born of the dead";²³ as "the one Mediator of God and men,"²⁴ He has linked heaven and earth; as the Son of Man, He is the object of God's love beyond all men, all angels and all creation. Christ as Head is the royal citadel of His Body, the Church, and all members are guided, illumined, and directed by Him. Secondly, Christ is the Head of the Church for this reason that, as supernatural gifts have found their supreme fulness and perfection in Him, it is from this fulness that His Body receives. Thirdly, the union of Christ the Head with the Church, His Body, is so close that the two form but

²⁰ "Ecclesiam esse Corpus Christi idea praedilecta est S. Pauli"—Tromp, *op. cit.*, 75.

²¹ Col. i. 18: He is the Head of the body, the Church; Ephes. v. 23: Christ is the Head of the Church; Ephes. i. 23: God hath made him Head over all the Church, which is his body. Cf. Prat, *op. cit.*, 1302.

²² Col. i. 15.

²³ Col. i. 18.

²⁴ 1 Tim. ii. 5.

one man, one mystical person, that is to say, the Whole Christ.²⁵ Moreover Christ is the Head of His Church by the fact that He so sustains the Church, and so in a certain sense lives in the Church that it is as it were another Christ.²⁶ The Apostle affirms this when, without further qualification, he calls the Church "Christ."²⁷

In short, the Catholic Church is the Body of Christ, because Christ is the founder, the head, the support, and the Savior of his Body. Saint Paul puts it briefly: "Christ is the Head of the Church; He is the saviour of His Body."²⁸

²⁵ "Mirum in modum Patres urgent Corpus Ecclesiae cum Christo Capite constituere unam personam mysticam"—Tromp, *op. cit.*, 95. Cf. Mersch, *op. cit.*, 209-440.

²⁶ On the various modes of speaking about 'Christus,' 'Christus totus,' 'Christus alter,' 'Sponsus,' and 'Sponsa' as applied by tradition to the Church, cf. Tromp, *op. cit.*, 52-53.

²⁷ 1 Cor. xii.12. Cf. Pius XII, *Litterae Encyclicae* "Mystici Corporis" (AAS 35.218); Prat. *op. cit.*, 2.284.

²⁸ Ephes. v. 23.—Christ is also Head of the angels. Even in His human nature He is superior to them, and they are subjected to Him (cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologica*, tom. 4 [Quaracchi: 1948] 151-152; S. Bonaventure, 3, dist. 13, art. 2, q. 3 [*Opera Omnia* 3.288-291]; S. Thomas, 3, q. 8, art. 4; Scotus, 3, dist. 19, q. unica, n. 8). By His passion and death Christ exercises His primacy over the Angels by a new right: He is the source of all graces and illuminations which the angels receive. But Christ is not in the same way Head of men and Head of angels. With regard to the angels, there is lacking the conformity of nature. "In respect to similarity of nature Christ is not Head of the angels, because He did not take hold of the angels—to quote the Apostle—but of the seed of Abraham," says Pius XII (*Litterae Encyclicae* "Mystici Corporis": AAS 35.213). Angels are not members of the Mystical Body of Christ which is the Catholic Church. The Pauline analogy of the human body does not apply to them, because of the lack of similarity of nature. Besides, the Mystical Body of Christ is made up of the faithful, believers, who have been incorporated into Christ through baptism. Hence it is that neither Scriptures nor the Fathers speak of angels as being 'the body of Christ.' When Saint Thomas (*loc. cit.*) says, "corpus Ecclesiae mysticum non solum consistit ex hominibus, sed etiam ex angelis," he speaks of *corpus mysticum* in an entirely different sense (cf. Anger, *op. cit.*, 39-51).

It is well to note that union with Christ the Head can be considered in two ways: first, by reason of similarity of nature between the Head and its members, and of the influx of grace; secondly, exclusively by reason of the influx of grace. It is clear that the Mystical Body of Christ properly speaking must have the conformity of nature between the Head and its members. When, therefore, the Fathers of the Church and Scholastics speak at times of angels belonging to the Body of Christ, they speak of it as of a union with Christ by reason of the influx of His grace. Christ is their Head in the sense that they, as we, are under His dominion and influence.

The Church is the Mystical Body of Christ

Pope Pius XII states that, if we would define and describe the Catholic Church, we shall find no expression more noble, more sublime or more divine than the phrase which calls it "the Mystical Body of Christ."²⁹

The expression "mystical body" of Christ has received from the earliest times more than one meaning;³⁰ it is only in the second half of the twelfth century that the Church itself begins to be qualified by the adjective "mystical."³¹ It was Alexander of Hales (†1245), the glory of the Franciscan School, who in his *Summa Theologica*, treating of the grace of Christ and His Headship of the Church, applies the term "mystical Body" to the Church.³²

The Mystical Body of Christ is the Catholic Church considered as the supernatural organism composed of the multitude of faithful who form one body, the Body of Christ, internally unified and vivified by the Spirit of Christ, the soul of the Church.³³ The phrase "Mystical Body of Christ" stresses the invisible and divine elements of the essentially visible Church. The Church is like Christ, her Head and Exemplar, "who is not complete, if only His visible human nature is considered, or if only His divine, invisible nature. . . . But He is one through the union of both and one in both."³⁴

The Church is called "the Mystical Body of Christ" to distinguish it, first, from the physical body of Christ, which born of the Virgin Mother of God now sits at the right hand of the Father; secondly, to distinguish it from the Eucharistic body of Christ; thirdly, to distinguish it from any ordinary body in the natural order, whether physical or moral.³⁵ This latter distinction is of utmost importance, for it serves to remind us that the Catholic Church is a unique

²⁹ *Litterae Encyclicae* "Mystici Corporis," (AAS 35.199).

³⁰ Cf. Tromp, *op. cit.*, 102-160; E. Myers, *The Mystical Body of Christ* (London: 1938), 24-27.—On the origin of the term 'mystical body,' see Tromp, *op. cit.*, 98-102; Gruden, *op. cit.*, 53-58.

³¹ H. De Lubac, S.J., *The Splendour of the Church* (New York: 1955), 87.

³² *Summa Theologica*, tom. 4 (Quaracchi 1948) 153-154. Cf. *infra* n. 130.

³³ "Quamquam vox Corporis Mystici adhibetur variis significationibus, tamen sensu stricto est Ecclesia visibilis ut organismus et quidem interne a Spiritu Christi vivificatus"—Tromp, *op. cit.*, 23; cf. 167-169.

³⁴ Leo XIII, *Epistola Encyclica* "Satis Cognitum" (AAS 28.710).

³⁵ Pius XII, *Litterae Encyclicae* "Mystici Corporis" (AAS 35.221).

society, a communion, a living supernatural organism intimately and inseparably united to Christ; that it is distinct from a physical body in the natural order, and not to be confused with human societies and organizations. In the natural body the principle of unity joins the parts in such a way that each lacks its own individual subsistence; in the Mystical Body of Christ that mutual union, though intrinsic, unites the faithful by a bond which leaves intact their individuality, personality, liberty and responsibility. Again, in a natural body all the individual members are ultimately destined to the good of the whole body; in the Mystical Body of Christ, if the ultimate end is considered, it is directed to the advancement of all and of every single member, because they are individual persons.³⁶

If we compare the Mystical Body of Christ to a moral body, a society, the difference is exceedingly great and important. A moral body is an organization, but the Church is a living organism because of its soul, the Spirit of Christ. In the moral body the principle of unity is nothing more but the common end and the common cooperation of all the members under the same authority for the attainment of that end; in the Mystical Body of Christ this mutual collaboration of all members is supplemented by a distinct internal principle which exists effectively in the whole and in each of its parts, and whose excellence is such that of itself it is vastly superior to whatever bonds of union may be found in a moral or even physical body. That internal principle is the Spirit of God, Who, numerically one and the same, gives life and unity to the whole Church.³⁷ In no social body is there such a bond between the head and members, and of members with one another, as there is in the Church because of the Spirit of Christ. He is for the Mystical Body of Christ, what the soul is for the human organism.

It is well to note that, although the Scriptures speak of this union of Christ and His Church under the form of metaphors and comparisons, it does not mean that the Mystical Body of Christ is nothing more than an abstraction, or a mere logical entity. It is a supernatural reality, since it is the subject of prerogatives, of

³⁶ *Ibid.* (AAS 35.221-222).

³⁷ *Ibid.* (AAS 35.222-223).

essential qualities, and of rights.³⁸ The union of Christ the Head with the Church, His Body, is a real, ontological union, or, to use the traditional terms sanctioned by the Fathers, "it is a mystical, transcendent, supernatural union whose unity and reality exceed our powers of expression and of comprehension; it is a union that God alone can make us understand, as He alone was able to bring it into being."³⁹

The Church is the Fulness of Christ

What St. Paul said of the human organism is to be applied analogously to the Mystical Body of Christ: "The head cannot say to the feet: I have no need of you."⁴⁰ As in the natural order the head alone cannot fulfill its functions apart from the bodily organism, and is completed by the members, in like manner Christ the Head requires His members, and without the Church, which is His Mystical Body, He is incomplete. This is precisely what the Apostle means in saying that the Church is the fulness of Christ: "He has put everything under His dominion, and made Him the head to which the whole Church is joined, so that the Church is His body, the completion of Him who everywhere and in all things is complete."⁴¹ The Church, being His Mystical Body, is the fulness of Christ (*pleroma Christi*⁴²), the complement of Christ, because it completes and perfects Him in the plan of God's eternal designs in regard to His Incarnate Son and all creatures,⁴³ while Christ in a sense attains through the Church a fulness in all things.⁴⁴ She is in the same relation to Christ as a building to its foundations, as the stem to the root, as the organism to the life that animates it, as the bride to the bridegroom, as the head to the body. The Church is Christ. The expression is strong; but the Apostle repeats it over and over again

³⁸ "The image of the Head and members, of the Vine and the branches, the idea of incorporation, of life-giving inclusion, of mystical identity are too much in evidence and too often repeated in Scripture and Tradition to permit one to regard them only as figures of speech and rhetorical exaggerations"—Mersch, *op. cit.*, 582.

³⁹ Mersch, *op. cit.*, 584. Cf. Jürgensmeier, *op. cit.*, 22.

⁴⁰ 1 Cor. xii. 21.

⁴¹ Ephes. i. 22-23 (Mgr. Knox's translation).

⁴² Cf. Prat, *op. cit.*, 1, 294-296; Tromp, *op. cit.*, 84-85; Gruden, *op. cit.*, 74-78.

⁴³ Prat, *op. cit.*, 1, 299; 2, 283.

⁴⁴ Cf. Pius XII, *Litterae Encyclicae* "Mystici Corporis" (AAS 35.230).

in a variety of metaphors: without the Church, Christ has not His fulness. Christ is fully revealed only when the nature of the Church is revealed, for she is His Body and His fulness.⁴⁵

This fulness, to be sure, adds nothing new to the God-Man, Christ. It is from Christ and by the vivifying power of Christ that His Mystical Body derives its growth and builds itself up; it is from Him that grace and strength descend to all the members who form His Body, the Church, and God sees us and blesses us only for His sake, in Him and through Him. Moreover it is the Eternal Word of the Father who deigned, as Augustine points out,⁴⁶ to become the Head of the Church. The supereminent dignity of the Church rests on the fact that she is the Mystical Body of the Incarnate Son of God.

Oneness of Christ and Church: the Whole Christ

The Fathers of the Church emphasize and inculcate the Pauline teaching that Christ and the Church, Head and Body, form one, new man, one mystical person in whom heaven and earth, hence all creation, are yoked together. "The one whole Christ is not divided," writes Clement of Alexandria, "there is neither barbarian, nor Jew, nor Greek, neither male nor female, but a new man, transformed by the Holy Spirit of God."⁴⁷ The familiar sayings of Augustine "Christus totus, Caput et Corpus" and "Caput et membra, unus Christus" express the teaching of the Church. The mystical Christ is a supernatural reality. The historical Christ born of Virgin Mary is manifest in physical form; the eucharistic Christ is reality in sacramental form; the mystical Christ is reality in His own characteristic form. The historical Christ, the Word made flesh, is not the whole mystical Christ. The mystical Christ is the true vine with its branches; it is Christ the Bridegroom with His Bride, the Church; it is Christ the Head together with all His members.⁴⁸

The revelation of the great mystery of the Whole Christ in the fulness of time was already prefigured in the union of Adam and Eve.⁴⁹ Adam, inspired by God, spoke of his union with Eve, and

⁴⁵ Jürgensmeier, *op. cit.*, 29-30; Mersch, *op. cit.*, 121, 578.

⁴⁶ "dignatus est esse caput Ecclesiae"—*Sermo* 45, n. 5 (PL 38.266).

⁴⁷ *Protrepticos* 11 (PG 8.229).

⁴⁸ Prat, *op. cit.*, 1.300; Jürgensmeier, *op. cit.*, 21-22.

⁴⁹ Cf. Council of Vienna (Denz 480).

uttered the prophetic words: "they shall be two in one flesh."⁵⁰ Saint Paul, referring to this divine oracle, added: "Those words are a great mystery, and I am applying them here to Christ and his Church."⁵¹ This corresponds to the Scriptural conception that man and wife "are no longer two, but one flesh," that they become one body of which the man is the head.⁵² As man and wife are united in such a manner that they become a complex entity like the human organism, so are Christ and the faithful united, forming one body, Christ being the Head and the faithful the members thereof. The indissoluble union of husband and wife in Christian marriage is modeled upon the inseparable union of Christ the Bridegroom with the Church, His bride. Head and members form one single man, one Christ; the Bridegroom and the Bride are one flesh. There is, certainly, subjection and dependence between her and Him, but at the same time she is His Body, His fulness and complement.⁵³

The marvelously intimate union between Christ and His Church was foreshadowed also in the Old Testament's prophecies concerning the alliance between God and man.⁵⁴ At all times the idea of a pact and union between God and man appears as part of divine revelation: an alliance which precedes God's foreknowledge of the fall of man, hence an alliance in no way occasioned by the fall of Adam. Of special importance to our study is the alliance made with Abraham, renewed and confirmed by God in Isaac and Jacob, because it signified an ideal of the greatest possible intimacy between God and man. Even when Israel proved unfaithful, as she did, God did not rescind His pact; He pursued her with an everlasting love. The Lord spoke through Osee: "And I will espouse thee to me for ever: and I will espouse thee to me in justice, and judgment, and in mercy, and in commiserations. And I will espouse thee to me in faith: and thou shalt know that I am the Lord."⁵⁵

⁵⁰ Gen. ii.24; cf. Matth. xix. 6; Ephes. v. 31. In view of Adam's prophecy St. Thomas (2-2, q. 2, art. 7) says that in his state of original justice Adam had foreknowledge of the mystery of Incarnation (and of the Church, the Body of Christ).

⁵¹ Ephes. v. 32 (Mgr. Knox's translation).

⁵² Cf. 1 Cor. xi. 3.

⁵³ Cf. De Lubac, *op. cit.*, 153.

⁵⁴ Tromp, *op. cit.*, 36 ff.

⁵⁵ Osee ii.19-20.

Many other prophets of Israel might be cited to the same effect. The reason is that Israel is moving towards something which the Old Dispensation was intended to announce and prepare, namely, the nuptial union of Christ and the Church. The espousals announced by the prophets of old are realized in the revelation of the great mystery in the Gospel: the mystery of the union of Christ and Church in the unity of one, new man, the mystical Christ. It is highly significant, therefore, when the Fathers teach that the Word became incarnate to join unto Himself as Head the Church which is His bride and His Mystical Body.⁵⁶

The oneness of Christ and Church, that is, the Whole Christ, is a subject upon which tradition dwelt at great length. Saint Augustine repeats again and again, on countless occasions, that Christ and the Church are one and the same thing, one man, one person, one Christ, one Son of God. Hence the Whole Christ is not the Savior alone, but Christ the Head plus the members who form His Mystical Body. It is Christ the Head united with the Church, His Body. "The faithful," as Mersch remarks,⁵⁷ "are not merely in Christ, nor are they simply one in Christ; they are Christ Himself, the one Christ, the Mystical Christ." The members of Christ are one with Him: He is they and they are He. All are gathered together into this unity, and in God's eyes they are but one well-beloved Son.⁵⁸ So real is this unity that God Himself cannot separate these two that He has joined together; in order to love Christ completely, so to say, He must love all of us together with our Head. There is one forceful passage in Augustine which merits to be quoted at length; it reflects brilliant light on the purpose of our study. The holy Doctor says:

God, who loves His Son, cannot do otherwise than love the members of His Son. Nor has He any other reason for loving them except that He loves the Son. He loves the Son according to His Divinity, since He has begotten the Son equal to Himself; but He loves the Son also in His human nature, because the Only-begotten Word became flesh, and because of the Word the flesh of the Word is dear to Him. Us He loves because we are the members of His well-beloved Son. And, that we might become members, He loved us before we came into existence. . . . He did not begin to love us only on the day we were reconciled to Him by the blood of His Son; He loved us before the world was made, that we too might

⁵⁶ *Tromp, op. cit.*, 111-112.

⁵⁷ *Op. cit.*, 139.

⁵⁸ *Id.*, 414.

become His sons together with His Only-begotten Son, long before we had any existence. . . . Thus the love wherewith the Father loves the Son is also in us. It is in us because we are members of the Son; we are loved in Him, because the Son is loved wholly, Head and body.⁵⁹

Augustine repeats the same thought with even greater force in another passage wherein he commends charity:

the children of God are the body of the only Son of God, and, since He is the Head and we the members, there is but one Son of God. Therefore he that loves the children of God loves the Son of God, and he that loves the Son of God loves the Father. Nor can anyone love the Father unless he love the Son; and he that loves the Son loves also the children of God. What children of God? The members of the Son of God. And by loving he too becomes a member; through love he enters into the unity of the body of Christ, and there shall be one Christ, loving Himself (*et erit unus Christus amans seipsum*).⁶⁰

These passages from the pen of Augustine are a clear expression of the Pauline teaching on the oneness of Christ and the Church in the mind of God. In a very true and profound sense, therefore, the Church is a continuation of the mystery of Incarnation and Redemption. The mystery of the Church is the very mystery of Christ.⁶¹ When speaking of the mystical Christ the Fathers of the Church do not lose sight of the individual personality of the historical Christ born of Virgin Mary. On the contrary, the very intensity of His personal life is the necessary condition of His full mystical life as the Head of the Church. They do not separate the divinely established unity of Christ and the Church, but distinguish two different dignities; for Christ is the Head and the Saviour of His body, the Church. As Pius XII teaches, even though the Apostle brings Christ and His Mystical Body into a marvelously intimate union, he distinguishes one from the other as Bridegroom and Bride, as Head and Body.⁶² The union between Christ and the Church, the Head and the Body, must not be considered on par with the union between the divine nature and the human nature in the person of the Incarnate Word; however close and mysterious, it is not a hypostatic union. Hence the Whole Christ must not be so taken, as

⁵⁹ *In Ioan. tract.* 110, n. 5-6 (CC 36.625-626); cf. *tract.* 111, n. 6 (CC 36.632).

⁶⁰ *In epist. ad Parthos* 10 (PL 35.2055).

⁶¹ Myers, *op. cit.*, 2.

⁶² *Litterae Encyclicae* "Mystici Corporis" (AAS 35.234).

if that ineffable bond by which the Son of God assumed a definite human nature, belongs to the universal Church.⁶³

The Church a Mystery and a Sacrament of Christ

The idea of the Church as God willed her, knows her and loves her, is neither a deduction of our reason nor a postulate of our nature. It is supernatural; it encloses a sacramental mystery.⁶⁴

Without going into details, a mystery is a supernatural reality partially hidden or mysterious, but nevertheless knowable and in some ways visible. St. John Chrysostom writes: "We call a mystery that of which one aspect is seen and the other aspect is believed."⁶⁵ When we state that the Church is a mystery, by no means do we intend to do away with her essential visibility. The mystical Christ is visible in the very way that its historical founder Jesus Christ was visible. He was visible both as man and as man sent by God. Analogously the Church is visible both as a society of men, and as the Body of Christ founded and sustained by God.⁶⁶ Christ, according to Saint Paul, was a mystery. The Incarnate Son of God had a human nature, visible and readily known as man by those who had the normal use of their faculties; but His divinity, His divine nature, was something not grasped by "flesh and blood," but only by those to whom the heavenly Father had revealed it. Similarly the Church is a mystery, because its outward juridical organization is visible, but its inward divine life is known by those who have supernatural faith.

The Church is a mystery; that is to say, she is also a sacrament, a sacramental mystery, like Christ Himself.⁶⁷ In this world the Church is the sacrament of Christ, as Christ in His sacred humanity is for us the sacrament of God.⁶⁸ The divine nature of Christ is really and most closely united to the visible humanity, the flesh, and in such a way that, although it is hypostatically united with the flesh in the person of the Logos, it remains hidden under the flesh. The Church, too, by virtue of its union with Christ, is a great

⁶³ *Ibid.*, (AAS 35.218).

⁶⁴ Cf. Clérissac, *op. cit.*, 6.

⁶⁵ *In Epist. 1 ad Corinth.*, homilia 7 (PG 61.55).

⁶⁶ Scheeben, *op. cit.*, 540.

⁶⁷ *Id.*, 558-559.

⁶⁸ Cf. De Lubac, *op. cit.*, 147; Scheeben, *op. cit.*, 560-561.

sacrament, a sacramental mystery. For although she is outwardly visible, and according to her visible aspect appears to be no more than a society of men of one faith and under one visible head, it harbors in its interior the mystery of an extraordinary union with Christ made man and dwelling within it, and with the Holy Spirit who fructifies and vitalizes it.

The Church is the sacrament of Christ; which means, to express it another way, that there is between her and Him a certain relation of mystical identity. "The whole mystery of the Church," says Clérissac, "lies in the equation and convertibility of these two terms: Christ and the Church."⁶⁹ She is united to the Son just as the Son is united to the Father; she is in the Father's hand just as she is in the hand of the Son, her Bridegroom. This is the mystery of Christ in the Church and of the Church in Christ.⁷⁰

The great mystery hidden before all ages and revealed only in the fulness of time, is the immense plan of God's love by which He decreed to unite all in His well-beloved Son, in the unity of the Whole Christ. All creation holds together in this plan, and it holds the whole together in Christ.⁷¹

The Church in Franciscan Theology

It is with a definite purpose in mind that we have presented a summary outline of the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ. For we aim to show that the Church, which is Christ's Mystical Body, is inseparably connected with the Franciscan doctrine on the primacy of Christ, and that she occupies a prominent place within the Franciscan theological framework.

The teaching of the great Franciscan masters on Christ the final scope and exemplar of all creation is at the same time the doctrine of the primacy of the Whole Christ. It extols not only Christ, the Head of His Body, but His Mystical Body, the Church, as well. It is a key to the doctrine of the Mystical Body which, in turn, to use the Pauline expression, completes and perfects the Franciscan concept of the Headship and Kingship of Christ.

⁶⁹ *Op. cit.*, 17.

⁷⁰ *Id.*, 26.

⁷¹ Cf. E. Mersch, *The Theology of the Mystical Body*. Translated by C. Vollert, S.J. (B. Herder Book Co.: St. Louis, Mo. 1952), 53-57.

We may state in advance that Franciscan Theology on the Incarnate Word does not bear solely and exclusively on the person of Christ; it does not leave the Mystical Body of Christ out of its consideration, as if the Church were some accidental appendage of Christ, or as if she were some after-thought on the part of God's love for His only-begotten Son Jesus Christ. It necessarily includes the Whole Christ, Head and Body, because Christ the Head and the Church, His Mystical Body, are but one, one mystical person, one Son of God upon whom God's love rests. The first outpouring of God's immense love outside of the Blessed Trinity was destined absolutely for the adorable Heart of Christ and His Mystical Body. In the hidden designs of God Christ and His Church were never envisaged separately: their union is indissoluble. There is a mysterious identity between them. The Church is Christ. Saint Augustine does not hesitate to say: "nos ipse sumus—we are He. We are He, since we are His body and since He was made man in order to be our Head."⁷²

The Christ, whose Kingship Franciscan Theologians never ceased to proclaim and advance, is the Christ revealed in the fullness of time; it is the Christ whom St. Paul knew and preached, whose glory and absolute primacy over all creation he extols in his epistles—and the Franciscan doctrine on the universal Kingship of Christ is solidly based on his teaching. It is the Christ who is in us, lives in us, and is one with us as His members; and we are in Him, live in Him, and are one with Him. The Christ whom Saul persecuted is none other than He who is one with His Church. It is He who spoke in the name of His Body, "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? . . . I am Jesus whom thou persecutest" (Acts ix.4-5). He it is who has been predestined the perfect adorer and glorifier of God, the final scope and exemplar of all ways of God, and the Head of His Mystical Body, which is the holy Church spread over the entire earth. He it is who possesses the supreme Royalty and "in all things He holds the primacy" (Col. i.18). It is the Whole Christ: Christ the Head and the Church, His Mystical Body. She cannot be separated from her glorious Head.

The doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ is the unfolding in

⁷² *In Ioan. tract.* 111, n. 6 (CC 36.632-633).

the fullness of time of the eternal plan of God's love towards His Incarnate Son Christ Jesus and all the creation which He produced out of love. But, as Sacred Scripture and Tradition teach, God did not wish to place mankind with Christ their Head side by side, as it were, without any organization and isolated one from another. The Incarnate Word was never willed by God to be ever actually alone, a solitary individual; He was predestined absolutely to be the Head and King, not merely in an extrinsic way, but precisely as Head of His Mystical Body, as the Bridegroom who with His Bride, the Church, are inseparably joined together in an organic whole. The Church is not the result of some fresh plan, as it were, on the part of God, nor of any belated pity for the fallen mankind. Apart from Christ, the Church has no existence of her own since it is in Him that she has her being as His Mystical Body. She is therefore rooted in the utmost depths of the one Son of God. She has her beginning in the glory of eternity in Christ, her Head.⁷³

The entire present divine economy is centered in the Whole Christ. Saint Paul, unveiling in time, so to speak, the mystery of God's love, places Christ in its center. Everything converges on this point, thence everything proceeds, and thither everything returns. St. Bonaventure says that "Christ is the central rock; all things revolve around Him and it is in Him that all things must be reunited, just as the lines drawn from a circumference are rejoined in the indivisible unity of a central point."⁷⁴ Christ is the beginning, the middle, and end of all creation. In the natural order, as in the supernatural, everything is in Him, everything by Him, everything for Him. It is in the Whole Christ, in the one Son of God, as St. Augustine loves to repeat, that God has foreknown us, called us, and predestined us (cf. Rom. viii. 29-30; Ephes. i. 1-6). It is in the Church, the one Christ, that God looks upon us and loves us; in her that He desires us and we encounter Him; in her that we cleave to Him and return to Him.⁷⁵ Before being born from the pierced side of Our Lord on the Cross, she was eternally conceived in the Word for His glory.

The Whole Christ, then, is the object of the divine eternal decree

⁷³ Mersch, *The Whole Christ*, 24. Cf. Clérissac, *op. cit.*, 8-9.

⁷⁴ *In Lucam*, cap. 20, n. 23 (*Opera Omnia* 7.508).

⁷⁵ De Lubac, *op. cit.*, 24-25.

whereby Incarnation was willed by God in order to manifest in a most marvelous way His love and His glory. Christ is the crown of all creation, visible and invisible: by Christ we mean, to use the words of Pius XII,⁷⁶ the Head and Body, the Whole Christ. This does not detract in any way from the teaching of Franciscan Theologians on the Headship of Christ;⁷⁷ neither does it confuse Christ the Head with His Mystical Body, the Church: the two are one without division and without confusion. It is our firm conviction that this is in perfect accord not only with the spirit of Saint Francis who loved the Whole Christ passionately, but also with the great masters of Franciscan thought who imbibed of his spirit. If Franciscanism was born of Francis' love for Christ and for His Church, no less is Franciscan Theology inspired and guided by the same love.⁷⁸

In this part of our study we aim to establish the point that the Franciscan doctrine on the universal and absolute primacy of Christ in the present order of divine Providence—a doctrine firmly rooted in Scripture and Tradition—necessarily includes the Whole Christ, Head and Body, which is His Church. Consequently, whatever it teaches about the glorious Head of the Mystical Body, must embrace at the same time His Mystical Body: for the two are one not only in the fullness of time, but also in the eternal decrees of God. In view of the Whole Christ all has been willed, ordained, and ordered: for its sake all things visible and invisible have been created.⁷⁹ By one and the same decree with the Incarnation of His only-begotten Son God preordained His Mystical Body, the Catholic Church. As the redemption of mankind was not the primary nor the adequate motive of the Incarnation of the Word of God, neither was it of the existence of the Church, the Body of Christ. The permission of sin did not determine the existence of the God-Man, Christ, but

⁷⁶ *Litterae Encyclicae* "Mystici Corporis" (AAS 35.230).

⁷⁷ On the teaching of Scotus about Christ the Head of the Church see Hieronymus de Montefortino, *Ven. Ioannis Duns Scoti . . . Summa Theologica*, p. 3, q. 8, art. 1 ff. (Romae: 1903), V. 112 ff.

⁷⁸ Cf. E. Bettoni, O.F.M., *Visione Francescana della Vita* (Edizione 2-a. Brescia 1956) 11. What the author affirms of Franciscan piety (p. 81) is equally true of Franciscan Theology: "il francescanesimo sottolinea nel modo più efficace l'importanza che Gesù Cristo ha in ordine di rapporti che si stabiliscono fra Dio e l'uomo."

⁷⁹ Anger, *op. cit.*, 484.

only the mode in which it was realized in history. The same holds true for the Church, because she is His living Mystical Body.

The Whole Christ in the Old Testament

The Old Testament in its entirety is concerned with Christ and His kingdom, the Church. In his lengthy study on the historical development of the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ in Scripture and Tradition, E. Mersch states that "it is to the Mystical Body that the whole of the Old Testament leads,"⁸⁰ and that the Whole Christ "is prefigured in the Old Testament and revealed explicitly in the New."⁸¹ The creation of Adam and Eve, the prophetic announcements of a nuptial union between God and man, the allegories of bridegroom and bride, of a spiritual temple, and many others, are presented by the Fathers as figures of Christ and His Church.⁸² Whatever Scripture says of Christ the Head of His Mystical Body can in a true sense be applied to the Church. This is a thought dear to St. Paul, and the Fathers of the Church have been careful not to lose sight of. Consequently, the Church was certainly prepared for over many years, as Christ was, by the history of the Jewish people, and prefigured in the earthly paradise; but in reality she is older than all this, as He is.⁸³

The history of the Old Testament, enlightened by the New, clearly proclaims that Christ's Kingdom, the Church, was to embrace all nations in the unity of a single body joined to Him as to a Head.

The New Testament and Tradition

The Apostle's teaching on the primacy of Christ is at the same time the doctrine of the Whole Christ. He tells us in the prologue of his Epistle to Ephesians that before the foundation of the world, in the eternal plan of God, there was question of the Mystical Body of Christ, of incorporation and deification of mankind in Christ:

He has chosen us out, in Christ, before the foundation of the world, to be saints, to be blameless in his sight, for love of him; marking us out before-

⁸⁰ *The Whole Christ* 26.

⁸¹ *Id.*, 577.

⁸² Cf. Tromp, *op. cit.*, 26-36, 60-66.

⁸³ De Lubac, *op. cit.*, 38.

hand (so his will decreed) to be his adopted children through Jesus Christ. Thus he would manifest the splendour of that grace by which he has taken us into his favor in the person of his beloved Son.⁸⁴

What the first verse of Genesis is for a religious understanding of the universe: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth"; and what the prologue of St. John's Gospel is for the understanding of the Word of God: "In the beginning was the Word"; that the prologue of Paul's epistle to the Ephesians is for the Mystical Body of Christ. Just as in God there is a pre-existence of Christ in relation to the Incarnation and creation, so there is in God a pre-existence of the Church in relation to Christ as His Mystical Body and to all creation, visible and invisible: the two form one organic whole, one mystical person. "The manner of being," Mersch explains, "that God willed for man was an *esse in Christo*, an existence in Christ. Human ontology, viewed in its origins, was in reality a supernatural ontology, an ontology of members destined to be joined together in a body: we have existence in order that we may become members of the Saviour," that is, that we may be His Mystical Body.⁸⁵ Even as Christ was predestined to be our Head, so in Him and for His glory we have been predestined to be His members in the unity of His Body, the Church, to be one in Him and with Him, one Christ, one Son of God.⁸⁶ "Our predestination in Christ," writes De Lubac, "is the predestination of the Church; Saint Paul never envisages it outside this framework of totality."⁸⁷

Predestination of Christ according to His human nature is at the same time the predestination of His Mystical Body. But Christ, as Franciscan Theologians faithfully maintain, was willed absolutely for His own glory and as the final scope and exemplar of all creation in the present order of divine economy. It follows, therefore, that the Whole Christ, Head and Body, was thus willed by God.

The same thought may be gathered from the analogy Saint Paul institutes between husband and wife, on one hand, and Christ and the Church, on the other. The union of man and wife, the Apostle teaches, is based on the union of Christ and His Church; the latter is

⁸⁴ Ephes. i.1-6 (Mgr. Knox's translation).

⁸⁵ Mersch, *The Whole Christ*, 22.

⁸⁶ *Id.*, 140-150; Anger, *op. cit.*, 475-476.

⁸⁷ *Op. cit.*, 24.

the exemplar of the former. We may, therefore, legitimately predicate of Christ and His Church certain things which St. Paul affirms of the union of man and wife, and of the relation of one to the other, the more so since these things are verified in a more noble sense in the divine prototype. The Apostle, dwelling on the relationship between man and wife, says that women should "be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord; because the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church."⁸⁸ This denotes, first, a relation of headship on the part of man with regard to his wife. In the complex entity of the union of man and wife, the husband is the head of the wife; the wife, in relation to her husband, is, by analogy, his body, hence the apostolic precept, "men ought to love their wives as their own bodies";⁸⁹ husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church."⁹⁰ Secondly, it denotes an intimate union, a certain oneness: "they are not two, but one flesh."⁹¹ Christ and the Church are one: the Church is Christ.⁹² Again, there is a relation of finality: "man was not created for the woman, but the woman for the man."⁹³ Hence it is that "man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man";⁹⁴ "the woman is the glory of the man."⁹⁵

In the designs of God, says the Apostle, these things are a great mystery in reference to Christ and His Church.⁹⁶ That Christ is the Head of the Church, and that the union of Christ and His Church is very close and mysterious, we have already seen. What interests us here more is that the Church is the glory of Christ, her Head, and

⁸⁸ Ephes. v. 22-23.

⁸⁹ Ephes. v. 28.

⁹⁰ Ephes. v. 25.

⁹¹ Ephes. v. 32; cf. Matth. xix. 6; Gen. ii. 24.—Speaking of the oneness of Christ and His Church, St. Augustine writes: "quid est Ecclesia? Corpus Christi. Adjunge illi caput, et fit unus homo. Caput et corpus, unus homo. Caput quis est? Hic qui natus est de Virgine Maria, qui . . . et resurrexit propter justificationem nostram. Ipse est caput Ecclesiae, ipse panis de illa terra. Corpus autem ejus quod est? Conjux ejus, id est Ecclesia. Erunt duo in carne una. Sacramentum hoc magnum est: ego autem dico in Christo et in Ecclesia. Sic et Dominus in Evangelio, cum de viro et uxore diceret: Igitur jam non sunt duo, sed una caro. Ergo unum voluit esse hominem Deum Christum et Ecclesiam."—*Sermo* 45, n. 5 (PL 38.266).

⁹² 1 Cor. xii. 12.

⁹³ 1 Cor. xi. 9.

⁹⁴ 1 Cor. xi. 7.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Ephes. v. 32,

that, as the woman was created for man, so, too, the Church exists for the Head, Christ.

This order of finality is brought out by St. Paul also in his first Epistle to Corinthians iii.23, where he states that "all things are for you, and you for Christ, and Christ for God."⁹⁷ The whole world, life and death, all things present and future, have been ordained by God for the faithful. They are the Body of Christ, and members of member; He is their Head. Unto the building of this Body God has ordered all these things. In turn, all creation and they themselves are for the glory of Christ: "and you are for Christ." It is through Him, in Him, and for Him that all things were created in heaven and on earth, both visible and invisible.⁹⁸ Thus the end of all things is Christ as man.⁹⁹ This glory is due to Christ, namely, that all things should serve Him, be ordained to Him, and look to Him as their end, because of His own excellence. Ultimately, since all of God's works *ad extra* are for His own glory, Christ is for the glory of God: "and Christ for God."

God's motive in His works *ad extra*, as maintained by Franciscan masters on Incarnation, is hereby clearly indicated: Christ is for

⁹⁷ In his endeavor to root out inane glory and party strife among the faithful of the Church of Corinth, St. Paul tells the Corinthians not to glory in men, be they wise and eloquent, be they apostles Paul, Apollo, or Cephas; they should not form factions as if some belonged to Paul, others to Apollo, or to Cephas. And the reason which the Apostle adduces is because the Apostles themselves and all others, nay, the whole world, life and death, all things present and future have been ordained by God for the faithful, and especially the elect. It is the order of finality established by God: "all things are yours." But neither are they to glory in themselves on account of their exalted dignity, for they in turn are Christ's: "and you are Christ's." He is their Head and Lord; they are His possession, His Body and His mystical members. They should refer all glory and praise to Christ: He is the end of all creation. Ultimately Christ is for God's glory.—Cf. St. John Chrysostom, *In Epist. 1 ad Corinth.*, homilia 10, n. 2; Theodoretus, *Interpretatio Primae Epistolae ad Corinthios* (Opera Omnia 1 [Coloniae Agrippinae 1567] 60); Ambrosiaster, *Commentaria in Epist. ad Corinth. Primam* (among the works of St. Ambrose: PL 17.201–202); A Lapide, *Commentaria in Epistolam 1 ad Corinthios*, cap. 3 (*Commentaria in Sacram Scripturam*, tom. 9 [Neapoli 1858] 186); R. Cornely in *Cursus Scripturae Sacrae. Commentaria in Nov. Testamentum*, pars 2, p. 97–98.

⁹⁸ Cf. Col. i.16–17; John i.3.

⁹⁹ "horum vero omnium finis est Christus, ut homo. Haec enim gloria per se tali homini debebatur, scilicet, ut omnium creaturarum et hominum esset finis, ut omnia illi servirent, ut omnia ad eius gloriam ordinarentur."—A Lapide, *loc. cit.*, [supra n. 97],

God; the Church is for Christ, her glorious Head; all else for the Church.¹⁰⁰ Since Christ is one with His Body, the Church, by one and the same decree of Incarnation God willed the Whole Christ. And as the Head was willed absolutely, so, too, the Church; for without His Mystical Body, the predestination of the Head alone is unthinkable.

The same conclusion can be arrived at from a study of the text of Genesis i.27, bearing on the creation of the first man and first woman: "to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them."¹⁰¹ In the creation of Adam and Eve in the state of original innocence Tradition sees the figures of Christ and of the Church in the eternal counsels of God; and in the union of Adam and Eve in their state of original justice, the union of Christ the Bridegroom with the Church, His Bride.¹⁰² This certainly implies that the Whole Christ was willed by God logically prior to His foreknowledge of the fall of our first parents and, in view of their fall, of their redemption by Christ the Redeemer.

As early as the second century Hermas represented the Church as an old woman, and his reason is as follows: "Because she was created first, before all things. For this reason she is old; and for her sake the world was established."¹⁰³ Elsewhere he states: "The God who drew creatures out of nothing and made them multiply and increase" did it all "for the sake of His holy Church."¹⁰⁴ Notwithstanding the apocalyptic character of *The Shepherd of Hermas*, the place the Church occupies in the plan of God is clearly indicated:

¹⁰⁰ R. Deffrennes, O.F.M., expresses this Franciscan viewpoint in these terms: "Par rapport à son Père, Jésus est le moyen de sa glorification ad extra; relativement aux hommes, Jésus est moyen de leur divinisation (ut vivamus per Eum), il est le lien qui les relie au Père. Il est le Chef dans l'union duquel ils sont élevés à la dignité, eux aussi, d'Adorateurs du Père: le Christ est à Dieu, les hommes sont aut Christ . . . et tout est aux hommes."—"Essai de synthèse de la Théologie dans la Charité," *La France Franciscaine*, XVI (1933) 147.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Matth. xix. 4.

¹⁰² Cf. Tromp. *op. cit.*, 36. What Tromp says of Eve, "Evam protoparentem figurato sermone repraesentare Ecclesiam, doctrina est antiquissima." (*op. cit.*, 35), is equally true of Adam in his original innocence with respect to Christ the Head of the Church.

¹⁰³ *The Shepherd*, Vis. 2, chap. 4, n. 1 (*Loeb Classical Library*. K. Lake, *The Apostolic Fathers* 2.25).

¹⁰⁴ *The Shepherd*, Vis. 1, chap. 1, n. 6 (*Ibid.*, K. Lake 2.9).

"for her sake the world was established." She is built upon the Son of God as on a rock, and belongs to Him as to a master.¹⁰⁵

If we collate the text of Hermas with what the author of the so-called *Second Epistle of Clement to Corinthians* says of the Church, the primacy of the Whole Christ stands in bold relief. The anonymous author, a contemporary of Hermas, exhorts the faithful in these terms:

Thus, brethren, if we do the will of God our Father we shall belong to the first Church, the spiritual one which was created before the sun and moon; . . . Therefore let us choose to belong to the Church of life, that we may win salvation. But I do not think that you are ignorant that the living Church is the body of Christ. For the Scripture says, "God made man male and female;" the male is Christ, the female is the Church. And moreover the Books and the Apostles say that the Church belongs not to the present, but has existed from the beginning; for she was spiritual, as was also our Jesus, but he was made manifest in the last days that he might save us. And the Church, which is spiritual, was made manifest in the flesh of Christ.¹⁰⁶

The author of the above homily is well familiar with the Pauline concept of the Church, for he calls her the Body of Christ and represents her as His Bride. The Church existed from the beginning before the creation of the sun and the moon; that is, in the eternal plan of God she comes before the rest of visible creation. The reference to Genesis i.27, and its figurative meaning, implies that just as Adam and Eve were the first man and the first woman created, and for them the whole earth was made, so Christ and the Church, being the prototype, was first willed by God, and for them all things, visible and invisible, were ordained.

Origen writes in a similar vein: "Do not believe that the Bride, that is, the Church, has existed only since the Savior's coming in the flesh; she exists since the beginning of the human race and even since the creation of the world: even—I call Saint Paul to witness—since before the creation of the world. For the Apostle said: 'Since He has chosen us in Christ since before the creation of the world, that we might be holy and immaculate before Him, predestining us in love to the adoption of the Son.' And it is written in the Psalms:

¹⁰⁵ *The Shepherd*, Sim. 9, chap. 12, n. 1, 7, 8 (*Ibid.*, K. Lake 2.249, 251).

¹⁰⁶ *The Second Epistle of Clement to Corinthians* xiv, 1-3 (*Ibid.*, K. Lake 1. 151).

'Remember, Lord, Thy Church, which Thou hast gathered together from the beginning.' So, the foundations of the Church have been laid from the beginning."¹⁰⁷

Saint Hilary is no less explicit. He but reechoes the tradition of the Greek Fathers when he says that we have been elected by the Father before the foundation of the world in Christ to be His Mystical Body.¹⁰⁸

Saint Augustine, as was shown above,¹⁰⁹ teaches that God did not begin to love us only on the day we were reconciled to Him by the blood of His Son; He loved us before the world was made that we too might become His sons together with His only-begotten Son, long before we had any existence. By predestining Christ according to His human nature as the head of the Mystical Body God also predestined the Mystical Body by one and the same act.¹¹⁰

The primacy of Christ and His Church in all of God's works of creation, both visible and invisible, occupies a rather prominent place in Anastasius of Sinai.¹¹¹ In no uncertain terms he teaches that Christ and the Church were the exemplars of all other creatures in heaven and on earth:

All creation, both visible and invisible, was first constructed and prefigured according to her [Church's] image and of Christ, her Spouse. For this is the mystery which God first predestined before the ages and generations. Hence God is also said to have brought all things to a head and restored them in Christ. What else does it mean to bring to a head and to restore than that the things that were prefigured and adumbrated in Himself by

¹⁰⁷ *In Cant. Canticorum*, bk. 2 (*Origenis Opera Omnia*. Opera et studio C. Delarue. tom. 3 [Parisii 1740] 62).

¹⁰⁸ *Tractatus in Ps. 13*, n. 4 (PL 9.297): "omnes enim currimus apprehendere, in quo apprehensi sumus a Christo, id est, inveniri in ejus corpore, quod ex nobis ipse praesumsit, in quo ante constitutionem mundi a Patre sumus electi . . . ;" *Tractatus in Ps. 14*, n. 5 (PL 9.301-302): "qui Christi sunt, in Christi corpore ante constitutionem mundi electi sunt, et Ecclesia corpus est Christi, et fundamentum aedificationis nostrae Christus est."

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *supra* n. 59.

¹¹⁰ On this point of Augustine's teaching see J. S. Grabowski, *The Church: An Introduction to the Theology of St. Augustine* (B. Herder Book Co.: St. Louis, Mo. 1957), especially chapter on 'The Church and Predestination.' Cf. E. Braem, "Christus als model en genadebron van onze praedestinatie volgens Sint Augustinus," *Augustiniana* (Lovanium: 1954), 137-145.

¹¹¹ D. Unger, O.F.M.Cap., "Christ the Exemplar and Final Scope of All Creation according to Anastasius of Sinai," *Franciscan Studies* 9 (1949), 156-164.

ideas, were actually fulfilled in Him by facts? . . . Now when the Apostle of God said 'all things, both visible and invisible, were created in Christ,' he plainly shows and teaches that even the invisible creatures were pre-figured and made in Christ and the Church.¹¹²

The text is clear enough to speak for itself. It enunciates the tradition of the Church on the indissoluble unity of Christ and the Church in the divine decree on the Incarnation of the Word of God. The same teaching is encountered in Irenaeus, Athanasius, and Cyril of Alexandria.¹¹³ Elsewhere Anastasius of Sinai repeats that all creation is made for the sake of Christ and the Church: "For if Paul applies to the Church the fact that every creature was made on account of Adam and Eve, when he says, 'This is a great mystery, I mean in Christ and the Church,' then without doubt every creature that is made for the sake of man and his spouse is referred to Christ and the Church."¹¹⁴ Again: "All things were made on account of Christ and as tending toward Christ, both the things in the heavens and the things on earth."¹¹⁵ All creation was modeled on Christ and His Church.¹¹⁶ True to the teaching of Saint Paul, Anastasius of Sinai never disjoins Christ from His Church in the eternal act of predestination.

That the Church, the mystical Bride and Body of Christ, should enter so intimately into the eternal designs of God concerning His only-begotten Son as to be with Him the first object willed outside of the Blessed Trinity, as well as the final scope and exemplar of other creatures, should cause no wonder. St. John Chrysostom does not hesitate to affirm: "The Church is more pleasing to God than heaven itself. . . . The heaven is for the Church, and not the Church for the sake of heaven."¹¹⁷

St. Maximus the Confessor, whose teaching on Incarnation is of

¹¹² *In Hexaemeron, Praef.* (PG 89.854). Unger, *loc. cit.*, 158.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, Cf. D. Unger, O.F.M.Cap., "Christ's Role in the Universe according to Saint Irenaeus," *Franciscan Studies* 5 (1945), 3-20, 114-137; "Christ Jesus the Secure Foundation according to Saint Cyril of Alexandria," *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947), 1-25, 324-343, 399-414.

¹¹⁴ *In Hexaemeron, Praef.* (PG 89.856). Unger, *loc. cit.*, 161.

¹¹⁵ *In Hexaemeron* 4 (PG 89.890). Unger, *ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Unger, *loc. cit.*, 158-159.

¹¹⁷ "Amabilior enim est Ecclesia Deo, quam coelum ipsum . . . Propter Ecclesiam coelum, non propter coelum Ecclesia"—*Homilia ante Exilium* n. 2 (PG 52.429).

no small importance for Franciscan doctrine on the primary motive of Incarnation,¹¹⁸ lends his weight in support of our present study. The holy Doctor dwells at length on Christ as the very reason for the existence of all creatures: without Christ there would have been no creation at all, because He is the very End of its existence.¹¹⁹ From among many pertinent passages we select the following where, after citing a combination of Pauline texts, he says: "The mystery has been hidden from ages and generations but now is clearly shown (Col. i.26) by the true and perfect Incarnation of the Son of God, who united our nature to Himself inseparably and inconfusedly, according to subsistence, and He conjoined us as first fruits to Himself by means of His holy flesh, . . . which is from us and our own; and He deigned in His kindness that we be one and the same with Him, just as we were pre-ordained before the ages in Him to be the members of His Body (cf. Ephes. i.3-6, 22-23). [This He did] by joining and knitting us closely together with Himself in spirit and leading us to the measure of the spiritual maturity which springs from His own fullness."¹²⁰

In this passage St. Maximus teaches that "God ordained our incorporation into Christ from all eternity, and that before (in the order of finality) He ordained the word. The Mystical Body with Christ as Head was in God's plan from the beginning."¹²¹ This was God's plan, foreknown as such before all ages, for the deification of man through the mediation of Christ the Head of the Church. But because man transgressed God's precept and abused His goodness, God willed this same Christ as Redeemer; and thus through His Son Christ Jesus God did realize the first plan in spite of sin.

The role of Christ, as taught by St. Maximus the Confessor, is at once cosmological and ecclesiological. That what makes Christ the final scope of all creation, the primary intention of God's works *ad extra*, and the absolute object of all His decrees, likewise makes Christ the Head of His Body, the Church. According to His teaching, "all things were created to have their supernatural and natural

¹¹⁸ D. Unger, O.F.M.Cap., "Christ Jesus Center and Final Scope of all Creation according to St. Maximus Confessor," *Franciscan Studies* 9 (1949), 50-62. The English texts and references are based upon this study.

¹¹⁹ Unger, *loc. cit.*, 53.

¹²⁰ *Ambiguum liber* (PG 91.1097). Unger, *loc. cit.*, 56.

¹²¹ Unger, *loc. cit.*, 57.

gifts from Christ and in intimate union with Him. God always intended all creation to form a mystical union in Christ as well as for the sake of Christ."¹²² The Whole Christ marks the unity which was God's purpose in creation.

Incarnation and the Church

The testimony of Scripture and Tradition shows that the Mystical Body of Christ was preordained by God by one and the same eternal decree with the Incarnation of the Word of God. The Church, to be sure, was ordained for the glory of her Head, Christ Jesus, while all things, visible and invisible, were created for the Whole Christ: for the glory of Christ the Head, and for the glory of His Spouse, the Church, and for the glory of the angels. The execution of this divine plan in the fullness of time needs to be considered, at least briefly.

The Fathers of the Church view the mystery of Incarnation as the very mystical nuptials of Christ and the Church. Their teaching may be expressed in the words of the great Doctor of Ecclesiology, Saint Augustine. Speaking of the very act of Incarnation, he says: "The nuptial union is that of the Word and the flesh. The bridechamber of this union is the Virgin's womb. For the flesh itself was united to the Word, whence also it is said: 'henceforth they are not two, but one flesh.' The Church was assumed [in Incarnation] unto Him out of the human race; so that the Flesh itself, being united to the Word, might be the Head of the Church; and the rest who believe, members of that Head."¹²³ St. Leo the Great remarks: "The birth of the Head is the birth of [His] Body."¹²⁴

The very fact of Incarnation constitutes Christ the Head of His Mystical Body formed, at least potentially, from the whole of mankind.¹²⁵ In the eternal absolute decree of God the Church is indis-

¹²² Unger, *loc. cit.*, 53.

¹²³ *Enarr. in Ps. 44*, n. 3 (CC 38.495). Scheeben writes: "The Fathers view the Incarnation itself as a marriage with the human race, inasmuch as it virtually contains everything that can lead to the full union of the Son of God with men. But the relationship of unity it sets up comes to full fruition only in the Church" (*op. cit.*, 543). Cf. Tromp, *op. cit.* 27-35.

¹²⁴ "Natalis Capitis, natalis est Corporis"—*Sermo* 26, n. 2 (PL 54.213).

¹²⁵ "Il Verbo di Dio non si è incarnato in tutti gli uomini, ma solo in quell'uomo esistito in un certo momento della storia e in un punto dello spazio: Gesù Cristo. Ma poichè quella singola natura umana assunta non esiste isolatamente, ma è un membro di quell'unità che è il genere umano, ed è

solubly joined to her divine Head; she is so united to Him in the very moment of Incarnation. This does not mean, of course, that the Church, as a visible hierarchical society, as a visible organism animated by the Spirit of Christ, appears as such at that moment. She "was born from the side of Our Saviour on the Cross like a new Eve, mother of all living."¹²⁶

Incarnation as well as Redemption are ordained unto the formation of the Mystical Body of Christ. The Word became man in order to unite to Himself as Head the Church.¹²⁷ From the moment of His Incarnation Christ laid the foundations of the Church. This foundation is, first, the similarity of the Head and Body in the assumed human nature: the Word of God became one of us; secondly, since in Christ dwells the fullness of grace and divinity, He is the Head from whom all supernatural life and power is able to flow unto the regeneration of mankind.¹²⁸ Moreover, in the moment of Incarnation Christ was anointed King, Prophet, and Priest; for this reason the Fathers call the Church "Corpus Summi Sacerdotis," "Corpus pacifici Regis Christi," "Corpus Christi Capitis."¹²⁹ The Incarnate Word is the ideal exemplar of the Church, as well as the model for the members of His Mystical Body.¹³⁰

connessa realmente con tutti gli altri membri, in essa e per essa il Verbo attrae a sé tutto il genere umano, e se lo incorpora e lo domina. Attorno al corpo vero e proprio di Cristo si costituisce così il suo Corpo mistico, formato, almeno potenzialmente, dall'universalità degli uomini"—Bettoni, *op. cit.*, 96.

¹²⁶ Pius XII, *Litterae Encyclicae* "Mystici Corporis" (AAS 35.205). Cf. Leo XIII, *Encyclica* "Divinum illud" (AAS 29.649): "The Church which, already conceived, came forth from the side of the second Adam in His sleep on the Cross, first showed herself before the eyes of men on the great day of Pentecost."

¹²⁷ For patristic texts on this point, see Tromp, *op. cit.*, 111-112; Mersch, *The Whole Christ* 209-440.

¹²⁸ "Notandum est in incarnatione non tantum haberi unionem aliquam cum fidelibus, qui credentium Ecclesiam constituunt, sed etiam cum eadem, prout est societas a Christo instituta. Nam haud aliter ac in incarnatione ponitur fundamentum materiale Corporis Mystici, quod est similitudo Capitis et Corporis in eadem visibili natura, haud aliter etiam fundamentum spirituale illius Corporis ut organismi. In incarnationem enim Christus assumit corpus sacrosanctum de B.M.V. ut sit Caput Ecclesiae, cum omnibus donis et charismatibus, Ecclesiae ad fidelium gubernationem atque sanctificationem per Spiritus Sancti effusionem communicandis. . . . vi Incarnationis vita Corporis et membrorum in Capite inest in archetypo eminenti et in fonte adhuc clauso"

—Tromp, *op. cit.*, 32-33, 115.

¹²⁹ Cf. Tromp, *op. cit.*, 33, 87-88.

¹³⁰ "Corpus Christi verum, quod traxit de Virgine, est figura et sacramentum

The above consideration leads us to this conclusion: if the Church is inseparably linked with Christ, her Head, in His very Incarnation, as she is, then too she must be so joined to Him in the eternal plan of God. Besides, in the order of execution of this plan in time the Church is the fullness of Christ, and His complement: without His Mystical Body Christ would be incomplete. Hence, too, in the eternal absolute decree of God Christ would be incomplete without His Body, the Church: she is His fullness and completion in the eternal plan of God.

That the Mystical Body of Christ was willed together with the Incarnation of the Word, may be further confirmed by the authoritative teaching of Pius IX and Pius X. The former, in his dogmatic Bull *Ineffabilis Deus*, teaches that B. V. Mary "was preordained by one and the same decree with the Incarnation of the Divine Wisdom";¹³¹ the latter, in his Encyclical *Ad diem illum*, declares that "in one and the same bosom of His most chaste Mother, Christ took to Himself human flesh and at the same time united to Himself the spiritual body [i.e. the Mystical Body, which is the Church] built up of those who are to believe in Him. Consequently Mary, bearing in her womb the Saviour, may be said to have borne also all those whose life was contained in the life of the Saviour."¹³² The inference is evident: the Mystical Body of Christ was preordained by one and the same decree with the Incarnation of the Word of God. But since the Incarnate Word was decreed absolutely as the End and Exemplar of all creation—as the Franciscan school rightfully maintains; and since Christ is one with His Mystical Body, the Church, it follows that the Whole Christ was willed absolutely by God as the final scope and exemplar of all creation.

In the light of the Franciscan teaching on the universal and absolute primacy of Christ the Head, we conclude further that, just as Christ would have come even if Adam had not sinned, so, too, there would have been Christ's Mystical Body even if man had not sinned. Again, in the present order of divine economy the Incarna-

corporis mystici, quod est Ecclesia"—Alexander of Hales, *De Verbo Incarnato*, Inquis. unica, tract. 3, q. 1, memb. 2, cap. 2, art. 3 (*Summa Theologica*, tom. 4 [Quaracchi 1948] 153).

¹³¹ *Pii IX Pontificis Maximi Acta*. Pars Prima (Romae: 1854), 599.

¹³² ASS 36.453.

tion of the Son of God is not the result of the fall of man; similarly the existence of the Church, the Body of Christ, is not due to the sin of our first parents.

The Mystical Body of Christ and Redemption

In view of the fall of man God, out of His immense love and mercy for His creatures, also predestined Christ as the Redeemer of the human race: He willed to redeem man through His only-begotten Son. The loving hands of the Father who fashioned man in the image of His Incarnate Son, held fast unto man even after the fall. He sent His Son that He might redeem us and that we might receive the adoption of sons which we lost. The predestination of Christ as Redeemer of humankind was occasioned by the fall of Adam. "The Incarnation as such was willed from the very beginning as the foundation of the supernatural order, the actualization of that through a suffering Christ was due to the foreknowledge of sin and the need of redemption, which in God's mind followed, logically, the foreknowing of the Incarnation as such."¹³³ The permission of sin determined only the mode in which the Incarnation of the Word of God was carried out in time;¹³⁴ it also determined only the mode, but not the existence, in which the Kingdom of Christ, His Mystical Body, is realized. The Word of God assumed a passible human body because, due to the sin of Adam, man has lost the gift of impassibility. The Church, considered in her members, is a "corpus permixtum" or "permixta ecclesia," as Augustine says;¹³⁵ that is, within the pale of the Church, the Body of Christ, there are saints and sinners, good and bad members.

By His bloody immolation on the Cross Christ acquired a new right to what already belonged to Him as absolute Primate and Head of the Church. He is the Savior of mankind, especially of the faithful who form His Mystical Body. "He is the Saviour of his Body," the Church, says the Apostle,¹³⁶ for "He has purchased with

¹³³ Unger, *loc. cit.*, [supra p. 118] 57.

¹³⁴ "La permissione del peccato non ha determinato la esistenza dell'Uomo-Dio, ma soltanto il modo con cui si è realizzata nella storia, per il quale il Christo 'doveva . . . patire tali cose e così entrare nella sua gloria' "—Bettoni, *op. cit.*, 89.

¹³⁵ *De Doctrina Christiana*, lib. 3, chap. 32, n. 45 (PL 34.83).

¹³⁶ Ephes. v. 23; cf. 1 Tim. iv. 10.

His blood His members who constitute the Church."¹³⁷ Out of the depths of His love for His Body, "He gave himself up on its behalf. He would hallow it, purify it by bathing it in the water to which his word gave life, he would summon it into his own presence, the Church in all its beauty . . . it was to be holy, it was to be spotless."¹³⁸

God permitted sin, and willed the redemption of man through the immolation of His Son, not as a means to, but as a condition of, the greater glory of the Whole Christ: first, the added glory of Christ the Head of His Church through the acts of redemption;¹³⁹ secondly, but nevertheless inseparably from Christ the Head, the added glory of His Mystical Body. In virtue of the mysterious identity of Christ and the Church there is a marvelous interchange of activity. On one hand, the prayers, works, acts of obedience and of suffering with which Christ honored His Father, are also ours; on the other hand, the prayers, acts of worship, the works we perform, the trials and tribulations which we as members of His Mystical Body bear, become Christ's, and as such are offered to God. The members of His Body are intimately associated with their Head in His role of a perfect Adorer of God;¹⁴⁰ they share also in the redemptive acts of their Head, for in Christ and with Christ they continue the four ends of the Sacrifice of Christ.¹⁴¹ It is the Whole Christ who continues in time and space to offer unto God the most pleasing oblation once offered on Calvary by Christ the Head for His Bride, the Church. The Sacred Liturgy, as Pius XII teaches, "is the integral public worship of the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, of its Head and of its members."¹⁴² It is the Whole Christ who is offered to God in the Sacrifice of the Altar. "In the Sacrifice of the Altar," the same Pontiff says, "is signified the general sacrifice by which the entire Mystical Body of Christ . . . is offered to God through Jesus Christ, the Great High Priest";¹⁴³ "in the Sacrament of the Altar

¹³⁷ Pius XII, *Litterae Encyclicae* "Mystici Corporis" (AAS 35.220).

¹³⁸ Ephes. v. 25-26 (Mgr. Knox's translation).

¹³⁹ Cf. D. Unger, O.F.M.Cap., "Franciscan Christology," *Franciscan Studies* 2 (1942), 471; Bettoni, *op. cit.*, 99-115.

¹⁴⁰ Bettoni, *op. cit.*, 97-98; Deffrennes, *loc. cit.* (*supra* n. 100) 147-148.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Pius XII, *Epistola Encyclica* "Mediator Dei" (AAS 39.549-550).

¹⁴² *Epistola Encyclica* "Mediator Dei" (AAS 39.528-529).

¹⁴³ *Id.*, (AAS 39.559).

. . . the Church is signified; in that very thing which she herself offers, she herself is also offered."¹⁴⁴ Christ is present with the Church in her every liturgical action.¹⁴⁵

Moreover in carrying out the work of Redemption Christ wishes to be helped out by the members of His Body; this He willed "for the greater glory of His unspotted Spouse."¹⁴⁶ The Church contributed nothing toward the immense treasury of the Redemption; but in the distribution of these treasures, not only does Christ the Head share this task with His Church, "but wants it in a way to be due to her action."¹⁴⁷

We need not belabor this point any further. The very oneness of Christ and His Mystical Body precludes any separation of the Head from the Mystical Body with regard to the foremost reason why God permitted sin, and willed the redemption through Christ. Without excluding other reasons, we maintain that God would not permit sin, unless as a condition of a greater good; in other words, the added glory of the Whole Christ was the condition under which God permitted the fall of Adam and willed the redemption through the passion and death of His Incarnate Son.

Love as Motive of the Mystical Body of Christ

We have considered the Mystical Body of Christ in the light of the Franciscan doctrine of the universal and absolute primacy of Christ, showing that whatever holds true of Christ the Head of the Church, is likewise true in a very profound sense of His Mystical Body, and, consequently, of the Whole Christ. In conclusion a brief presentation of the motive of God's idea with regard to the Church will not be amiss.

All of God's works *ad extra* proceed in a most ordered way from His most perfect and unselfish love. For God is love: He lives by love, He creates for love, out of purest liberality. Out of love and for purpose of love He created all things, visible and invisible, thereby communicating to other beings His goodness in a measure in which they are capable of receiving it.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ *Id.*, (AAS 39.528).

¹⁴⁶ Pius XII, *Litterae Encyclicae* "Mystici Corporis" (AAS, 35.213).

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ "Toute la raison de ces communications *ad extra*, c'est sa charité. . . .

Since God is love and creates for love, He freely willed others to share in His bliss of love. Above all He willed the Incarnation of His Son so that Christ might be the perfect lover, the perfect adorer of God outside of the Blessed Trinity. God willed Christ primarily for His own glory: Christ is the object of God's love beyond all men, all angels and all creation. From Him God receives love, adoration and praise in an infinite degree. Whereas in the rest of creation God's love and perfections are like so many scattered fragments mirroring the beauty and goodness of God, in Christ there shines the splendor of the fullness of divinity and of grace: "he that seeth me seeth the Father also."¹⁴⁹

Out of love for His Incarnate Son God created all things and subjected them under His dominion. Christ is the Head and King of all creation. He is the end of all creation: in Him creation finds the *raison d'être* of its existence. Christ is principally for the glory of God, yet He is also for His own glory and for our salvation and deification. All creation gives glory to Christ and through Him to the Blessed Trinity one God.

By one and the same eternal absolute decree with the Incarnation of the Word God willed the Mystical Body, the Church, for the glory of Christ, her Head. God's love for Christ embraced the Whole Christ. Out of love and for purpose of love God created man in the image of His Son Christ Jesus. The Son embraced man in His infinite knowledge and undying love even before the world was created. To give visible, concrete expression to this love, He assumed our nature in hypostatic union to be the Head of His Mystical Body formed from the same flesh which He assumed. Out of love for mankind He redeemed man. He is the Head as well as the Savior of His Body, the Church; He "is the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful."¹⁵⁰ It is out of love, too, for His Heavenly Father that Christ has offered Himself as a most pleasing oblation on behalf of all, especially of the elect.¹⁵¹

Si vous demandez le pourquoi de son plan et de ses conseils divins, il n'y a qu'une réponse et une explication: Il aime"—Deffrennes, loc. cit. (*supra* n. 100) 146.

¹⁴⁹ John xiv. 9.

¹⁵⁰ 1 Tim. iv. 10.

¹⁵¹ Scotus, *Rep. Paris.* 4, dist. 2, q. 1, n. 7: "Christus etiam voluit obsequium maxime gratum offerre Deo Patri, quia se ipsum hostiam immolandam pro

The Mystical Body of Christ is the visible expression of God's love for man whom He has chosen, called, and predestined in His own Son in the unity of His Mystical Body. The Church was begotten, so to speak, of God's love for His own Son and for His Mystical Body; for God has no other reason for loving us except that He loves the Son.¹⁵² The glorification of Christ and of His members, that is, of the Whole Christ, marks the fulfillment of the purposes of God with regard to mankind. The Church is primarily for the glory of her exalted Head, Christ Jesus; in Him and one with Him, for the glory of Triune God.¹⁵³

The Doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ and Its Place in Sacred Theology

The doctrine of the Whole Christ, being the central truth of Christianity, occupies a conspicuous position in the works of the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers of patristic era. Indeed much of what the Fathers have written can be correctly understood only in the light of their Pauline concept of the Church which they explored in conjunction with other dogmas or in their exegetical commentaries on the sacred text.¹⁵⁴

The Scholastics treated of the Body of Christ in connection with

nobis obtulit, et noluit hoc obsequium pro se, quia non indiguit, sed pro electis et praedestinatis . . ."

¹⁵² Cf. *supra* n. 59.

¹⁵³ It is to be noted that under this primary *finis* there are diverse intermediate ends all directed unto the glory of Christ, and in Him, with Him, and through Him, ultimately, for the glory of God. Hence it is that in the sources of divine revelation and in the documents of the magisterium of the Church now one now another particular end of the Church is stressed, either in connection with Incarnation, Redemption, or deification and salvation of man, etc. Thus, v.g., Pius XI (*Encyclica* "Rerum Ecclesiae"—AAS, 18.65) states: "For the Church has no other reason for existence, then, by enlarging the kingdom of Christ throughout the world, to make all men participate in His salutary redemption." Similarly, with regard to Incarnation, Pius XII says: "The reason why the only-begotten Son of the Eternal Father wished to be a Son of Man, was that we might be made conformed to the image of the Son of God and be renewed according to the image of Him who created us" (*Litterae Encyclicae* "Mystici Corporis"—AAS, 35.214).

¹⁵⁴ "Pervadit doctrina Corporis Christi totam litteraturam patristicam inde ab initio speculationis theologiae et quidem ita pervadit, ut multa a Patribus conscripta bene intelligi non possint, nisi ab eo qui hanc doctrinam cum omnibus suis modalitatibus bene habeat perspectam"—Tromp, *op. cit.*, 87.

the grace of headship of Christ and his vivifying power over the members of the Church.¹⁵⁵ Some of the earliest treatises on the Church, as v.g., that of Thomas Waldensis († 1430)¹⁵⁶ and, particularly, of Cardinal Turrecremata († 1468),¹⁵⁷ devote a rather prominent part to its exposition.

During the sixteenth century Catholic theologians on the whole did not urge much the idea of the Church as the Mystical Body of Christ against the invisible church imagined by the Protestant reformers. Among those who strongly insisted upon the Pauline concept of the Church as a bulwark against the invisible church of the reformers was Cardinal Hosius.¹⁵⁸ It is certain, however, that up to the time of St. Robert Bellarmine the doctrine of the Church as the Body of Christ did receive more or less extensive treatment from Catholic ecclesiologists, even though the external and juridical part of the Church was expounded in preference to its internal pneumatic element. This holds true also of Franciscan polemical theologians, such as Caspar Schatzgeyer,¹⁵⁹ Nicholas Herborn,¹⁶⁰ Anthony Delphini,¹⁶¹ Anthony Cordubensis,¹⁶² and Alphonsus de Castro.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁵ "The Augustinian tradition that had been so characteristic a feature of the early Middle Ages suffers a gradual decline during the age of the Scholastics. One notices at the first contact with their works that the doctrine of the Mystical Body no longer occupies its position of prominence; rarely is it mentioned, and even then it is spoken of with great moderation"—Mersch, *The Whole Christ*, 451 (cf. pp. 441-498 for a resume of the doctrine of the Mystical Body from the patristic era to the Council of Trent).

¹⁵⁶ *Doctrinale Antiquitatum Fidei Ecclesiae Catholicae . . . in tres tomos digestum* (Venetiis: 1571).

¹⁵⁷ *Summa de Ecclesia* (Venetiis: 1561).

¹⁵⁸ Cf. L. Bernacki, *La Doctrine de l'Eglise chez le Cardinal Hosius*. Paris 1936; G. Grabka, *Cardinalis Hosii Doctrina de Corpore Christi Mystico in luce saeculi XVI* (Washington, D.C.: 1943).

¹⁵⁹ *Scrutinium Scripturae pro Conciliatione Dissidentium Dogmatum*. Edidit U. Schmidt, in *Corpus Catholicorum*, heft 5 (Münster in Westfalen: 1922).

¹⁶⁰ *Locorum Communium adversus huius temporis haereses Enchiridion*, Edidit P. Schlager, in *Corpus Catholicorum*, heft 12 (Münster in Westfalen: 1927).

¹⁶¹ *De Potestate Ecclesiae*. Venetiis 1549; *Universum fere Negocium de Ecclesia . . . in tres libros optimo iure digestum* (Venetiis: 1552). Cf. A. Garani, O.F.M.Conv., *De Ecclesiae Natura et Constitutione Doctrina Ioannis Antonii Delphini O.F.M.Conv.* (Padova: 1943).

¹⁶² *Opera Quinque Libris Digesta* (Venetiis: 1569).

¹⁶³ *Adversus omnes Haereses Libri XIII* (Parisiis: 1543).

With St. Robert Bellarmine¹⁶⁴ the visible and juridical elements of the Church obtained prime consideration, while the dogmatic exposition of the nature of the Church gave way to a polemical and controversial treatment of it. The definition of the Church handed down by the holy Doctor¹⁶⁵ came to be generally accepted by later ecclesiologists with the result that there followed a one-sided, partial idea of the nature of the Church. Moreover his distinction between the 'body' and 'soul' of the Church¹⁶⁶ gave rise at times to a tendency to speak of a 'juridical Church' in distinction to 'the Church of charity,' or of 'the visible Church' versus 'the mystical Body,' or of 'the hierarchic society' in distinction to 'the community of grace.'¹⁶⁷ The problem of the members of the Church suffered not a little from this distinction.

Although Catholic ecclesiologists from the sixteenth century onwards never lost sight of the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ, their works, as a rule, do not contain any noteworthy development of it. They aimed chiefly at refuting the Protestant errors about the invisible church, the divine institution of the hierarchy, papal authority and primacy, the visible marks and properties of the true Church of Christ. This was also the general character of the works written against Gallicanism which had for its object the curtailment of papal authority. The Pauline concept of the Church played no fundamental part in the structure of the works concerned; sometimes it figured therein merely as a corollary, as a refutation of an objection against the visibility of the Church, or was swamped in the enumeration of the 'figures' of the Church contained in the works of the Fathers.¹⁶⁸ The works of the Fran-

¹⁶⁴ Cf. J. De la Serière, *La Théologie de Bellarmin* (Paris: 1909); Grabka, *op. cit.*, 135-140.

¹⁶⁵ "Nostra autem sententia est Ecclesiam . . . esse coetum hominum eiusdem Christianae fidei professione, et eorundem sacramentorum communione colligatum, sub regimine legitimorum pastorum, ac praecipue unius Christi in terris vicarii, romani pontificis"—*De Controversiis Christianae Fidei*, lib. 3, cap. 2 (*Opera Omnia Bellarmini* II [Neapoli 1856] 75).

¹⁶⁶ "Notandum autem est, . . . Ecclesiam esse corpus vivum, in quo est anima et corpus, et quidem anima sunt interna dona Spiritus Sancti, fides, spes, charitas, etc. Corpus sunt externa professio, et communicatio Sacramentorum"—*id.* (*ibidem*).

¹⁶⁷ Cf. De Lubac, *op. cit.*, 66.

¹⁶⁸ De Lubac, *op. cit.*, 63.

ciscan ecclesiologists of the seventeenth century, Angelus Petricca¹⁶⁹ and Felix A. Guarnieri,¹⁷⁰ show that the doctrine of the Church as the Body of Christ held no fascination for them. De Lubac is correct when he remarks that the Pauline concept of the Church as the Body of Christ was viewed by Catholic authors "as fitted only to put across an idea which remained that of a society undoubtedly supernatural in its origin and end, and with equal supernatural means at its disposal, but without mystical unity in the true sense of the word."¹⁷¹

The nineteenth century witnessed a resurgence of the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ, particularly at the hands of Möhler, Scheeben, Passaglia, Hurter, Cardinal Franzelin, and others. The theologians of the Vatican Council brought to the light of day the importance of the Pauline and patristic concept of the Church.¹⁷² The proposed Schema on the Church read, in part, that "this aspect of the Church can never be over-emphasized, if it is to be held up before the eyes of the faithful and become permanently and deeply fixed in their minds, this lofty representation of the Church, the head of which is Christ."¹⁷³ Yet it must be admitted, as De Lubac observes,¹⁷⁴ that the lead of these theologians was not very much followed. The doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ was normally the object of passing mention only, and the tendency to consider the Church only in its external and juridical elements persisted until recent times.¹⁷⁵

The Doctrine Today

In recent years there has appeared a vast amount of literature on the Church considered in her inner beauty. Special works have explored scriptural and patristic data as well as scholastic contribution to the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ. The Encyclical

¹⁶⁹ *De Militante ac Triumphante Ecclesia Disputationes adversus huius temporis haereticos in duodecim Libros distributae* (Romae: 1647).

¹⁷⁰ *Opus de Ecclesia Militante . . . Divisum in Quatuor Libros*. Romae 1694.

¹⁷¹ *Op. cit.*, 63.

¹⁷² Cf. *Collectio Lacensis: Acta et Decreta Sacrosancti Oecumenici Concilii Vaticani VII* (Friburgi Brisgoviae: 1892), 578.

¹⁷³ *Collectio Lacensis VII*. 567.

¹⁷⁴ *Op. cit.*, 62.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. J. Bellamy, *La Théologie Catholique au XIX^e Siècle* (Paris: 1904), 226-242.

cal *Mystici Corporis* of Pope Pius XII has provided not only a fresh impetus but a sure guide as well to the study of the One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Church—the Mystical Body of Christ; to a deeper study, that is, of the scriptural and patristic notion of the mystery of the Church. More and more treatises appear wherein the Church is presented as she is in herself, and not as she is to her opponents. No longer are Catholic theologians, with an eye to Protestantism, presenting a partial aspect of her; rather they present her as she is in reality: a phenomenon both divine and human, visible in her juridical and hierarchical organization, in her means, in her members, yet her inward beauty, oneness, and vitality can be grasped only by faith; a true and perfect society of its kind, and yet in her origin, progress, and evolution transcending all laws, historical as well as social. They present the Church as the supernatural mystery of the Incarnate Word, a sacramental mystery of Christ.

Unfortunately, however, not a few authors of our day separate the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ from its rightful place in Ecclesiology, and treat of it as a corollary or an appendix to the tract on the Incarnate Word or on Grace. Such a method, we believe, breaks the unity of the treatise on the Church, and is tantamount to rending asunder the Body of Christ, to dissolving the mystery of the Church, as if the external visible aspects of the Church could be disassociated from her divine and supernatural elements. The Catholic Church is so constituted by her Divine Founder, that even her visible elements are of divine institution and come under the object of faith. The Whole Christ, that is, Christ the Head and the Church, His Body, is the integral object of Ecclesiology.

Moreover such a separation does not take stock of the fact that the problem of the members of the Church can not be solved properly unless we have before our eyes the Church not only as a hierarchical and juridical society but also as a supernatural organism, a living body, animated by the Spirit of Christ. The Catholic Church is the Mystical Body of Christ; consequently no one can be a member of the Body of Christ, who is in no way a member of the Church. It is one thing to be a member of the Church, and another to be related to it in desire and resolution.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Pius XII, *Litterae Encyclicae* "Mystici Corporis" (AAS, 35.243).

Again, it is only in the light of the supernatural unity of Christ and His Church that the full import of the necessity of the Church for salvation can be truly and properly understood. Since Christ is the Head of the Church, and the Church is His Mystical Body, and their union is indissoluble, the communication of the Holy Spirit, the participation in truth and in the life of Christ the Head, cannot be obtained except in the Church and through the Church. Outside the Church there is no salvation, really means nothing else than: Outside Christ there is no salvation.

Others, while treating briefly of the Mystical Body of Christ, develop their treatises exclusively along historical and apologetical lines, the theological approach to it being entirely neglected. Such an exclusively apologetical and historical approach can in no way be an adequate exposition of the article of the Creed. Together with the Incarnation from which it is inseparable, the Mystical Body of Christ is the one central truth of divine revelation. Only with faith as our sure guide and as a higher light can we expect to attain to a fruitful understanding of the mystery of the Church.¹⁷⁷ No apologetics can engender this deep and salutary understanding.

The treatise *De Ecclesia Christi* has been too often relegated to a secondary position in Sacred Theology. Many, indeed, do not even consider it strictly theological matter, but merely an introduction to theology. As a result the doctrine of the Church is not given its rightful place within the structure of Sacred Theology. We maintain that greater emphasis should be laid on a dogmatic presentation of it. The reason for this is clear: the tract on the Church is nothing else than a treatise on the Mystical Body of Christ. It is one and the same reality.

Towards a Franciscan Theology of the Church

There can be no doubt, we believe, that a unified theological treatise *On the Church* within the framework of the Franciscan Theological Synthesis would be very welcome. It is our firm conviction that the Franciscan doctrine of the universal and absolute primacy of Christ the Head of the Church, which is His Mystical Body, provides a deeper and richer understanding of the data of

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Vatican Council, Sess. 3, chap. 4 (Denz 1796).

revelation about the Church. In harmony with the principle of Duns Scotus,¹⁷⁸ Franciscan masters have extolled and continue to extol the Kingship of Christ. By the application of the basic Franciscan principles to the Body of Christ, the Church, the dignity and glory of the Bride of Christ is at the same time extolled.

By a Franciscan *Theology of the Church* we do not mean the introduction of some novelty into the structure of the Body of Christ, the Catholic Church; neither do we advance a radical departure from the standard treatises on Ecclesiology. Rather we urge a Franciscan orientation to it, a christocentric approach built upon the Franciscan doctrine of love as God's motive in all His works *ad extra* and of the absolute primacy of Christ. The Church was willed by God by one and the same eternal and absolute decree with the Incarnation of the Word of God. The object of that decree, which logically preceded that of redemption, is the Whole Christ: Christ the Head of the Church, and the Church, His Mystical Body, joined together inseparably. God willed the Church for the glory of Christ, her Head, and also for the glory of man. For the glory of Christ, because of His absolute primacy: He is the entire reason for all things created and also their exemplar; for the glory of man, because in His love God embraced us and chose us in His Son in the unity of His Mystical Body to the dignity of adoptive sonship.

But God also saw that man would sin, so He willed Christ also as Redeemer of mankind. Out of love for His Son and in His Son for mankind, and for purpose of love, God willed the redemption of fallen man through the immolation of Christ on the Cross. Christ is not only the Head but also the Savior of His Body, the Church. Out of love and for purpose of love, Christ has redeemed with His blood His members who constitute the Church. "Ideo multum tenemur ei," says Scotus.¹⁷⁹

Here we have the Franciscan ideas guiding the whole structure of the Church in her twofold essential element, and at the same time imparting to it a meaning which surpasses by far the significance of the Church which one may gather from perusing an ordinary text-

¹⁷⁸ "In commendando enim Christum malo excedere quam deficere a laude sibi debita, si propter ignorantiam oporteat in alterutrum incidere"—*Oxon.* 3, dist. 13, q. 4, n. 9.

¹⁷⁹ *Oxon.* 3, dist. 20, q. 1, n. 10.

book on the Church. With this Franciscan approach the unity of the treatise on the Church is achieved not only in the eternal designs of God, but also in the execution of the same in time.

The theological monument erected by Franciscan theologians to the glory of Christ the King of all creation emerges as a magnificent and lofty edifice of which Christ is the Head, and the Church, His Body; or, to use a figure of speech, of which Christ is the pinnacle, and the Church His living temple constructed of His members, incorporated through Baptism into Christ. He is the Head and the Foundation of this living temple, His Church. He is the King of His kingdom, the same Church. Unto the building of this living temple, all other works of God *ad extra* are ordained. Within this temple, the Mystical Body of Christ, Saint Augustine says, "Christ teaches Christ."¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰ *Sermo* 354, n. 1 (PL 39.1563).

THE LAST THINGS—THE RETURN OF MAN TO GOD

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The crowning point of God's love for man is the return of man's love to God, which reaches its ultimate perfection in the beatific vision. All things were created out of God's love and it is only in the attainment of God through love that the final purpose for which man was created is completed. What is so characteristic of Franciscan teaching—the primacy of love—reaches its climax in eternal beatitude, which is the supreme perfection of the rational creature and unites such a nature in the highest degree to its most perfect object. In this way the circle of the primacy of love, from the love of God in creating man through Christ who is King and Exemplar, reunites itself to the very source from which it began. The return of man to God is the return of love for love—the love of God for man and man's love for God in God.

We propose here to treat of man's eternal beatitude in the light of the teachings of St. Bonaventure and John Duns Scotus.

Doctrine of St. Bonaventure

For St. Bonaventure beatitude is that end which satisfies our appetite. The human soul is ordained for this end, which as an object is God alone, the uncreated Good. Beatitude can only be attained through the influence of God as a form informing the soul rendering it deiform and completely satisfying it.¹ It is an accidental form or perfection which makes the soul more noble in so far as it gives it a second being (*esse secundum vel bene esse*). This accidental form has its origin from God and not from the soul itself and unites the soul to the supreme good, which is the termination of every appetite. In this sense, says St. Bonaventure, it is more noble than a substantial perfection.² Moreover, created beatitude is a

¹ Bonaventurae, S., *Opera omnia*, Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi), 1882–1902. In *IV Sent.* dist. 49, quaest. 1, art. unic. (IV, 1000–1).

² *Ibid.*, ad 4 (IV, 1001).

quality. It is not purely an act because an act of glory proceeds from some habit; nor is it purely a habit because it refers to the highest perfection which is in continuous act. Therefore, it is necessary for us to speak of it as a habit in act, but more principally it is a habit or deiformity, and so more principally in the genus quality.³

All men naturally desire true beatitude. To confirm this the Seraphic Doctor cites Boethius, who argues that the desire for the true good is implanted by nature in the mind of man and it is only the true good which makes us truly happy. Therefore all men desire true beatitude. Furthermore, man does not desire just any good, but that good which satisfies his desire. And no good except true beatitude fully satisfies the human soul.⁴ Again St. Bonaventure says that man's desire for true beatitude is either natural or deliberative. And if he can deliberate in regard to this desire, he can desire the contrary, namely, misery, which is contrary to the nature of man's will. This being so, man desires true beatitude by a natural desire, which is common to all and constant in all.⁵ In concluding this question St. Bonaventure says that there are two things which go to make up a desire or appetite, namely, agreeableness (*convenientia*) and need (*indigentia*). And since the rational soul was created in the image and likeness of God, it is capable of the most sufficient good. It is not sufficient to itself, since it is vain and deficient. Hence it naturally desires true beatitude.⁶ It may be objected that many are ignorant of true beatitude, for some say that knowledge must precede a deliberative desire but not a natural desire. St. Bonaventure says that this is not so. For, just as in us there is a twofold love (natural and deliberative), so likewise there is a twofold knowledge. Hence, just as deliberative knowledge precedes deliberative love, so natural knowledge precedes natural love. Moreover, there is a twofold instinct for good—in general and in particular. And this instinct for good in general comes from a natural knowledge and in this respect there is no error; but the instinct for this or that particular good is not entirely from a

³ *Ibid.*, ad 5 (IV, 1001).

⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 2, art. unic. (IV, 1002-3).

⁵ *Ibid.*, (IV, 1003).

⁶ *Ibid.* (IV, 1003).

natural habit, but by an assumption made by the deliberating reason. And concerning this there is error. We must understand the same of the appetite. All men, therefore, have the desire for true beatitude in general and they have knowledge of it in general. For all men believe that beatitude is the good which suffices and all desire it.⁷ And if we ask: how does one know this in general? St. Bonaventure answers that this knowledge is innate.⁸

In the Soul Alone

Beatitude inheres in the soul alone as in its primary subject because only the soul is capable of it and can enjoy it. The Seraphic Doctor gives two reasons why beatitude is in the soul alone. First, because beatitude consists in God, Whom the soul alone sees and loves. Secondly, the beatitude of glory corresponds to grace; and grace, which is a spiritual quality, is in man by reason of the soul alone; so also is beatitude. Nevertheless, beatitude does redound to the body on account of its union and participation with the soul.⁹

Furthermore, beatitude exists in the soul primarily according to potency and it is one in many potencies just as there is one soul in many organs and one health in many members. St. Bonaventure says: "*Beatitudo inest animae secundum modum specialem unionis Dei et animae; sed modus specialis non est nisi per cognitionem perfectam et amorem, et hic est per potentias.*"¹⁰ Again, beatitude is a second habit and second perfection of the soul which must be present according to some potency of the soul to receive it which differs from the substance of the soul. Hence beatitude is not present in the soul immediately through the substance of the soul.¹¹

Since beatitude or glory is one in many potencies, we may ask: in what potencies is the act or operation of glory present? St. Bonaventure answers that it is an act or operation of all the potencies of the soul,¹² because glory is a complete and ultimate perfection. Because it is complete, it perfects the whole soul and therefore every spiritual potency of the soul. Because it is an ultimate perfection, it

⁷ *Ibid.*, (IV, 1003).

⁸ *Ibid.*, (IV, 1004).

⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 3, art. unic. (IV, 1005).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 4, art. unic. (IV, 1006).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, (IV, 1006).

¹² *Ibid.*, q. 5, art. unic. (IV, 1008).

is joined to operation since act perfects habit. Therefore all the potencies of the soul come into play in the act of glory. In answer to the objection that the total reward of glory consists in the vision of God, so that the whole notion of beatitude would consist in the act of intelligence, St. Bonaventure replies that there are three acts of glory, namely, the vision of the rational potency, the love of the concupiscible potency and the comprehension of the irascible potency. These he calls the endowments (*dotes*) of the soul and they are required in order that the soul enjoy God perfectly, that is, that it have perfect vision, perfect love and perfect comprehension of Him. But these three acts are entirely conjoined and connected. Hence he who sees perfectly, loves and possesses perfectly, so that through this connection what is of all is attributed to one. However, more is attributed to vision because of the fact that in vision the *status patriae* is distinguished from the *status viae*. But this is not so with love; for love is everywhere.¹³ Because the substantial reward of beatitude consists in God, the principal acts of glory are those according to which the soul is converted to God. And it is also according to these acts that the endowments (*dotes*) of the soul are assigned, because according to these acts the soul is united to God as the bride to the Bridegroom and tends immediately to God.¹⁴

In this question where St. Bonaventure properly treats of the perfection of the state of glory and of the endowments of the soul, he barely touches upon the celebrated controversy, namely, in which act or operation the beatific act *formally* consists: whether simultaneously in the acts of many potencies or in the act of one potency. And assuming that it consists formally in the act of one potency, does it consist in the act of the intellect (in *visione*) or in the act of the will (in *fruitione per amorem amicitiae*)? It may be noted, however, that the following points fall outside the scope of controversy: 1. The beatitude of heaven comprises many perfections and operations, especially fruition of the will and the immediate vision of the intellect. This is explicitly taught in the Constitution of Benedict XII (*Benedictus Deus*) "quod ex tali visione et fruitione eorum animae . . . sunt vere beatae." 2. There is no doubt that beatitude is in the will as an *object*. This St.

¹³ *Ibid.*, q. 5 ad 1, 2, 3 (IV, 1009).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, (IV, 1009).

Thomas concedes where he says that beatitude is in the will "dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo ita, quod sit voluntatis objectum; et sic beatitudo, cum sit ultimus finis, et ex fine sit ratio boni, quod est voluntatis objectum, oportet ponere, beatitudinem in voluntate esse. Alio modo ita, quod sit aliquis actus voluntatis; et sic beatitudo in voluntate esse non potest."¹⁵ 3. It is clear that *in via generationis* God is in the very nature of things the immediate object of vision before He is the immediate object of fruition. But it is controverted whether this is also true *in via perfectionis*.

Richard of Middleton holds that beatitude consists in the act of the intellect as well as in the act of the will, but more principally in the will "quia in visione inchoatur et in fruitione consummatur."¹⁶ St. Bonaventure agrees with this opinion. In speaking of the concept of fruition the Seraphic Doctor teaches that fruition presupposes cognition or vision as a disposition, but essentially it is an act of the will which carries with it both love and delight: ". . . videre et habere requiruntur ad *frui*, similiter *amare*. Nam si quis videt aliquid et habet nunquam delectatur, nisi amet; aliter tamen requiritur visio quam amor. Nam visio disponit, similiter et tentio, sed amor delicias suggerit. Unde est quasi acumen penetrans, et ideo ei maxime convenit unire et per consequens delectare et quietare: ideo essentialiter, non dispositive, est fruitio. Propter quod est intelligendum, quod actus voluntatis potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet per modum appetitus et complacentiae. Primo modo antecedere potest ipsam visionem; secundo modo consequitur, et in hoc est perfecta ratio ipsius fruitionis, scilicet in complacentia rei visae et habitae."¹⁷ Moreover, St. Bonaventure says that although God, or beatitude or Christ can be called the end of the good will, it is preferable to say with St. Augustine that charity is the end because of the fact that the complete notion (ratio) of end is proper to charity itself. Thus charity is the *end in which* (finis in quo) and the *end by which* (finis quo) the will rests; and the *end by which* the will rests is twofold: either *simply* (simpliciter) or *for the time being* (et nunc). Uncreated charity, which is God, is the *end*

¹⁵ Thomae, S., *Opera omnia*, (ed. Vives) Paris, 1872-1880. *Comment. in IV Lib. Sent.* dist. 49, quaest. 1, art. 1, quaestiuncula 2.

¹⁶ Bonaventurae, S., *Op. cit.*, *In IV Sent.* d. 49, q. 4, scholion 4 (IV, 1007).

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, *In I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2 (I, 37).

in which the will rests. But created and consummated charity, such as the charity of heaven, is the *end by which* the will rests *simply* in God.¹⁸ This distinction between the *end in which* and the *end by which* in regard to charity is also the basis for the common distinction used between objective beatitude or that which beatifies (God), and formal beatitude or that act by which the beatifying object is apprehended and possessed. Again, St. Bonaventure says that God would not be perfectly united to the soul if He were united without charity, because the soul is not disposed to be united to God by glory unless through the medium of a habit by which it is conformed to God and by which it is elevated and in a certain manner firmly bound to God. For the union of beatitude is through knowledge and love. Hence just as the habit of loving does not make for a lessening of love, but rather for its perfection, so also it does not make for an imperfection in the union of beatitude, but rather for its perfection and completion.¹⁹

St. Bonaventure clearly teaches then that beatitude consists "in actu intellectus originaliter, in actu vero voluntatis complete," which is summed up very beautifully in the *Breviloquium*: "In man's reward that godliness of glory is given him by which he is conformed to God, sees God clearly with his reason, loves God *fully* with his will, and retains Him forever in his memory. Thus the whole soul lives, the whole soul is richly endowed in its three powers, and the whole soul is joined to God, is united to Him and rests in Him, finding in Him as in all good: peace, light and eternal sufficiency."²⁰

To the question whether all the Blessed in heaven have an equal beatitude, the Seraphic Doctor answers: beatitude, as a reward, taken as an object is entirely one; but if one considers it formally, it is one by a unity of conformity and by a unity of connection; nevertheless there is a difference in the amount of joy and reward. For one who sees God more clearly than another, enjoys Him more than another.²¹

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, *In II Sent.* d. 38, q. 2, a. 1 (II, 884).

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, *In III Sent.* d. 31, q. 1, a. 3 ad 4 (III, 690).

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, *Breviloquium* pars VII, cap. 7 (V, 289).

²¹ *Op. cit.*, *In IV Sent.* d. 49, pars 1, q. 6, a. 1 (IV, 1010-11).

Glorification of the Body

St. Bonaventure teaches that the glory of the body pertains to the substance of beatitude, so that the glorification of the body makes for greater joy both extensively and intensively, not through an increase of the habit, but by the removal of any impediment that would retard it.²² Furthermore, the glory of the body arises from the glory of the soul. But in reference to the dispositions or absolute qualities of the body, these are from God Who refashions the body. In regard to the consummation of the body's endowments, however, this happens through the influence of the glorified soul. Hence just as in the present life the soul influences the body, so that through this influence the body is more durable, stronger and more agile, so also the glorified soul influences all these qualities to which the body shall be disposed perfecting and consummating its refashioning.²³

The Endowments of the Glorified Body

The glorified body will possess four endowments or qualities: clarity, impassibility, subtlety and agility. These four qualities are opposed to the four elements which comprise our earthly body. And since these elements are imperfect, a fourfold defectibility arises from them. From *water*, which is a humid and passible element, the body has passibility and corruption. From *earth* it has obscurity because it is an opaque element. From *fire* it has animality because heat continuously consumes. From the *air* it has infirmity, for the air is very easily changed. Hence these four defects must be removed by their opposite goods in order that the body be perfect with a complete perfection. So there are four qualities: impassibility contrary to corruption, clarity contrary to obscurity, spirituality contrary to animality and penetrability contrary to infirmity. But these qualities of the glorified body will not be equal in all the Blessed.²⁴

Whether in heaven we shall perceive with our senses according to their own proper acts, St. Bonaventure concludes that the sense of

²² *Ibid.*, pars 2, q. 1, a. 1 (IV, 1012-13).

²³ *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 1 (IV, 1014).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 2 (IV, 1016).

sight and touch and perhaps also hearing will have their own proper acts, but not the other senses. For *to perceive* (*sentire*) can be from the conjunction of the power with the organ which is well disposed, or from the conjunction of the power with the object. Since, therefore, in heaven there will be powers joined to organs well disposed, there will be all the powers for perceiving. However, since the objects of all the senses will not be had in glory, certain senses will perceive in their own proper acts and certain ones will not. For the objects of certain senses are absolute properties and they are found in the glorified body. Such are the color of sight and levity of touch. And because the glorified body shall rise with luminosity and levity, the objects of these two senses will be had in heaven, and hence these two senses will perceive in their own proper acts. The objects of the other senses, however, are not properties of the glorified body nor are they absolute properties, but emanations from bodies. Such are smell, sound and taste. And because they will not be had in glory, the senses of smell, sound and taste will not perceive in their own proper acts.²⁵ Furthermore, those senses which will perceive in their own proper acts will do so by receiving species from the sensible objects themselves.²⁶

Whether or not the habit of knowledge (*scientia*) will remain in heaven, St. Bonaventure says that we can consider knowledge as a habit, its use and its mode. Knowledge as a habit will remain and be completed in heaven; in regard to its use, it will be changed, but in regard to its mode, that will be taken away. As a habit it will not be taken away because it is not repugnant to perfection. For it is not repugnant to see God and to know propositions, conclusions and principles of some other science, e.g., geometry. Its use will not be taken away entirely, because, if there would be a habit without use or act, it would be incomplete or less complete, which is not proper according to that most perfect and complete state. Nevertheless, it will be changed on account of the imperfection connected with it. Its mode, which is had through discursive and successive processes of reasoning will simply be taken away, because in heaven the mode of knowing will be by simple gaze (*per simplicem aspec-*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 3 (IV, 1018-19).

²⁶ *Ibid.*

tum) of the divine essence, for there the intellect is rendered deiform through the complement of glory. And hence in heaven knowledge in a certain way will be preserved, in a certain way changed and in a certain way be taken away.²⁷ But this in no way derogates from the fact that the Blessed know all things in the Word, for knowledge of things in the Word and knowledge in its proper genus are simultaneously compatible in regard to habit and act, because the one is ordained to the other.²⁸

The Doctrine of John Duns Scotus on Beatitude

According to Scotus beatitude is the supreme perfection of a rational creature, which unites such a nature in the highest degree to its most perfect object.²⁹ Considered subjectively beatitude pertains to human and angelic natures; its object is the highest perfective good (God) and it consists *per se* in the operation of a faculty of the soul,³⁰ and therefore it perfects more immediately the potency of the soul rather than its essence. Moreover, this operation or beatific act is simply more perfect than the habit from which it proceeds even in the notion of final perfection because it attains the final object more immediately. It is also more perfect in the notion of formal perfection because so great a perfection in its highest degree could not belong equally to its habit and its act. But beatitude does redound to the essence of the soul, but only through the medium of the potency. Hence the essence of the soul cannot be beatified as distinct from its potencies.³¹

Furthermore, it is the opinion of the Subtle Doctor that if beatitude be taken in an *intensive* sense, that is, for its ultimate and perfect attainment, it consists in one operation; if, however, it be taken in an *extensive* sense, that is, for the immediate attainment of each potency in reference to the same object, then the attainment of one potency is more intimate and more ultimate than the other. Hence beatitude consists in the operation of both the intellect and the will. *Simply* speaking, however, the beatitude of a rational

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, In III Sent. d. 31, q. 3, a. 2 (III, 186-7).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, ad 3 (III, 687).

²⁹ Scoti, Joannis Duns, *Opus Oxoniense*, (ed. Vives), Paris, 1891-1895. *Comment. in IV Lib. Sent.* dist. 49, quaest. 6, n. 24 ad 4 (XXI, 269).

³⁰ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 2, n. 2 et 6 (XXI, 8).

³¹ *Oxon.*, III, d. 2, q. 1, n. 14 (XIV, 123).

nature is in one operation. It does not consist in the aggregation of all the goods pertaining to it, but that by which the beatific object is immediately and ultimately attained.³² Hence Scotus admits that the intellect as well as the will is immediately beatified in so far as God is the beatific object of both potencies and both in their proper manner are beatifiable and in their own manner immediately attain the beatific object. Nevertheless, in respect to the beatitude of the potency, or beatitude taken in the extensive sense, each potency is beatifiable which can attain the beatific object immediately. But Scotus says there is a distinction to be made in regard to the *immediacy* of each potency, so that among these potencies there is one which more immediately and more perfectly attains the beatific object than the other. Only one potency in nature most perfectly attains the object, while the total attainment of the other potencies is posterior to and in virtue of that one which most immediately and most perfectly attains the object. This potency Scotus calls *beatitudo naturae* or beatitude taken in its intensive sense. It follows from this that if we take beatitude in its extensive sense, it would consist in as many operations as there are potencies; but if it be taken in its intensive sense, it consists formally and simply in only one operation and in only one potency.³³ Moreover, Scotus says that the beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in one operation only, because only in one operation is nature "sibi simpliciter perfecte bene," so that nothing is lacking to it.³⁴

Both Scotus and St. Thomas agree that the essence of beatitude consists in operation. They disagree, however, as to the faculty in which this essential operation takes place and precisely what constitutes the essence of beatitude. St. Thomas says: "The essence of beatitude consists in an act of the intellect; but the delight that results from beatitude pertains to the will . . . because joy itself is the consummation of beatitude."³⁵ Scotus, on the other hand, holds that the essence of beatitude consists in an act of the will. Our beatitude, or *finis extra*, says Scotus, is that which is simply

³² *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 3, n. 5 (XXI, 80).

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Thomae, S., *Summa theologiae*, cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Medievallium Ottaviensis ad textum S. Pii Pp. V iussu confectum recognita, 5 vols., Ottawa 1941-5, I-II, q. 3, a. 4.

the best or the highest good; and the highest good is that which is to be willed the most. Therefore, among those things which belong to the end, that which is more immediate to the end is willed more. But *to will* is more immediate to the end because it tends immediately to itself as to the ultimate end since the ultimate end is the proper object of the will itself. Thus the highest good or beatitude is the proper object of the will itself. Besides, if beatitude or the *finis extra* is simply the highest to be willed, that is the highest beatitude or *finis intra* which, among intrinsic things, is the highest to be willed, for this is the manner of any willing. The will desires more the perfection of itself in the ultimate end than the perfection of the intellect.³⁶ Furthermore, the act of the will is ordained or ordainable to that end simply which is immediate to itself in relation to those things which pertain to the end, but the act of the intellect is not so ordained, but it is ordainable mediately to the end and hence participates less in the notion of end. Thus “*velle non est propter intelligere, sed converso.*”³⁷

It is true that the beatific object is attained by the intellect and primarily so, that is, by a primacy or priority of generation, because from the nature of things intellection precedes volition. But the attainment of the end is not first by a primacy of perfection or the full and perfect attainment, such as the attainment by the act of the will is. For an act is not more perfect unless it unites with a perfect object; but the act of the will unites to a thing in itself, as it is in itself. The act of the intellect, however, unites only to a thing as the object is in the knower. But the beatific object is simply more noble in itself than it is in the knower. Therefore, the act of the will unites to the beatific object simply under a more noble aspect.³⁸ Likewise, man constituted in *puris naturalibus*, or even a sinner, could see God immediately, if God by His absolute power would show him His essence; but without grace he could not properly enjoy or love the divine essence through the act of the will, as the Blessed do. Therefore, not by an act of the intellect, but only by an act of the will are the Blessed distinguished from the non-

³⁶ Scoti, *Oxon.* IV, d. 49, q. 4, n. 4 (XXI, 97).

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 4 ex latere n. 20 (XXI, 163).

Blessed.³⁹ Thus Scotus holds that beatitude consists essentially in the will, vision being only a previous required condition.

The act of the will in which beatitude consists is simply fruition or the act of the love of friendship for the highest good on account of itself. It is not the act of desire or concupiscence. Scotus says that in general there is only a twofold act of the will, namely, to will and not to will (*velle et nolle*); and the 'velle' is also twofold: either to will on account of the good of what is willed, or, to will on account of the good for the one willing. The former is the love of friendship; the latter is the love of concupiscence. Fruition consists only in the love of friendship, that is, to inhere with love in the beatific object on account of itself.⁴⁰ The will of concupiscence wills the good for the sake of the one willing, whereas the will of friendship wills for God *bene esse* and this act is properly the act of charity.⁴¹

Beatitude then consists essentially in fruition. This fruition is an act elicited by the will, but it does not consist in delight (*delectatio*), so that delight concomitant with the beatific object is not of the essence of beatitude. Beatitude consists essentially in the attainment of the ultimate end or beatific object and this happens by the act of love which is an elicited act. Therefore only this operation or love of God on account of Himself pertains to the essence of beatitude. Conjoined to the perfect act of fruition or love of God on account of Himself, there is delight, but it is consequent upon the act of fruition and accrues to it as its accident. Hence delight or joy (*gaudium*) does not pertain strictly or essentially to beatitude. Joy or delight is essentially a *passio* and no *passio* unites to the beatific object, for this union takes place only by an action or operation.⁴² For this reason by His absolute power God could separate joy from the vision of His essence.⁴³ The same is to be said in regard to the repose (*quietatio*) in the end after it has been attained; for repose in the end is but a perfection accruing to an operation as beauty to a young man.⁴⁴ In this respect Scotus merely points out that beati-

³⁹ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 3, n. 11 (XXI, 91).

⁴⁰ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 5, n. 2 (XXI, 171).

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 7, n. 1-3 (XXI, 271).

⁴³ *Ibid.*, n. 6 (XXI, 302).

⁴⁴ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 4, n. 6 (XXI, 271).

tude considered formally, or according to its essence, consists solely in the attainment of the ultimate end, which takes place formally not through concomitant or subsequent delight, but by operation or love as an elicited act. Also when he speaks of fruition as the essence of beatitude, he takes beatitude in the strict or formal sense. For delight pertains to beatitude in its extensive sense, which is the aggregation of all the goods of the Blessed. The will can be considered twofoldly: in one way as an operative potency and in another way as a receptive potency. As an operative potency it is perfected by an operation which unites it simply and ultimately to the highest good. As a receptive potency the will is perfectible, not by its operation, but by supernatural passions because it is ultimately receptive of such passions and hence it is perfected by delight and joy.⁴⁵

The Act of Fruition of the Blessed is a Free Act

In heaven the Blessed will and love God with a free volition, but such wise that *de facto* it is impossible for them not to love God or that there is at least a necessity *secundum quid* of loving God. There is no doubt that Scotus very often asserts that the created will in heaven remains free notwithstanding the immediate vision of the divine essence. Hence it does not necessarily love God. The will is the proper or elicitive principle of volition, which, according to its formal notion (ratio), is free; hence it cannot be otherwise in heaven than it is in this life. Besides, infused charity of its very nature is essentially the same in heaven as it is on earth. But since it does not formally force the will to love God on earth, neither does it force the will in heaven. Hence there is no necessity of eliciting the act more then as now, so that in the presence of the beatific vision the elevated will does not love (fruitur) necessarily in so far as there is no necessity on the part of the will itself.⁴⁶ In other questions where Scotus teaches the same doctrine, he expressly asserts that the Blessed in heaven, both angel and man, can still sin because it is not necessary that they should love God and by that token they can elicit an opposite sinful act. There would seem to be excessive

⁴⁵ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 7, n. 4 (XXI, 301).

⁴⁶ *Oxon.*, I, d. 1, q. 4, n. 13, 15 (VIII, 367); *Reportata* 1, d. 1, q. 2 (XXII, 56).

indeterminism in this doctrine, but all Scotus wishes to express is that the will in the immediate vision of God is and remains free, and by this fact determines itself, not as some physical agent, but from natural necessity it is moved determinately or moved to an action precisely and immutably determined. Here Scotus intends to remind us that the will in willing observes another order than that which the intellect does in intellection. Hence he asks: whether security pertains to the essence of beatitude. And he shows this in his own doctrine treating of the difference between the action of the intellect and the action of the will.⁴⁷ Thus, although the intellect by natural necessity sees the proportionate object present, the will does not by natural necessity rejoice (fruitur) in the object seen. Thus it is that the immediate vision of God is not *per se* and simply necessary because God immediately reveals His essence contingently and not necessarily. Hence even the will rejoices (fruitur) in God only contingently, since the vision of God on the part of God Himself is only contingent. It is likewise false that the habit of supernatural charity necessitates the will of the Blessed to love. For habit cannot be prior to the cause of the potency's operation. Habit, therefore, does not use potency, but potency uses the habit as an instrument and second cause. But the prior cause is not determined to act nor consequently necessitated by the second cause, but rather conversely.⁴⁸ Therefore, says Scotus, there is no necessity from habit in determining potencies to act. But from the habit of glory there is a necessity *secundum quid* because habit is naturally inclinative. Neither is there such a necessity from charity in the will because the will can freely use charity or not.⁴⁹

The Subtle Doctor therefore grants that the beatified will loves God by a certain necessity and in this respect it cannot sin, provided it does not happen by a natural necessity or in such a way that the will be not now free and unable to determine itself. Thus it is morally impossible for the will not to will beatitude because it most willingly consents to the natural appetite. Not only does the will remain free in heaven, but also the natural appetite of beatitude and it becomes more intense the more clearly and immediately

⁴⁷ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 6, n. 9 (XXI, 187).

⁴⁸ *Oxon.*, I, d. 1, q. 4, n. 13 (VIII, 367).

⁴⁹ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 6, n. 9 (XXI, 187).

the intellect knows that in God there is only good and no defect of good; for greater approximation of the object to the potency makes for a more intense action. It happens that man possesses an instinctive desire for God because he is satisfied only in an infinite object. From this it seems to follow that the will is morally not able not to love God or to cease from loving Him and in this respect it is at least morally, although not physically, impeccable.

In *Collatione* 15 Scotus proposes the question: whether the will informed by charity is able not to will God seen in His essence in heaven. And he replies: four things concur in order to will God seen in His essence in heaven, namely, the continuous manifestation of His presence, the eminence of the object, seen through the essence, the cause of continuous contemplation and the continuous fruition in the will. For by whatever the essence is directed in order to see things in their proper genus, sees God through His essence. This continuous impression is like a weight inclining the will to exercise its act on the object. But this necessity is not one of violence, but of immutability. Thus Scotus expressly teaches that the will in heaven shall remain the same as on earth, that is, free. Nevertheless, it will God necessarily, namely, by a necessity not of coercion or violence, but by spontaneous necessity and by a necessity of immutability, so that *de facto* it cannot not will God. And in order to show how this necessity is compossible with freedom, Scotus furnishes the following example:⁵⁰ if someone voluntarily casts himself down and always in the act of falling continues his willing, he falls necessarily by the necessity of natural gravity; but freely wills the fall. Likewise God, although He necessarily lives by a natural life and this by such a necessity that excludes all liberty, nevertheless He freely wills Himself to live by such a life. Therefore we do not place the life of God under necessity—understanding life as loved by God with free will. So also one who voluntarily casts himself down or falls, does so naturally.⁵¹ It is similar with the love of the Blessed towards God: on the one hand the Blessed freely determines himself to love God because he is free and it is in accordance with free will to determine itself; on the other hand it is so absorbed in the fullness of the

⁵⁰ *Quodl.*, q. 16, n. 18 (XXVI, 201).

⁵¹ *Theorema*, 22, n. 3 (V, 103).

highest good that it cannot not love, but by an elicited act it most willingly follows is natural appetite for God, is ultimate end and beatitude. Whether the will of the Blessed is necessitated to will God by something supernatural, is a question which Scotus leaves undecided.⁵²

In regard to the impeccability of the Blessed, Scotus holds that they do not have physical impeccability such as God enjoys, but he does not deny that they have internal moral impeccability. God alone from the very nature of things is absolutely and entirely impeccable, but the will of the rational creature is mutable and naturally indifferent and free to sin. In heaven it remains physically the same as on earth. Hence it retains the physical, remote or radical potency of sinning. Impeccability can be given only through a supernatural gift; but everything supernatural is a gratuitous gift of God and does not pertain to the nature of the creature. Impeccability is and remains a separable accident just as grace and glory. If God would so will He could reduce the Blessed to the state of pure nature and then certainly they can sin. The Blessed Angel cannot sin unless grace and glory be lost but with its nature remaining.⁵³ Thus the perpetuity of glory is as a free gift of God as glory itself. But no creature can know by its natural reason what depends contingently on the divine will alone and such is the continuation of beatitude already conferred. Hence the only certitude in the intellect of the Blessed is that which is made known to it by revelation from God.⁵⁴ The conclusion of Scotus is then that the perpetuity of beatitude and consequently impeccability do not necessarily follow from the nature or formal notion of beatitude itself nor from the will of the creature nor from supernatural charity, but ultimately depends on the free will of God, who gives beatitude freely and so freely conserves the creature in it. However, Scotus does not intend to state that the free will of the Blessed will ever cease to love God and so sin because *de facto* beatitude is eternal.⁵⁵

⁵² *Quodl.*, q. 16, n. 7 (XXVI, 189).

⁵³ *Reportata*, 3, d. 18, q. 3, n. 16 (XXIII, 400).

⁵⁴ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 6, n. 22 (XXI, 267).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, n. 2 (XXI, 181).

The Beatific Vision in Particular

The Blessed in beholding the divine essence see the three divine Persons, so that it is impossible to see the divine essence without seeing the divine Persons. Nevertheless, by His absolute power God could make it so the Blessed see His divine essence without seeing the Persons or that they see one and or the other Persons but not all three simultaneously.⁵⁶

God or the divine essence in itself is the primary object of vision and other things not divine are the secondary object.⁵⁷ And although the primary and secondary objects are seen in one and the same act, it is within the absolute power of God that the primary object be seen without the secondary object.⁵⁸

Contingent truths, even contingent mysteries of faith such as the Incarnation, transubstantiation, which depend on the free will of God, are not necessarily seen in the Word. Only the principal object of faith is necessarily seen or the truth that God is one and triune.⁵⁹ The vision of contingent truths is not necessary in order that the intellect be simply blessed.⁶⁰

Not all individual things are seen in the Word by vision or intuitive cognition. For the real object or the thing itself as present necessarily concurs in the intuitive cognition of it. In the Word other things are known as having existence, but they cannot be seen there as actually existing because they are not in the same place.⁶¹ St. Peter is certainly in heaven and is seen by the other Blessed, but as actually existing he is not seen intuitively in the Word, because he is not actually in the Word. Not even the soul of Christ sees intuitively all things as actually existing in the Word. Since many objects are not or could not be present to the intellect of Christ according to their actual existence, it could not have intuitive knowledge of them.⁶²

Besides the vision of God, the Blessed can see things in their

⁵⁶ *Oxon.*, I, d. 1, q. 2, n. 9 (VIII, 334).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 6 (VIII, 322).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* (VIII, 323).

⁵⁹ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 10, q. 9, n. 14 (XVII, 294).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, (XVII, 295).

⁶¹ *Oxon.*, II, d. 3, q. 11, n. 12 (XII, 279).

⁶² *Oxon.*, III, d. 14, q. 2, n. 6 (XIV, 527).

proper genus. For, according to St. Augustine "simul stant cognitio rerum in Verbo et cognitio in proprio genere."⁶³ The Blessed also know in the abstract things pertaining to creatures according to their species in the divine essence in so far as they are positive beings and have an idea in God, e.g., the positive punishments of the damned.⁶⁴

Besides supernatural knowledge, the Blessed also enjoy all that natural knowledge which is *per se* accessible to a separated soul. For, according to Scotus, nature is not without its own specific operation. And the human soul is a most perfect form and its proper operation according to the possible intellect is to understand and according to the active intellect to abstract and according to the will to will. Therefore no mode of being can be fitting to the soul according to its nature in which it cannot exercise these operations. But according to its nature it is such that it can have separated being and this is from the perfection of its nature. Therefore in that separated being there can be these operations. But it is possible that the soul has not previously acquired the species of these objects as is evident of the soul of a deceased child. Thus it can acquire them after it is separated.⁶⁵ If for no other reason, says Scotus, than the two principles "*plura non sunt ponenda sine necessitate*" and "*in nulla natura ponendum est, quod derogat ejus dignitati, nisi sit evidens ex aliquo convenienti tali naturae,*" the opinion that the separated soul needs the "*species influxas a Deo vel ab Angelis*" in order to acquire new knowledge or knowledge of something previously unknown, is to be rejected.⁶⁶ Then the Subtle Doctor proposes his own opinion: that the separated soul can acquire knowledge of an object previously unknown and this by abstract knowledge as well as by intuitive knowledge.⁶⁷ For if some object presents itself to the separated soul, e.g., a stone, sufficiently present, all things are present which are required for sufficient abstract knowledge, namely, the active intellect and the object, and these are sufficient active causes for forming intelligible species without the

⁶³ *Ibid.*, q. 3, n. 4 (XIV, 524).

⁶⁴ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 50, q. 3, n. 3 (XXI, 545).

⁶⁵ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 45, q. 2, n. 2 (XX, 279).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 5-6 (XX, 281).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 12 (XX, 304).

phantasm no less than with it. For there is nothing *per se* in the phantasm which suffices to cause an intelligible species.⁶⁸ Thus for Scotus the separated soul, in order to acquire merely natural knowledge, does not need species inspired by God, but immediately without such species as without phantasms it can know all that is intelligible proportionate to itself and proportionately present, even the secrets of hearts and that by a knowledge that is intuitive as well as abstract, but not sensitive knowledge.⁶⁹ The separated soul enjoys a more perfect knowledge both in regard to the manner of acquiring as well as in regard to the object than the soul conjoined to the body in this mortal life.

The Relation of the Beatific Vision and Fruition to the Natural Powers

There is a distinction between the formal fruition and vision of God and the effective fruition and vision of Him. To have fruition or see God formally is purely receptive and passive and it takes place solely by the reception of fruition or vision of the beatific object in the will and intellect of the Blessed. To have fruition or see God effectively, however, is an active operation, so that the potency of the will or intellect is an active cause and it elicits the fruition or volition in respect to the vision. Scotus says: "*Quod animam posse summe frui, potest intelligi dupliciter, vel formaliter vel effective, hoc est vel quod summa fruitio informet istam voluntatem, a quocumque causetur, vel quod ipsa voluntas eliciat summam fruitionem et sit causa activa respectu ejus.*"⁷⁰

Human nature "*ex puris naturalibus*" is the immediate receptacle of beatitude.⁷¹ If human nature could not be beatified immediately in itself, but only through a habit or by something accidental and superadded to it, the habit would be beatified *simpliciter* and the nature only *secundum quid*; then the habit (or light) sees God and charity loves God and not the human soul except accidentally and *secundum quid*.⁷² Besides, beatitude consists in operation—in the

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 45, q. 4, n. 2 (XX, 376); IV, d. 45, q. 1, ad 3 (XX, 272).

⁷⁰ *Oxon.*, III, d. 13, q. 4, n. 18 (XIV, 475).

⁷¹ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 11, n. 8 (XXI, 404).

⁷² *Ibid.*

act of the intellect or will; but an act is received in the potency not in the habit because the potency of the intellect and will, not the habit, sees and loves.

The human soul is not sufficiently active "ex puris naturalibus" to attain the act of vision because it is impossible that the intellect be the cause of vision unless it has in itself the object known or something else in which it is more eminently contained. But human nature does not possess God in Himself and of Himself present to it under the notion of the object nor in something else in which it is more eminently contained.⁷³ Thus God must reveal or manifest His essence immediately.

Some supernatural habit is not necessary in the Blessed for the sole reception of beatitude, but only for the effective co-operation in causing beatitude or for active vision and fruition. From this it follows that in the Blessed there will be nothing supernatural prior to the operations of the intellect and will. But if something supernatural is placed in the Blessed prior to these operations, this will not be for the sake of reception of beatitude, but for the sake of action, so that the operation in the Blessed be elicited by which he attains God.⁷⁴ But if the intellect be merely passive, being only as a receptacle for the act of vision, then the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*) is not required, since some form on the part of the intellect is not required for the sole sake of reception. Also, if the will be merely passive potency in respect to fruition, then on the part of the will charity is not required.⁷⁵ It is necessary at least to posit charity for the sake of eliciting operation and consequently the will can elicit some operation with charity which it cannot elicit so intensely without it. And thus it is clear that man can have some operation of beatitude which he cannot have "ex puris naturalibus."⁷⁶

The light of glory seems less necessary for seeing God, but Scotus in no way intends to reject it. He holds that whoever considers the will as merely passive in respect to fruition, does away with charity because some form is not required for the reception of fruition on the part of the will and it is according to itself most highly disposed

⁷³ *Ibid.*, n. 9 (XXI, 417).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, n. 10 (XXI, 418).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

to receive it. But on account of Scripture and faith we have to posit charity and it is at least necessary to posit it in the Blessed for the sake of eliciting an operation. But the light of glory does not seem to be necessary, because what is said of natural corporeal light, namely that it is required not only on account of the object but also for the eye, seems to be some kind of a metaphor. For the greater the object is the more light is in it and the less light is required on account of it.⁷⁷ Hence the light of glory does not seem to be necessary in order that the object become clearer because the beatific object, the essence of God, is most clear in itself. However, in this question Scotus does not reject the light of glory. He says: "Si intellectus sit mere passivus, habens se solum in ratione susceptivi ad actum visionis . . . tunc non requiritur lumen gloriæ."⁷⁸ But as we have already observed, according to him the intellect is not merely passive but also active. This makes it sufficiently clear that he holds the light of glory to be necessary in fact. Moreover, it is evident from many other places that Scotus did not intend absolutely to repudiate the light of glory. "Aliud et aliud est lumen hic et ibi, et ideo actus sunt diversi specie."⁷⁹ "Dico, quod sicut habens lumen gloriæ et charitatem consummatum non potest peccare."⁸⁰ Nam "habitus charitatis et lumen gloriæ bene inclinaret semper ad non peccandum."⁸¹ "Et si arguitur, quod sine habitu informante potest esse visio perfecta, ergo et fructio perfectissima, respondeo: nullus negat communiter in gloria habitum luminis gloriæ in intellectu. Et iste ex parte intellectus potest poni correspondere charitati ex parte voluntatis."⁸²

By the absolute power of God man in this mortal life can attain at least essential beatitude although not complete beatitude. There is nothing on the part of God that would be repugnant; for God, if He wills, can immediately manifest His essence in this life. If some previous disposition is required, as the light of glory, He can grant it now as in heaven. There is nothing repugnant on the part of man:

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 12, n. 6 (XXI, 442).

⁸⁰ *Oxon.*, III, d. 2, q. 1, n. 12 (XIV, 122).

⁸¹ *Reportata*, 4, d. 49, q. 5, n. 12 (XXIV, 646).

⁸² *Oxon.*, I, d. 17, q. 3, n. 36 (X, 99).

for man as such is capable of beatitude. Mortality cannot be a formal repugnance to it, otherwise the mortal soul of Christ could not have enjoyed the beatific vision. There is only a virtual repugnance in regard to the effects because beatitude of soul also redounds to the body. Hence it would be a miracle if the soul sees and enjoys the essence of God while the body would remain mortal, passible, etc. But by God's absolute power such beatitude could be, because essentially or in the most strict sense, it contains only the immediate vision and fruition of God in Himself.⁸³

⁸³ *Oxon.*, IV, d. 49, q. 12 (XXI, 439).

DISCUSSION

GEOFFREY BRIDGES, O.F.M.:—Fr. Cyril has raised some provocative questions in his paper. It is due to the fact that he has taken a new look at the principles and methods involved in the writing of theological textbooks. No one will dispute that the textbooks are in need of more than new editions and new translations. Perhaps the present discussion can help Fr. Cyril arrive at a completely new and refreshing look at what has been for students one of the “drier” tracts in theology.

Fr. Cyril squared off first against the “overpowering” of theology by philosophy. It is true that in many texts a large amount of space is devoted to questions normally treated in the so-called natural theology. But actually there are more authors than I had anticipated who have adhered more closely to the theological approach. Out of seven tracts on *De Deo Uno* picked at random, I found that only two went into a detailed discussion of the “Five Ways.” These same two showed throughout the tract the same propensity to delve extensively into philosophical problems, while the others clung more to the restraint advocated by Fr. Cyril.

In this matter I would suggest a middle of the road policy—and here I have in mind a textbook by Franciscans giving a Franciscan approach. Would it not be practical to include as scholia, or even in small print if you wish, any specifically Franciscan contributions which are of a purely philosophical nature; for instance, an indication that the “Five Ways” and most other proofs for the existence of God are not demonstrations in the Aristotelian-scholastic sense of the term, together with some Franciscan attempts at a genuine demonstration? It would be a review for most Franciscan students (which is not a bad thing) and an education for non-Franciscan readers.

The second problem raised by Fr. Cyril concerns reason and philosophical systems. I believe that he is raising a warning voice against the forcing of theology into a mold or system determined by one’s particular system of philosophy—a systematic overpowering of theology by philosophy. It is a point well made. However, it is not possible—and Fr. Cyril has indicated this clearly, too—to avoid one’s philosophical system when reason enters legitimately into a theological discussion. As soon as the theologian using reason attempts to employ specific concepts, he must understand these concepts in terms of a system. For example, in discussing God as an “unchangeable spiritual substance,” mentioned by the Vatican Council, the theologian will understand substance in terms of the system in which he was trained. If he makes a conscious effort not to understand it so, but to re-think the problem, he is beginning the development of a new system of philosophy. I stress this point, because there may be some who would suggest that in the writing of the theological synthesis a conscious effort be made to avoid any specific philosophical system and to use only reason. When the writer of the tract on the Triune God discusses the distinction between the Divine Persons and between the Divinity and the Persons, he must accept the kinds of distinction of his personal system of philosophy—or he must work out a new system. A system cannot be avoided. Preferably, in the present instance, this system should be Franciscan. A certain amount of leeway, however, must be conceded to the writer. The synthesis cannot be a compendium of unanimous opinions of all present-day Franciscans.

On this point, however, I would again advocate a middle course. Ordinarily a theologian's "philosophy" enters into the development of the finer points of theology, e.g., after treating the attributes of God it is a finer precision to decide what kind of distinction there is between the attributes. Here I think the primacy should be given to the more purely theological development, and that the precisions be handled in corollaries, which can be treated more or less extensively at the discretion of the professor.

On the problem of the approach to the attributes of God, I would like to mention just briefly that though conceivably a theologian's "philosophy" could influence him in his arrangement of the attributes, actually it would seem that from St. Thomas down to the present the determining factor has been "reason," as Fr. Cyril used the term. It seems that, since St. Thomas wished to treat of the attributes in an orderly fashion, he asked himself: what is a reasonable and convenient arrangement? He decided to take up first the essential attributes and later the operational attributes. With one exception, the texts I consulted adopted this division, though some authors used other terms, such as the quiescent and the active attributes.

With all due reverence for the Council of the Vatican, since there is no apparent order in the attributes it enumerates and since theology is a science of orderly conclusions, I would advocate following the traditional approach.

I most heartily endorse Fr. Cyril's plea for a theology with some flesh and bone and spirit to it. It is unfortunate that modern textbooks are still influenced by the Reformation. It should be possible to develop theology as a science, with orderly conclusions and solid arguments, without adopting the apologetic method. Relegate the errors to fine print, give the arguments, in so far as they are formally arguments, a secondary position, and develop the full meaning and implications of the doctrine on hand. The purpose of the theology courses in our seminaries is to educate and to inspire the students much more than to arm them for bouts with heretics.

In conclusion, I devoutly hope and pray that Fr. Cyril will receive the inspiration to develop his text along the Scotistic lines he has indicated. In fact, I will retract my recommendation that the attributes be treated in the traditional way, if he can find a way to order them around divine love and goodness.

DISCUSSION

EUGENE KUBINA, T.O.R.:—St. Anthony of Padua is considered the first teacher of the Franciscan school of theology. St. Francis himself gave Anthony this commission: "I command thee to teach theology, but in such a way that the spirit of prayer and piety be not relaxed." We may assume that he taught the friars in the same simple and forceful manner, and with the same deep comprehension of Sacred Scripture, which characterized his sermons. Anthony did not write a commentary on Peter of Lombard, as was customary for most medieval theologians; nor did he compile a *Summa* as did St. Thomas Aquinas. However, his sermons, in which he expounded the theological and mystical content of Sacred Scripture, have become, in a sense, a textbook of moral and dogmatic theology. In them we find the fundamentals of every theological tract. The Saint himself says: "Theology is the science of Sacred Scripture."

The sermons of St. Anthony demonstrate depth, industry, and seraphic spirit. His style of writing and his constant use of Scripture clearly identify

him. He not only interprets scriptural texts, but he substantiates his doctrine by drawing on the moral, mystical, and ascetical works of the Fathers and the Victorines. The Saint does not particularly indulge in fanciful or oratorical flights. His sermons were written to act as a manual for preachers, so he did not glory in the speculative by making numerous distinctions and subdistinctions. Although he made use of many oratorical devices, he kept in mind the admonition of the Seraphic Father St. Francis, to be effective rather than speculative, practical rather than critical. His sermons are a rich source of biblical, patristic, and theological knowledge, making him an eloquent orator and the first lector of the Franciscan school of theology.

Father Diomede Scaramuzzi's book, *La Figura Intellettuale di S. Antonio di Padova*, is a concise course on the dogmatic and moral theology expounded by the Saint in his sermons. This book was included in the process of the Sacred Congregation of Rites declaring St. Anthony a Doctor of the Universal Church. The brief summary of St. Anthony's teachings about the doctrine of grace contained in this paper is drawn to a large extent from Father Scaramuzzi's analysis.

Paraphrasing the words found in St. John, 15:5, "Without Me you can do nothing," St. Anthony affirms in general the necessity of grace. Without God we are able to do or to have nothing; furthermore, we are not able to preserve habits. Even after grace it is necessary for the Lord to be with us and to preserve us in that which He alone can give. The *Summa* of Alexander of Hales always recognized a grace distinct from actual grace, and it seems to be the first Scholastic work to call it habitual grace. Alexander's *Summa* describes this grace as a gift from God, one that is not the result of another grace, a grace that cannot be preserved unless God be with us. So he condemned such errors as naturalism and semi-pelagianism.

Before any good work can be done, two things are necessary: namely, wisdom and power (virtues). By wisdom one is disposed to do a work, and by power this work is completed. St. Anthony describes the soul of a just person as a throne where Jesus Christ, the wisdom and the power of God, may repose. Jesus Christ, by His wisdom, brought this soul into existence, and then by His power He re-created it after the Fall. When Christ, the king of kings, reigns in the soul by His grace, He destroys every evil of the world, the flesh, and the devil. Here the Evangelical Doctor affirms that Christ is the meritorious cause of all graces that come to us from God. The Saint speaks of wisdom and power given by Christ, signifying with St. Augustine that justifying grace brings with it sanctifying grace, a fundamentally supernatural gift, the full rectitude of the spirit under the influence of divine inspiration, and of the accompanying virtues, but without total perfection. Augustine recognized this supernatural inspiration as one of the special gifts lost by sin.

St. Anthony mentions several effects that grace has upon the soul. First of all, every work performed in the state of grace is referred to the donor of grace to Whom is all honor and glory. He calls grace "the light of God's countenance upon us" (Ps. 4:7). The grace of justification is the light from the countenance of God. It is the reproduction of the image of God in us. The soul of man is signed with grace just as a coin is signed with the image of the king. When Our Lord said: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's," (Matt. 22:21) it is as if He were saying: "As you give to Caesar the coin that is stamped with his image, so return to God the soul that has been illumined and signed with the light of His countenance."

Grace nourishes the virtue of penance in so far as it removes one from carnal concupiscence and worldly vanity. To explain this point more clearly St. Anthony gives us the example of a mother who wishes to break her child of breast-feeding. The mother will rub her breasts with a bitter ointment, and the child, seeking sweetness, finds instead bitterness. The Holy Spirit, acting in the spiritual realm, gives a certain bitterness to the temporal vanities of this world. When a man goes to seek sweetness from the pleasures of the world, he finds also a mixture of bitterness, and then, aided by grace, he learns to abhor this bitter-sweet mixture, and turns instead to the true and perfect sweetness of divine things. In speaking of this effect of grace St. Anthony uses the terms *prevenient* and *subsequent* grace, and it is interesting to note that he is perhaps the first of the scholastics to make this particular distinction.

Another effect of divine grace is the mystical marriage of the soul with the Holy Spirit. In this marriage the bride of conscience is adorned with good thoughts that are disposed in proper order; the symphony of the senses are moderated by the hand of discretion; in this marriage there is exultation and rejoicing because of God's kindness. The Introit for the second Sunday after Pentecost tells us of the marriage song for this occasion: "All the earth adores Thee, O Lord, and sings to Thee, addressing a psalm to Thy name." Then, according to their progress in the spiritual life, St. Anthony divides the people of the world into four groups. Those from the East are the beginners since they resemble the first faint rays of the rising sun. Those from the southern part are the proficient because they glow like the midday sun. Those from the West are the perfect since they resemble the completion of the sun's cycle. Finally, the northern part represents those good Catholic people living in the state of matrimony, who, although possessing the material things of this world, bear with patience all the tribulations and sorrows of their state. The spouse of the soul is the Holy Spirit, and so long as He unites Himself with the soul, He makes it chaste and fertile, chaste with purity of mind, and fertile with good works. Such a soul united in marriage with the Holy Spirit is like the sheep mentioned in the Canticle (4:2): "All bearing twins," that is, the twins of love, or the good works that are proper to the active and the contemplative life.

St. Paul says that our conversation is in heaven (Phil. 3:20). Grace, since it seeks to establish penance in the flesh, helps us to reach for heaven even while we are still standing upon earth. It strives to make our conversation the conversation of heavenly things.

Man, while he is in mortal sin, is nothing, because God, who truly is, is not in him through grace. Augustine tells us that a man can gain nothing when he is in the state of sin. However, when a man is converted to heaven and grace returns, then there is created in him a new creature, a pure conscience. The old man with his former actions and sensual conversation passes away, and we have instead a new man, a man who no longer lives for himself but for Christ. The total and complete renovation of the interior and the exterior man is the effect of grace. Only sin can destroy or ruin this renovation. Grace is the formal principle of the supernatural life and of all sanctity. The Holy Spirit, He who is breathed from the Father and the Son into the hearts of the saints, is the One who sanctifies us so that we might merit to be saints. As the human spirit is the life of the corporeal body, so the Holy Ghost is the life of our supernatural existence. The former life produces sensation, while the latter life produces sanctity.

St. Anthony is careful to make the distinction between grace and the person of the Holy Ghost. Although following Peter Lombard in many things, he does not follow his unique opinion that grace is not a created gift but is the Holy Ghost Himself. The other scholastics, like St. Bonaventure, quickly rejected this opinion. St. Anthony admits that the Holy Ghost is the means by which a man is sanctified but not the sanctity or the justification itself.

Speaking of the gratuity of grace, the Evangelical Doctor tells us that the Holy Spirit gives grace as He wishes, when He wishes, in the manner He wishes, and in the degree that He wishes. In Osee, 14:5, the Lord says: "I shall love them freely," which means that it is not because of preceding merits that God distributes His grace but only because of His kindness. On this point Anthony quotes St. Bernard who says that sometimes the disposition of prayer and good intention are lacking in a particular person, yet grace reaches out to him although he does not seek it. The grace of God often seeks those who do not seek Him.

Grace puts an end to sin. It is the light that dispels the shadows of sin in the blind mind of a sinner. If something is poured into a container that is already full, that which is poured in is lost. So it is with a soul that is in the state of grace; there is no room for the uncleanness of sin. Grace occupies the whole soul, and there is no space or corner left for anything that is contrary to grace. The grace of God is so abundant and powerful that when a soul drinks of it, the family of the soul, that is, the emotions and the senses, also benefit. The emotions and the senses work for the common good of the soul. Grace is like the seven loaves of bread with which Christ satisfied the multitude. It is given freely to saints and to sinners, to the wise and to the simple.

Even though grace comes to us for the giving, we are helpers in guarding it. Grace does not watch over us unless we also watch over it. Grace even seems to demand this vigilance, and Our Lord found it necessary to remind the Apostles: "Could you not watch one hour with Me? Watch and pray that you enter not into temptation." (Matt. 26:40-41) By hardness of heart one is able to repel and reject the inspirations and visitations of divine grace. The justification of a man is a twofold operation, namely, divine inspirations and his own deliberation. The Creator cooperates with His creature, and in the work of justification the assent of the will is a necessary and essential element. Isaias (1:9) reminds us of this fact: "If you will wish and hear Me, you will eat the goods of the earth." However, any impeding of the work of justification must be ascribed to free will. If we are willing to do nothing towards this work, then we implore God's help in vain; we would be false to call upon Him for aid. Justification is a twofold process—that of mutual cooperation. When we pray with the Psalmist: "You are my liberator and my helper, O Lord do not delay," then it is understood that to have Him as a helper we must be cooperators.

Free will, without the support of grace, cannot accomplish the work of justification. If free will alone were sufficient, then only *to wish* to be just would be *to be* just. Merely to have a right will does not make one just or unjust. If such were the case, we could make ourselves either way simply by willing it. Here St. Anthony anticipates the answers to certain Protestant errors concerning grace. Neither an angel nor a devil is able to force free will. Neither does God wish to apply force. However, God does desire to gather us to Himself in unity, and to accomplish this we ought to offer ourselves freely to Him.

In his explanation of the relationship between grace and free will, St. An-

thony shows himself to be a learned and a careful theologian. This Franciscan Doctor avoids the theological controversy about the efficacy of grace. His paramount aim was to explain briefly and exactly the fundamental premises of the Catholic doctrine on grace, namely, that grace is necessary, and that the human will always enjoys free choice. He preached effectively against the heretics of his time who denied either of these two truths.

St. Anthony further explained the freedom of the will in a sermon on the feast of the Annunciation. The Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin Mary and filled her with the gift of graces. However, the Incarnate Word awaited her consent before He took up His abode within her. No one is able to receive God into his soul except through consent of the will. Whatever is in the soul without consent is not able to justify a man. A good will, inspired with divine grace, is able to conceive and produce good works. Through the practice of devotion a good will is able to advance. Furthermore, every good work has three characteristics: swiftness, charity, and finality. First, we must be swift to perform good works, because delay courts danger. What you do, do quickly. Secondly, when we provide charitably for a neighbor, we store up merit for ourselves. Thirdly, the final cause of every good work is the glory of God and the salvation of souls.

FRANCISCAN EDUCATIONAL CONFERENCE

FIRST SESSION

Tuesday, August 20, 7:30 P. M.

The Thirty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference was formally opened with a prayer to the Holy Spirit by Very Rev. Gerald Walker, O.F.C.Cap., the Provincial of the Province of St. Joseph. Fr. Gerald thanked the delegates for honoring the Capuchins of his province who are celebrating their centennial in America. Encouraging the friars to practice Franciscan fraternal love, he prayerfully wished the assembly God's blessing and guidance in their meetings.

Fr. Cyprian Abler, O.F.M.Cap., the local superior, in his words of welcome remarked that "this is the F.E.C. meeting to be held in a retreat house." The delegates were given a brief history of the new retreat center by Fr. Cyprian, who concluded his talk by offering all of the hospitality possible to the visiting friars. The words of welcome of both the Provincial and the local superior were dutifully acknowledged by the President, Fr. Maurice Grajewski, O.F.M.

The academic portion of the first session was presided over by the Vice-President, Fr. Aidan Carr, O.F.M.Conv. In the first paper, entitled *The Concept of Franciscan Theology*, Rev. Maurice Grajewski, O.F.M., discussed the need to stress the Franciscan approach to sacred theology. He also pointed out the various contributions of the Franciscans to the history and development of theology.

SECOND SESSION

Wednesday, August 21, 9:00 A. M.

Following the opening prayer, the President announced the time of the meetings for the Executive Board, the Resolutions Committee and the Publicity Committee. A paper on *The One and Triune God* was delivered by Rev. Cyril Shircel, O.F.M. Fr. Cyril declared: "Revelation and theology are destined to make known to us the loveliness of God, who is our end and goal. In this approach, theology is not dry intellectual speculation, but becomes truly inspirational." Fr. Dominic Unger, O.F.M.Cap., read a paper on *The Final Cause*

of the *Incarnation* in which he set forth the common view of the Franciscan school since Duns Scotus that in the present economy of salvation God willed Christ first among all the beings of the universe, and that consequently the existence of Christ is not conditioned by any creature or by man's need of redemption from sin.

THIRD SESSION

Wednesday, 2:00 P. M.

Fr. Maurice, the President, announced that a picture of the group would be taken later in the afternoon, and that the Synthesis Committee and the Library Section would meet in the evening. Three papers were then read: *The Predestination of Our Lady in the Franciscan School* by Fr. Kilian Lynch, O.F.M.; *The Concept of Original Justice according to St. Bonaventure* by Fr. Berard Marthaler, O.F.M.Conv.; *The Infused Virtues according to the Franciscan School* by Fr. Aidan Mullaney, T.O.R.

Fr. Kilian showed that the Blessed Mother was chosen in the divine plans before all creatures as the Virgin Mother, and that all her other privileges and titles follow from this divine choice of her as the first predestined one. In commenting on the final paper of the session, Fr. Leonard Paskert, O.F.M., called attention to the pastoral implications of the Franciscan teaching that emphasizes the supereminence of the infused virtue of charity.

FOURTH SESSION

Thursday, August 22, 9:00 A. M.

Two papers were given at this session. Fr. Ernest Latko, O.F.M., dealt with *The Franciscan Contribution to the Theology of the Sacraments*. "The contributions of the many Franciscan writers in this field," Fr. Ernest declared, "have been monumental." He quoted many passages illustrating this statement from the great medieval Franciscan doctors, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and Duns Scotus.

Fr. Juniper Cummings, O.F.M.Conv., developed the Franciscan approach to the doctrine of grace under the title, *The Theology of Love—A Study in Grace*. Fr. Juniper pointed out the wealth of Franciscana on the subject of divine grace and many other theological subjects available in this country, especially at St. Bonaventure

University. The morning session adjourned with an announcement from the chair that the Resolutions Committee would have a special meeting after lunch.

FIFTH SESSION

Thursday, 1:30 P. M.

The final session consisted of the reading of two papers followed by the annual business meeting. The first of the two papers, *The Treatment of the Mystical Body*, was presented by Fr. Gregory Grabka, O.F.M.Conv. Fr. Gregory stated: "God pre-ordained the Mystical Body of Christ. The entire economy regarding creation is centered in the Whole Christ, Christ the Head and the Church, His Body. To separate Christ from the Church, or the Church from Christ, in the divine place, is to do away with the mystery of the Incarnation; it is to dissolve the unity which was God's purpose in creation."

The last paper, *The Last Things: The Return of Man to God*, was read by Fr. Germain Williams, O.F.M.Conv., who pointed out how the primacy of love, characteristic of the Franciscan teachers, reaches a climax in the teaching of the Franciscan School on the nature of man's eternal beatitude.

After the presentation of the ten papers, the scholars settled down to the mundane work of the business meeting. Fr. Maurice, the President, announced that Very Rev. Thomas Plassmann, O.F.M., had been named *President Emeritus* of the F.E.C., and that Fr. Vincent Dieckmann, O.F.M., was appointed for a three year term as Commissioner of the F.E.C.

Following a plea by the Secretary that papers be handed in promptly, the following report of the Treasurer was read:

Receipts

Deposited in Bank (August 4, 1956)	\$ 952.39
Contributions from Prov. and Commiss. (dep.).....	825.00
Contributions received (not deposited)	225.00
Deposit made on Sept. 4, 1956 (gift)	20.00
Interest received (Nov. and May 1956/7)	15.52
Sales of FEC (Fr. Sebastian Miklas)	300.00
Sales from Franciscan Herald Press (1956)	947.24

<i>Total Receipts</i>	<u>\$3,285.15</u>
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Expenses

Shipping FEC Stock (1955 Report)	\$ 73.00
Printing 1955 FEC Report	1,886.41
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<i>Total Expenses</i>	\$1,959.41
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Balance on hand, August 20, 1957	\$1,325.74
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The Library Section reported the progress made on the various projects it has undertaken. The list of Franciscan Subject Headings has been completed and will soon be made available. The Section is sponsoring an indexing of the Reports of the FEC and the Franciscan Studies. It also proposed to inaugurate a review service for Franciscan librarians on works dealing with Franciscan subjects. Fr. Vincent Dieckmann, O.F.M., was elected chairman for the new term.

Fr. Cyril Shircel, O.F.M., reporting for the Synthesis Commission, thanked the F.E.C. for the opportunity of presenting the Commission's ideas before the group. "The present convention," he said, "represents the work of the members of the Commission." Fr. Roger Matzerath, S.A., then read the resolutions, which were accepted as read. A committee under the direction of Fr. Juniper Cummings, O.F.M.Conv., was set up to establish a Commission for a Moral Synthesis.

The delegates were invited to hold the next year's Conference at St. Bonaventure University. Several topics were offered as themes for the 1958 Meeting including: Synthesis of St. Bonaventure, Philosophy, Gathering and Translating Franciscan Sources, and The Seminary's Fifth Year.

By acclamation the following were re-elected as Officers of the Franciscan Educational Conference: *President*, Fr. Maurice Grajewski, O.F.M.; *Vice-President*, Fr. Aidan Carr, O.F.M.Conv.; *Secretary*, Fr. Sebastian F. Miklas, O.F.M.Cap.; *Treasurer*, Fr. Irenaeus Herscher, O.F.M.

Fr. Maurice, the President, fittingly closed the 1957 F.E.C. Meeting by thanking the Capuchin hosts for their hospitality saying: "The Franciscan Educational Conference and its delegates felt deeply honored to be part of the centennial celebration commemorating the coming of the Capuchins to America in October, 1857. After expressing gratitude to the delegates, writers, discussants and officers, the President intoned the *Te Deum*.

RESOLUTIONS OF THE FRANCISCAN EDUCATIONAL CONFERENCE

The Committee on Resolutions of the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference respectfully submits the following resolutions:

1. *Whereas*, the Franciscan Educational Conference is unanimous in its recognition of the Franciscan hospitality offered the visiting delegates at Our Lady Queen of Angels Retreat House in Saginaw, Michigan, *be it resolved* that we give a hearty vote of thanks to the Very Reverend Provincial of the St. Joseph Capuchin Province, Very Rev. Gerald Walker, O.F.M.Cap.; to the Very Rev. Superior, Father Cyprian Abler, O.F.M.Cap.; and to all of the friars of the local community.

2. *Whereas*, the Friars Minor Capuchin of the Province of St. Joseph are commemorating the centenary of their foundation and celebrating the completion of one hundred years of apostolic and seraphic achievement, *be it resolved* that the Franciscan Educational Conference joyfully take this occasion to extend hearty congratulations and good wishes.

3. *Whereas*, this year's conference discussed sympathetically and enthusiastically a dogmatic theology according to Franciscan masters by representative members of the Franciscan family, *be it resolved* that the Franciscan Educational Conference continue to sponsor, promote, and encourage research and study leading toward an early publication of a handbook of dogmatic theology.

4. *Whereas*, in our day Franciscan and other sisterhoods, as well as the laity, realize the need for theology, *be it resolved* that the Franciscan Educational Conference sponsor and promote an adaptation of the above-mentioned dogmatic theology to meet this demand.

5. *Whereas*, a great wealth of theological doctrine is to be found in the extensive commentaries produced during the golden age of the Franciscan School, *be it resolved* that the Friars be encouraged and exhorted to revise and reprint these works in order to better enhance the integration of past and present Franciscan scholarship.

6. *Whereas*, a fruitful source of theological development is to be found in scientific monographs, *be it resolved* that the Franciscan Educational Conference encourage and urge that Friars studying for their doctorate in theology choose thesis topics on Franciscan subjects.

7. *Whereas*, Father Marianus Miller has done a great service to the cause of a Franciscan synthesis by the publication of the first of his projected twenty-one volume work on theology, *be it resolved* that the Franciscan Educational Conference congratulate him and offer its fraternal best wishes that he bring his series to an early felicitous completion.

8. *Whereas*, beginning on October 4, 1957, the Friars of St. Bonaventure University are to commemorate a century of educational endeavors, *be it resolved* that the Franciscan Educational Conference offer felicitations and congratulations to this great Franciscan institution and its personnel on the happy occasion.

9. *Whereas*, the Very Reverend Thomas Plassmann, O.F.M., occupies a special relationship to the Franciscan Educational Conference because of his long and faithful service, *be it resolved* that he be unanimously accepted as President Emeritus of the Franciscan Educational Conference.

FRANCISCAN TEACHING SISTERHOODS

Nov. 29, 1957—Milwaukee, Wis.

The sixth National Meeting of the Franciscan Teaching Sisterhoods opened fittingly on the feastday of all Saints of the Franciscan Order with a High Mass and a sermon. We were told at this time of the importance of the Franciscan approach to Theology with its Christocentric emphasis and its Mariology. This approach, the keynote of this meeting, was proposed as an answer to contemporary educational and social problems. We were reminded of the theological commission, the members of which are synthesizing and systematizing the Franciscan deposit for use in the education of seminarians and Sisters who follow the Rule of St. Francis.

During the conferences and discussion periods the following aspects of Franciscan theology and its applications to our life as religious teachers were discussed:

The two disciplines, philosophy and theology, are best kept distinct as far as this is possible in order to avoid confusion and error. This was illustrated in the light of the study of God, both as One and as Triune.

Earlier theologians confined themselves to discussion on God's activity within the Trinity. Blessed Duns Scotus discussed activity of the Trinity *ad extra*, outside itself. Franciscan synthesis will rest upon the authority of reason rather than upon the personal authority of St. Bonaventure.

The absolute and universal primacy of Christ in creation was predestined by God for His glory. Since God acts in an intelligent manner, creation followed a hierarchy of order—Mary, the angels, man, and lesser creatures. It is well to keep distinct from this problem the hypothetical problem of sin in the plan of the Incarnation. In the Franciscan tradition the Incarnation is altogether different from the fall.

The richness of Franciscan Mariology was brought to us in the description of the development of one phase, Mary's predestination. If man had not sinned, the Blessed Virgin would still have been the Mother of God. Her origins were represented in Sacred Scripture as are the origins of Christ. The "Living Ark of Divinity" was pre-

destined to a special dignity which transcends that of all creation and comes first after Christ in grace and glory.

A survey summary of the Franciscan theology of the Sacraments was presented, as well as the efforts of Franciscan scholars in the historical development of sacramental history.

A life that is completely Franciscan must be Christocentric. The truly Christocentric life is founded on love and leads to ever greater Love. In a conference on the Theology of love we heard discussed God's gratuitous gift to us, His Love that does more than is necessary for His creatures. All creation is a gift of God, but Grace, His higher love-gift, is a special effect of God's love which gives us the wherewithal to be able to merit eternal reward.

Beatitude was discussed first as to its nature—that is, in what it consists and how it operates; secondly in its effects both in itself and what it does.

Finally much of our discussion combined the conference matter with a basic interest of the audience, namely Franciscan Theology for Sisters. Discussed were the requirements as they vary for the seminarian and the Sister. Descriptions were given of the existing Franciscan Theological schools for Sisters, their progress and their problems.

An important phase of the discussion dealt with the need of a Theology designed for the religious, first as a *woman* to open wide to her the meaning of the spiritual maternity to which her vow of Chastity dedicates her; secondly as a *Sister* to guide her in the spiritual life that is hers by reason of her state of life; thirdly as a *Franciscan* that her apostolate may become truly Christocentric.

The meeting, at its close, was graced by a brief message from His Excellency, our Archbishop. Two thoughts stressed in the message were these: 1) Teachers and students of theology must keep their hand on the pulse of the Church; for the Church, guided by the Holy Spirit, keeps her hand on the pulse of the times. 2) In the study of theology, the modern trend is toward *Christocentrism*, and Franciscans might well rejoice, for that trend is characteristic of the Franciscan Spirit.

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